A POLITICAL HISTORY OF MUNHUMUTAPA

c 1400-1902

S.I.G. Mudenge

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S.I.G. MUDENGE
Chirungurira House,
Borrowdale,
HARARE

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Abbreviations

AHU	Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino
anon.	anonymous
APO	*Arquivo Português Oriental*
av.	avulsos
BNL	Biblioteca National de Lisboa
BS	*Bantu Studies*
c.	circa
Cód.	Códice
CX.	Caixa
doc.	documento
DPMAC	*Documentos sobre os Portugueses em Moçambique e na África Central 1497–1840*
DRdI	Documentos Remitidos da Índia
ed.	edition, editor, edited
fl.	folio, folha
Hist. Mss. Colln.	Historical Manuscripts Collection
ibid.	ibidem
Itern. Journ. Afric. Hist. Stud.	*The International Journal of African Historical Studies*
IdFdS XVIII	*Inventário do Fundo do Século XVIII*
JAH	*Journal of African History*
LM	Livro das Monções
Moç.	Moçambique
NADA	*Southern Rhodesia Native Affairs Department Annual*
op. cit.	opere citato
Rhod. Hist.	*Rhodesian History*
RSEA	*Records of South-Eastern Africa*
S. Afr. Archaeol. Bull.	*South African Archaeological Bulletin*
sd.	sem data (no date)
trans.	translation, translator, translated

Glossary

ALFERES — sub-lieutenant.

ALMADIA — a dug-out canoe.

AMBUYA — title given to the Munhumutapa's major-domo or steward before the eighteenth century.

ANGOMA — see *ngoma.*

ARINGA — large fortified stockade.

ARRATEL — weight of about one pound (16oz) or 0.459 kg.

ARROBA — weight of 32 pounds (lb) or 14½ kg.

BAIRAÇOENS — see *bairado.*

BAIRADO — origin unknown; possibly from the Shona word *kubayira (mubayiro),* i.e. to reward (wage). Used in the documents to refer to goods given by the Portuguese to envoys of African rulers in return for the presents they brought to the Portuguese from their masters and in consideration of that service.

BANDADZI — servant; domestic slave; personal attendant (man or woman). Same as *bandazio.*

BANDAZIO — Portuguese rendering of *bandadzi.*

BANDO — decree; proclamation.

BAR — (i) a weight which varied between about 518 to 650 pounds (230 to 290 kgs.) made up of between 16 to 20 arrobas.
(ii) a bale of cloth containing 400 *panos*
or
(iii) any place or settlement where gold is mined.

BAZAAR — market-place (Persian origin). See also *vashambadzi.*

BERTANGIL — a cotton cloth, usually blue, red or black, made in Cambay.

BINGA — the royal court of the rulers of Manyika Kingdom; Chief's enclosure in his own village.

BOCA — lit. mouth; present or gift given to open negotiations.

BOMBARDA — bombard; canon, mortar.

CACIS — Arabic for priest (*quasis* in Arabic).

CAFRE (CAFFRE) — see *kaffir.*

CAPORRO — Portuguese rendering of *kaporo,* domestic slave or adopted dependant.

CHIKARA — Supreme Being; see also *Dzivaguru;* also fearsome beast of prey.

CHIKUNDA — slave.

CHIKUYO — title of one of the two priests found at the *Dzivaguru* shrine.

CHIMUNO — title of Captain-General of the army of the Munhumutapa in the nineteenth century.

CHINANZE — title of the valet of the Munhumutapa in the nineteenth century.

CHIPATA — see *chupata.*

CHIRAMBAUNUA — official crier or spokesman at a Mutapa court. Also a crier in a slave company who shouted out orders.

CHIREMBA CHOUMAMBO — royal crown.

CHIRIMO — warm part of the dry season (usually months of August, September and October). See *do crimo.*

CHIRIRO — period of mourning after the death of a ruler, i.e. in this study a Mutapa; this was a period of institutionalized anarchy.

CHIRISERI — title of one of the two priests found at the *Dzivaguru* shrine. See also *Chikuyo.*

CHISI — day of rest or holiday.

CHIVABVU — month of May. See *Chiuauo.*

CHIVANGA — court steward. See also *chuanga.*

CHOANGO — representative of a town/district at Mutapa's court. See *chuanga.*

CHUABO — a fathom of cotton cloth valued at about 500 weak *reis;* also 20 strings of beads.

CHUAMBO — fortified stockade; fort.

CHUANGA — same as *choango;* in the eighteenth century this was a term used to describe (a) the representative of a Mambo resident at a bar (q.v.) or (b) a slave belonging to the owner of a *prazo* who lived on it and attended to the annual tribute from the *colons* (non-slave peasant farmers) to the owner. See also *chivanga.*

CHUAUO — Portuguese rendering of the Shona term *Chivabvu;* Month of May; the great feast on the day of the new moon in the month of May: Thanksgiving feast.

CHUPATA — transit duties; fee paid for safe conduct. Same as *chipata.*

CHUREIRO — title for the pages of the Munhumutapa when they became mature married men.

CHURRO — granary; storehouse for a trader; *dura.*

CONGRUA — the royal stipend given to the missionaries (priests).

CORJA — 1/20 of a bar or 20 pieces of cloth weighing between 25.9 lbs to 37.5 lbs.

COROA — crown, vide *terras da coroa, prazos.*

COVADO — measurement of 26 2/3 inches or 66 centimetres.

CRUZADO — Portuguese silver coin of 400 *reis,* worth about four shillings at the beginning of the seventeenth century.

CURVA — Portuguese rendering of *kuruva.*

DARE	meeting place for men of a village; court or council of a village or chief or superior authority.
DENDEMARO	hut or barrack reserved for ritual (esp. where a *mhondoro* presents itself to the public).
DEGRADADO	convict.
DHAKA	mud, soil, earth.
DO CRIMO	Portuguese rendering of *chirimo.*
DUMBZE (DUMBZI)	among the Tavara people this refers to the equivalent of a headman or the oldest male in a lineage.
DUNHU	a ward or district under a sub-chief.
DURA	same as *churro.* Plural *matura.*
DZIMBABWE	see *zimbabwe.*
DZIVAGURU	Big Pool (refers to God as a giver of rain); other names are *Chikara, Nyadenga, Mwari, Mulungo.*
EMPATA	Portuguese rendering of *mupeto.*
EMPOFIAS	Portuguese rendering of *mhosva.*
ENCOSSE	inkosi, a grandee.
ENOCASSAS	kettledrums used in war especially to call troops to attack on all fronts.
FATO	clothing.
FAZENDA	cloth, goods *(Fazenda Real* = Royal Treasury).
FEIRA	market-place, fair, trade settlement.
FUMO	land chief.
FUNDA	big war drum carried by a captain-general in war.
GARA	Portuguese rendering of *ngara.*
GURU	big; in battle formation, the main body of an army.
GUTA	city; the settlement where the residence of a king (chief) is located.
HAKA	pangolin.
HONDO	war.
HUMWE	beer party for work. See *nhimbe.*
HWAMANDA	musical horn.
IMBA	nuclear family; the smallest social and production unit; a house or hut.
IMPOFIAS	see *mhosva.*
INFICIS	Munhumutapa's body guards; a wolf-like animal (hyena?). Possibly from Shona *svitsi,* spotted hyena.
INHAMA	Portuguese rendering of *nyama.*
INQUERITO	enquiry, examination or investigation.
ISHE	a chief.
KANGARE	extracting gold through crushing or grinding gold-bearing quartz.

KAFFIR	an infidel, an unbeliever; used first by the moslem traders to refer to the non-moslem Africans; later used by the Portuguese to refer to the non-moslem Africans. Now used as a derogatory term for Africans. Kafristan is a place in Afghanistan and its natives are called Kafirs. (Arabic origin)
KAPORO	same as *caporro.*
KARUVA	little flower; name of a famous priest of *Dzivaguru* who is sometimes confused with *Dzivaguru* himself (vide *Dzivaguru).*
KASISI	same as *cacis.*
KUGARIRA	to work for father-in-law in lieu of paying *roora (lobola).*
KURONZERA	to entrust livestock to another's care.
KURUVA	to pay tax; make obligatory contribution; tribute paid first by the Arabs and later by the Portuguese captains in Mozambique to the Munhumutapas.
KUUNGA	to extract alluvial gold.
LIPOTE	beads equivalent to ½ a *chuabo* or 10 strings of beads; 20 *lipotes* were equal to one *mutava.*
LUPASSA	Portuguese rendering of *rupasa.*
LUZIOS	canoes.
MACHINDA	princes of the blood.
MACHIRA	indigenous cotton cloth.
MACUTI	threads on which trade beads were strung.
MADZIMAMBO	plural of *mambo* (vide *mambo).*
MADZISHE	plural of *ishe* (vide *ishe).*
MAFOCARIRA	leader of the pages of the Munhumutapa (vide *massacorira).* (origin unknown)
MAKOTA	see *makurukota.*
MAKURUKOTA	councillors (sing. *gota).*
MAMANA	plural of *mana* (vide *mana).*
MAMBO	king, emperor (paramount chief).
MANA	large family unit or compound in a village.
MANAMUCATE	Portuguese rendering of *mwanamukati.*
MANCHILA	a hammock or a palanquin.
MANDO	a seventeenth-century ceremony or rite held at the time of the new moon in June every year at the court of Mutapa when all the subjects were expected to be present.
MANGWENDE	chief diviner of the Munhumutapa.
MANHANGA	pumpkins (general term).
MAPFUNDE	sorghum.
MAPURU	leader of the body guard of the Munhumutapa in the eighteenth century.
MARIMBIRIMBI	army scouts for reconnaisance work.
MAROMBE	court praise-singers and jesters.

MARONDO — clay pit; hole from which soil is taken for smearing houses or making bricks or clay pots. Historically, this refers to a gold-mine dug in the form of a well.

MASANZA — wooden trestles; the houses where royal corpses were dried; also royal graves.

MASHONGAVUDZI — a woman past child-bearing age belonging to the *Nhari Unendoro* clan in charge of Karuva's virgin 'wife', *Nochiswa,* at the *Dzivaguru* shrine.

MASSACORIRA — sons of nobles who served at the court of the Mutapa as his pages while they were between the ages of 15 and 20 years. (origin unknown)

MATICAL — measure of gold equivalent to eight tangas in eighteenth-century Mozambique or 0.155 oz or 1½ xerafins at beginning of seventeenth century or 467 *reis* in mid-sixteenth century (Arabic origin, *mithqal* or *misqal).*

MATUNHU — plural of *dunhu.*

MATURA — granaries.

MAUEIRO — *massacorira* on reaching the age of 20 years. (origin unknown)

MAZARIRA — Portuguese rendering of *Mazvarira.*

MAZVARIRA — title of the first wife of the Munhumutapas in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

MBANJE — marijuana, cannabis, *dagga.*

MBIRA — xylophone, marimba.

MBOKORUME — senior son-in-law; a trusted confidante and counsellor of the Munhumutapa.

MBONGA — girl dedicated to the service of God,see *nochiswa.*

MESO — eye; in a Mutapa embassy this was the title of the intelligence officer on each mission.

MHONDORO — spirit medium, especially guardian spirit of a tribe; a lion.

MHOSVA — litigation, crime, judicial case.

MHURURUMBE — a special song-and-dance, with stomping and hand-clapping, welcome for a *mhondoro.*

MIBHADHA — royal staffs carried as symbols of office (plural of *mubhadha*).

MICHEO — special straw or cloth for padding the arms and the neck, worn during period of mourning.

MIDZIMU — plural of *mudzimu.*

MIGANHU — boundaries (sing. *muganhu).*

MILANDO — lawsuit, complaint, dispute.

MISHONGA — medicines.

MISSOCA — a company of 100 soldiers.

MITI — a string of beads weighing 1/10 of a *lipote;* 200 *mitis* were equal to one *mutava.*

MITUWA — white trees (*kirkia acuminata*).

MOAGEM — Portuguese rendering of *Mukomohasha.*

MOGANOS	Portuguese rendering of *miganhu.*
MONHAES	Portuguese rendering of *vanyai.*
MORADOR	settler (non-African).
MOREFO	Portuguese rendering of *murefu.*
MOROO	Portuguese rendering of *muroyi.*
MOTOR	same as *mutoro.*
MOZUGA	Portuguese rendering of *muzvagwa.*
MUBHADHA	royal staff ; walking stick with no handle (sing. of *mibhadha).*
MUCAZAMBO	Portuguese rendering of *mukazambo.*
MUCHONGA	Portuguese rendering of *mushonga.*
MUDZIMU	spirit of a dead relative; ancestral spirit.
MUKARANGA	junior wife.
MUKAZAMBO	male slave-leader.
MUKOMOHASHA	the Captain-General of the army of the Munhumutapa from about mid-sixteenth century to the early 1630s.
MULUNGO (MULUNGU)	God, especially among the people of the Zambezi valley and the Marave people.
MUPETO	tax or obligatory contribution or imposition (e.g. of a father-in-law). Historically this was a form of limited war declared by the Munhumutapas to enforce payment of tribute *(kuruva)* by the Portuguese.
MURANDA	sing. of *varanda.*
MURANDU	same as *milando.*
MUREFU	high one; nobleman; grandee.
MURENGA	God.
MURIVO	vegetable relish eaten with *sadza.*
MUROMO	a mouth; in a Mutapa embassy this was the title of the official spokesman of the mission.
MUROYI	wizard or witch; sorcerer.
MURUNGO (MURUNGU)	same as *Mulungo.*
MUSASA	temporary camp; shelter; roofless enclosure usually constructed from tree branches.
MUSHA	a homestead; village.
MUSHAMBADZI	see *vashambadzi.*
MUSIMO	Portuguese rendering of *Muzimu.*
MUSSAMBAZ (E)	Portuguese rendering of *mushambadzi* (plural *vashambadzi).* See *vashambadzi.*
MUTAVA	a measure equivalent to 10 *chuabos* of beads.
MUTEYO	trial by ordeal.
MUTORO	a third of one *bar* of cloth.
MUTSOKA	same as *missoca.*
MUTUMBA	a house where a spirit medium gets possessed; also a tall drum.
MUTUMWA	same as *nhume.*
MUTUPO	clan name; totem.
MUZIMU	Supreme Being (vide *mudzimu).*

MUZINDA	the headquarters/residence of a chief; also a chief 's courtyard.
MUZUKURU	grandson or nephew.
MUZUNGU	monster from the sea; person of Portuguese or Caucasian descent.
MUZVAGWA	young unmarried woman (miss).
MVURA	water or rain; also a spirit medium when not possessed.
MWANAMUKATI	envoy, emissary; same as *manamucate.* Lit. nephew.
MWANGATO	a carved staff used by a spirit medium (usually it has carved lion claws at its base).
MWAVI	trial by ordeal.
MWENDAMBERI	Lt-General of the army of the Mutapa in the eighteenth century.
NECHINANGA	Captain-General of the army of the Mutapa in the eighteenth century; in the nineteenth century it became the title of the Mutapa's chief minister.
NECHOMBO	acolyte.
NEHANDA	title of second wife of a Mutapa before eighteenth century; during the eighteenth century it became the title of the first wife of the Mutapa. She was a close clanswoman of the Mutapa; also used to refer to the medium of Nyamhita Nehanda (ruler of Handa), the wife-sister of the first Munhumutapa, viz Matope Nyanhehwe.
NEHANDAS	general term for Mutapa's female relatives who were also his wives.
NENGOMASHA	title for the governor of the provinces and second most important person in the Mutapa state before the eighteenth century. In the eighteenth century it was the title of one of the keepers of the royal graves.
NENZOU	title for the treasurer of the Mutapa in the eighteenth century.
NETAMBE	chief herbalist of the Mutapa.
NETONDO	a high priest of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries Mutapa kingdom.
NEVANJE (NEVANJI)	first son or heir apparent; also favourite son of a ruler.
NEVINGA	chief minister of the Mutapas in the eighteenth century; before about mid-eighteenth century he acted as regent during the interregnum.
N'ANGA	a diviner, healer.
NGARA	headgear made up of many porcupine quills. See also *gara.*
NGOMA	drum.
NHAMBEZE	commander of a company of 100 soldiers. (origin unknown)
NHIMBE	same as *humwe.*

NHUME — messenger, emissary.

NOCHISWA — virgin 'wife' of Karuva found at the *Dzivaguru* shrine at Nyamakate Pool.

NOHETERA — title of the two priests found at the *Dzivaguru* shrine. See also *Tenzi*.

NYAMASUO — chief door-keeper.

NYAMBEDZI — same as *nhambeze*.

NYANZVI — expert person; master craftsman.

NYARUKAWO — Mutapa's captain of the vanguard in time of war, during the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.

NYIKA — a chiefdom, country.

NZANGA — large village/town or headquarters of a *sadunhu*.

PALMO — measurement of 22 centimetres.

PANDE — wooden bowl; also the base of a large sea shell used as a personal ornament.

PANO — cloth measuring a fathom or length of outstretched arms worth 500 weak or 200 strong *reis* (about one shilling); also 20 strings of beads.

PARAPANDAS — trumpets made from large horns of certain animals. See also *hwamanda*.

PARDAO — a coin equivalent to 360 *reis* of gold, 300 if of silver; equivalent to a *xerafim*. Plural *pardos*.

PASTA — about 16½ oz or gold weighing 100 maticals.

PATAMARES — envoys, messengers.

PEMBERAÇOENS — see *pemberar*.

PEMBERAR — to run to and fro in a feigned fight and as if avoiding blows aimed at one; dance for joy, rejoice. From Shona, *kupembera*.

POMBE — Swahili word for beer made from fermented grain (*doro* in Shona).

POVO — people, mass (people). (Portuguese)

PRAZO — large land concessions made to individual Portuguese or religious institutions in Zambezia.

PRESIDIO — fortress; fortified military place; garrison; the forces in a fortress; annual present sent by the Portuguese Governors in Mozambique to the Munhumutapas through the agency of a Portuguese official known as the captain-major of the garrison of *zimbabwe* of the Munhumutapa.

QUINTAL — a weight of approximately 128 pounds (lbs) or four *arrobas*.

QUITE — a throne or three-legged stool. See also *shite*.

REAL — old Portuguese monetary unit worth about 1/16 of a penny in Portugal.

REGIMENTO — a royal or vice-regal instruction; also an instruction by the Captain-General of Mozambique after 1752.

REINO	kingdom.
REIS	plural of *real.* Also kings (Portuguese).
REY	king.
RONZERA	see *kuronzera.*
ROTA	walking staff. Also *mubhadha.*
RUKWEZA	Finger-millet (*eleusine coracana*).
RUPASA	a reed mat. See *lupasa.*
SADUNHU	a sub-chief; see *dunhu.*
SADZA	thick porridge made of millet or maize meal.
SAGOATE (SAGUATE)	gift or present.
SAHWIRA	a trusted friend; ritual friend.
SAMUSHA	a village head. See also *musha.*
SANZA	see *masanza.*
SHITE	among the Marave people a *quite* was known as *shite.* (NB in old Portuguese script *qui* was sometimes pronounced as *shi* or *chi,* hence Quiteve for Chiteve).
SOMBREIRO	sombrero, parasol, umbrella.
SUNGA	see *tsunga.*
SVIMBO	knobkerry.
SYMBACAYO	keeper of the *zimbabwes* of a Mutapa as well as of the royal wives in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.
TENZI	title of the two priests found at the *Dzivaguru* shrine. See *Nohetera* for the alternate title.
TERRAS DA COROA	crown lands.
TOSTAO	old Portuguese silver coin or Brazilian nickel coin worth 100 *reis,* if gold then it was worth 1200 *reis* in the sixteenth century, plural *tostoes* or *tostois.*
TSUNGA (SUNGA)	a herb (leaves cooked as spinach); determination to act, cost what it may. In the eighteenth century, beef mixed with pieces of human flesh prepared for consumption by the soldiers of Munhumutapa to fortify them before going into battle.
VADZIMU	plural of *mudzimu.*
VAKARANGA	junior wives (sing. *mukaranga).*
VANYAI	messengers; also soldiers of the Munhumutapa; see *monhaes.*
VARANDA	servants; subjects of a chief.
VARIDZI VEVHU	the owners of the soil; the aboriginal population.
VASAHWIRA	plural of *sahwira.*
VASHAMBADZI	plural of *mushambadzi.* African itinerant traders or slaves acting as agents for the Portuguese merchants. (Persian, bazaar: a market; and Swahili, *jambazi:* a rogue, a cheat, and *mbazazi:* a trader, a swindler, a cheat)
VATETE	an aunt.
VATORWA	outsiders; persons living in a community with whom they have no kinship relations.

XERAFIM	coin of 360 *reis* of gold (300 of silver); equal to one pardão; 1½ *xerafins* of gold weighed one matical.
ZAMBA	large wooden tray used for gold panning.
ZHEVE	ear; an official in the Mutapa embassy who was meant to listen carefully to all that was being said so that he could recount it accurately to the Mutapa on the return of the mission.
ZIMBABWE (ZIMBABOE, ZIMBAHWE, ZIMBAVE, DZIMBABWE)	lit. large houses of stones; but often used to mean court of *mambo*, or the *mambo* himself or his walled grave; in this study it is used to refer to the court; palace and capital city of the Mutapa state.
ZIMBAKAYO	see *symbacayo*.
ZUMBA	roofless grass enclosure for ritual purposes.
ZUMBAYA	see *zvambaira*.
ZUNDE	chief's field; work done for a chief in his field; labour tribute to a ruler, especially field work.
ZVAMBAIRA	to crawl on the stomach; the highest form of homage paid to the Munhumutapa.
ZVISI	plural of *chisi*.



Map 1: Geographical features of Zimbabwe showing rivers, modern cities, towns and mining centres.



Map 2: Shona and Shona-related societies





Map 3: Main Shona kingdoms of the sixteenth century

Map 4: Historic cities, towns and *feiras* (marketplaces) in relation to modern cities



Map 5: Kingdom of Mukaranga and its principalities

Preface

'They can neither read nor write, and have no books, and all ancient history and other things which they know they learn by tradition from their ancestors.'[1] (emphasis added)

The above quotation from Fr João dos Santos, writing in the early seventeenth century, underlines the first limitation of this study which is a reconstruction of the Mutapa state primarily from extant Portuguese documents: Very little oral tradition has been used in the writing of this work. The reason is that it was researched and written during the war years when the illegal regime specifically forbade the writer to return to Zimbabwe to carry out oral research. The second limitation is that this is largely a history about rulers and their interaction with outsiders, especially the Portuguese. This limitation was imposed on the writer both by the nature of the sources and by the stage of historical reconstruction of the Mutapa state which is still very much in its infancy. In that respect, this is not a history of the *povo* of Zimbabwe during the pre-colonial times. That history remains to be researched and written. The contribution of the present study lies very much in providing a much firmer chronological framework to the study of pre-colonial Zimbabwe history.

The empire of Munhumutapa is one of the few African polities south of the Sahara that survived for a very long time. It is also one of the very rare pre-colonial states to possess a wealth of written documentary evidence covering such a span of time. But there is a surprising lack of scholarly investigation of its history. Besides a somewhat brief outline recently produced by W.G. Randles in his *L'Empire du Monomotapa*[2] there is no other work attempting an overall synthesis of the Mutapa state.

The major reason why scholars have, surprisingly, not paid much attention to the reconstruction of the Mutapa state is largely because the work of D.P. Abraham[3] in the late 1950s and early 1960s promised so much in this regard that nobody else felt the need to enter the field of Mutapa history at that stage. Instead Zimbabwe historians concentrated on the histories of Manyika, Rozvi, Duma, Ndau, Teve and Ndebele states[4], leaving well alone the imperial history of the Mutapas to *Madyenzungu Kafurirakumusoro*,[5] alias D.P. Abraham.

The present writer more or less stumbled into the history of the Mutapa state by accident rather than by design. The original foray into Mutapa history was born largely out of a desire to better understand the Rozvi political organization by comparing it with the Mutapa political organization. But it soon became clear that such an exercise was well nigh impossible without a fuller treatment of the history of the Mutapa state itself. That conclusion has led, by stages, to the present study.

This work is reconstructed largely from Portuguese documents. It is an introduction to the political and economic history of the Mutapa state. It is not offered as a definitive treatment of the subject, but merely a stopgap measure to fill a lacuna in the history of Zimbabwe.

Although aspects of the history of the Mutapa state have been dealt with previously in the works of such writers as E. Axelson, G.M. Theal, M.D.D. Newitt, A. Isaacman, P. Schebesta, S.R. Welch, A. Wilmot, A. Lobato, S.X. Botelho, J.J.T. Botelho[6] and others, this has been done largely from the standpoint of the Portuguese communities in Mozambique. Most of the above writers have looked at the Mutapa state from a coastal perspective. The present study attempts to reverse the above approach by looking at the same events from a Mutapa angle. The Portuguese come into the picture only when they enter the Mutapa story. However, trying to reconstruct Mutapa history by using Portuguese sources is, especially where it involves Mutapa–Portuguese relations, like attempting to base a defence case on the evidence of the plaintiff! A number of devices have had to be employed to stand the plaintiff's evidence on its head. The evidence has been examined for internal consistency; prior and post events then unknown to a writer as well as other contemporary sources have been employed to corroborate or refute some other evidence; all Portuguese sources have been examined to establish whether or not they accord with the known socio-political and cultural tenets of the Mutapas and their people; and, where available, oral traditional evidence has been used as a mechanism to control the Portuguese sources. A second problem has been the effort to put into some form of balance the over-importance given to Portuguese–Mutapa relations in the sources. This poses a danger of creating the impression that the Mutapa state existed only for, and was largely concerned with, the management of its relations with the Portuguese, an entirely false conclusion which has often led to an assumption that external trade

was the most important source of wealth for the Mutapas. Throughout the study an attempt has been made to put into perspective the ever-intruding Portuguese presence as found in the sources. But it should be conceded at the outset that by the nature of the evidence the battle could not be won completely.

Besides the detailed exposition necessitated by the need to challenge the sources, in places there is occasionally a deliberate excursion into other types of detail which scholars and non-Zimbabwean readers may feel could have been pruned or left out altogether. For that the writer offers no apology, for this work is written primarily for the Zimbabwean reader to whom every crumb, insignificant and trivial as it may seem to scholars and outsiders, is a piece of treasure to be recorded, restored and polished!

Finally, it only remains to warn the reader that no attempt has been made in this study to modernize Portuguese spellings. To retain accuracy the spelling found in the documents has generally been respected. In the case of Shona words/names an attempt has been made to use modern orthographic equivalents wherever possible, e.g. *mwanamukati* for *manamucate*, Ganyambadzi for *Ganeabaze*, etc. Where there is doubt as to the accuracy of the modern equivalent a question mark has been added after the name/word, e.g. *Matuzianhe* (Matuzianye?). But where there is no doubt in the mind of the writer then the modern Shona equivalent is given with the Portuguese documentary variant(s) in brackets and italicized, e.g. Ganyambadzi (*Ganeabaze, Ganeabazi*). In all cases, the Zimbabwean Shona orthography is used in preference to the Mozambican, e.g. *k* is preferred over *c* in words like Mukaranga (*Mucaranga*), Manyika (*Manica*), etc.

Notes

1. Fr J. dos Santos, 'Ethiópia Oriental', *Records of South-Eastern Africa (RSEA)*, 7, (Cape Town, 1964 reprint), 201.
2. W.G.L. Randles, *L'Empire du Monomotapa du XV^e au XIX^e Siècle* (Paris, 1975).
3. D.P. Abraham, 'The Monomotapa Dynasty', *Native Affairs Department Annual (NADA),36*, (1959), 59–84; 'The Early Political History of the Kingdom of Mwene Mutapa 850–1589', *Historians in Tropical Africa, Proceedings of the Leverhulme Intercollegiate History Conference held September 1960* (Salisbury, University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 1962), 61–92; 'Maramuca: an exercise in the combined use of Portuguese records and oral tradition', *Journal of African History (JAH)*, 2, (1961), 211–25; 'Ethno-history of the Empire of Mutapa. Problems and Methods' in *The Historian in Tropical Africa*, (ed) J. Vansina, R. Mauny and L.V. Thomas (London, 1964), 104–121.
4. H.H.K. Bhila, *Trade and Politics in a Shona Kingdom: The Manyika and their Portuguese and African Neighbours, 1575–1902* (Harlow, 1982); S.I. Mudenge, 'The Rozvi Empire and the Feira of Zumbo', unpublished Ph.D. thesis (London University, 1972); R.M.G. Mtetwa, 'The "Political" and Economic History of the Duma People of South-eastern Rhodesia from the Early Eighteenth Century to 1945', unpublished D.Phil. thesis (University of Rhodesia, 1976); A. Mtetwa, 'A History of Uteve under the Mwenemutapa Rulers 1480–1834: A Re-evaluation', unpublished Ph.D. thesis (Northwestern University, 1983); A. Masunungure, completing a Ph.D. thesis for Michigan State University on 'The Ndau of Rhodesia 1600–1890'.
5. *Kafurirakumusoro Madyenzungu*. Literally, *Kafurirakumusoro* means in Korekore 'the one that browses at the top', i.e. the giraffe. The implication of the name being that, like a giraffe, Abraham sought traditions that few people could know of because of their antiquity. *Madyenzungu* means 'peanut-eater', a self-explanatory name which shows Abraham's proclivity to that particular delicacy!
6. E. Axelson, *South-east Africa 1488–1530* (London and New York, 1940); 'Some loopholed forts in the Mount Darwin District', *Proceedings and Transactions Rhodesia Scientific Association, 44*, (1956), 7–12; *Portuguese in South-East Africa 1600–1700*. (Johannesburg, 1960); J.J.T. Botelho, *História Militar e Política dos Portugueses em Moçambique da Descoberta a 1833* (Lisbon, 1934); S.X. Botelho, *Memória estatística sobre os Domínios Portugueses na África Oriental* (Lisboa, 1835); A. Lobato, *A Expansão Portuguesa em Moçambique 1498 a 1530* (Lisboa, 1954), 1–3; *Evolução Administrativa e Económica de Moçambique 1752–63* (Lisboa, 1957); A.F. Isaacman, *Mozambique: The Africanization of a European Institution: The Zambezi Prazos, 1750–1902* (Madison and London, 1972); M.D.D. Newitt, *Portuguese Settlement on the Zambesi* (London, 1973); G.M. Theal, *Records of South-Eastern Africa*, 9 vols (Cape Town, 1898–1903, reprint 1964); P. Schebesta, *Portugals Konquistamission in Südost-Afrika* (St. Augustin, 1966); S.R. Welch, *South Africa under King Manuel 1495–1521* (Cape Town, 1946); *South Africa under John III 1521–1557* (Cape Town, 1949); *South Africa under King Sebastian and the Cardinal 1557–1580* (Cape Town, 1949); *Portuguese Rule and Spanish Crown in South Africa 1581–1640* (Cape Town, 1950); *Portuguese and Dutch in South Africa 1641–1806* (Cape Town, 1951); A. Wilmot, *Monomotapa (Rhodesia). Its Monuments and Its History from the Most Ancient Times to the Present Century* (London, 1896).

CHAPTER 1

Introduction: The Shona[1] Environment, Socio-Economic Organization and Historical Identity

i. Environment

The theatre for the history of the Shona people has been that stretch of land bounded north to south by the Zambezi and Limpopo rivers and east to west by the Indian Ocean and the Kalahari desert respectively. At various times in Shona history this theatre has overflowed to encompass the lowlands of the north-eastern Transvaal, as well as the northern side of the Zambezi valley in the Tete province of Mozambique and the south-eastern part of Zambia.

This whole land mass is dominated by present-day Zimbabwe which is part of the African plateau rising from about 300 metres in the Zambezi and Limpopo river valleys to over 900 metres on the plateau proper. The land below 900 metres is known as the lowveld and represents almost 35 per cent of present Zimbabwe and more than half the total land mass of the Shona historical theatre as outlined above. Historically, population has tended to move from the highlands into these less hospitable lowlands. The land above 900 metres is made up of the middleveld, 900–1 250 metres and comprising 40 per cent of present Zimbabwe, as well as the highveld and the eastern highlands, rising from 1 250 metres to about 2 500 metres, which make up 25 per cent of present Zimbabwe.

Straddling Zimbabwe from south to north-east is a mineral-rich geological formation known as the 'Great Norite Dyke', which in places is represented by ranges of mountains and hills. Among the minerals can be mentioned those closely associated with the pre-colonial history of the country, such as gold, copper, iron and tin. In the present century a host of other minerals have been discovered and exploited. The whole region is criss-crossed by numerous rivers, streams, rivulets and brooks, none of which is suitable for major inland navigation. Some rivers, such as the Zambezi, Limpopo, Save, Pungwe and Runde, are navigable by small crafts but often only at rtain times of the year.[2] However, it was from these rivers and

Seventeenth-century French portrait of the Munhumutapa based on a description by de Barros.

streams that much alluvial gold was recovered during the pre-colonial period.

The vegetation is predominantly mixed woodland and savanna, with occasional pronounced stretches of rolling plains of tall elephant grass on the plateau and thick semi-tropical forests in the south-east of Zimbabwe and the Zambezi valley. Dry scrubland stretches from the south to the south-western extremities of the country. The latter vegetation is associated with the grass known as 'sweet veldt' which is nutritious to cattle all year round. Furthermore, the leaves of the mupani (*colophospermum mopane*) tree normally found in the area also provide additional feeding for animals. The largely savanna vegetation of Zimbabwe has provided ideal habitation for both people and animals. Vast herds of ivory-bearing elephants, prides of lions and leopards with their coveted skins, as well as herds of deer, bucks and such other safari-associated beasts, have roamed the woodland savannas of Zimbabwe from times immemorial, sometimes providing people with meat and at other times as predators preying on them.[3]

The rainfall is heaviest in the east and south-east where precipitation of up to 150 cm a year is recorded. The least amounts are found in the southern and western border areas where rainfall of 25 cm is normal. This part of the country is notorious for periodic droughts. The greater part of the country has rainfall of between 50 and 100 cm a year. Most of the rain falls during the months November to March.[4] The economic activities of the people in pre-colonial days were governed by this climatic phenomenon. Droughts of varying severity have been experienced in the region. Some lasted for up to two consecutive years, and on at least one recorded occasion for up to five years.[5] Some of the more severe droughts have caused economic dislocation, social disintegration and political instability. However, such droughts were rare and far between. For the milder ones the Shona had some crops, such as *mapfunde, mhunga, rukweza,* and *manhanga*, which were relatively drought-resistant and often relied on certain wild tubers, bulbs, grasses, leaves and fruits they collected from the forest.[6]

Temperature does not appear to have played a major part in influencing events before the colonial period. It was only during the colonial era that it became important in determining areas of major European settlement in the country. As a general observation the lowlands tend to be warmer than the highlands.[7] The hot, humid river

valleys tend to be ideal breeding grounds for mosquitoes and tsetse flies, two pests which affect both human habitation and pastoral activities. Besides the above two types of pests the region was prone to periodic visitations by locusts, while tick-borne diseases were not an unknown threat.[8]

However the two ecological factors having the greatest economic implications, and by extension therefore socio-political significance, were rainfall and the prevalence of pests.

ii. Socio-economic organization and activities

The savanna-type environment of Zimbabwe largely determined the principal branches of production of the Shona in pre-colonial days, viz agriculture and pastoralism. Besides those two main branches of economic production there were others which included mining, hunting, trading, manufacturing, fishing and gathering. While the above list shows most of the branches of economic activities practised by the Shona, it should not be assumed that *all* of the Shona participated in *all* of the above branches of production during the whole pre-colonial period. Geographical factors, as already pointed out, were not the same in all areas. For example, those areas like the Zambezi valley where tsetse fly is prevalent could not support pastoral activities, whereas the presence of 'sweet grass' in the south-western part of the country has made it an ideal cattle-keeping area even to this day. In short, natural, social and technological factors often influenced the type of economic activity practised at a particular time and place. The different ecological environments within the Shona historical theatre dictated particular economic activities at various places and times.

This section offers a broad description of how the social and economic organizations of the Shona at local levels related to each other. An understanding of how Shona society operated at the lower levels is vitally important for a fuller appreciation of Shona organization at state level. The effectiveness or otherwise of the central organs were intimately related to the nature of its relationship to the lower levels of societal organization. The description that follows is sufficiently general to the Shona for it to serve as a baseline for most Shona states including those of the pre-Mutapa era. Organization at a state level for the Mutapa will be dealt with elsewhere.[9] While every effort has been made to base the reconstruction on contemporary Portuguese

records where these do exist, the use of latter-day sources has proved unavoidable since many Portuguese observers made more regular comments on trade than on societal organization The danger of projecting into the past what early twentieth-century observers recorded is not unknown to the writer. Great care has been taken to reduce reliance on such evidence and only evidence as is thought to be consistent with what is known of the Shona economy and society from contemporary sources has been used. The use of latter-day evidence has been forced on the writer by the realization that it is only from some known facts that speculation about an unknown past can be made. Furthermore, given the fact that the Zimbabwe environment did not change dramatically during the period under study and that the population did not suffer major outside cultural invasions until the nineteenth century, there is some justification to assume a degree of institutional conservatism, especially when such institutions appear to have socio-economic rationale behind them.

(a) Imba

The smallest social and production unit throughout the period of known Shona history seems to have been the nuclear family or *imba*, lit. hut. This was made up of a man, his wife (wives) and their children. This unit owned and worked its own gardens and lived in its own distinct section or compound (known as *mana*) in a village. A *mana* could be made up of anywhere from two, as in a monogamous arrangement, to as many as 30 or more people in a polygamous situation or when the married sons of a man were living in the same compound with him. Besides numbers of people, distance was also an important consideration. Two or three people living in a homestead separated from the nearest homestead by up to three kilometres may still be regarded as a *mana*, and a man with 10 wives and 30 children living a few metres away from his nearest neighbours constituted a *mana*. But when he lived a kilometre or two away then his homestead would be referred to as a village or *musha*.

The nuclear family or *imba* was not only a social but also a production unit. In a nuclear family, the man or father of the house owned the biggest, and often best, garden where he grew the major crops – millets, rice, beans and, after the sixteenth century, maize. Strictly speaking, this was the family garden and everybody had to make his/her contribution of labour by working it. The husband had a major say in how the crops from this garden were used. In addition to this

'family' garden, there were other gardens belonging to the wife (wives) and older unmarried children, both boys and girls. These were smaller in size and importance and could only be tended to after the 'family' garden had been done. The wife usually grew vegetables such as groundnuts, peanuts, pumpkins, beans, cucumbers, yams and some grain crops (especially in polygamous marriages) in her gardens. She controlled the disposition of the produce from her gardens as did the children from theirs. For the purposes of production the members of an *imba* (family) played different roles.[10] According to Fr João dos Santos,

> their most ordinary occupation [of Shona women] being to dig, sow, and weed, the hoe being as proper in the hands of the Kaffir women as the distaff is in the girdle of the women between Douro and Minho. Therefore Kaffirs who are careful to choose laborious wives are the richest, and have most provisions.[11]

The above observation by dos Santos has in part prompted one recent writer to claim that there was a Zambezian rule which stated that 'richness lay in women'.[12] But it would be wrong to conclude that Shona men traditionally took no part in agriculture. Indeed dos Santos himself tells us that even in the sixteenth century 'some of the Kaffirs [men] also weed, dig, and assist their wives'.[13] However from what is known of Shona culture it seems that it has always been regarded as a man's duty to clear ground for new gardens by cutting down the branches of trees and then burning them for fertilizer. The heavy, strenuous or dangerous labour has always been reserved for men in Shona society. But according to Monclaro, once the initial clearing was over Shona cultivation was neither heavy nor dangerous, for he tells us that

> they dig the earth with small hoes, merely scraping the soil, and there in the scrapings and hollows they throw the millet or other seed they sow, covering it up at once with little earth; and it yields a good crop.[14]

In a monogamous situation it was normal for the man to go to the gardens in the morning to plant, weed or harvest, while his wife remained at home preparing lunch and joined him late in the morning. In the late afternoon she returned home to prepare the evening meal and the husband was the last to return.

The man did most of the threshing of the grain crops and the milking of the cows, and his sons herded the cattle. He was expected to make various types of baskets, wooden plates, spoons, sticks, hoe

handles, axe shafts, wooden pillows, stools and so forth. He also made his own fishing and hunting nets. In theory he was expected to make his own iron weapons and tools – knives, daggers, assegais, axes, hoes, arrows, etc. He butchered and skinned the animals, made drums and tuned them. He did much of the hut construction whilst his wife plastered the walls with mud. In addition he had to attend the village council, the *dare*. Normally it was his responsibility to attend other people's work parties (*humwe* or *nhimbe*) so that they in turn would be willing to attend his own. An understanding of the variety of a peasant man's duties in the Shona society is crucial, as we shall see later, to a proper appreciation of the implications and difficulties of military mobilization in a Shona state.

On the other hand, the wife was responsible for all the housework, especially cooking and brewing beer. Again in theory, she was supposed to make all her earthenware utensils. Apart from being responsible for most of the weeding in the gardens, she stamped and ground corn, collected mushrooms, wild herbs and fruits, and caught termites, ants and caterpillars.[15]

In conclusion it may be noted that duties such as hunting and cattle-keeping, obviously fraught with danger, were predominantly a male province. The equally taxing job of clearing new ground for gardens was also a male responsibility. But planting, weeding and other domestic chores were dominated by women. The characterization of a typical Shona man by dos Santos, so readily accepted by some twentieth-century writers, claiming that 'they are all indolent and lovers of idleness, given to feasting, singing and dancing . . . [and] hunting wild animals, monkeys, and wild beasts for food',[16] is highly superficial and prejudiced, telling us more about dos Santos' lack of understanding of Shona society than the role played by the Shona man in the process of production.

In the late nineteenth century, the German traveller Karl Mauch noted that among the southern Shona 'one meets with only a very few who could be called genuine loafers.'[17] What is without doubt, however, is that the Shona man, by reserving hunting and cattle-keeping for himself, controlled the economically, politically and socially significant sectors of the branches of production. Ivory, skins and cattle could be more easily used for exchange purposes and to store wealth than could agricultural produce.

(b) Musha

The next socio-economic unit among the Shona after the nuclear family was the village or *musha*. The village head was known as a *samusha* or *mwenewomusha*.[18] Usually he was the most senior male member of the family that founded the village. The composition and size of a village were not fixed by some predetermined criteria. These differed from one *musha* to another. But in general a village tended to be made up of predominantly agnatically-related men and their families. Kinship ties were a very important factor in the life of a village. However not all villages were composed entirely of agnates. Indeed it may be suggested that there were few such villages. Most villages also contained some *vatorwa* (outsiders, lit. those who are taken in from outside) who were non-agnates allowed to live in a village.[19] Such a *mutorwa* (sing.) could be a trusted friend, e.g. a *sahwira* as among the Budya, or a wanderer or a refugee. Among the Budya, *vasahwira* were 'supposed to render to each other unlimited assistance and generosity . . . The relationship is supposed to perpetuate itself in the children of the contracting partners.'[20] But invariably sooner rather than later some kind of 'perpetual kinship' relationship is declared between the *vatorwa* and the agnates. The former may be declared 'perpetual' nephews or sons-in-law or fathers-in-law. In this way the village is held together, in part, through kinship relationship. Among the Tavara, a son-in-law was expected to live with his wife's parents, rendering them personal service for a period of years before being allowed to move away with his family. This was called *kugarira*.[21] Later evidence will be adduced to show that the Mutapa's senior son-in-law, the *mbokorume*, was a trusted confidant of the Mutapa and that he lived at court.

A Shona *musha* was not a permanent settlement. 'Land-rotation cultivation' made it a relatively temporary shifting village. Also, because population density was limited to an average of about 14 persons per sq km (based on 25 per cent land usability)[22], villages had to fragment continuously as the population increased. Normally villages had no fixed boundaries unless they were close to each other. The limits of a village included the homesteads and the gardens cultivated by the villagers. Its population ranged from less than 100 to a few hundreds and, in special conditions, may well have reached a few thousands. The population of such towns as Great Zimbabwe is thought to have been about 11 000 people.[23]

The village operated as an economic unit of production. There is a real sense in which it could be seen as an 'extended family'. If a man wanted help in weeding his gardens, threshing his grain or building a house, all he had to do was to have his wife brew some beer and then invite the village to a *nhimbe* or *humwe*, a work party. It was usually men, and to some extent mature women, who attended the work parties. Of course those who did not attend other people's *humwe* were unlikely to attract many people to their own. Hence during weeding time a man could spend two or three afternoons a week attending *humwe*. To outside observers like dos Santos and Monclaro this might have seemed as evidence of the Shona spending 'much on eating, drinking and arranging feasts and drunken merry-making',[24] but among the Shona this 'feasting, singing and dancing'[25] was far from being evidence of indolence and laziness. Instead these 'feasts' were organized to assist the process of production. Feasts were also held during the dry season to win the goodwill of those invited so that during the critical periods of weeding, harvesting and threshing the goodwill could be translated into much-needed labour. This was a sound investment policy. Hunting and fishing were often done as co-operative efforts. For example, hunting elephants for their flesh and ivory was normally the work of a hunting party or village, whether this was done by digging large pits or attacking with assegais. Hunting with nets or by using pits usually required teamwork.[26] Although in theory it would seem that a pre-colonial Shona person was a sort of 'Renaissance man' who was supposed to know something about woodwork, iron-mongering, hunting, fishing and so many other things, in practice more often than not he did not. Instead there were skilled people or *nyanzvi* who specialized in these fields and were often thought to be possessed by beneficiary spirits which endowed them with their different expertise. In this way people in a village relied on each other by bartering for crafts, commodities and items which they could not produce individually. Items such as iron could not be produced in every village as it was available only in particular geographical locations.

Perhaps equally important in bringing the village together was the *dare*. This was the meeting place where men of the village came together every night if their *mamana* were close by. There the men of the village would share their evening meal and exchange views. If there were any problems or issues to be dealt with the *dare* would

deal with them. Every mature man had a right to sit at the *dare*.[27] It was both a village assembly and a village court but it could impose fines for only minor offences. Court fees, usually in the form of an animal, were shared by all present. The *samusha* was chairman of all such gatherings. Any message or requests from the superior ruler, e.g. military mobilization, was communicated through the *dare*. The *dare* was not such a democratic assembly as it has sometimes been made out to be, for women were not allowed to attend unless they were specifically invited to do so, clear evidence of discrimination and of oppression. However it appears that the rationale behind this oppression was a need to preserve the kinship dominance of the village. After all, because of the exogamous nature of marriage every village would almost always have a majority of outside mature women. This was not true of outside mature men. They were a minority, and a dependant minority at that. Given that kinship was the unifying force at village level, to have allowed a majority of outsiders such as mature women to dominate the *dare* would have undermined the unifying force of the village.

Mutual assistance in time of danger or famine or for work was the hallmark of the village. This communalism at times has been termed 'African socialism'.[28] But the relationships in a village were based not only on material interdependence but also on personal or social relationship. This non-material aspect found its highest articulation in kinship. At village level this was not only a kinship of 'blood'; those accepting a position as dependants to the elders of a village were almost always eventually accepted as kin. In this way kinship assumed characteristics of an all-embracing ideology, some of the tenets being ancestor veneration, respect for age, notions of seniority, etc.[29]

(c) Dunhu

A number of villages formed a ward or *dunhu* under a sub-chief known as *sadunhu*. Among the Tonga, subjects of the fifteenth-century Mutapa state in what are now the Zambezia and Manica e Sofala provinces of Mozambique, a *sadunhu* was known as an *encosse* (*inkosi*) or *fumo*.[30] According to Barretto, *matunhu* (pl. of *dunhu*) had 'their own names and limits, which are called *moganos*, and these territories . . . had their own fumos, or petty Kaffir kings.'[31] Since the element of territoriality is so important here it cannot be over-emphasized that the boundaries or *miganhu* of a *dunhu* were clearly

defined, often by such natural features as rivers or mountains. According to one authority, 'the *dunhu* was home' to a Shona person.[32] A *sadunhu* was usually a descendant of the first man who moved into the region or a member of a conquering dynasty which imposed itself on an existing population.[33]

The headquarters of a *sadunhu* was normally a fairly large village/town, *nzanga*. A higher *dare* met at the *sadunhu's* headquarters. At this *dare* procedures were more formal than at the village *dare*. Not every adult man could sit at all sessions of the *dare*. When this *dare* sat as a court of law the *sadunhu* was usually assisted by his counsellors, close agnates or friends or important men in the ward. Cases of land disputes between villages and other civil or criminal cases which could not be resolved at village level were referred to this *dare*. Court fees had to be paid to a *sadunhu*. Each *dunhu* had its own day of rest, *chisi*, on which all work except house-work was supposed to stop. *Chisi* is often regarded as the day on which the original *sadunhu* died. Failure to observe *chisi* was an offence punishable by a fine.[34] The *sadunhu*, as a descendant of the protecting ancestors, had important ritual duties to fulfil to ensure a fruitful agricultural season.[35] The Portuguese have left us some fascinating accounts of the holidays in the Mutapa state. It would appear that there were fixed days for the *zvisi* which were seriously observed. The Mutapa and his people divided each month into three weeks of 10 days each and, according to one source, observed the fourth and seventh day of each week as holidays or *zvisi*. The first day of the new moon was regarded as day one and the thirtieth day as the last day of the month. This meant that in every month there were at least six days of holidays. According to dos Santos, 'These days are called *musimos*, which signifies the souls of dead saints, and I believe that they observe these days in honour of their black saints.' [36] And Bocarro has this to say on the same subject:

> On these holidays the Kaffirs put on the best pieces of cloth they have, and the king hears all causes, so that these are the audience days for them. While he hears causes he is always standing with two small staves in his hands, about three-quarters of a yard long, and the parties are prostrate on the ground. These audiences often last from morning till evening, without the king ever sitting down, and when he cannot give audience because of some hindrance it is held by his governor Ningomoxa. On the eighth day of the moon no one speaks to the

> king or enters his palace, for this day is ill-omened, and no matter of importance is begun or ordered upon it.[37]

Besides the above *zvisi*, the Mutapa also observed the new moon with some ceremonies for, 'On the day of the new moon the king is accustomed to *pemberar* in his house with two assagais in his hands, which means to run to and fro in a feigned fight, and as if avoiding blows aimed at him.'[38] After this the Mutapa would scatter cooked millet on the ground and his nobles would eagerly pick them up and eat them. However,

> The day of the new moon in the month of May is their great feast, which they call *chuauo* [Chivabvu–month of May], at which all the lords in the kingdoms appear, excepting such as have the title of kings, for these, although they are vassals of Monomotapa, and pay him tribute, never come to his court, or leave their own kingdoms; but all the other lords, who are innumerable, are present at these feasts, and all *pemberam*, which means skirmish with assagais in their hands, attacking and menacing each other therewith, as though in warfare. The monomotapa watches the skirmish from a seat, and in this manner, to the sound of drums and trumpets, they spend the whole day. The king withdraws at night, and no one sees him again for eight days, during which time the king's drums are sounded day and night with a loud noise, for they are many and very large, after the fashion of kettledrums. On the eighth day of the moon the monomotapa orders one of the nobles against whom he has some ill-will to be put to death, and with his death, which he offers to his mozimos as a sacrifice, the feast comes to an end, the drums cease, and each one returns to his house and lands.[39]

This 'May Day' feast would seem to have been a 'Thanksgiving Day' when Mutapa and his people thanked their *midzimu* for the harvest. It is likely that similar, if less elaborate, ceremonies were probably observed at the chiefdom (*nyika*) level.

The *sadunhu* benefited in other ways from the people under him. For example, during planting and harvesting time every village had to send people – men and/or women – to go and work the *sadunhu's* gardens. This is called *zunde*. In a polygamous marriage the husband's chief garden(s) also bore the name *zunde* and every wife had to contribute by working in the garden(s). The *sadunhu* was likely to have bigger and more gardens than most people in the *dunhu*. Through labour tribute he appropriated an enforced surplus from the community of the *dunhu*. What was produced in his fields was well

beyond his immediate subsistence needs. In addition to the above source of wealth he also received fees from his judicial services to the community. But it was expected that on ceremonial occasions he would contribute more than others. In case of drought he was expected to help out and when the chief (*ishe*) demanded tribute again he was expected to make his own contribution. The *sadunhu* was summoned from time to time to the chief's or even the emperor's courts, especially in times of national crises, such as war, or for such occasions as coronations or state funerals. He himself would periodically invite the *samushas* to his court for consultation and/or briefing.

The composition of a *dunhu*, more so than that of a village, was even less homogeneous from the point of 'blood' kinship relations. It is probably true that those related to the *sadunhu* by blood usually formed a strong, if not necessarily a majority, faction of the population in the *dunhu*. But, just as in the case of a village, types of 'perpetual' kinship relationships were usually established with the *sadunhu* and his kin group. To many Shona a *dunhu* was perhaps the largest 'extended family' they owed loyalty to without some kind of persuasion or coercion. Within a *dunhu* people could change their villages fairly freely, but no stranger could settle in a *dunhu* without the consent of a *sadunhu*. The people within a *dunhu* often attended each other's work parties just as they did at village level. A *dunhu* could be made up of anything from a few hundred to a couple of thousand people and could have a radius of 5 km, 10 km or more.

In war, the warriors from a *dunhu* would have fought, as we shall see later, as a distinct regiment/battalion, with the villages comprising the companies. The importance of a particular *dunhu* within a chiefdom (*nyika*) depended on a number of historical, political and demographic factors. A ward with many people, or far away from a chief's capital, probably enjoyed greater independence. However it was the *sadunhu's* kinship relations with the chief or *ishe* which was often most significant. If a ward chief belonged to one of the 'houses' within the chief's family with a right to succeed to the chieftaincy then, irrespective of its population or geographic location, such a *dunhu* was very important indeed. The same was true in the case of a dynastically senior *sadunhu* even if he had no rights to succession. All *masadunhu* were chosen according to the customs of the *dunhu* but were confirmed and crowned by the chiefs, the *madzishe*.

It would appear that a *sadunhu's* kinship connections were important elements in his ability to benefit from his position. And a *dunhu*, because of its well-defined territorial limits, often enjoyed a physical cohesion which a village did not possess.

(d) Nyika

Above the *sadunhus* were the *madzishe*, i.e. chiefs. These rulers at times called themselves, and wanted to be referred to as, *madzimambo* (sing. *mambo*), i.e. kings. But the Munhumutapas and the Rozvi emperors regarded themselves, and wanted to be regarded by other rulers, as the only *madzimambo*. Indeed some of these *madzishe* would have preferred to be addressed by the title *Madzimbabwe* (He that dwelleth in a *zimbabwe*),[40] a title strictly-speaking reserved for the emperors. The *madzishe* were the *reis* (kings) of the Portuguese documents. The headquarters/residence of such a ruler was described as a *muzinda*. In Manyika, the city where the *muzinda* was located was known as a *guta* and the *dare* of the ruler of Manyika, i.e. the Chikanga, was known as *binga*.[41] In the early eighteenth century when the Rozvi dominated the rulers of Mutapa they demanded that the headquarters of the latter should not be referred to as a *zimbabwe* but only as a *muzinda*.[42] *Mizinda* (sing. *muzinda*) were sizeable settlements. The sizes of chiefdoms (*nyika*) varied greatly from anywhere around 30 km to anything in the order of 90 km in length and width. The population of the chiefdoms also varied according to size and ecological capacity of the land. But the figures would probably have reached tens of thousands in most cases. Like a *dunhu*, a *nyika* or chiefdom had well-defined boundaries or *miganhu*.

A chief had legislative as well as judicial powers which he exercised in consultation with his council, the *dare*. An *ishe's dare* was not a free-for-all assembly; only specially chosen *makota* or *makurukota* (sing. *gota*) or counsellors/councillors could sit with the chief. The *makota* were either *machinda*, i.e. princes of the blood, or commoners of outstanding ability or wisdom.[43] The chief's *dare* was a high court of appeal which could impose capital punishment. A chief was chosen, invested and crowned in accordance with the practices of his chiefdom by a superior *mambo* (king, emperor).

A chief derived his income from a number of sources. Judicial fees were probably one of the more regular sources. Labour tribute, especially from those in the *dunhu* where the *muzinda* was located, was another important contribution. De Barros' description of *zunde*

in the Mutapa state shows just how significant this was. According to him,

> They [Shona of Mutapa] have a system of service . . . which is that all the officers and servants of his court, and the captains of the soldiers, each with his men, must serve him in the cultivation of his fields or other work seven days in every thirty. *And the lords to whom he gives any land which contains vassals receive the same service from them.*[44] (emphasis added)

Other *matunhu* would give labour service only if they were near enough. Those too far from the *muzinda* would have had to pay their *mupeto* (tribute) either in cattle, grain, gold, hoes or other valuables. Because of the availability of labour, a chief usually had more and larger fields than most people and his gold-digging operations would have benefited from the same labour. Furthermore, hunters had to pay special tributes to the chief. Any hunter who killed an elephant had to pay the tusk which touches the ground, i.e. the heavier one, to the chief.[45] Certain animals whose meat was considered a delicacy, e.g. pangolin *(haka),* had to be surrendered to the chief. Skins of royal animals such as lions, leopards and similar animals had to be handed over to the chief. There was no point in hiding them because one could never use them in public. Traders passing through a chiefdom sometimes had to pay tolls or presents to the chief. The chief was a recipient of other gifts from those who sought his favours. Through the wealth the chiefs appropriated from their subjects they were able to take part in external trade from which they obtained cloth, beads and trinkets.

From the sources of wealth cited above it should be evident that Shona chiefs were potentially relatively wealthy and powerful figures. The power of some of these subject chiefs of the Mutapa is amply attested to in the many wars they fought with so much bloodshed. Cases in point were the wars of the Samungazi Tonga and *Matuzianhe*. The stories of the rebellious wars fought by some of the Shona vassal rulers of the Mutapa and Rozvi *mambos* were so devastating that later scholars who argue that Shona chiefs ruled such loosely-organized confederacies that they could not have commanded much power do so at the expense of abandoning much evidence to the contrary.[46] Some of the provincial chiefs built for themselves stone structures – *zimbabwes* – as evidence of their wealth and power. A chief did not have a standing army but was able to mobilize the peasants in his chiefdom if the need arose. The first to

be mobilized were those hundreds of men who lived in the chief's *guta* followed by those who resided in the *dunhu* where the *guta* was situated, i.e. where the chief was in fact the *sadunhu*. These men could be mobilized in hours rather than days. When it is said that the Shona rulers had no standing army this fact must be borne in mind. In our study of pre-nineteenth-century Shona history we have not yet found evidence of many successful rebellions by *sadunhus* against provincial chiefs. The reason why such rebellions seem to have been rare cannot be ascribed solely to a speculation that this was so because the exactions by these chiefs were too light to bother the *sadunhus*, some of whom would have been conquered aboriginals. The coercive power of provincial chiefs was real enough to discourage revolts. Some of the provincial chiefs, especially if they were imperial princes or powerful chiefs, maintained their own bodyguards and musicians (drummers and *mbira*-players). In the cases of the rulers of Uteve, they tried to do everything on the scale of the Mutapas themselves. But then there is a sense in which from the sixteenth century onwards the Sachiteves should be treated like the Mutapas themselves. The same may be true of the Makombes of Barwe and the Chikangas of Manyika during certain periods of their history. These royal scions generally preferred to call themselves *madzimambo*, i.e. kings or emperors.

The unifying effect of kinship within a chiefdom was not as pronounced as it was at village level or even that of the ward level. But it would be wrong to claim that it was completely absent. Some of the *sadunhus* were often members of a chief's lineage superimposed on a conquered population and hence their very continued position would have been tied to the continued domination of the ruling chiefly lineage. In the case of conquered *sadunhus* usually intermarriage was used to establish kinship relationship. In this way kinship served to reinforce political allegiance.[47] At the levels of the Mutapa state intermarriage was used for similar purposes. But assisting kinship as integrative factors in a chiefdom were the presence of military forces, the practice of venerating the ancestors of chiefs and a common belief in a High God.

Above the *nyika* there were kingdoms and empires which were also known as *nyika*. The socio-economic organization and history of one of these, i.e. Mutapa state, is the subject of this study. But before dealing with the Mutapa state it is necessary to offer an historical identification of the Shona of Munhumutapa.

iii. Historical identification of the Shona (Karanga) of Mutapa

In present-day Zimbabwe the name Karanga is used to describe a subdivision of the Shona people found in the southern part of the country. These people speak a dialect of Shona known as Karanga.[48] From the available evidence, most of the Karanga of today would seem to be made up of breakaway groups from dynasties/'houses' to the north and east of the country.[49] However from the records it would appear that the term 'Karanga' is also the historic name of most of the people known today as the Shona in Zimbabwe. For throughout the 400 years or so of Portuguese intercourse with the Mutapa state the Portuguese consistently referred to the Mutapa and his people as the Karanga. To quote Fr dos Santos from the early seventeenth century,

> Monomotapa and all his vassals are Mocarangas, a name given to them as inhabitants of the lands of Mocaranga, and they speak a language called Mocaranga, which is the best and most polished of all the Kaffir tongues that I have heard spoken throughout this Ethiopia [Africa], as it is the softest, and their manner of speaking is better; for instance, the Moors of Africa and Arabia speak from the throat, as though they were vomiting and dragging their words from it, but on the contrary the Mocarangas speak and enunciate their words with the point of the tongue and with the lips in such a way that they pronounce many words almost whistling, which is very pleasing. So I have heard various Kaffirs from the courts of Quiteve and Monomotapa speak, where the most polished Mocaranga is used.[50]

Or as Fr Manuel Barretto said in 1667,

> Mokaranga is the name of the famous kingdom of the emperor of Monomotapa, and the natives are called Mokarangas. They are a noble race, and respected among the Kaffirs.[51]

The identification of Mutapa and his people as Karanga is found in all the other Portuguese sources as well.[52]

The name 'Shona' is a term apparently first used in written records south of the Limpopo by the white and Ndebele people in the nineteenth century to describe the historic Karanga people.[53] It has stuck and been 'accepted' by the people, thanks to the mediating role of colonial scholars and administrators. But during the period we are dealing with, the Shona people collectively called themselves and were known to others as the Karanga. To this day those who left the Zimbabwe homeland to migrate to the northern Transvaal and to

central and southern Mozambique, in their traditions refer to their early ancestors as Karanga and their original homeland, Zimbabwe, as Vukaranga (*Vhukalanga, Bhukalanga*). As Fr André Fernandes records in 1560 about a Karanga kingdom near Inhambane in Mozambique,

> The reason that these Mocarangas are among the Botongas, and surrounded by them on every side, is that the father of the present ruler had his dominion in Bocolonga, and was at war with another more powerful than himself, and was defeated.[54]

However, to avoid confusion, the modern term 'Shona' has been used retroactively to describe the 'Karanga' of Mutapa.

Historically, the Shona are said to have entered Zimbabwe during the later Iron Age (post AD 1000).[55] These later Iron Age people are said to have come from north of the Zambezi – some authorities say they came from southern Zaire (Shaba region)[56] while others say they came from the Great Lakes area of East Africa.[57] Whatever the true place of origin of these later Iron Age people may be, however, most of these authorities are agreed that these were the true ancestors of the historic Shona. Some go further to claim that the later Iron Age people were a better-armed and better-fed horde of invaders who absorbed, dominated or wiped out the previous 'Early Iron Age' population.[58] In fact there is no concrete evidence to back up the latter hypothesis. What evidence there is seems to imply that the later Iron Age people came in small groups. Some of these groups are recognized by means of the sites where their material remains have been found, as the 'Leopard Kopje', 'Harare', 'Musengezi', 'Ingombe Illede', 'Early Zimbabwe', etc. groups.[59] These cattle-keeping and iron-using agricultural communities did not enter an empty country. They found other iron-using agricultural communities known to archaeologists as the 'Gokomere' group.[60] The Gokomere people do not seem to have possessed as many cattle as the later Iron Age groups. But the weight of the evidence at present would seem to suggest that both the so-called 'Early' and 'Later' Iron Age peoples were Bantu-speakers.[61] In associating the present Shona language only with the later Iron Age, scholars assume that since the material culture associated with these people eventually became dominant therefore their language(s) also became dominant. Now this is an assumption which may or may not be true. However, there are no convincing arguments to prove that present-day Shona do not

represent an interaction of the 'Early Iron Age' populations with the 'Later Iron Age' communities. From their material cultures it is assumed that the two groups had a common ancestry. While this does not establish that their languages were necessarily similar it strongly suggests that they were probably both Bantu-speaking communities. If so then a fusion/amalgamation of their languages could have produced modern Shona. As the evidence stands there are no good reasons to exclude the early Iron Age communities from also being regarded as ancestors of the Shona.

But, according to Peter Garlake, the distinction between the later and early Iron Age is not altogether convincing. The evidence we have of increasing numbers of cattle and people and greater variety of pottery in the so-called 'Later Iron Age', is said to be no more than evidence of the growth of the so-called 'Early Iron Age' people. As the population increased in numbers so did their cattle. In this situation it was inevitable that local variations in pottery-making would arise. It is Garlake's contention that there is nothing in the present evidence that is inconsistent with the theory of local evolution from 'Early Iron Age' to the so-called 'Later Iron Age'. (personal communication) This is a very neat and attractive theory. However, what it now requires is the establishment of the stages of this evolution. In other words, we need concrete evidence of the intermediate villages where the populations of people and cattle are seen to be increasing slowly and pottery styles undergoing modifications. Furthermore, we need to integrate our local Iron Age study into the context of Bantu studies in the rest of Africa.

In time these people evolved the art of building in stone and of state formation. The greatest of their stone building achievements – Great Zimbabwe, Khami, Danamombe, Nhandare and Matendere stone structures – as well as their most famous state formations, Mutapa and Rozvi empires, were all based in present-day Zimbabwe. Going together with the above they evolved institutions and practices which enabled them to leave a permanent imprint on the history of south-central Africa. Besides the well-known Mutapa-related states of Uteve, Barwe and Danda[62] found in Mozambique, there are also less known but equally interesting Shona-related states of the Vhenda, Lobedu and Phalaborwa in the northern Transvaal[63] as well as Gambe's (Manekweni?) kingdom in Mozambique.[64] In southern Mozambique and north-east Transvaal are found the Tsonga-



above: The elliptical building at Great Zimbabwe. 'Zimbabwe-type' stone structures are characterized by free-standing walls.
below: Nhandare belongs to the 'Khami-type' tradition of stone building. It is characterized by retaining walls, platforms and general use of decoration.



speaking peoples, some of whom not only claim to have Shona origin in their traditions but whose adelphic collateral system of succession demonstrates clearly that they are more related to the Shona than to any other Bantu-speaking people south of the Zambezi or the Limpopo rivers.[65] In the Republic of Botswana are found the Kalanga-speaking people whose dialect is accepted as part of Shona and whose history and culture are closely tied to the historic Shona.[66] North of the Zambezi are found people collectively known as Gova who claim and show clear evidence of being related to the Shona. Furthermore, it has been argued that the Zimba of the sixteenth century were in fact a section of the Shona people who crossed north of the Zambezi, lived and increased in number under the overlordship of Undi before bursting with hurricane-force power from the Zambezi valley to East Africa, leaving behind a trail of horrific destruction.[67]

The historical influence and significance of the Shona in south-central Africa – diachronically, spatially, culturally and politically – may be comparable to that of the Luba-Lunda and the Nguni. If the Nguni were famed for their military prowess, the Shona, like the Lunda, became masters of the peaceful arts – agriculture, mining, trade, building and creation of political and religious institutions.[68]

The Shona-related societies were well-known as builders in stone. Apart from the Zimbabwean stone ruins, there are other ruins clearly related to the Zimbabwe stone culture found outside the country, like Mapungubwe in the northern Transvaal and Manekweni in southern Mozambique.[69] The stone ruins outside Zimbabwe tend to belong to what archaeologists call the 'Zimbabwe-type' ruins. These ruins are pre-sixteenth century in origin. Another stone-building tradition known as 'Khami-type' or 'Rozvi archaeology' is found only within the borders of present-day Zimbabwe, in the south-western part of the country. This tradition came into being only from the sixteenth century and reached its apogee in the late seventeenth to the eighteenth century with the rise to power of the Rozvi – a section of the Shona which achieved ascendancy in Zimbabwe from the late seventeenth to the early nineteenth century.

The two Shona stone-building traditions can be identified from each other by a number of characteristics. The 'Zimbabwe-type' stone structures tend to have free-standing walls, while the 'Khami-type' stone structures normally have retaining walls, platforms, general use of decoration and are archaeologically linked by the

occurrence of polychrome, incised, band-and-panel or Khami ruins pottery.[70] The 'Zimbabwe-type' stone structures seem to have begun not earlier than the eleventh century, flourished during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, and declined in the fifteenth century.[71] Since both Mapungubwe and Manekweni stone ruins belong to the later tradition, this suggests a presence of Shona, or Shona-related or influenced, people in the northern Transvaal and southern Mozambique well before the sixteenth century.[72] The 'Khami-type' structures are not older than the sixteenth century[73] and are thought to have flourished in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.[74] The famous Mutapa state is not associated with any major stoneworks.[75] The reason for this seems to have been because the state was based in an area where there was little granite stone suitable for building purposes.[76]

The Shona stone structures either of the 'Zimbabwe' or 'Khami' varieties are said not to have been built primarily for defensive purposes. They were largely meant to be permanent structures enclosing the pole-and-*dhaka* (mud) dwellings of a privileged population living within the stone structures. The beautiful chevron, dentelle, herringbone, check and cord forms of decoration found with the large structures tell us more of the wealth and aesthetic appreciation of the dwellers of the stone structures than their fears. The stone structures, therefore, are said to be poetry or political statements writ in stone for much the same reasons as Europe built its famous cathedrals and Versailles palaces. While desire for grandeur certainly played a part in the conception and execution of some of the larger structures, it is equally clear that some of these structures were often built on rock outcrops which could be defended easily. To argue that the rulers of these stone structures were so powerful that they had no conceivable enemy to threaten them is not to prove that the stone structures were built without defence in mind or that they were indeed no deterrent to potential rebels and invaders.[77] Certainly the history of the Mutapa state shows that, even without the presence of the Portuguese in the region, rebels and invaders were not in short supply in south-east central Africa. Given that potential aggressors were then armed with bows and arrows, clubs or battleaxes and could use stones, poles and fire to attack the stone-dwellers, the stone structures were indeed formidable and intimidating to the enemy. It is no wonder we find these stone structures strategically built where they can control important

grazing lands, goldfields or trade routes. According to de Barros, 'In the opinion of the Moors who saw it [Great Zimbabwe], it is very ancient and was built there to keep possession of the mines [gold].'[78] Besides the nearby goldfields, we know that Great Zimbabwe was strategically placed to exploit and dominate important grazing lands in the south and north. The Shona execution of these granite stone-built structures has been clearly and irrefutably established by the archaeologists who have excavated and studied the stone ruins.[79]

The Shona dwellers of the stone structures have left evidence of having had considerable trading relations with the east coast and other African peoples. The Shona trade in gold and ivory seems to have been a factor in the rise of the east coast city-states of Kilwa, Malindi, etc. Through Sofala the gold and ivory of Zimbabwe found their way to the above cities. The period of the flourishing of the East African city-states coincides with the rise of the 'Zimbabwe-type' stone structures.[80] This has often led some writers to conclude that the early 'Zimbabwe-type' stone culture and state formation were brought about as a result of the wealth from external trade. This so-called 'trade stimulus' hypothesis for the origin of the putative state based around the 'Great Zimbabwe'[81] seems doubtful in the light of recent research into the role of foreign trade in the Rozvi state and the role of cattle in the economy of the Great Zimbabwe state.[82]

A study of the 'Zimbabwe-type' ruins in Zimbabwe and Mozambique indicates that pastoralism was a major consideration in the economy and/or siting of these centres.[83] However, trade enabled the Shona diaspora to keep in touch in a way which otherwise might have been unlikely. There is evidence that northern Transvaal, southern Mozambique and the Zambezi valley communities were all in contact with parts of Zimbabwe.[84] It is partly as a result of common possession of some of the items of trade that a connection between the Vhenda, Lobedu and Phalaborwa and the Rozvi is postulated. The presence of the so-called 'water beads' found among the Vhenda, Lobedu and Phalaborwa as well as at the Danamombe, Khami and Nhandare ruins shows that these people were in touch with or related to the builders/dwellers, the Rozvi rulers, of those Zimbabwe stone structures.[85] It is in part for that reason that Lobedu, Phalaborwa and Vhenda migrations from Zimbabwe have been postulated to be about the seventeenth or eighteenth century.[86] By their knowledge of a wide expanse of south-central Africa and their cultural and linguistic affinity to a people occupying a large tract of southern Africa, Shona

communities everywhere possessed advantages which enabled other communities to share in and contribute towards the 'Greater Shona' commonwealth of interests. Further, it helped the Shona in diaspora quite often to assume roles of leadership wherever they found themselves.

Perhaps the best known Shona characteristic is their high level of cultic activity. Broadly speaking, all the Shona communities have a concept of a High God known at different times and in different places by different names but today generally referred to as *Mwari* in Zimbabwe. In addition to being monotheists, the Shona venerate their ancestors and believe in spirit possession. The above three cornerstones of the Shona belief system have been elaborated, modified and transformed in various places and at different stages of their history.

In the Mutapa state, spirit possession and ancestor veneration were raised to incredible heights in the form of royal *mhondoro* cults. This seems to have been done to legitimize and raise to prominence the ruling Shona dynasty of Mutota. But even during the period of Mutapa ascendancy the concept of a High God remained intact as is evidenced from contemporary Portuguese documents.[87] On the other hand, the breakaway Rozvi dynasty, while retaining spirit possession and ancestor veneration, failed or tactfully decided not to raise a royal *mhondoro* cult of the Mutapa proportions but instead accepted or elaborated on the High God aspect of Shona belief which is today known as the *Mwari* cult in Zimbabwe.[88] Manipulation of ritual seems to have played a big role in the development of the Lobedu state and in spreading Vhenda influence in the northern Transvaal; and rain-making seems to have been important in the maintenance of the power of the Shona ruler near Inhambane in the sixteenth century.[89]

Finally, Portuguese writers have left us such fascinating general descriptions of the appearance of the historic Shona of Mutapa that we have decided to reproduce some of them below to give the reader some impression and a feel of the times we are dealing with. From Portuguese sources of the sixteenth century we have a description left for us by one writer in about 1518. According to him the Shona of Mutapa were

> Gentiles whom the Moors call Kaffirs. They are black men, go about naked, and from the waist down they wear painted cotton cloths, and some cover themselves with animal skins, the skins they wear being of wild animals, and the leading citizens wear

those skins trailing along the ground like tails, to shew quality and gallantry, making leaps and gestures that make those tails go from one side to the other. These latter carry swords in wooden sheaths, adorned with gold or other metals, they wear them on the left side like we do, on belts of painted cloth made for the purpose with four or five knots, with their tassels hanging: they wear these for gallantry; in their hands they carry bows,and some spears. The bows they carry with their arrows are of middling size, not as long as the English nor as short as the Turk: the shafts of the arrows are long and very well made: they are warriors, some of them merchants; the women go about naked whilst they are maidens, only covering their shame with cotton cloths, and when they are married they throw other cloths over their breasts.[90]

And from the early 1570s, Fr Monclaro has left us another description of the Shona dress and appearance:

> All of them commonly wear loosely-woven cotton cloth . . . called *machiras* . . . These *machiras* may measure two rods and a half in length and a rod and a half across, being wound around the body and crosswise over the chest, the rest remaining uncovered. They wear horn-like headgear as an adornment, being made of their own hair turned back in a strange manner; these horns are in general use in Kaffraria, and provide a good shade. In the middle of the head they make one which draws the hair in most orderly well-arranged fashion, first making the hair long by means of small pieces of copper or tin which they tie at the end of a few hairs brought together, so that the weight gradually makes them long and not crisp, and thus they go about with their heads covered with these small pieces.
>
> Once the hair has grown long, they bring it together in the middle of the head in a fair amount to make a bigger horn, the hair being tied with a certain grass with which they make a very comely thread of a certain length; the tapering end is left untied. Then in most regular fashion they do make other small horns, being very skilful in this; and the women wear many copper rings in their arms and legs, being drawn very fine, and the same they make with gold, which is extremely fine and with this thread they make these rings.[91]

Finally, we have the additional description provided by Fr dos Santos from the early seventeenth century:

> Monomotapa and the Mocarangas his vassals wear a white shell on the forehead, hanging from the hair as an ornament, and Monomotapa wears another large shell on his breast. These shells they call andoros . . .
>
> No Kaffir cuts his beard or hair, nevertheless there are very

baskets of tough, flexible tree branches, to weave blankets and sacks from tree bark, to convert forest into fields by stumping, to help with sowing and reaping, to chase destructive baboons away from maize fields, and so on.

It is the duty of the women to observe cleanliness and order within their huts, to carry water and wood, sometimes over considerable distances, daily, to wash, dry, grind and cook millet which is necessary for the daily meals. Their principal work is making ready the lands and they have to prepare salt and beer. The education of the children is their very own task, as the man does not concern himself with this at all. There is certainly enough to do just to be able to live from hand to mouth, and considering this, one can excuse polygamy.

16. Dos Santos, 'Ethiópia Oriental', 208.
17. Mauch, 'The Makalaka', 71–72; see note 15 for the full quotation.
18. A.M. Pacheco, *Uma viagem de Tete ao Zumbo (Diário)* (Lourenço Marques, 1883), 29; Holleman, 'Some Shona Tribes', 361.
19. Holleman, 'Some Shona Tribes', 374.
20. M.W. Murphree, *Christianity and the Shona* (London, 1969), 29.
21. Posselt, *Fact and Fiction*, 126; '"Chigumi", "Kugarira" or "Ugariri"', *NADA*, (1923), 79–81.
22. Murphree, *Christianity and the Shona*, 22; R. Palmer, *Land and Racial Domination in Rhodesia* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1977), 15.
23. P. Sinclair, 'First steps towards the reconstruction of the rural economy of the Zimbabwe state', paper presented at the *International Conference on Southern African History* (Roma, August 1–8, 1977),1; T.N. Huffman, 'Zimbabwe: Southern Africa's First Town', *Rhodesian Prehistory, VII, XV*, (1977), 13; P.S. Garlake, *Great Zimbabwe described and explained* (Harare, 1982), 14.
24. Monclaro, 'Relação', 385.
25. Dos Santos, 'Ethiópia Oriental', 208.
26. Ibid., 321.
27. Those who spoke imprudently when the *dare* sat as a court were often given the duty to slaughter and skin a goat so that by the time they were through the case would also be over. Hence the Shona saying: *kuvhiyiswa mbudzi*, to be made to skin a goat, i.e. to be sent away on a frivolous mission while serious business is being settled.
28. e.g., J.K. Nyerere, 'Ujamaa – The Basis of African Socialism', in G.C.M. Mutiso and S.W. Rohio, *Readings in African Political Thought* (London, 1975), 512–515.
29. C. Meillassoux, 'From reproduction to production: A Marxist approach to economic anthropology', *Economy and Society, 1*, 1, (1972), 99–100; Holleman, *Chief, Council and Commissioner*, 84–85.
30. Dos Santos, 'Ethiópia Oriental', 286.
31. Manuel Barretto, 'Informação do Estado e Conquista dos Rios de Cuama', *RSEA, 3*, 467.
32. Holleman, *Chief, Council and Commissioner*, 88.
33. Ibid., 89, 91.
34. C. Bullock, *The Mashona* (Cape Town, 1928), 254; Dos Santos, 'Ethiópia Oriental', 200; H.F., 'Chisi or Zwisi', *NADA, II*, (1933), 32; A. Bocarro, 'Década XIII da História da India', *RSEA, 3*, 359. According to M de Faria e Sousa, 'Ásia Portuguesa', *RSEA, 1*, 25, the festival days were the fourth and fifth day of each week.
35. Holleman, *Chief, Council and Commissioner*, 89.

36. Dos Santos, 'Ethiópia Oriental', 200.
37. Bocarro, 'Década', 360.
38. Ibid; João de Barros, 'Da Ásia', *RSEA*, 6, 269. De Barros makes clear that the day of the new moon was a holiday as well as the sixth and seventh days of the week. This made the days of rest seven in a month.
39. Bocarro, 'Década', 360–361.
40. Abraham, 'Monomotapa Dynasty', 76, 77; Bullock, *The Mashona*, 38.
41. Anon., 'Discripção Corográfica do Reino da Manica seus Custumes e Leis', *Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino avulsos de Moçambique caixa* (A.H.U. Av. de Moc. CX.), 17.
42. Chapter 8. See note 51.
43. Bullock, *The Mashona*, 384.
44. De Barros, 'Da Ásia', 271; Bullock, *The Mashona*, 298, 300–301, 383; Holleman, *Chief, Council and Commissioner*, 92–93, 87; Dos Santos, 'Ethiopia Oriental', 222; M. Hannan (SJ), *Standard Shona Dictionary* (Salisbury, 1974), 752.
45. D. Livingstone, *Missionary Travels and Researches in South Africa* (London, 1857, reprint 1972), 651.
46. Holleman, *Chief, Council and Commissioner*, 90.
47. Ibid., 91.
48. C.M. Doke, *A comparative study in Shona Phonetics* (Johannesburg, 1931), 3, 167.
49. This is true of the important Chiefs of Chivi, Bere, Banga, Churumuhanzu, Gutu, Ndanga, Moyondizvo Rozvi, etc. For the evidence see Posselt, *Fact and Fiction*; Bullock, *The Mashona*; R. Baker, 'The Mutupo among the Wa Manyika', *NADA*, 3, (1925); H. Franklin, 'Nyaningwe', *NADA*, 6, (1928); Sr M. Aquina, 'The Tribes in Chilimanzi Reserve', *NADA*, *IX*, (1965) and 'The Tribes in Victoria Reserve', *NADA*, *IX*, (1965); L.C. Meredith, 'The Rain Spirit of Mabota Murangadzwa, Melsetter District', *NADA*, 3, (1925); J.H. Tagwireyi, 'Origin of the Vamari clan', *NADA*, 27, (1950); P. Tizirai, 'The story of the Chilimanzi people (Vamanzu)', *NADA*, 26, (1949); D.J. Van der Merwe, 'Some history of the Vakaranga in the Gutu Reserve', *NADA*, *14*, (1936–7).
50. Dos Santos, 'Ethiópia Oriental', 288–289.
51. Barretto, 'Informação', 482.
52. e.g., Bocarro, 'Década', 358; Faria e Sousa, 'Ásia Portuguesa', 24.
53. There is no evidence that the term 'Shona' was ever used before the nineteenth century. Von Sicard's attempts to derive the term Shona from the name of the town of Sena is unconvincing. Equally baseless is the conjecture that the term might have derived from the Portuguese term *suina* (swine). What is without doubt is that the term is first found in the records written by whites coming from South Africa in the nineteenth century. Finally we have today Ndebele sources claiming that the term 'Shona' was given to the original inhabitants of this country by their (Ndebele) ancestors. See H. Von Sicard, 'The Derivation of the name Mashona', *African Studies*, *9*, 3, (1950), 138–143; P.R. Kirby (ed), *The Diary of Dr. Andrew Smith, 1834–1836*, vol. 2, (1940), 222; J.P.R. Wallis (ed), *The Matabele Journals of Robert Moffat 1829–1860*, vol. 1, (1976), 233; Bullock, *The Mashona*, 12; Posselt, *Fact and Fiction*, 12. According to Dr N. Bhebe, 'In my interview with Nqagwana Khumalo, husband of the daughter of Mgandani, Ntabayezinduna T.T.L., 17/6/71, he had this to say on the origins of the name Shona among the Ndebele: "We used to attack these people and they would run away and disappear into holes and caves." (Sindebele version, "Sasihlasela abantu laba babaleke bayotshona emilindini. Yikho sasesibathi ngamatshona.") (personal communication) However it should be

noted that Dr Andrew Smith used the term 'Mashoona' in his diary in 1835, i.e about four years before the Ndebele nation moved from the Transvaal to Zimbabwe. This evidence casts doubt on the Nqagwana Khumalo's evidence as given to Dr Bhebe. It can also be stated categorically that the Portuguese only used the term Shona in the nineteenth century following the use of the term by the whites in South Africa. A nineteenth-century Portuguese source is very clear on this subject:

> Much of this territory, |wrote B. de Freitas about the present three Mashonaland provinces| or all of it, is called 'Mashona' or Mashonaland by the English, certainly ambiguously. None of the people of this part of Africa accept such a name, and none admit that it has been given to them to indicate a nationality or race. The etymology of this word seems to be 'ma-bchina, bchuna, bchura', which derives from 'ura', 'dirtiness', 'cutaneous excretion', a term of disgust used by the Zulus to indicate the people of the north, no matter which ones.

Freitas, B. de, 'Memorandum on the Rights of Portugal in the Territories to the South of the Zambesi', 12 July 1890, F|oreign| O|ffice| 179 [Embassy and Consular Archives, Portugal, Correspondence, 1800–1912] 279, No. 168. T.V. Lister to G. Petre, No. 57. It is to the south therefore that research into the origin of the term Shona should initially turn for clues.

54. André Fernandes to Father Provincial in India, Otongue, 24 June 1560, *RSEA*, 2, 66; E.J. Krige, 'Note on the Phalaborwa', 358; J.D. Krige, 'Traditional Origins and Tribal Relationships of the Sotho of the Northern Transvaal', BS, 11, (1937), 325; H.A. Stayt, *The Bavenda* (London, 1931), 17; N.J. Van Warmelo, *Contributions towards Venda History, Religion and Tribal Ritual* (Pretoria, 1932), 9; Botelho, *Memória estatística*, 145–172; A.K. Smith, 'The peoples of Southern Mozambique; An historical survey', *JAH, XIV*, (1973), 565–580.
55. R. Summers, 'The Rhodesian Iron Age', in J.D. Fage and R.A. Oliver (ed), *Papers in African Prehistory* (London, 1970), 164; T.N. Huffman, 'Prehistory – Iron Age, Ruins Period', *Rhodesiana, 29*, (1973), 10; Abraham, 'Early Political History', 61, 74–75.
56. P.S. Garlake, *Great Zimbabwe*. (London, 1973), 155–156. Suggests that Leopard Kopje people may have entered Matabeleland from northern Botswana and Angola; R.A. Oliver, 'The Problem of the Bantu Expansion', in Fage and Oliver (ed), *Papers in African Prehistory*, 153, 154.
57. Abraham, 'The Early Political History', 61; Marodzi, 'The Barozwi', *NADA*, 2, (1924), 88; R. Summers, *Zimbabwe: A Rhodesian Mystery* (Johannesburg, 1965), 80, 83.
58. Summers, 'The Rhodesian Iron Age', in Fage and Oliver (ed), *Papers in African Prehistory*, 164; B.M. Fagan, 'The Greefswald Sequence: Bambandyanalo and Mapungubwe', in Fage and Oliver (ed), *Papers in African Prehistory*, 195–8.
59. Garlake, *Great Zimbabwe*, 158–160; T.N. Huffman, 'Great Zimbabwe: A review article', *Rhodesiana, 29*, (1973), 90.
60. Summers, 'The Rhodesian Iron Age', 160–161; T.N. Huffman, 'Prehistory – Iron Age, Ruins Period', 9.
61. T.N. Huffman, 'The Early Iron Age and the Spread of the Bantu', *South African Archaeological Bulletin* (S. Afr. Archaeol. Bull.), *XXV*, 97, (1970), 3–21.
62. Botelho, *Memória estátistica, 145–172;* Pacheco, *Uma Viagem*, 22.
63. Van Warmelo, *Contributions towards Venda History*, 4–9; E.J. Krige and J.D. Krige,

The Realm of a Rain Queen (London, 1943), 5; E.J. Krige, 'Note on the Phalaborwa', 358.

64. P.S. Garlake, 'Pastoralism and Zimbabwe', *JAH, XIX*, 4, (1978), 487.
65. Smith, 'The Peoples of Southern Mozambique', 565–580; M. Wilson, 'The Sotho, Venda and Tsonga' in M. Wilson and L. Thompson (ed), *The Oxford History of South Africa, 1*, (London, 1969), 176, 178.
66. A.M. Sebina, 'Makalaka', *African Studies (AS), 6*, 2, (1947), 82–94; Doke, *Shona Phonetics*, 3, 167.
67. Chapter 6, note 133; C.S. Lancaster, 'The Economics of Social Organisation in an Ethnic Border Zone: The Goba (Northern Shona) of the Zambezi valley, *Ethnology, 10*, (1971), 445–465; C.S. Lancaster, 'Ethnic identity, history and "tribe" in the Middle Zambezi valley', *American Ethnologist, 1*, 4, (1974), 707–730.
68. Jan Vansina, *Kingdoms of the Savanna* (Madison and London, 1968), 70–97; J.D. Omer-Cooper, *The Zulu Aftermath* (London, 1966).
69. Garlake, 'Pastoralism and Zimbabwe', 482; Garlake, *Great Zimbabwe*, 156–159.
70. P.S. Garlake, 'Rhodesian ruins – a preliminary assessment of their styles and chronology', *JAH, XI*, 4, (1970), 505.
71. Ibid., 501–2.
72. Garlake, 'Pastoralism and Zimbabwe', 482. Garlake says that stone building at Manekweni probably started in early or mid fourteenth century. Carbon dates of AD 1370 and AD 1410 for Mapungubwe have been established. R.R. Inskeep, 'The archaeological background' in M. Wilson and L. Thompson, *The Oxford History of South Africa, 1*, 33–34.
73. Garlake, 'Rhodesian ruins', 503.
74. Ibid., 508; S.I.G. Mudenge, 'Eighteenth-Century Portuguese Settlements on the Zambezi and the Dating of Rhodesian Ruins; Some Reflections on the Problems of Reference Dating', *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* (Intern. Journ. Afric. Hist. Stud.), *X*, 3, (1977), 390–3.
75. See Chapter 2 for reference to minor stone building by early Mutapas. The largest of these was *Rusvingo rwa Kasekete*. R. Summers, *Ancient Ruins and Vanished Civilization of Southern Africa* (Cape Town, 1971), 46.
76. Garlake, 'Rhodesian ruins', 508.
77. Garlake, *Great Zimbabwe described and explained*, 13–14.
78. De Barros, 'Da Ásia', 268; Damião de Goes, 'Chrônica do Felicíssimo Rei Dom Emanuel da Gloriosa Memória', *RSEA, 3*, 129.
79. e.g., D. Randall-MacIver, *Mediaeval Rhodesia* (London, 1906); G. Caton-Thompson, *The Zimbabwe Culture* (Oxford, 1931); Summers, *Zimbabwe: A Rhodesian Mystery*; Garlake, *Great Zimbabwe*. The argument against a Shona origin is espoused mainly by non-archaeologists like R.N. Hall in *Prehistoric Rhodesia* (London, 1909) and *Great Zimbabwe* (London, 1905).
80. P.S. Garlake, 'The value of imported ceramics in the dating and interpretation of the Rhodesian Iron Age', *JAH, IX*, 1, (1968), 26–28; T.N. Huffman, 'The rise and fall of Zimbabwe', *JAH, XIII*, 3, (1972), 362–363.
81. Huffman, 'Prehistory – Iron Age, Ruins Period', 11–13; 'Great Zimbabwe: A review article', 88–92; 'The rise and fall of Zimbabwe', 353–366; D. Randall-MacIver, *Mediaeval Rhodesia*, 86.
82. Garlake, 'Pastoralism and Zimbabwe', 479–493; S.I. Mudenge, 'The Role of Foreign Trade in the Rozvi Empire: A Reappraisal', *JAH XV*, 3, (1974), 373–391.
83. Garlake, 'Pastoralism and Zimbabwe', 479–493.
84. M. Wilson, 'The Sotho, Venda and Tsonga' in M. Wilson and L. Thompson (ed),

The Oxford History of South Africa, (1), 151, 164; Mudenge, 'Rozvi Empire and Feira of Zumbo', Chapters 1, 4, 5, 6. See also Chapters 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 below.

85. C.C. Davison and J.D. Clark, 'Transvaal Heirloom Beads and Rhodesian Archaeological sites', *AS, 35,* 2, (1976), 123–137.
86. Ibid., 136, 137.
87. See Chapter 3, section iii (f). See also Chapter 4, section (i) below.
88. Mudenge, 'Rozvi Empire and Feira of Zumbo', 126–138; M.L. Daneel, *The God of the Matopo Hills, an Essay on the Mwari Cult in Rhodesia* (The Hague, 1970).
89. Krige and Krige, *Realm of a Rain Queen,* 3; G.P. Lestrade, 'Some notes on the Political Organization of the Venda-Speaking Tribes', in Van Warmelo, *Contributions Towards Venda History,* IV–V; G.P. Lestrade 'Some notes on the Ethnic History of the VhaVenda and their Rhodesian Affinities', in Van Warmelo, *Contributions Towards Venda History,* XXVII–XXVIII; N.J. Van Warmelo, *The Copper Miners of Musina and the Early History of the Zoutpansberg* (Pretoria, 1940), 23; Fr André Fernandes to the Brothers and Fathers of the Society of Jesus in Portugal, Goa, 5 December 1562, *RSEA, 2,* 148, 'and that almost the only cause of such respect as they had for him was that they thought he had power to give them water and could deprive them of it at his will, and when he wishes to threaten them he says he will give them no water'.
90. [Anon.], 'Descrição da Situação, Costumes e Produtos de Alguns Lugares de África', (*c.* 1518), *DPMAC, V,* 359, 361.
91. Monclaro, 'Relação', 381. This description of the Shona of the Mutapa is very similar to one of the Shona of Uteve left by Fr dos Santos:

> Most of these Kaffirs are as black as jet, with woolly hair; they are handsome men, especially the Macarangas, who dwell in the lands of Quiteve. All wear their hair made into horns all over their heads for finery. The hair is made to stand up as straight as an arrow by being twisted round a thin piece of wood, so that it cannot bend, and outside it is bound with the outer covering of a certain herb like that of spurge laurel, which when it is fresh sticks like glue, and when it is dry becomes as hard as wood. With this they tie their hair in twists from the root to the point, making each twist into a very well shaped horn, and this is all their finery and show, which they arrange for each other. They make great sport of a man who wears no horns, saying that he is like a woman, because a man being the male should have horns. . . No Kaffir may wear his horns in the same fashion as Quiteve; he wears four horns; one a palm in length above his forehead like a unicorn, and three half a palm in length, one at the back of the head, and one over each ear; each horn standing very straight up in its place. . .
>
> The dress of the king and of his lords is a fine cloth of cotton or silk hanging from the waist to the ankle, and another much larger cloth of the same cotton woven by the Kaffirs, which they call *machiras,* or of silk, thrown over the shoulders like a cape, with which they cover and muffle themselves, always leaving the end of the cloth on the left side so long that it drags upon the ground, and the more it drags the greater their majesty and dignity. The rest of their body is naked. All, even the king, go barefoot.

Dos Santos, 'Ethiópia Oriental', 206–207. Dos Santos makes clear that some ordinary people go naked but many others wear monkey skins.

92. Dos Santos, 'Ethiópia Oriental', 289.

CHAPTER 2

Munhumutapa Empire from the Foundation to the Martyrdom of Fr Silveira: *c.*1400 to 1561

i. Foundation of the empire

The Munhumutapa empire is said to have been a conquest state founded by one Prince Mutota, also known as Nyatsimba or Nemasengere.[1] It is claimed to have been a successor to the state associated with the Great Zimbabwe.[2] The precise relationship between the 'Great Zimbabwe State' and its successor, the Mutapa empire, remains obscure. And so too is the actual story of how the Mutapa empire was founded. The best evidence for the existence of a state around the Great Zimbabwe is deduced from archaeology. Whether this state was restricted to the area immediately surrounding the Great Zimbabwe ruins or included much of present-day Zimbabwe is not clear. All that can be confidently said is that the culture associated with the Great Zimbabwe civilization spread far beyond the vicinity of the ruins. It spread as far as present-day Mozambique and included much of the future Mutapa empire. It is also known that the people of the Great Zimbabwe state had trading relations with the east coast as well as with other parts of Zimbabwe, such as the Urungwe district which appears to have sent copper objects to the Great Zimbabwe.[3] It is possible that Zimbabwe cotton or cotton cloth (*machira*) and Chidima-Dande salt may have been other items sent from the Zambezi valley to the Great Zimbabwe state.[4]

The history of the Mutapa empire from its foundation until about 1490 suffers from a lack of accurate dating. But after that date Portuguese sources can be used to reconstruct its story. Prior to that time, historians have relied on oral evidence collected in the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Although these oral sources purport to give specific names/events of the Great Zimbabwe state period and the Mutapa state before 1490 it is not at all clear as to how reliable these can be. It seems more likely that the events described in these sources for the pre-1490 period are in effect a much telescoped version of what happened. We know for certain that our chief source, *mhondoro* Mutota, by giving only 14 Mutapas who ruled from *c.*1700

to 1902, in fact remembered only half of the actual number of Mutapas who succeeded to the throne during that period.[5] The same is true of Pacheco's informants who remembered only 20 Mutapas who ruled from the beginning of the state to 1862.[6] The true figure should have been more than 40 Mutapas. Following similar reasoning, it seems that the names of six Mutapas said to have succeeded before 1490 are most probably a telescoped version of the reality. Therefore the achievements often ascribed to such legendary figures as Mutota and Matope may well represent processes of state formation to which a number of other as yet unknown Mutapa rulers contributed. It is therefore as embodiment of the process of state formation that the stories of these rulers are here retold.

According to archaeological evidence, the 'Great Zimbabwe State' began to decline from the mid-fourteenth century. It is not clear whether this decline was caused by internal or external factors. It is possible that civil wars, over-population around the Great Zimbabwe, famine, plague, decreasing gold production and/or coastal trade may have led to the decline of this state. One writer has even suggested that decreasing rainfall and earth movement in the region hampered the navigability of the Save river which is said to have been the main trade route of the Great Zimbabwe state.[7]

Either as a consequence of or in response to some such forces as suggested above, some elements within the state began moving northwards, toward a region already in trade contact with the Great Zimbabwe state. The evidence from the oral sources gives two different processes of the foundation of the Mutapa state. One is that of a conquering army from the Great Zimbabwe state, under Prince Mutota, swinging through Shangwe into Dande in search of salt.[8] If indeed Mutota was a prince of the ruler of the Great Zimbabwe state, given as Chimubatamatosi, it is just conceivable that such a conquering army could in fact have established the Mutapa empire.[9] The second version presents a less dramatic but much more complex, and perhaps more believable, picture. According to this latter version, the foundation of the Mutapa empire was a much slower process of infiltration of the Shangwe–Dande–Chidima regions by small Karanga groups of hunters/refugees/adventurers from the south.[10] Over a period of time, perhaps covering nearly half a century, one of these Karanga elephant-hunters from the south, known to us as Mutota,[11] a man of outstanding abilities then living in Shangwe, rose to

prominence. He began to be interested in moslem traders coming from the newly-established sultanate of Angoche who were using the Zambezi trade route into the interior of Zimbabwe instead of the traditional Sofala overland route. The Angoche traders used to trade for ivory and gold with some Tonga and Tavara societies along the Zambezi river.[12] The existence of good rock salt in Dande, an area to the north-east of Shangwe, further excited the Karanga hunter's interest in that region. It seems that by that time the hunter(s) had made alliances with some of the Mombara, Tonga and Tavara groups and individuals. Traditions recall that one such individual, a man called Netondo or Nyakatondo, probably a local trader who used to buy ivory from the Karanga and sell it to the moslem traders, became a close ally of Mutota.[13]

Through intermarriage, and economic intercourse with the peoples in the north and north-east, as well as by calculated political intervention in contested chieftaincy successions in favour of one side or the other, the Karanga were able to establish control and spread their influence over the indigenous groups. By such means they became arbiters or power-brokers in the region. Relying on such networks of relationships, which marriage, kinship systems and economic contacts reinforced and consolidated, one of the Karanga clans, later to be known as the *Nzou Samanyanga* clan, provided a number of outstanding hunter-warriors, the best known being Mutota or Nemasengere. As their power increased, Mutota was able to mobilize it to conquer Dande with its rich agricultural lands, rich elephant-hunting grounds, good-quality salt deposits, strategic location between the Tavara/Tonga in the east who were at that period then in touch with the moslem traders and the Mombara copper traders in the west, as well as the fact that it abutted the Zambezi river opposite its junction with the Luangwa river.[14]

To win Dande, Mutota and his sons are said to have defeated a powerful Tavara chief called Matsiwu and the chief rain-maker known as Karuva, a priest of the local *Dzivaguru* or 'High God' cult. Karuva was pushed further east into Choma.[15] Mutota, the ruler of Dande, and the friend and ally of many chiefs to the west, south and east of his chiefdom/kingdom, established his capital at Chitako-Changonya hill close to the Utete river. It is said that he later built a stone enclosure close by. When he had conquered Dande he distributed/confirmed ownership of *matunhu* and *nyika* to some of his allies who had assisted

him in his conquest or accepted his authority. It is said that before his death Mutota was able to impose his overlordship on the traditional Karanga lands of Guruuswa.[16] How effectively Mutota controlled these series of alliances is not at all clear. It is, however, unlikely that this would have been very effective at that stage.

Before his death Mutota is said to have demanded that any of his sons who wished to succeed him had first to commit incest with Nyamhita, one of his daughters. This seems to be a very intriguing request because there is no obvious reason why the demand, given Shona culture as it subsequently evolved, should have been made. There is no evidence that this act was believed to fortify the new ruler, nor was the possibility that Nyamhita was a favoured daughter of Mutota a sufficient explanation. Even less satisfactory is the inference that Mutota did not know how to handle the succession issue and knowing that most of his sons would baulk at the thought of incest put it as a condition. The speculation that there may have been some fertility rites associated with such incestuous relations finds no basis in Shona culture.[17] What the legend seems to stress however was Matope's consuming ambition for power which led him to do the unthinkable.[18] Finally, it is just conceivable that some of the inhabitants of the Zambezi valley may possibly have followed a matrilineal form of succession, like the Tonga and the Maravi people, and as such they expected Nyamhita to succeed. However, since the Shona of Mutota followed the patrilineal form of succession, they expected Matope or one of the sons of Mutota to succeed. In the marriage of Matope and Nyamhita the two systems/traditions coalesced at the expense of the matrilineal system. It must be pointed out, however, that at this stage this is only a theory and not an established fact.

When Mutota died he was succeeded by his son Matope, alias Nyanhehwe alias Nebedza,[19] or by Nemangoro, another of his senior sons. Although not much is known of Nemangoro's reign the fact that it is mentioned at all, in view of the complete domination of subsequent Mutapa history by the descendants of Matope (Nebedza), must be taken as very strong evidence indeed that Nemangoro did succeed his father Mutota. His reign must have been sufficiently notable to escape the all-too-familiar historical amnesia often imposed on such events by the house which subsequently becomes dominant. However, what is in no doubt is the eventual succession of Matope.[20] Matope was probably the greatest conqueror and ruler of all the

Mutapas. Even long after his death his *mhondoro* claimed, and was accorded, spiritual superiority over all the Mutapa *mhondoro* up to the twentieth century. It is only twentieth-century sources that challenge this superiority by claiming that the *mhondoro* Mutota is the senior *mhondoro*.[21] Part of the reason why this was so may well be because the sons of Matope wanted to exclude the descendants of all the other sons of Mutota from succession by elevating Matope to the position where he challenged even Mutota in spiritual seniority. A similar situation is apparent in the importance accorded to Mutapa Mukombwe once his descendants managed to monopolize the throne after 1695. In the history of the Mutapa state, Mukombwe, Matope and Mutota are remembered as Mutapas who distributed land to their followers.[22]

Matope's *zimbabwe* was found in Bedza region, about 30 km south of the Zambezi–Musengezi confluence.[23] It is for that reason that Matope, alias Nyanhehwe, was also known as Nebedza, i.e. the owner or ruler of Bedza. Matope gave the district of Handa, which was just north of Bedza along the Musengezi river, to his sister-wife Nyamhita, who for that reason became known as Nehanda, i.e. the ruler/owner of Handa.[24] After consolidating his somewhat unusual succession Matope went to wars of conquest. In a series of campaigns he conquered all the lands east of the Musengezi river to the very banks of the Rwenya river, subjecting Tavara and Tonga groups.[25] In these campaigns Matope continued to use his father's technique of making alliances. Exploiting what seems to have been the influence of the *Nguruve* clan in the area, he gave one of his daughters/sisters, known as Mureche, to an important member of that clan by the name of Chimupore.[26] With support from Matope, Chimupore was able to exert his authority over what later became the Barwe kingdom. The extension of the area of influence from Barwe to the Indian Ocean may have been effected during this period or shortly before Matope's death.[27]

After his campaigns to the Rwenya, Matope found that his authority was being resisted by the Tavara around Choma. These Tavara were led by the Tsunga of the *Nhari Unendoro* clan whose spokesman was Karuva, a priest of the *Dzivaguru* cult. Apparently these people offered tough opposition to Matope. Tradition has preserved their resistance in the form of legends.

In 1862, Pacheco recorded one version of this legend. According

to the Pacheco version, after Matope completed his campaigns which had taken him as far afield as the river Rwenya, on his return journey he found his passage home blockaded by the forces of a princess, Chikara, who was more powerful than himself. At first Matope was at a loss as to what to do. In the end he decided to seize one of the locals by the name of Chikuma who told him the secret of Chikara's strength. He advised Matope that his warriors should wear rosaries made of sea and cowrie shells around their heads. Matope followed the advice and his men pursued those of Chikara who, seeing the advancing forces, hurriedly retreated. Chikara, realizing what was happening, escaped towards Nyamakate pool where she, together with her children, drowned.[28]

Variants of the above legend have been collected since the eighteenth century by writers such as Miranda, Posselt, Gelfand and Bourdillon,[29] to mention only a few. In these basically similar legends, the name of the person who resisted is sometimes given as Dzivaguru, Karuva or Murungu. More will be said about these legends in chapters three and four when the religion of the Mutapa state is discussed. Let it suffice for the moment to say that the Chikara mentioned by Pacheco was most probably none other than Karuva, a powerful rain-maker of the *Dzivaguru* (High God) cult. He belonged to an important Tavara section of the *Nhari Unendoro* clan.

From this legend, repeated both by Mutapa and *Nhari Unendoro* sources, we may deduce that Matope met stiff resistance from the Tavara people organized by the *Nhari Unendoro* clan. After failing on many occasions to subdue them on his own, he decided to ally himself with some of the Tavara. Either through bribery or threats, he secured the co-operation of Chikuma, a son of Karuva, who either betrayed the positions of the Tavara forces under his father's command or even contributed forces to Matope to attack those under Karuva. It was only then that Matope succeeded in subduing the Tavara. After his victory, Matope made Chikuma an important chief among the Tavara and Chikuma's descendant, Chief Chizwiti, is still one of the most important Tavara chiefs in Zimbabwe today. In return, Chikuma is said to have given Nokavemba,[30] a sister of his, as wife to Matope to seal their friendship and alliance. Matope also allowed the *Dzivaguru* cult to continue as long as it was not used as a rallying point against his authority. As for himself he either assumed or was accorded the praise name Mutavara, i.e. conqueror of the Tavara, to commemorate his sweet victory over the Tavara peoples.[31]

Before his death, Matope is said to have established himself as the most powerful person south of the Zambezi all the way to the Indian Ocean.[32] Matope's wars along the hot and inhospitable, tsetse-infested Zambezi valley lowlands, instead of the gold-producing, healthy, eastern highlands of Manyika, may seem intriguing at first. But a description of the moslem trade routes of the fifteenth century makes this an intelligible strategy.

ii. Long distance trade routes and moslem traders

During the fifteenth century there were two moslem trading factions competing with each other for the Zimbabwe gold trade. One group was made up of the moslem traders from the sultanate of Angoche who were using the Zambezi river as a trade route to reach the Zimbabwe highlands. The second group was made up of the Sofala-based traders who travelled overland through Manyika. These groups came into existence in the fifteenth century as a result of rivalries in Kilwa, where the defeated faction moved south to found a new sultanate at Angoche which was independent of Kilwa. Since Sofala remained loyal to Kilwa, these two settlements of Angoche and Sofala competed for the Zimbabwe gold trade.[33]

The conquests of Matope must have suited the Angoche moslems quite well. From Angoche, moslem traders used to sail to the mouth of the Cuama (Zambezi) known as Quelimane. Six leagues up the stream was the town of the famous chief Mongalo, one of whose descendants was to meet Vasco da Gama in 1497 and the Francisco Barreto expedition of 1571.[34] There they paid their dues and hired smaller boats, or *almadias*, to carry their merchandise along the channel until they came to where the channel was too narrow to navigate. From there they carried their goods overland. But when they came to the main stream they reloaded their cargo into the boats. Further up the stream, about 20 leagues (200 km), they came to a mountain called Otonga (Tonga country). Here was a large village where moslem and African traders set up *bazaars* (markets) to barter with each other.[35] This Otonga seems to have been known at times as *Ounharouro* or *Onhaquoro* and may have been at or just below modern Sena.[36] In the interior, another famous trading centre was in the land of the Mombara (Mambara) people. Here much copper was traded between the moslems, the Karanga of Mutapa and the Mambara people. The trade of Mambara may have taken place at Ingombe Illede and/or around the Hwangwa river *feira* site of the seventeenth century.[37]

The overland trade route from Sofala through Manyika had its own *bazaars*, one of the better known being the *bazaar* of Nyakouee (*Ynhacouee*) whose ruler, according to António Fernandes, was

> the captain-major of the king of Menamotapa [who] . . . has great lands and in his lands they have fairs on Mondays which they call Sembaza fairs where the Moors sell all their merchandise; the kaffirs also gather there from all the lands and thus they have quantities of supplies; it is said that the fair is as big as that of the Vertudes.[38]

This *bazaar* may have been up the Rebvuwe river somewhere around the future *feira* of Bandire.

Besides the above known *bazaars* there were probably other central points inland which served the same purpose. In addition to such trading centres, trade was also facilitated by itinerant moslem traders who travelled through the major villages selling their merchandise. Some moslem traders used local Africans as *vashambadzi*, or itinerant agents, to visit the villages. De Barros shows that the moslem traders did visit the interior centres to trade when he writes that in order to get gold from the Shona,

> the Moors who carry on the trade among them make use of artifice to arouse their cupidity, for *they cover them and their wives* with clothes, beads, and trinkets, with which they are delighted, and after they have thus pleased them, they give them all these things on credit, telling them to go and dig for gold and if they return in a certain time they can pay them for all.[39] (emphasis added)

The fact that the moslem traders could dress the men and women with clothes implies that they visited where these people lived, at their villages or districts. The number of moslems south of the Zambezi, in the lands of Mutapa, are said to have been about 10 000 strong.[40] These included all who believed in Islam and/or probably all those who merely dressed like moslems. This does not seem to be such a highly improbable figure, for later it will be seen that moslems remained as an important factor in Zimbabwe until the late seventeenth century.

The imposing of a political empire by the Mutapas over the existing moslem trading emporium must have given the peace and security in which gold and ivory trade could be carried out. Matope's conquests gave him control of the Zambezi trade route. It can

therefore be inferred that control of trade was a consideration in the expansion and possibly in the creation of the Mutapa state itself. One does not need to go along with the theory that it was the moslem traders who implanted the idea to form a state into Mutota[41] in order to accept that trade played a role in the process of the growth and foundation of the Mutapa state. In return for security provided by Matope these traders could use their trade networks to put in a word or two about the new rising star from the north-east of Zimbabwe. Through presents, tolls and taxes, they increased his coffers. To the Angoche-based moslems, the rise of the Mutapa state along the Zambezi must have been a positive development to be nurtured in their struggle with the Sofala-based Kilwa-affiliated moslems. In this way, external trade and its existing connections may have assisted in the expansion of the Mutapa empire.

iii. Expansion of the Mutapa empire

At first, to many of the provincial chiefs, either placed on their thrones by the Karanga or through their assistance, sending 'presents' to Matope would have appeared good policy in case they needed his help in the future. But as time went on, it cannot have been too clear to many of his erstwhile 'allies' whether he still wanted to be thought of as merely an ally or as a master. To those in Dande, Chidima and Mutavara the message was probably clear that Matope was then lord of the region. Some claim that the royal *mhondoro* cult was initiated by him. Others say that it was he who introduced agriculture to the Tavara/Tonga as well as the wearing of animal skins.[42] It is even asserted that the appellation *Munhumutapa* was first applied to Matope.[43] There is no reason why all these claims should be accepted literally. Most of them are factually incorrect. Their importance, however, lies in the message they are trying to convey, namely that Matope was probably the first true king/emperor among the Mutapas. He is associated with some of those key institutions, like the royal *mhondoro* cult found in the Mutapa monarchy. Matope may therefore more correctly be referred to as the first true Emperor Munhumutapa.

The next important phase in the growth of the Mutapa state was the inclusion of Uteve and Manyika in the empire. This was brought about after the death of Matope. How long thereafter is not clear. Matope is said to have been initially succeeded by his son Mavhura

Maombwe, whose achievements are unknown and who is said to have ruled for a short time.[44] Of the sons of Matope, the one remembered best is Nyahuma Mukombero.[45] He is said to have been the son born out of the union of Nehanda or Nyamhita and her brother Matope.[46] Mukombero's son was ruling as Mutapa Chikuyo when the Portuguese arrived on the Mozambique coast.

The conquest of Uteve is said to have been initiated during Mukombero's reign. Uteve was important because the Kilwa–Sofala moslem traders continued to trade with the Zimbabwe highlands from that non-Mutapa controlled region. According to one traditional source, Mutapa Nyahuma Mukombero extended his influence into Uteve with the help of the Changamire of Guruuswa. Mukombero is said to have placed his own son, Manyenganyura, over the new province.[47] But according to some Teve traditions, the first Sachiteve was Bandahuma.[48] It is said this first Sachiteve was assisted in founding his new kingdom by a Changamire. In some Teve traditions, the first Sachiteve is described as a brother, and not a son, of the ruling Mutapa and is said to have founded his kingdom in order to escape the maltreatment he received from his brother, then the ruling Mutapa.[49] If Manyenganyura Bandahuma was in fact a son of Mukombero then he was hardly 15 years old when he was made the Sachiteve, for his elder brother Chikuyo Chisamarengu was about 16 years old when their father, Mutapa Nyahuma Mukombero, was killed around 1490.[50] The issue of Bandahuma's age poses a number of problems. First of all, if indeed Bandahuma or Manyenganyura was Mukombero's son and hence a young man when he was given Uteve to govern, why was it necessary to give the governance of so strategic a province to such a young boy when in fact Mukombero had an elder son, Chikuyo Chisamarengu? Secondly, why did Mukombero not give the province to his own half-brothers who would have been mature men? The evidence at our disposal is inconclusive for us to say firmly whether Manyenganyura Bandahuma was a son or a brother to Mutapa Mukombero. Perhaps for our purposes the exact relationship between the then ruling Mutapa and the first Sachiteve is less important than the fact that the Changamire of Guruuswa helped him to establish his kingdom and that the Sachiteve belonged to the royal Mutapa dynasty and hence had a claim to the succession of that throne.

iv. Rebellion and civil wars in Mutapa and arrival of the Portuguese

The best-remembered event during Nyahuma Mukombero's reign was the revolt of the Changamire of Guruuswa. Elsewhere I have argued that Changamire was not a name but an honorific title. There I have suggested that the Changamire mentioned in Alcáçova's letter was probably the senior scion of the Togwa dynasty. For that reason we have termed him Changamire Togwa I.[51] The relationship between the Togwas and the Mutapa dynasty remains problematic. So too does their connection with the Great Zimbabwe state. It could be argued that from the point of view of material culture the Togwa kingdom of Guruuswa was the true successor to the Great Zimbabwe state and was only temporarily occupied by the Mutapas during part of the fifteenth century. The evidence on the relationship of Changamire Togwa I with the Mutapa dynasty comes after the period of Changamire Dombo's rise to power (1684–1695). This has often led to the fusion of the two rulers' achievements and origins as if they were one man.[52] D.P. Abraham, relying on Botelho and other sources already cited above, ascribes Dombo's origins to Changamire Togwa I.[53] Abraham uses evidence referring to Dombo I to reconstruct the story of Changamire Togwa I.[54] Because this confusion so vitiates his reconstruction of the story of the Changamire Togwa I, we have decided not to rely on any of the embellishments Abraham made to Alcáçova's story.[55] Instead we have relied on Diogo de Alcáçova who wrote his story in 1506, i.e. 12 or 13 years after the death of Changamire Togwa I.[56] In his narration, Alcáçova described Changamire Togwa I as a chief justice or governor of the Mutapa empire who owned vast lands of his own.[57] He was much favoured by Mutapa Mukombero and in time increased his wealth and followers to such an extent that even Mukombero began to feel uneasy. Some other favourites of Mukombero became jealous (and perhaps fearful) of the growing power of Changamire Togwa I and so fuelled Mukombero's suspicions by spreading rumours of the Changamire Togwa's ambitions to the Mutapa throne.

Mukombero decided to eliminate Changamire Togwa I. According to Alcáçova, there used to be a custom whereby when a Mutapa wanted to eliminate any of his vassals all he had to do was to send a bowl of poison to the intended victim; if the latter wished to comply with the sentence he was given time to dress himself in his best attire

as if going to a feast and then he publicly drained the poison. After his death his successors inherited his property. However, if on the other hand he refused to drink the poison he would be executed and his whole estate forfeited to the Mutapa.[58] There is no evidence that this custom continued in the Mutapa state after the fifteenth century. Indeed the writer knows of no other examples of such a practice from Shona history/culture. But it is probable that what Alcáçova was describing was a form of *muteyo* (*mwavi*), or trial by ordeal, whereby an accused could either drink a bowl of poison or that of *mwavi* or lick a red-hot *adze*, etc.[59] If he was innocent it is said no harm came to him. On the other hand if he refused to undergo the ordeal, or was harmed by the *muteyo*, then his guilt was established. It would appear that what Mutapa Mukombero offered Changamire Togwa I was trial by ordeal through the poisoned cup. The accusation against him was high treason – plotting to overthrow Mutapa Mukombero.

But Changamire Togwa I refused to undergo the 'trial by ordeal' and instead 'sent reply to the king that he would fight him in war wherever he might wish for he would rather die by fighting than by poison.'[60] As a sign of his preference for a peaceful solution of the misunderstanding, Changamire Togwa I sent to Mukombero 4 000 polled cows and gold that could fill four water-barrels used by the Portuguese on their ships in the sixteenth century.[61] But Mukombero insisted that he should drink the poisoned cup. After a third order Changamire Togwa I realized that there was no hope of making Mukombero change his mind and so decided to fight for his life. With what must have been a powerful army he entered Mukombero's *zimbabwe* which had 'houses . . . which were of stone and clay and very large',[62] and there he murdered the emperor and went on to declare himself the new Munhumutapa. Alcáçova says that he killed 21 of the 22 sons of Mukombero. Apparently the eldest son, Chikuyo Chisamarengu, who was then about 16 years of age, escaped the carnage.[63] If we accept Abraham's reconstruction, two other sons of Mukombero, viz the leper Munyore Karembera and Sachiteve Manyenganyura, also survived their father.[64]

Changamire Togwa I is said to have ruled peacefully for a period of four years before he was himself killed by Chikuyo Chisamarengu who had rallied all those loyal to his cause. The war between Chikuyo Chisamarengu and Changamire Togwa I is said to have lasted for

about three and a half days and many people are said to have been slaughtered on both sides.[65]

Chikuyo Chisamarengu ascended the throne in 1493/4 and is said to have re-established control over most of the empire with the exception of the lands of Guruuswa, which remained loyal to the Togwa dynasty. There was intermittent warfare from about 1494 until the early sixteenth century between Mutapa Chikuyo Chisamarengu and Changamire Togwa II assisted by the son of Changamire Togwa I.[66] In part as a result of these disturbances, the gold trade between the Zimbabwe highlands and the coast declined considerably during that period.

Besides the Changamire Togwa II rebellion, Mutapa Chikuyo had to face the Sachiteve's unilateral declaration of independence as well as the challenges and opportunities presented by the Portuguese–moslem trading communities. Sachiteve Bandahuma, apparently with the support of Changamire Togwa II, became increasingly independent of Mutapa Chikuyo.[67] Between Uteve, Guruuswa and the lands of Mutapa there lay the as yet unconquered highlands of Manyika. Both Sachiteve Bandahuma and Mutapa Chikuyo cast their eyes in that direction. In the end, Manyika was occupied by Chikanga, a son of King Makombe of Barwe, a loyal vassal of Mutapa Chikuyo. Sachiteve Bandahuma sent his son Nyamunda to counter Chikanga's activities but was unsuccessful.[68] It is then, we are told, that Nyamunda, on his father's instructions, turned his attention to the land of Madanda which he conquered and placed under the control of a younger brother of his.[69] But according to Botelho, Madanda, like Uteve, was conquered by a son of a Mutapa who was aided by a Changamire of Guruuswa and for that reason was '*com sugeição ao rei de Changamira*' (as a subject or dependant of the king Changamire).[70] More will be said a little later on the subject of the Togwa Changamires in Uteve–Madanda. For the moment, however, let it suffice to know that Madanda was founded by rebels against the Mutapa empire and as such the Sedanda was never a vassal of the Mutapa.

Before his death, Sachiteve Manyenganyura Bandahuma, so it would appear, had not completed the conquest of the lands of Madanda, especially those close to the coast and to Sofala, and so it was left to the great Nyamunda to complete the conquest. It is not clear when Bandahuma actually died but by December 1515 Nyamunda was the Sachiteve.[71] From 1506 until 1515 it appears that the lands from the coast to Manyika, Barwe and Mukaranga in the west

DYNASTIC TABLE OF EARLY MUTAPAS



were relatively at peace and trade contacts were re-established with Sofala.[72] Whether this relatively peaceful period coincided with the last years of Bandahuma's rule or Nyamunda's early reign is not known. What is known for certain is that by December 1515 João Vaz de Almada, Captain of Sofala, received an embassy from 'a local lord whom they call Ynhamunda [Nyamunda] and who has risen against the king of Bonapotapa [Munhumutapa], and who is a man feared by all the neighbourhood.'[73] As late as 1517, Nyamunda was still fighting against the Mutapa. By 1518, Nyamunda was being described as an 'evil', a 'cur' and as being 'very cruel and a tyrant . . . feared beyond belief'.[74]

Nyamunda's wars had a number of reasons, chief among which was the desire to conquer 'all the lands around the rivers' up to the port of Sofala and perhaps to expand into 'the hills' of Manyika.[75] The latter objective brought him into conflict with the Mutapa. Nyamunda, through Manyenganyura Bandahuma, had legitimate aspirations to the Mutapaship itself. It is possible that the eventual capture of the Mutapa throne was not out of his mind. Certainly his son and successor, Chipute, openly laid claims to the Mutapaship. But according to one Portuguese source, the struggle between the Mutapa and Nyamunda was 'for no other reason than to see who shall wed the fortress [Sofala] and have it on his side', because without goods obtained from the trade with Sofala, Munhumutapa 'cannot get men, or wage war against' Nyamunda.[76]

Winning the fortress to his side seems to have been Nyamunda's initial strategy. But this does not seem to have been dictated only or primarily by the desire to deny Mutapa trade goods. As it has already been pointed out, the Mutapa had an alternate source of obtaining trade goods from the Angoche-supplied Zambezi route. It appears that one of the reasons why Nyamunda wanted to 'wed' Sofala must have been because he had been impressed by the way Portuguese cannons had defeated the moslem rulers around Sofala and must no doubt have heard of the attack on Angoche by Portuguese soldiers in 1511.[77] It must have been tempting to try to have such people on his side. Among the first presents he asked for from the Portuguese was a *bombarda*.[78] If denying Mutapa trade goods was not the only or indeed the chief reason why Nyamunda started the war it cannot have escaped his discerning mind that if he could conquer Manyika he would have been in direct contact with his ally Changamire Togwa. If successful he would have ended up controlling the outlet of the chief

gold-producing areas of the Zimbabwe highlands. Dues and tariffs from the trade would have increased his coffers and the Mutapa state would have been weakened.

The Sofala-based moslems must no doubt have welcomed the prospect of controlling the important Guruuswa–Manyika gold trade. It is conceivable that the moslem traders of Sofala understood, and possibly even actively promoted, this policy for in this they could have outmanoeuvred the Mutapa–Angoche axis. Indeed, in 1527, Nyamunda was to give monopoly to trade in the interior through his kingdom to the Sofala moslems.[79]

On the other hand, the Portuguese show no evidence that they fully grasped the situation and instead did everything to open direct links with the Munhumutapa. In 1506 they received traders (envoys?) from the Mutapa and gave them presents.[80] Later they even sent António Fernandes, a *degradado*, into the interior to find out more about the Mutapa empire and its trading system.[81] Portuguese interest in direct relations with the Mutapa must have been well-known to Nyamunda. Initially, Nyamunda tried to counter this interest by befriending the Portuguese at Sofala. In December 1515, after declaring open war on the Mutapa, he sent a trading-cum-political embassy to Sofala. The embassy carried 500 *maticals* of gold, 400 of which were to be used for trade and the other 100 was a present to the Portuguese king, because Nyamunda, in the words of the then captain of Sofala, 'desired nothing better than to see our people, and for us to maintain with him a loyal friendship, asking me to be his brother and friend'. Nyamunda promised to send the captain of Sofala 'a great sum of money'.[82] Unfortunately, the captain could not send a Portuguese-led embassy to Nyamunda but instead sent a royal slave and two moslems from Sofala. The embassy carried presents valued at more than the 100 *maticals* of gold that Nyamunda had sent as present to the King of Portugal. Within a month the embassy was back at Sofala.

Nyamunda sent yet another embassy of his own with 600 *maticals* of gold to trade. He protested that his original present of 100 *maticals* was meant to be a free gift and a sign of his desire for friendship and not part of trade transaction. He promised the captain that in future the Portuguese at Sofala should not worry about where to buy provisions as he had enough to supply their needs, and went further to add that he had much gold in his land and so the captain should in future send trusted moslems to go and trade there.[83] In return he

requested a *bombarda* and a christian (white Portuguese?) to be sent to visit him. When members of the embassy of white Portuguese from Sofala to Nyamunda fell sick on the way and were unable to reach Nyamunda's capital, the latter became very irritated and refused to acknowledge the presents sent from Sofala which included one *bombarda*. He held the moslems and an African slave who arrived with those presents, and sent back his own ambassadors with a request for four *bombardas* and one or more white men who knew how to operate them. The captain of Sofala was rather alarmed by the new turn of events but tried not to show it and instead politely turned down the request for four *bombardas* and a white man.[84]

The above events would seem to suggest that Nyamunda's intention was, in the first instance, to try to win the Portuguese as allies in his war against the Mutapa or at the very least to neutralize them as possible Mutapa allies. But when he realized that he could not win them as allies and that their frienship was not as valuable as he had at first imagined, he decided on a policy of actively forcing them into a posture of neutrality. According to Dom António da Silveira, by 1528 Nyamunda was so tough that sometimes he made certain that the captains of Sofala did not know the routes of the interior and when necessary even stopped them from trading.[85] He used to rob and kill any of the Mutapa's men who dared to go to Sofala to trade since he was then at war with the former.[86] However, for a time he allowed Portuguese and moslem traders to visit his kingdom to trade provided they followed established trade routes where their movements could be controlled. Tavora even claims that he had prevailed over Nyamunda to such a degree that, for a while during his captaincy, traders were quite safe when travelling in the interior.[87] But whenever they started travelling through the bush, Nyamunda had them killed and their merchandise confiscated.[88] During that time Nyamunda stopped all African traders from the interior, especially those from Manyika and Mutapa, with whom he was at war, from coming to trade at Sofala. This ban even affected those Africans from Bouro (Butua)[89] who had much gold and were not at war with him.[90]

However the captains of Sofala had little choice but to be conciliatory to Nyamunda, as evidenced by the fact that in 1512 when Nyamunda asked for six charges of powder and some balls, apparently to be used by the firearms he must have received from the Portuguese, the request was complied with; and, whenever his embassies visited the fortress of Sofala they were always well treated.[91] By 1528, the

Portuguese show evidence of having finally comprehended Nyamunda's attitude towards them, for one captain commented that, as long as

> it seemed to him [Nyamunda] that we *might be of some use*, he was a good neighbour and allowed a lot of gold to come to the factory; *now that he has no need and knows what, in truth, the captain of Sofala can do*, he bursts with laughter at the thought of him and blocks all the routes and then writes to the captain to send ambassadors to him, accepts the gift they take him, detains them with words every three years and finally kills him (sic).[92] (emphasis added)

The above quotation strengthens the argument that Nyamunda's original interest in the fortress was not so much to obtain trade goods (clothes) which supposedly could be used to recruit fighters but for what he believed the captain of Sofala might do to help him in his struggles against Mutapa. In the end he found out that the captain could do little. As a result, he treated him accordingly.

The Portuguese persisted with their interest to be in direct contact with the Mutapa and the interior in spite of the fact that this did not accord with Nyamunda's plans. After routing the Mutapa forces which had invaded his country,[93] by 1528 Nyamunda virtually controlled all access to Sofala. Indeed, even in 1527, he sent a message to Sofala saying 'that the routes would be open only to the Moors of Sofala for them to go wheresoever they wanted with the goods traded in this factory.'[94] This led Dom Lopo d' Almeida to conclude that 'while Inhamunda [Nyamunda] is alive, Your Highness cannot gain profit from Sofala.'[95] So long as the Portuguese continued to show interest in getting in touch with Mutapa and the interior, Nyamunda saw no reason why he should change his own policies.

Some writers have at times explained the decline of the Sofala trade in the early sixteenth century as a result of either Portuguese inefficiency and/or high-handedness or a moslem plot to avoid the Portuguese-dominated Sofala in favour of the moslem-controlled Angoche.[96] It would now appear, in view of the above reconstruction, that some if not much of the credit for the decline of Sofala during that period must be handed over to Nyamunda and his wars. But by harrassing Angoche and its traders using the Zambezi route during part of the same period, the Portuguese contribution in the decline of trade in Zambezia in general may have been a much more important factor than recent insights have led us to believe.[97]

During the wars against Nyamunda, from about 1515, Mutapa

Chikuyo faced further revolts from other rulers, Osono and Omboyro. The identity of these notables is not clear, but Osono seems to be similar enough to Sono, who is said to have been captain-general of Mutapa's armies, and Omboyro may be referring to the ruler of 'Mbire'. De Almada claims that all Mutapa could do was to turn these warring barons against each other.[98] According to Alcáçova, in 1506 the ruler of Guruuswa was still at war with Chikuyo. Gaspar Veloso, relying on António Fernandes, the first Portuguese to visit the Mutapa, wrote in 1512 that 'the king of Butua [Guruuswa] . . . is as great as the king of Menomotapa [Munhumutapa] and is always at war with him.'[99] Whether this fighting was continuous since 1506 is not clear. The same Fernandes also mentioned that the king of *Inhoqua* (Nyoka?) was then also at war with Mutapa Chikuyo.[100] Besides the troubles with *Inhoqua* and Guruuswa, António Fernandes' journey showed that peace and good order prevailed in much of the Mutapa empire at that time. Portuguese–Mutapa relations developed only after Chikuyo's reign, in spite of the latter's attempts to establish good relations with Sofala. Nyamunda effectively frustrated his efforts in that direction. In the end, Chikuyo could only request that the Portuguese at Sofala should maintain a position of neutrality in his struggle against Nyamunda.[101] But by giving firearms and ammunition to Nyamunda, their neutrality must have appeared suspect. It was only after Nyamunda's reign that Mutapa–Portuguese relations were to grow closer.

v. Portuguese penetration of the hinterland

With the death of Chikuyo, around 1530, Mutapa Neshangwe Munembire is said to have succeeded. His rule has been estimated as having lasted until about 1550.[102] It was during this reign that the Portuguese finally decided to supplant the Angoche-based moslem traders on the Zambezi route. According to Fr Monclaro, the Portuguese who discovered this route was one Gaspar da Viega.[103] Between the 1530s and 1540s they replaced moslem *bazaars* along the Zambezi with their own towns at Quelimane, Sena and Tete.[104] With the establishment of these towns, the Portuguese were in much closer proximity to the Mutapa than before. Not much is known of the Sachiteve–Mutapa wars during this period until 1542. In that year the Mutapa sent an embassy to Sofala, the first for a long time. The ambassador explained that the reason ambassadors had not visited Sofala of late was that for the last two years (*c.* 1540–1541) the Mutapa was at war with those people living between his empire and

the fortress of Sofala, i.e. the people of Uteve. Apparently by 1542 hostilities had ceased or been reduced to such an extent that the Mutapa's ambassador could visit Sofala. But the lands around Sofala had been devastated by war. Sepúlveda says that the Mutapa and the Sachiteve fought these wars in order 'to prevent one another from coming to trade or take merchandise from the factory because, whosoever has it, will forthwith be more powerful than the other'.[105] If there was validity in this claim then the Sachiteve would long have been the most powerful force for he dominated trade with Sofala for a long time. The Mutapa ambassador asked the captain to send a Portuguese as an ambassador to go and stay at the Mutapa *zimbabwe* as a sign of Portuguese good faith to the Mutapa. When this was done, the Mutapa ambassador declared, his master would reopen the Sofala trade route. Although the Portuguese did send an ambassador, by the name of Fernão de Proemça, to the *zimbabwe* of Mutapa, nothing is known of the results of that mission.[106]

The fact that the lands around Sofala experienced little peace around 1547 is confirmed in an intriguing letter by João Velho. Velho says at that time 'Changamira' was the king and lord of the lands around the 'River of Sofala'. The 'River of Sofala' referred to here is either the Pungwe or the Buzi. It appears that the 'Changamira' allowed moslems of Sofala to go to these lands to trade. One of them, known as Mafamede[107] Dao, had lent some money to Dom Jorge, the Captain of Sofala. Dom Jorge was friendly to another Sofala moslem by the name of Mafamede Joane, apparently a rival of Mafamede Dao. Dom Jorge had Mafamede Dao murdered and decided to make his ally, Mafamede Joane, 'Lord of the River of Sofala'. With the support of some Portuguese at Sofala, Mafamede Joane began to attack those people of the 'River of Sofala' who resisted him and gave presents of trade goods to those who did not. Soon he was accepted as leader. More goods were given to provincial rulers to wean them from their loyalty to 'Changamira' and to lead them to revolt. With the support of these notables, the Captain of Sofala, after a tough campaign, threw out 'Changamira' from the lands of the 'River of Sofala'.[108]

The question is, who was this 'Changamira' who was ruling over the lands close to Sofala in the late 1540s? The temptation is to see him as a 'Changamire Togwa' or a member of a so-called 'Changamire dynasty' said to have ruled the Mbire area around modern Wedza in Zimbabwe. Indeed, Abraham says that this so-called 'Changamire

dynasty' was removed from Mbire by Mutapa Neshangwe Munembire during this period.[109] Elsewhere we have already disagreed with the hypothesis that the title Changamire was a dynastic name. Changamire is a honorific title and not a dynastic name. However, the reconstruction of the story of Sachiteve Bandahuma's, as well as Nyamunda's, wars for control of the lands of Sofala shows that the latter ruler had expanded the kingdom of Uteve closer to Sofala. In 1542 there is a report of the wars around Sofala but no mention of the intervention of the 'Changamire Togwa' is made. Instead, a continuation of the Nyamunda wars seems to be implied.[110] As the evidence stands, the 'Changamira' mentioned in the João Velho document would have been either the old man, Changamire Sachiteve Nyamunda, or his successor, Changamire Sachiteve Chipute.

Neshangwe Munembire is said to have died around 1550 and to have been succeeded by a son of Mutapa Chikuyo Chisamarengu, by the name of Chivere Nyasoro, who had to murder an elder son of his father, Tombwe, in order to inherit the throne.[111] According to Abraham, it was during the reign of Chivere Nyasoro that Nyandoro, a son of Mutapa Neshangwe Munembire, conquered Hondosaka, the land between the Manzovo and Ruya rivers. In recognition for his conquest of the area, says Abraham, Nyandoro Mukomohasha was made 'commander-in-chief' of the armies of the Mutapa state and hereditary ruler of Hondosaka.[112] This seems to conflict with the claims that Matope conquered all the lands down to the Rwenya river and even further down to the Indian Ocean. It would appear that Nyandoro Mukomohasha was sent to pacify or reconquer a troublesome border region. In 1572 Monclaro found out that for the past 23 years before that year, i.e. beginning about 1550, the Samungazi Tonga, then living above Tete, had roamed over and conquered an area nearly 100 leagues (1 000 km) in length. Although these Tonga had originally been subjects of the Mutapa, during that period they were rebels.[113] By reconquering Hondosaka and keeping it firmly under control, Nyandoro Mukomohasha secured the major trade route into the key province of Mukaranga. According to Monclaro, Nyandoro Mukomohasha was not made 'commander-in-chief' of the Mutapa armies but 'general and captain of the gates of the Kingdom'.[114] Later the post of 'captain of the gates' was to be held by a Portuguese trader at Masapa. In this post, Mukomohasha represented an important line of defence of the Mutapa state. Both in the early 1570s, during the Barreto expedition, and between 1629 and 1631, in the

Mavhura–Kapararidze wars, the rulers of Hondosaka are said to have played important roles in the defence of the state.[115]

With the establishment of the Portuguese towns of Sena and Tete and the defeat of the then Sachiteve by Dom Jorge and Mafamede Joane, the Portuguese controlled both the Sofala and Angoche trade routes. From then onwards even the moslems had to rely mainly on Portuguese goods brought by Portuguese ships to Sofala and along the Zambezi routes. The trade of lower Zambezi was monopolized by the Portuguese captain stationed at Mozambique. He used to send his boats to Sofala and Sena with trade goods. The goods were sold to Portuguese and moslem merchants who lived there. In 1572 it is said 20 Portuguese traders lived in the Zambezi valley and they seem to have co-existed happily with the moslem merchants who resided in that region. At Sena the relations between the moslems and the Portuguese merchants could be so cordial that even Monclaro remarked that

> all, Christians and Moors, went about so much mixed together as if they belonged to the same sect, and as the Moors were not always evil, those to whom they wanted to give life, they did give it on account of the profit to be derived from the merchandise.[116]

And Couto writes of a 'village of friendly Moors' near Sena in 1571, where 'those Moors, owing to their intercourse with the Portuguese with whom they had, for the most part, grown up together, spoke and wrote our language well.'[117]

At Sena, Portuguese merchants traded with moslems and Africans of the land.[118] What they did not sell was sent into the interior to the fairs of Ruhanje, Bukutu, Masapa, Manyika and others.[119] Like the merchants at Tete, some of those at Sena used either to go themselves accompanied by African agents into the interior or to send their merchandise with African agents into the interior trading centres. Some of these merchants had as many as 100–200 African clients to carry the goods into the interior centres. Couto says that 'up till now not one [of the agents] has been known to have played any mean trick on his master, or have stayed behind in the backlands with his master's property.'[120] Each of the African clients carried on his head a *mutoro* weighing two *corjas*, or nearly 25 kg of cloth. Besides the cloth, they also carried beads strung on *macuti* (mukute?) threads called *mitis*. It is said 10 *mitis* weighed one *lipote* and 20 *lipotes* equalled one *mutava*. In the eighteenth century, one *mutava* equalled 10 *chuabos* or

200 strings of beads or 5 000 weak *reis*.[121] It is said that at the inland fairs the Sena and Tete merchants 'had their correspondents' who handled their affairs at those centres.[122] At these fairs the traders from Tete and Sena met with Africans 'from the back areas . . . at fixed dates'.[123] Much of the merchandise was sold at these centres. It does not appear that the Portuguese traders on the Zimbabwe plateau at this stage travelled outside these centres. Instead only moslems and African agents travelled out of the markets to various interior centres or villages. At these villages, moslem and African agents often gave merchandise on credit to ordinary villagers 'and by thus trusting them they oblige them to dig [for gold], and they [villagers] are so trustworthy that they keep their word.'[124]

Some comments need to be made about late-sixteenth-century external trade south of the Zambezi. Studies of external trade in West Africa are said to suggest that Islam acted as a major factor in binding and reinforcing trust among traders, merchants and their agents.[125] In Zambezia, during much of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, there appears to have been trustworthiness which allowed credit to be extended to traders, merchants and their agents. Since Islam and Christianity were divisive factors in the latter area, why did such trust and co-operation exist? It would appear that in Zambezia either the security provided by the state or the mutual self-interest of those involved in the trade, or a combination of both of the above factors, was sufficient to induce the confidence and co-operation that existed in the Zambezian trade.

The evidence of co-operation among the christians, moslems and African traders painted above should not be taken to mean that conflicts did not exist. They did. But the Portuguese–moslem history in Mozambique is so dominated by the story of the martyrdom of Fr Dom Gonçalo da Silveira that the above corrective of the popular impression of the basically hostile nature of those relations was necessary even for a fuller understanding of that event itself. The ruling Mutapa at the time of Fr Silveira's martyrdom was Negomo Mupunzagutu who succeeded his father, Chivere, around 1560.[126] His succession was contrary to the adelphic collateral system of succeeding to the throne as practised by the Mutapas. Theoretically, Nyandoro Mukomohasha of Hondosaka should have succeeded. But Mukomohasha traditions claim that Nyandoro Mukomohasha was too addicted to the life of roaming and conquering to be attracted by the Mutapa



At these fairs the traders from Tete and Sena met with Africans 'from the back areas

t fixed dates'. Much of the merchandise was sold at these centres.

coloured beads and nothing else . . . Elephant hunters and their wives dress in the stomachs of the animals they kill, very nice grey cloth which, divided in two, is enough for two people and is so soft that it feels like satin.

111. Mudenge, 'Rozvi Empire and Feira of Zumbo', 197. Shows that traders on the Zambezi trade route needed canoes which had at times to be hired from African owners.
112. Gomes, 'Viagem', 196; Monclaro, 'Relação', 391, 393. Since copper, iron and tin deposits were not evenly distributed, the areas which controlled especially copper and tin deposits probably manufactured most of the bangles and trinkets or sold bars of those metals. For evidence that these metals were used for such items, see Monclaro, 'Relação', 381.
113. Livneh, 'Pre-colonial Polities', 178–199; L. Gann, *A History of Southern Rhodesia* (London, 1965), 9.
114. Mello e Castro, 'Notícia', 133.
115. Ibid., 134.
116. Sousa, *O Oriente Conquistado*, 847–8; [Anon.], 'Descrição da Situação Costumes e Produtos de Alguns Lugares de África', 361.
117. Dos Santos, 'Ethiópia Oriental', 288.
118. De Barros, 'Da Ásia', 271.
119. Goes, 'Gloriosa Memória', 128–129.
120. Ajuda, 51–VII–43, [Anon.], 'Descripção dos Rios de Cuama' (1683), fols 473–483 V; Conceição, 'Tratado', 66 para 46.
121. [Anon.] 'Descrição da Situação, Costumes e Produtos de Alguns Lugares de África', 363; Goes, 'Gloriosa Memória', 130–131.
122. Livingstone, *Researches*, 661.
123. Conceição, 'Tratado',66 para 46; Nuno Velho Pereira to King, Moçambique, 29 October 1585, *DPMAC, VIII*, 529. Theal translates a sixteenth-century document which he ascribes to Duarte Barbosa as saying 'he [Mutapa] is each day served with very large presents, which the other kings and lords send to him, *each one in a fixed quantity*'. (emphasis added) Theal, *RSEA, 1*, 96. But a recent translation of the same document renders the same passage thus, 'Every day he is given many great gifts that the other kings and lords send, which gifts are in good number . . .' *DPMAC, V*, 361.
124. Bocarro, 'Década', 359; Faria e Sousa, 'Ásia Portuguesa', 25.
125. De Barros, 'Da Ásia', 271–272, Dos Santos, 'Ethiopia Oriental', 208–209, 211–212.
126. Fr André to the Brothers and Fathers of the Society of Jesus in Portugal, Goa, 5 December 1562, *RSEA, 2*, 145.
127. Dos Santos, 'Ethiópia Oriental', 209.
128. Conceição, 'Tratado', 66 para 47.

vi. Fr Gonçalo da Silveira's revolution foiled

It must have been a pleasure to Negomo to be told that a highly influential *muzungu mhondoro/n'anga* (white spirit medium/diviner) was coming to establish relations with his court with the full support of the Portuguese viceroy in India and the captain in Moçambique. This was a welcome project for Negomo in his struggle against Chipute. In the past only the moslems had sent their own religious leaders as traders into the interior and to his *zimbabwe* with the result that, at this stage, moslem influence was much stronger than that of the Portuguese on the Zimbabwe highlands.

Fr Silveira, a zealous nobleman belonging to the then recently-established Society of Jesus – soldiers of Christ, fighters of heresy and the protestant Reformation – looked at moslems and Islam as enemies of his faith and fatherland. Few Portuguese, least of all a nobleman, in the sixteenth century would have forgotten the invasion and occupation of Portugal by the moors. From a missionary point of view, Silveira, like most other Jesuits who went to the East Indies, could hardly have escaped being inspired by the achievements of St Francis Xavier, whose remains lie in the church of Bom Jesus at Old Goa in India. In his attitude towards the moslems one detects a strident note of intolerance not in tune with the easy-going relationship already evident between the moslem and Portuguese traders in lower Zambezia. For example, Fr Silveira writes of some groups of people as being '... corrupted by the infernal sect of Mohamed and even mixed with the pestilential Jews.'[128] Silveira saw his mission as being directed at the conversion of the Munhumutapa.[129] Once a christian king, the Mutapa was likely to favour the Portuguese traders in his country and either expel or reduce the numbers and influence of the moslems trading in his state. Therefore, if successful, his mission was expected to bring great advantage to the Portuguese crown and to the church of Rome. Although the Portuguese crown had been able to dominate the trading outlets of Sofala and the lower part of the Zambezi trade route, their numbers were too few and diffuse to make much of an impact in the interior. There the numbers counted and during the sixteenth century moslem traders held that advantage. But if Silveira converted the Mutapa and his people, then the christians would be able to completely dominate the trade of lower Zambezia. Because of the objectives of his mission, Silveira was more or less a one-man army of invasion on behalf of Portugal and Rome.

Stories of Silveira's travels to the Mutapa empire, and his achievements at Inhambane and along the coast, have been told many times.[130] Here the emphasis will be on his stay at the Mutapa's court. Silveira arrived at the *zimbabwe* of Negomo on 1 January 1561. He was well-received by Negomo who offered him gold, land (fields?), cattle and women as presents. But Silveira politely turned these down, explaining that what he sought was the conversion of the Mutapa himself. This unusual disinterest in material goods by a *muzungu* impressed the young Negomo.[131] Furthermore, Silveira was lucky to secure the assistance of a Portuguese trader known as António Caiado, said to have been 'a great friend of the king and on familiar terms with him',[132] who acted as his interpreter. When Silveira visited the king for the first time he was invited by the king to his private quarters, normally strictly out of bounds. There the king and his mother sat on the same Persian rug with Fr Silveira – also an unheard-of privilege. Caiado, acting as the interpreter, was only allowed to sit by the door. After exchanging greetings, the king repeated his offer of women, gold, cows and land to Silveira but the latter again declined the presents.[133] To which the king declared in wonderment:

> It is not possible that a man does not want any of these things I have offered, it being so natural in all of us to desire them; surely he is not like other men and he was born from the grass, where he had his beginning.[134]

The king then offered to provide all other forms of help his guest might require. The interview ended happily.

After a few days, reports reached Negomo that the *Kasisi* (Arabic *Quasis*, priest) had a *mozúga* (*muzvagwa*), i.e. woman, with him. Negomo, then still an unmarried youth, was interested to meet this reputedly beautiful woman. Silveira brought the image of the Virgin Mary which had excited the Mutapa's curiousity. Before he unwrapped the image, Silveira told Negomo and his mother that the image they were about to see was that of God's mother. Negomo found the story and the image so pleasing that he aked if he could keep it in his house. Silveira gladly gave it to him and even set up a little oratory covered with rich cloth where he mounted the image. This was probably the first such form of human representation that Negomo, and possibly his court, had ever seen. Since it was in his sleeping quarters, he apparently gazed at it over and over again and even began to dream

that the image was speaking to him but he did not understand its language. This went on for four to five nights. Silveira was told about all this, so that when the king asked him why it was that he did not understand the lady's language, Silveira replied that this was so because the king was not a christian. Negomo became even more anxious to understand the 'divine and heavenly' language of the Lady. After a day or two he could not contain his youthful curiousity anymore; consequently, he told Caiado to inform the *Kasisi* that he was ready to be baptized.

Silveira then started to catechize Negomo and his mother twice a day for a period of 16–18 days. By comparison to the mass baptisms he had organized along the coast, often after no more than one or two sessions of his preaching marathons which could last as long as three hours at a stretch,[135] his preparation of Negomo and his mother for baptism was not unduly hasty. On the twenty-fifth day of his arrival at the Mutapa's court, Silveira baptized Negomo Mupunzagutu, giving him the name Dom Sebastião in honour of the then Portuguese king. Negomo's mother was given the name Dona Maria. It was a day of great rejoicing. Silveira gave Negomo presents of cloth and, in return, Negomo gave Silveira 100 cows as a gift. Silveira had all the cows killed and the meat redistributed to the poor. This impressed all those around him and his influence began to increase beyond the court. Very soon he was able to convert and baptize 250–300 persons of rank in the state. Many people visited him, bringing him presents of milk, eggs, butter and so forth, but Silveira preferred to live on *sadza* (thick porridge made of millet or maize meal) and *murivo* (local vegetable sauce).

> The priest was so well liked by the king and all the men of rank that they always sought his company, and nobles and plebeians alike wanted to become Christians.[136]

Silveira's spiritual influence over the Mutapa and those close to him upset a number of interests in the state. The traditional spiritual leaders of the Shona – *mhondoro* and *n'anga* – were probably described as frauds and agents of the Devil by Silveira. But, as will be evident later, their roles were a vital component in the constitutional balance and for the political cohesion of the Mutapa state. The moslem traders, especially one Mingame, an islamic teacher, must have sensed the dangers posed by Silveira's work. No doubt Silveira's intolerance towards the 'infernal' mohamedans would probably have

above: Vasco Fernandes Homem visits the gold-mines of Manica, 1575.
below: Silveira's body being cast into the Musengezi River, 1561.

been detected by the moslems. Some of the court dignataries, like the *mbokorume*, who had refused to be baptized must have felt equally threatened by Silveira's influence.[137] Therefore, an alliance of the traditional Shona religious leaders, moslem traders and some court dignitaries united to counter Silveira's challenge to their roles. They decided to influence the young Mutapa Negomo against Silveira. First of all, they told Negomo that in fact Silveira was a Portuguese spy sent

> by the governor of India and the captain of Sofala to spy out the land and discover if there was much people in it so as to send back a message without loss of time and cause a great army to come over and kill the king and take his kingdom away from him.[138]

The second accusation was that Silveira was in cahoots with Sachiteve Chipute. As evidence that Silveira was Chipute's ally they pointed out,

> That the priest had gone first to Chepute (sic) before coming to Manamotapa (sic), having left his people there, and that he purported to come to negotiate peace with the king but intending to deal treacherously afterwards.[139]

They added that Silveira had secret instructions from Chipute

> to tell the *morefos* [*murefu* – High One], who are the nobles of the kingdom, that instead of having him [Chipute] as their ruler they had as king someone not entitled to it.[140]

They reinforced their two charges by adding that baptismal water and all the hocus-pocus uttered during baptism had magical powers to cast a spell so that the Mutapa could never turn against the priest and hence would become blind to his machinations. They charged that Silveira was a *moroo* (*muroyi*), i.e. wizard, who carried with him a dead man's bone (i.e. alter bone) and other objects to conquer the land, kill the Mutapa and bring drought and famine to the country. In conclusion they recommended,

> That His Highness should look after himself and not let him go away alive, otherwise he would leave unnoticed and the people of the land would kill each other and not know whence death came.[141]

Negomo was shaken by such serious accusations of truth mixed with half-truth and falsehoods. It was a potent brew. He quickly called his advisors, including his mother. They were all equally perturbed by the story. They decided to consult a *n'anga* to find out if there was any

truth in these charges. It appears that the *n'anga* confirmed everything. With that confirmation, Silveira's death was sealed.[142]

Silveira sensed the impending danger fairly early and told Caiado that the King was turning against him. At first Caiado did not believe this, but when he made inquiries from Negomo he was at first advised to keep away from the priest and then later he was told that Silveira was to be sent down to the coast. When he tried to find out from Negomo's mother what was to happen to Silveira, he was also told that Silveira was to be expelled from Mukaranga. Caiado warned Silveira of the imminent danger but the latter would not contemplate escaping. Instead he prepared for his death through prayers and by inviting nearby Portuguese to avail themselves spiritually of his presence through confession. He distributed his effects to them. On the night of his death, Caiado sent two young men to spend the night with him. But this was no deterrent. As soon as Silveira was asleep, seven or eight men, led by the *mocurume* (*mbokorume*), rushed in and strangled Silveira with a rope. They dragged his body out and threw it into the Musengezi river where the crocodiles buried him in their bellies. This was on 15 March 1561.[143]

After Silveira's death, more stories were spread to show that he had been a wizard.[144] In his fear Negomo decided that the 50 people converted and baptized the day Silveira was strangled should also be killed. But some of the nobles already baptized pointed out that, to be logical, the Mutapa himself would also have to be killed. At this stage, the Mutapa rescinded that decision.[145]

Two or three days after Silveira's death, Portuguese traders came to Negomo and reminded him that Silveira was a Portuguese nobleman and hence the viceroy was bound to send an army to avenge his death; and that as Silveira was a servant of God, he should expect that God will punish him for ordering his death. It is said that Negomo showed remorse and claimed that he had been misled by the moslems. To show his grief, it is said that he had two of the chief four moslems who had prevailed upon him to kill Silveira slain. A third man, Mingame, somehow escaped but later committed suicide at the coast. The fourth man disappeared.[146] Silveira's death was followed by severe famine and pestilence, killing thousands of people. The king was so disturbed that he is said to have ordered the death of his own mother.[147] It is said that his mother was one of the people

who had supported the move to have Silveira killed and for that reason he had her executed.

Silveira's death did not result in a major polarization of relations between Portuguese and moslem traders. It was not only, or even primarily, a Christianity-versus-Islam conflict. Silveira was a revolutionary whose gospel challenged the Shona social and political structures. It undermined some elements within the Shona body-politic. Those whom it threatened were too powerful at that stage and so, through Silveira's martyrdom, they checked the threat. But this was only for a time because, through the shedding of his blood, Portugal was roused to send a powerful army to invade the Mutapa state as well as more missionaries to convert the Shona of Mutapa. For that reason it may be said that Silveira had more influence in the Mutapa state after his death than during his lifetime.

CHAPTER 2

Notes

1. Abraham, 'Early Political History', 62–63; Abraham, 'Monomotapa Dynasty', 60; Pacheco, *Uma Viagem*, 23; António Pinto de Miranda, 'Monarchia Africana', 109, and Coronel Dionízio de Mello e Castro, 'Notícia do Império Marave e dos Rios de Sena', 130, both in *Fontes para a História, Geografia e Comércio de Moçambique (Séc XVIII)*, (ed) L. Fernando de Carvalho Dias, (Lisboa, 1954), *Anais, IX*, 1.
2. Abraham, 'Early Political History', 62.
3. Ibid; Garlake, *Great Zimbabwe*, 161–162.
4. The presence of spindle whorls at the Great Zimbabwe suggests that spinning and weaving were practised there. Garlake, *Great Zimbabwe*, 116, 193. See also J.D. White, 'Some Notes on the History and Customs of the Urungwe District', *NADA, X*, (1971), 37, 38, 40, 42, 45, 46, 48, 49, 50, 55, 57. Shows that people in Guruuswa knew of the salt deposits of the north.
5. Abraham, 'Early Political History', 62.
6. Pacheco, *Uma Viagem*, 27.
7. Abraham, 'Early Political History', 62; Garlake, *Great Zimbabwe*, 197–199; White, 'Urungwe District', 46; Huffman, 'Rise and Fall of Zimbabwe', 365–366; R. Summers, *Ancient Mining in Rhodesia* (Salisbury, 1969), 206–210; R. Summers, 'Archaeological distributions and a tentative history of tsetse infestation in Rhodesia and the Northern Transvaal', *Arnoldia*, (1967–8), *111*, xiii, 12.
8. Abraham, 'Early Political History', 62.
9. Ibid.
10. Pacheco, *Uma Viagem*, 23; White, 'Urungwe District', 38, 40, 42, 45.
11. Pacheco, *Uma Viagem*, 23.
12. Ibid; Abraham, 'Early Political History', 62; M.D.D. Newitt, 'The Early History of the Sultanate of Angoche', *JAH, XIII*, 3, (1972), 398–399.
13. Pacheco, *Uma Viagem*, 23; Abraham, 'Early Political History', 62.
14. White, 'Urungwe District', 38, 42, 45.
15. Abraham, 'Early Political History', 63.
16. Ibid; Pacheco, *Uma Viagem*, 23.
17. Abraham, 'Monomotapa Dynasty', 74.
18. Pacheco, *Uma Viagem*, 23–24.
19. Ibid.
20. Miranda, 'Monarchia', 109.
21. Abraham, 'Monomotapa Dynasty', 58–84.
22. M.F.C. Bourdillon, 'Peoples of Darwin: An Ethnographic Survey of the Darwin District', *NADA, X*, 2, (1970), 104, 106; Abraham, 'Monomotapa Dynasty', 62; and 'Early Political History', 62–65.
23. Abraham, 'Early Political History', 64.
24. Ibid; Pacheco, *Uma Viagem*, 24.
25. Pacheco, *Uma Viagem*, 24.
26. Pacheco, *Uma Viagem*, 23; Abraham, 'Early Political History', 65.
27. Abraham, 'Early Political History', 65, 82.
28. Pacheco, *Uma Viagem*, 24.
29. M.F.C. Bourdillon, 'The Manipulation of Myth in a Tavara Chiefdom', *Africa, XLII*, 2, (1972), 112–121; M. Gelfand, *Shona Religion* (Cape Town, 1962), 8, 9,

24, 25, 26, 28; F.W.T. Posselt, 'The Watawara and the Batonga', *NADA*, 7, (1929), 80–95; Miranda, 'Monarchia', 114–115.

30. It is possible that Nokavemba continued to be the name of one of the nine chief wives of Mutapa. Bocarro says that the fourth wife of Mutapa was known as Navemba which may be a shortened form of Nokavemba. Bocarro, 'Década', 358.
31. Pacheco, *Uma Viagem*, 24; Abraham, 'Early Political History', 64.
32. Abraham, 'Early Political History', 65, 82.
33. Newitt, 'Sultanate of Angoche', 398–399.
34. Monclaro, 'Relação', 363.
35. A. Carneiro, 'Sumário de Cartas de António de Saldanha, Capitão de Sofala e Moçambique, para el-Rei', *DPMAC*, *3*, 15.
36. A. Lobato, *A Expansão Portuguesa em Moçambique de 1498 a 1530, III*, (Lisboa, 1960), 243–244.
37. G. Veloso, 'Apontamentos', *DPMAC*, *III*, 185.
38. Ibid., 183.
39. De Barros, 'Da Ásia', 267.
40. Caneiro, 'Sumário de Cartas', 17.
41. Abraham, 'Maramuca', 212.
42. Pacheco, *Uma Viagem*, 24–25.
43. Ibid., 25. According to Pacheco, Matope was called Muanamotapua [Mwanamutapwa] (which literally means child captured in war) because his mother was a war captive. But Abraham, 'Monomotapa Dynasty', 60, 71–72, says that Mwene Mutapa or Nemutapa means Master of ravaged lands and was first used to describe Mutota, not his son Matope. There is no way of resolving the question of who was the first ruler to be called Munhumutapa. Secondly, from the records it is clear that the Portuguese writers were trying to record two main variants of the title *Muenemotapa*, i.e. Mwene Mutapa and *Monomotapa* (pronounced *Munumutapa*), i.e. Munhumutapa. Mwene Mutapa would have been favoured by the Tavara subjects of the Mutapa while Munhumutapa would have been dialectically preferred by the Shona (Karanga) of Mutapa. In this study we have opted for the latter variant. The meaning in either dialect is more or less similar insofar as they both refer to one who pillages or ravages others.
44. Abraham, 'Early Political History', 65.
45. Pacheco, *Uma Viagem*, 24; Diogo de Alcáçova to King, Cochin, 20 November 1505, *DPMAC*, *1*, 391, 393, 395.
46. Pacheco, *Uma Viagem*, 24.
47. Abraham, 'Early Political History', 65; A.H.U. Cx. 1 Moç. 'Documentos Diversos', João Julião da Silva, Soffala 8 August 1844, 'Memória Sobre Soffala'. Gives the name of the first Sachiteve as *Manhamganhure*; A.H.U. Cx.2 Moç. 'Doc. Diversos Imp. 367/52', [João Julião da Silva] 'Memória respectiva a Villa de Sofala, seo continente e antiguidades mais notáveis . . .' [*c.*1836 and 1847].
48. F. Santana, *Documentação Avulsa Moçambicana Do Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino, III*, (Lisboa, 1974), 5. The names of Banda*huma* and Nya*huma* indicate that those two rulers had pronounced foreheads, an observation which reinforces their suggested relationship of father and son.
49. Botelho, *Memória Estatística*, 145; D. do Couto, 'Da Ásia', *DPMAC*, *VIII*, 321.
50. Diogo de Alcáçova to King, Cochin, 20 November 1506, op. cit. 395.
51. Mudenge, 'Rozvi Empire and Feira of Zumbo', 54–59.
52. Mudenge, 'An Identification of the Rozvi', 27 note 41.

53. Abraham, 'Early Political History', 65, 64, 81 note 37.
54. Ibid., 81 note 37.
55. Diogo de Alcáçova to King, Cochin, 20 November 1506, op. cit. 391, 393, 395.
56. Ibid., 393.
57. Ibid; according to Abraham, 'Early Political History', 65, 'Changamire' was a son of Matope and a half-brother of Mutapa Mukombero. But according to Pacheco, *Uma Viagem*, 23, Mutota himself was of the same family as Changamire. And [João Julião da Silva], 'Memória Villa de Soffala' says that the first Changamire was a grandee of the court of a certain Mutapa also known as Nembire, who did such outstanding service to that Mutapa that he was rewarded by being given not only that Mutapa's first daughter as wife but some lands in the western part of the kingdom and nobles and other subjects as well as 'the title of Xangamire'. Botelho, *Memória Estatística*, 145, says he was a son of a Mutapa.
58. Diogo de Alcáçova to King, Cochin, 20 November 1506, op. cit. 393.
59. Dos Santos, 'Ethiópia Oriental', 204–205.
60. Diogo de Alcáçova to King, Cochin, 20 November 1506, op. cit. 393.
61. Ibid., 392.
62. Ibid., 395.
63. Ibid.
64. Abraham, 'Early Political History', 65–66.
65. Diogo de Alcáçova to King, Cochin, 20 November 1506, op. cit. 395.
66. Ibid.
67. Abraham, 'Early Political History', 66.
68. Ibid., 66–67.
69. Ibid., 67.
70. Botelho, *Memória Estatística*, 145; Couto, 'Da Ásia', 321; João Julião da Silva, 'Memória Sobre Soffala'.
71. João Vaz de Almada to King, Sofala, 26 June 1516, *DPMAC, IV*, 277.
72. Pedro de Anhaia to King's Treasurers, Sofala, 19 May 1506, *DPMAC, I*, 507; António Carneiro, 'Sumário de Cartas', op. cit. 17; Gaspar Veloso, 'Apontamentos', op. cit. 181–189.
73. João Vaz de Almada to King, Sofala, 26 June 1516, op. cit. 277, 279.
74. D. António da Silveira to King, undated but post 18 July 1518, *DPMAC, V*, 567, 569.
75. D. António da Silveira to King, op. cit. 569; Francisco de Brito to King, Sofala, 8 August 1519, *DPMAC, VI*, 11, 13.
76. António da Silveira to King, op. cit. 569.
77. António Carneiro, 'Sumário de Cartas', op. cit. 11, 13.
78. João Vaz de Almada to King, Sofala, 26 June 1516, op. cit. 283.
79. D. Lopo de Almeida to King, Sofala, 27 August 1527, *DPMAC, VI*, 277.
80. Pedro de Anhaia to King's Treasurers, Sofala, 19 May 1506, op. cit. 507; Manuel Fernandes to King's Treasurers, Sofala, 21 October 1506, *DPMAC, I*, 687.
81. Gaspar Veloso, 'Apontamentos', op. cit. 181–189.
82. João Vaz de Almada to King, Sofala, 26 June 1516, op. cit. 279.
83. Ibid., 283.
84. Ibid., 285.
85. D. António da Silveira to King, op. cit. 559.
86. Ibid., 569.
87. Cristóvão de Tavora to King, [1518–1519], *DPMAC, VI*, 5.

88. Francisco de Brito to King, Sofala, 8 August 1519, *DPMAC, VI*, 13, 11.
89. Ibid., 13. Although phonetically Bouro is closer to Barwe than Butua, and in spite of the fact that when António Fernandes, *DPMAC, III*, 183, visited the king of Barwe he found that he had 'a great amount of gold that comes from abroad', we feel that reference to 'merchants of Bouro, where they say there is much gold' cannot be referring to a place where only the king is said to have had gold he had obtained from elsewhere.
90. Francisco de Brito to King, Sofala, 8 August 1519, op. cit. 13.
91. 'Book of Receipts and Expenditure of Baltasar Matoso' (Post 4 October 1522), *DPMAC, VI*, 105, 125, 131, 135.
92. D. António da Silveira to King, [Post 18 July 1518], op. cit. 569.
93. Ibid.
94. D. Lopo de Almeida to King, Sofala, 27 August 1527, op. cit. 277.
95. Ibid , 279.
96. G.S.P. Freeman-Greenville, 'The Coast 1498–1840' in *History of East Africa, I*, (London, 1963), 135; J. Strandes, *The Portuguese Period in East Africa* (Nairobi, Dar es Salaam and Kampala, 1961), 98–100; Newitt, 'Sultanate of Angoche', op. cit. 401.
97. Newitt, *Portuguese Settlement on the Zambesi*, 24.
98. João Vaz de Almada to King, Sofala, 26 June 1516, op. cit. 291.
99. Gaspar Veloso, 'Apontamentos', op. cit. 185.
100. Ibid.
101. D. António da Silveira to King, [Post 18 July 1518], op. cit. 569.
102. Abraham, 'Early Political History', 67.
103. Monclaro, 'Relação', 395.
104. Gonçalo Pinto de Araújo to King, Goa, 15 November 1545, *DPMAC, VII*, 151; Tenente-Coronel P.A. de Sousa e Silva, *Distrito de Tete* (Lisboa, 1927), 20–21.
105. João de Sepúlveda to King, Moçambique, 10 August 1542, *DPMAC, VII*, 137.
106. Ibid., 139.
107. Mafamede, i.e. Mohammedan, see Padre Luís Fróis, Goa, 15 December 1561, *DPMAC, VIII*, 49.
108. [João Velho] to King, [Post 1547], *DPMAC, VII*, 169, 171, 173.
109. Abraham, 'Early Political History', 67.
110. João de Sepúlveda to King, Moçambique, 10 August 1542, op. cit. 137.
111. Abraham, 'Early Political History', 67.
112. Ibid., 68.
113. Monclaro, 'Relação', 401.
114. Ibid., 417.
115. Ibid; Capitão P.B. de Rezende, 'Do Estado da India', *RSEA*, 2, 416.
116. Monclaro, 'Relação', 393 note 18.
117. Couto, 'Da Ásia', *DPMAC, VIII*, 275.
118. Monclaro, 'Relação', 395.
119. Ibid., 393 note 18; Couto, 'Da Ásia', 273; 'Autos do Inquérito Mandado Fazer Pelo Governador Francisco Barreto' [Post 1 May 1573], *DPMAC, VIII*, 237, 245.
120. Couto, 'Da Ásia', 271.
121. Ibid., 273.
122. Monclaro, 'Relação', 393 note 18.
123. Couto, 'Da Ásia', 273.
124. De Barros, 'Da Ásia', 267.
125. A.G. Hopkins, *An Economic History of West Africa* (London, 1973), 64; Abner

Cohen, 'Cultural Strategies in the Organization of Trading Diasporas' in *The Development of Indigenous Trade and Markets in West Africa*, (ed) Claude Meillassoux (London, 1971), 266–81.

126. Abraham, 'Early Political History', 68.
127. Ibid., 68, 85 note 56.
128. Padre D. Gonçalo [da Silveira] to The Brothers of the Society of Jesus in Portugal, Goa, November 1559, *DPMAC, VII*, 423.
129. Padre D. Gonçalo to The Brothers of Society of Jesus, Goa, November 1559, op. cit. 423; Luís Fróis, Goa, 15 December, 1561, op. cit. 41.
130. e.g., D.B. Leite, *Dom Gonçalo da Silveira* (Lisboa, 1946).
131. Luís Fróis, Goa, 15 December 1561, op. cit. 43.
132. Ibid.
133. Ibid.
134. Ibid., 45.
135. Padre André Fernandes to The Brothers of the College of Goa, Chaul, 2 January 1560, *DPMAC, VII*, 437; Luís Fróis, Goa, 15 December 1561, op. cit. 37; Padre Paio Correia to Brother Bento Toscano, Cochin, 12 January 1562, *DPMAC, VIII*, 79; Baltasar to Padre Marcos, Goa, 16 November 1560, *DPMAC, VII*, 515; Padre D. Gonçalo to Brothers of the College of the Society of Jesus in Goa, Moçambique, 9 August 1560, *DPMAC, VII*, 503, 505.
136. Padre Luís Fróis, Goa, 15 December 1561, op. cit. 47.
137. Ibid., 55.
138. Ibid., 49.
139. Ibid., 51.
140. Ibid., 49.
141. Ibid., 51.
142. Ibid., 51, 53.
143. Ibid., 55; Couto, 'Da Ásia', 259.
144. Padre Luís Fróis, Goa, 15 December 1561, op. cit. 57.
145. Ibid.
146. Ibid., 57, 59; 'Livro sobre a Acção da Companhia de Jesus No Oriente', (Naples, 1573), *DPMAC, VIII*, 227.
147. Theal, *RSEA, 7*, 500; Wilmot, *Monomotapa*, 248–249; Francisco de Sousa, *O Oriente Conquistado*, 866. According to de Sousa, following Fr Silveira's death,

> an inumerable and almost endless swarm of locusts came down that stopped the light of the sun at mid-day and ravaged the fields destroying crops, the fruit, and leaves of the trees, devouring with insatiable hunger all that the land produced to feed the miserable people. A terrible plague followed with such devastation as had never before been seen in *Cafraria*. The famine and the loss of life lasted for two years.

INTRODUCTION TO CHAPTERS 3, 4, 5

Political, Administrative and Economic Organization of the Mutapa State

There are more opinions than critical studies on the topic of the organization and administration of the Mutapa state. According to some writers, the Mutapas had 'an elaborate court ritual and extensive bureaucracy'[1] surrounding them. But others claim that the early Mutapas 'were unable to create lasting institutions'.[2] And then the Mutapa state has been variously described as an 'empire', a 'kingdom', a 'paramountcy', a 'loose confederacy', a 'feudal republicanism' and so on. The Mutapas themselves have been called 'emperors', 'kings' or 'paramount chiefs'.[3] Controversy also surrounds the question of the economic basis of the state. Some writers argue that external trade was monopolized and controlled by the Mutapas and provided the economic basis of the state.[4] Then there are those who maintain it was the labour of the proverbial wives of the Mutapas which produced the 'wealth' from agriculture on which the state depended economically.[5] Again some writers claim that the chief integrative factor in the Mutapa political system was religion and that the Mutapas were the ultimate religious authority in the state.[6] However, others claim that either *mhondoro* Chaminuka or Nyanhehwe was the chief religious authority in the state.[7] There are other conflicting views which will be dealt with later.

A number of reasons as to why there is such a divergence of views on the topic may be offered. But the simplest explanation is that a complete study of the history of the Mutapa state is still lacking. Recently Mr Randles has tried to provide an outline in his *L'Empire du Monomotapa*, but the work is too sketchy to serve even as an adequate introduction. The only in-depth study of the organization and administration of the Mutapa state has been attempted by Dr Livneh in his study of communication in pre-colonial Zimbabwe.[8] Yet even this interesting study suffers from one major flaw in that it often describes the political machinery of a state that covers nearly 500 years as if it is dealing with a static organism. This ahistorical use of data was forced on Dr Livneh by the fact that no study of the history of the Mutapa state existed. As is the danger inherent in such an

approach, reality and theory can often travel along close but parallel lines, so near yet never meeting.

The history of the Mutapa state shows that diachronically the state changed both spatially and structurally. This means that many generalizations on various aspects of the state can be shown to be invalid for some centuries. During every century of its existence the Mutapa state contracted significantly. Beginning with most of the land from the Indian Ocean south of the Zambezi and north of the Limpopo and Save rivers, stretching to the fringes of the Kalahari desert in the fifteenth century, it lost the richest province of Guruuswa (Butua of the Portuguese sources) in the latter part of that century. By the beginning of the sixteenth century it had lost the important coastal province of Uteve. And early in the seventeenth century, Barwe, and for a time Manyika, hived off. Between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries most of the valley lands south of the Zambezi below Chikova were converted into *prazos* by the Portuguese. In the last decade of the seventeenth century most of what is now Zimbabwe was lost to the Rozvi empire. During the first half of the eighteenth century, Mutapa was reduced to the two provinces of Dande and Chidima in the Zambezi valley. But by the last half of the eighteenth century even Dande had hived off so that only one province, the hot and tsetse-infested Chidima, remained as the sole possession of the successors to the original state. Dr David Livingstone has left us an unflattering description of Chidima and its ruler, Mutapa Kataruza, during the second half of the nineteenth century.[9]

In view of the developments outlined above, some of the generalizations about the Mutapa state will be found to be inapplicable to all the periods with equal validity. For example, while it may well be correct to refer to the Mutapa state as an 'empire' during much of the fifteenth century it is perhaps more accurate to call it a 'paramountcy' or even a 'chiefdom' by the late nineteenth century. One is here dealing with an evolving, rather than an unchanging, entity. In analysing the organization of this state, an attempt, wherever possible, will be made to review the evidence coming from the entire history of the existence of the state. In spite of that precaution to get the approximate reality of how the various aspects functioned and related to each other at any given time, it is necessary to look at them in the context of the actual historical situations as discussed in the other chapters.

Because of the importance of the whole question of the political and economic organization of the Mutapa state, and in order to make the discussion easier to follow, the subject has been divided into three separate but related chapters.

CHAPTER 3

Central/Court Institutions

This chapter deals with the Mutapa state from the vantage point of its headquarters. It examines the physical location of the capitals, succession system, ministers/officers of the Mutapa and their functions, and the royal wives.

i. Mutapa's capital and palace

The Mutapa's court was known as *zimbabwe (zimbave, zimbaboe* of the Portuguese sources). Literally, *zimbabwe* means a large house of stone. This does not mean that the actual living houses of the Mutapas were ever built of stone. They were always made of poles and mud, and grass-thatched. But during the fifteenth and early sixteenth century, the Mutapas enclosed their *zimbabwes* with stone walling.[10] Subsequent Mutapas invariably built their *zimbabwes* from mud and wood, and grass-thatched them, but surrounded them with great wooden fences.[11] The Mutapa capitals were not at one fixed place; in theory each new ruler was free to choose a new place for his capital.[12] But during his reign he would not normally change its location, unless compelled to do so by other circumstances beyond his control.[13] The early capitals were frequently around Chitako-Changonya Hill and in Bedza region in the Dande–Musengezi area. From the eighteenth century until the end of the empire they were in Chidima, in present-day Mozambique, where their locations were very uncertain indeed because of the ecological conditions and political uncertainties during that period.[14]

During the seventeenth century we are told that the Mutapa palace was very large and was enclosed by a great wooden fence. The palace had three important apartments with three entrances leading into a great courtyard. The first apartment contained the Mutapa's own chambers where only he and his valets could enter through one of the three entrances. Another comprised the queen's chambers with its own entrance where no man could enter; and the third apartment and entrance belonged to the Mutapa's cooks and waiters.[15] It is said

that there were some other houses/apartments within the wooden fence but we do not know who else lived within the wooden enclosure, possibly members of Mutapa's family and some of his courtiers. Outside the wooden enclosure would have been other villages surrounding what Portuguese sources call the 'palacio'. According to Francisco de Sousa, the capital of Mutapa was a league (6 179 m) in circumference with houses built within a stone's throw of each other, with the Mutapa having nine compounds excluding those for his wives and children. As to the size of the populations of these settlements we are left to make our own guesses. All the Portuguese tell us is that they were very large.[16] In the late sixteenth century the 'city' where the Sachiteve's court was located could provide 3 000 to 4 000[17] men for royal hunting parties. These were by no means all the men of the 'city'. When we add women and children,[18] a population of 6 000–8 000 for Sachiteve's 'city' is probably a fair approximation. A similar figure for the Mutapas could be assumed for the period before the eighteenth century. After the eighteenth century the figure might well have been much less than that.[19]

However, the population density in these centres would have been controlled by a number of factors, the most important of which was the availability of drinking water. The region where the capitals of the Mutapas were found tends to be dry, with unpredictable precipitation. If the capital was near good water supply a greater population density would seem logical, and when it moved to a place with unreliable water supply a relatively smaller population might have been the practical response. Among the pre-colonial Tswana, with a similar environment, the above phenomenon has been observed.[20] Dr Livneh has argued that the Mutapa's city could not have had more than 2 000 adults or 6 000 people at its height, i.e. sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.[21] This is because he sees the Mutapa city as a self-sufficient centre which, like any other ordinary village in the state, could not have grown beyond certain limits without putting undue strain on its environment. In chapter five it will be argued that the hypothesis of a self-supporting and self-sufficient Mutapa capital cannot be supported by the evidence available. Instead it will be shown that the capital was economically supported by its periphery.

The population closely associated with, and dependent upon, the central administration was far bigger than that found immediately in

the royal city itself. From sixteenth/seventeenth century sources we are told that some distance from the royal city were to be found eight minor 'palaces' maintained by eight of the chief wives of the Mutapa. Each of these 'cities' was said to be substantial. In a broad sense these eight royal villages were also part of the central Mutapa administration.

The discussion on the population around the central authority has shown that, purely in terms of numbers, there were more than adequate people who could have assisted the Mutapa in his functions. However, it must be added that during the eighteenth century succession was sometimes rapid and at times the ruling Mutapas were refugees from their physical capitals. Thus the *zimbabwe* population, where the Mutapa actually ruled from, must have been smaller than usual.

ii. Succession system

He has the best right to succeed who has might on his side.

The problem of political succession is one which has troubled many a state throughout history. Whether one is thinking of Henry VIII of England and his sojourn through six wives in search of an heir, or the interventions of the military into the political systems of so many post-independent African states, the process of succession is a crucial test of the stability of a state. A defective succession system often results in bloody warfare and fragmentation of the state. Periods of succession are anxious moments for all concerned, because so high are the stakes for those involved that often human life becomes an expendable commodity. In this connection, the empire of Mutapa can be said to have failed the first major test of establishing political stability. Out of the 28 successions that took place between 1692 and 1902, military force had to be employed in the case of 16 of these, three we are reasonably sure were peaceful, and the remaining nine are unknown.[22]

What happened when the Munhumutapa died a natural death? During the eighteenth century we are told that one of his chief ministers, known as the *Nevinga*, immediately took over as regent for three days, or until a successor was chosen, after which the *Nevinga* was expected to commit suicide. This custom was abolished by Mutapa Nyamhandu, or João V, who realized that many good men were reluctant to become *Nevingas* because of the requirement to

commit suicide after the death of a Mutapa. But another source merely says that the practice of *Nevinga* interregnum came to an end in the late eighteenth century because, as soon as a Mutapa died, succession conflicts immediately followed with many people already taking sides. In this situation, force settled the issue.

However, whether or not a *Nevinga* interregnum was used, burial arrangements for the dead Mutapa had to go ahead before a successor assumed office. The priests and other court dignitaries took charge of the funeral arrangements. The warriors, mainly from the capital city and its immediate hinterland, were summoned to the court. In the eighteenth century it is said that the Mutapa was buried in his own *zimbabwe*, wrapped in the skin of a freshly-slaughtered cow. According to one source, it was also a custom that at times a Mutapa chose which of his wives were to be killed and buried with him in order to serve him in the next life. The burial itself was surrounded with great secrecy. The graves of the Mutapas were called *masanza* by the Portuguese. This appears to be so because traditionally a corpse was placed on a *tsanza* or *sanza* (plural *masanza*), which was a wooden trestle, and then hung in an airtight hut sealed with mud. This was done so that the corpses,

> thus hanging all the humidity of their bodies falls into vases placed underneath, and when all has dropped from them and they shrink and dry up . . . [they are] to be taken down and buried, and with the fat and moisture in the vases they say he [Mutapa] makes ointments with which he anoints himself in order to enjoy long life . . . and also to be proof against receiving harm from sorcerers. Others say that with this moisture he makes charms.[23]

During the eighteenth century, the Portuguese were always annoyed by impositions called *masanzas*. They never understood why passing close to these places was punishable by a steep fine. If they had only read their dos Santos they would have quickly realized why this was so.

After the Mutapa had been 'buried', the people went through an eight-day period of mourning. This period, known as *chiriro*, was a time of institutionalized anarchy, obviously meant to impress upon the subjects the dangers of having no Mutapa. Robberies, and even murders, were committed with impunity during this period. The people showed their grief by chanting funeral songs, playing mourning drums, shaving their heads and tying them with white pieces of cloth, or if unavailable smearing them with medicinal roots

and herbs and padding their arms and necks with a special straw called *micheo*. The chief wife and some four or five other women were then permanently stationed at the place of burial. They were to live in that area as guardians of the grave until death when successors would be appointed. The future *mhondoro* (medium) of the dead Mutapa came to live in the settlement. It is possible the *mhondoro* took the wives of the dead Mutapa at the *masanza* as his wives. In the eighteenth century, among the guardians of a *masanza* was a member from each of the three noble houses of Nengomasha (*Nengomacha*), Sika (*Sica*) and Nemavere. The revenue and tribute from the surrounding districts were used for the upkeep of the *masanza*. These *masanza* enjoyed the immunity of temples or sacred places and anybody who took asylum there, though he be a criminal, could not be touched. In war these places were exempt from plunder or desecration. Many of the personal effects of the dead emperor were kept at the *masanza*. It is said that the wives of the Mutapa at a *masanza* had the duty to place beer and *sadza* at the grave of the dead emperor.[24]

Going concurrently with some of the above rites would be the serious business of identifying a successor. As to how this was done, oral tradition and Portuguese contemporary documents do not agree. Some sources say the *mhondoro* spirit mediums were consulted as to which prince was to succeed. But it is most unlikely that the *mhondoro* would have pronounced on who the successor was to be before due consultation had taken place. According to Portuguese documents, succession was more or less by male primogeniture, i.e. succession of a Mutapa by his son. As dos Santos says (see note 25), both in Uteve and in Mutapa,

> The prince who succeeds to the throne is generally one of the eldest sons of the former king and his chief wives' who are legitimate, and when they have not sufficient prudence to govern, the second or third son succeeds.

And Monclaro concurs, 'the Monomotapa . . . is like a king . . . in the mode of succession, the eldest son being the heir.' In the seventeenth century Conceição made the same point by claiming that Nyamaende Mhande, as son of Mutapa Mukombwe, was the legitimate successor to his father. And in the nineteenth century Pacheco stated that 'Succession in the Mutapa state goes through the first sons born of a slave mother.'[25] But oral tradition says that it was a type of adelphic collateral succession, brother succeeding brother until one whole generation of brothers had succeeded and then it reverts to the first

ADELPHIC COLLATERAL SUCCESSION



In theory the succession should follow the numbers 1 to 36 in the order presented. In practice it never does that.

son of the first brother in the previous generation. From there it goes to the first son of the next brother and so forth. This system is diagramatically shown in Table A.

This complicated system has major defects in that, (a) one succeeds when one is too senile to be effective and therefore often has to use an assistant who becomes the effective ruler, (b) it encourages generational conflicts, i.e. in Table A number 17 may be older than numbers 13 to 16, and (c) at any given time there are many people who have a right to claim the throne.[26]

But how are we to reconcile these divergent claims coming from oral tradition and contemporary Portuguese sources? It is important that we should because if the Portuguese claims were accurate then our criticism of the collateral system of succession becomes irrelevant for our discussion. Although the Portuguese felt that male primogeniture was or should have been the mode of succession they were not unaware that this did not in fact always happen. Dos Santos tells us that if the sons of a dead Sachiteve or Mutapa had insufficient prudence then,

> the king is succeeded by his brother, if he is skilful and can govern well. This uncertainty in the succession is because the Kaffirs say that any legitimate son of former kings of that land can inherit the kingdom of his father, and that he has the best right of succession who is best fitted to govern. Therefore they do not choose the eldest or nearest prince as king, but the most skilful and prudent. The choice generally lies with the king during his life.[27]

In the nineteenth century Pacheco pointed out that if there were no legitimate sons to succeed, then a brother of the dead Mutapa, born of the same mother and father, succeeded.[28] But, in the same work, Pacheco also informs us that in the eighteenth century the *mhondoro* decided that the Mutapaship should alternate between two houses, i.e. the houses of Boroma and Nyamhandu.[29] This, he says, was largely adhered to. So it is clear the Portuguese were aware that male primogeniture was not always followed.

Leaving aside the discussion of theory and turning to what actually happened, we know for certain that of the 28 successions from 1692 to 1902 there was probably only one case of a son succeeding his father, i.e. Kandeya II succeeded his father Kataruza *c.* 1843 to *c.* 1867. During the seventeenth century there were two certain father–son successions. One of these, that of Gatsi Rusere by

his son Nyambo Kapararidze, led to bitter wars and Portuguese intervention into the internal affairs of the Mutapa state. Kapararidze was deposed by Mavhura, his uncle, who claimed to have been the rightful successor. However, through Portuguese intervention, Mavhura was himself succeeded by his son Siti Kazurukumusapa. In the sixteenth century we have one father–son succession, that of Chivere Nyasoro by his son Negomo Mupunzagutu. This, as we saw, was probably a specially-negotiated succession. In the fifteenth century there were possibly two others. Therefore, out of a total of about 46 Mutapas, there were probably six father–son successions. The remaining 40 were definitely not father–son successions.[30] It seems, therefore, that collateral adelphic succession was in effect the mode of succession. But, as has already been pointed out, this was only the guiding principle, the framework within which succession had to be decided; the ultimate arbiter was force. He who had force and/or powerful allies – whether these were Portuguese *prazo*-holders in the seventeenth century or the Rozvi rulers in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries – had the best right to succeed. In such a situation the niceties of legality, convention and legitimacy were often in conflict with the dictates of power. The many succession wars dealt with in chapters six to nine serve to underscore this major weakness in the Mutapa political system. As we shall see later, perhaps succession wars did more to weaken the Mutapa state than any other single factor.

In the eighteenth century, after a successor had been identified, whether by consensus or through the agency of the assegai, a cow was slaughtered as an offering first to the *vadzimu* of the Mutapa-elect, i.e., to the dead Mutapas, and then other pieces of the cow were offered by the *Dzivaguru* priests to *mudzimu* Chikara. After that, the new Mutapa was crowned by *Netondo*, a representative of the *Dzivaguru* priesthood. A Mutapa's regalia would have probably consisted of a *chiremba choumambo* (royal crown), a *quite* (throne) or three-legged stool, his 'assegai' of black wood with the point made of solid gold similar to the point of a lance, a *svimbo* (knobkerry), a staff *(mubhadha),* and perhaps the skin of a lion or leopard and a piece of cotton cloth. In the eighteenth century, a *sombreiro* or two and a carpet may well have been added to the paraphernalia.[31]

iii. Chief ministers/officers of the Mutapa

Although in theory 'The Emperor is the absolute lord of life, death,

honour and well-being of his vassals . . . his orders [being] stronger than all their laws'[32], in practice he was assisted by a number of courtiers and officers who exercised some of those powers. The routine matters of state at the court were dealt with by the Council *(Dare)* made up of the immediate advisors of the Mutapa. These were personally chosen by him on his accession, either from members of certain specified families where this was demanded by custom, or on a merit or friendship basis where this was not so prescribed. There is evidence to show that even in the cases where some positions had to be held by certain families this was not always honoured. For example, either Mutapa Mavhura or his son Siti lowered the status of the Mukomohasha family after the victory over their leader, Mutapa Kapararidze.[33] Other changes will be indicated later.

In the early seventeenth century the *Dare* of the Mutapa was composed of the following positional titles: *Nengomasha (Ningomoxa)* described as governor of the provinces; *Mukomohasha (Mocomoaxa)* with the title of captain-general of the armies; *Ambuya,* the chief major-domo/steward; *Nyandovo? (Inhantouo)* said to have been chief musician; *Nyarukawo (Nurucão)* given as captain of the vanguard in times of war; *Mbokorume (Bucurume)* described as the right-hand man of Mutapa; *Nehonho,* the chief door-keeper;*Mangwende (Maguende)* said to have been the chief wizard *(n'anga)*; and *Netambe (Netombo* or *Netondo* or *Nemutombo),* the king's apothecary (herbalist). In addition to the above courtiers, 'There are many other officers of lower rank' who served at the court of Mutapa.[34] Although technically the Mutapa's wives should not be included among his councillors or officers, some of them lived at court and others had specific duties related to foreign relations,[35] especially during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and for those reasons we should discuss them as part of the central administration.

Whereas in the past most scholars had assumed that the Mutapa's courtiers lived at court, Dr Livneh has recently argued forcefully that they in fact did not because, as the sources make clear, 'All these [officers] are great nobles, and have lands and vassals'.[36] Besides, Livneh cannot visualize a self-supporting Mutapa family producing sufficient food for itself and for these 'drones'. And anyhow what happened in the provinces when these officers were at court? Also, besides what Dr Livneh has put forward, we have ourselves quoted Bacarro where he specifically states that during the *Chivabvu* (May

Day festivities) 'all the lords in the kingdoms appear, excepting such as have the title of kings, for these, although they are the vassals of Monomotapa, and pay him tribute, *never come to his court, or leave their own kingdoms*'.[37](emphasis added)

In this chapter, however, we intend to take the opposite view. The very same Portuguese source quoted by Dr Livneh also specifically singles out the officers we have just mentioned above and distinguishes them from other provincial rulers, by calling them 'officers of the king's household'.[38] More specifically, we shall show that the functions of these officers as described in the Portuguese records were such that they could only be performed in any meaningful way through residence at court. And, finally, we hope to demonstrate in chapter five that the means to support such a bureaucracy at court was available.

(a) Governor of the Provinces and Chief Minister

The first of the Mutapa's officers during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries is given as *Nengomasha*. He is described as the second most powerful man in the state. And if the king 'cannot give audience because of some hindrance it is held by his governor Ningomoxa'. The *Nengomasha* is described as Governor of the Provinces.[39] The *Nengomasha* during the reign of Gatsi Rusere is described as having been one of his own uncles. When, in 1597, Maravi-based invaders, followers of Chunzo, attacked the Mutapa state, Gatsi Rusere sent the *Nengomasha* as head of an army against them.[40] The person who headed any military expedition represented the Mutapa on the expedition. The records make clear that the seventeenth-century *Nengomasha* were members of the foremost family in the state. If we have any doubt as to their power we only have to recall the story of *Matuzianhe*, an associate of the Nengomasha family, who was able to declare himself a Mutapa and had his claims acknowledged by some people. His defeat was accomplished as a result of a Mutapa–Portuguese alliance.[41] From all this it would appear that members of the Nengomasha house were in fact princes of the blood who had a positional title in the Mutapa state.

But what remains unclear is exactly what was meant by the title 'governor of the kingdoms'. Did it mean they regularly visited the provinces? There is just no basis for such speculation at this stage. We have been unable to find a Shona term to describe such a role.

The only interpretation we can make at this stage is that perhaps he was the contact point at court for provincial rulers when they or their representatives visited the court. But even this is not a satisfactory explanation.

However, it is possible to speculate that this officer may well have assisted the Mutapa in determining who in the regions was the rightful successor. According to dos Santos, 'In each village there is a governor or a captain [chief or *sadunhu*] appointed by the king, who has authority to judge the *empofias (mhosva)* and lawsuits of the Kaffirs of his village'. During the second half of the eighteenth century we find evidence confirming that provincial rulers were appointed by the Mutapas. But, according to these latter sources, by the late eighteenth century only a few of the provincial rulers were still elected by the Mutapas. The majority, either because of distance or through disobedience, were chosen by and from the sons or relatives of the dead ruler without reference to the Mutapas. The duty and right to appoint or confirm new provincial rulers were key elements in a Mutapa's control of his vassal rulers. Hence the officer who assisted him in this duty would have been a very important functionary in the state. However, it must quickly be added that by election and appointment one should not imagine that the Mutapa was free to choose anyone he liked without respect to the laws of succession operative in a given province. This was not the case. The Mutapa was limited to those whom custom gave the right to succeed. It was only immediately following upon conquest or reconquest of some lands that the Mutapa could choose almost at will to whom to allocate certain lands. But once that was done then he was bound to choose successors for the governance of those lands from the family to whom he had allocated them. There is also evidence that at the succession of a new Sachiteve, custom allowed him, at least in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, to eliminate some of the existing rulers and to appoint new ones. In the Mutapa state we have already quoted evidence to show that until the eighteenth century the *Nevinga* was expected to commit suicide when a new Mutapa came to the throne. It is therefore conceivable that in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries the Uteve custom may have been operative in the Mutapa state as well. Certainly this is the claim made by dos Santos, as we have already stated. In the nineteenth century the right to invest or crown provincial rulers fell to the *Dzivaguru* priesthood.[42]

Did the *Nengomasha* live in his lands or at court? His duties, as

Bocarro makes clear, required him to be at court regularly. According to Bocarro and de Barros, the Mutapa's people had, as we have already read, seven holidays every month. According to one of the sources, these holidays fell on the 1st, 4th, 7th, 14th, 17th, 24th and 27th of each month. On these days the Mutapa held audience to listen to issues brought for his resolution. 'These audiences often last from morning till evening, without the king ever sitting down, *and when he cannot give audience because of some hindrance it is held by his governor Ningomoxa.*'[43] (emphasis added)

What we are being told here is that, during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries at least, the Mutapa held audiences every three to four days, and that if for any reason he was unable to do it his *Nengomasha* did it. In other words, the *Nengomasha* could not leave the *zimbabwe* for more than three to four days. What the above evidence shows is that the duties of the *Nengomasha*, described in the sources as a household officer, demanded that he live at court, and that is probably what he did.

Up to now we have used sixteenth- and seventeenth-century sources to describe the roles of the *Nengomasha*, which seem to have been those of chief minister, but what about the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century sources? During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the *Nengomasha* family continued to be regarded as nobles of the 'first rank'. However, they seem to have lost their rank as the chief minister and second most powerful personage in the state. Instead they were given the prestigious, but ritualistic, role of guardian of the royal graves. They shared this elevated role with the houses of Sika (*Sica*) and Nemavere.[44]

What happened to the roles of second most important person in the state and chief minister? These functions were not discontinued but transferred to others. The roles were in fact divided between two personages, the *Nevanje*, or heir to the ruling Mutapa, and the *Nevinga*, or chief minister. During the first half of the eighteenth century there were two *Nevanjes*, a chief one and a minor one. Later it seems only one was kept. During the first half of the eighteenth century, the chief *Nevanje* was appointed governor of Dande and the second one was made governor of Nyamakose. In other words, at this stage these two did not stay at court.[45] However, when Dande broke away in the second half of that century they had to stay in Chidima. But even then the *Nevanje* only 'appears in the presence of the Emperor on rare

occasions'.[46] The *Nevanje* could be a brother, a son or a brother's son of the ruling Mutapa.[47] For example, during the reign of Mutapa *Zeze* (1762–1767/8), Chindikwe (*Chintique*), the son of Debwe II, a brother to *Zeze*, was the *Nevanje*.[48] It can be inferred that a *Nevanje* expected to become a Mutapa at some stage, not immediately after the death of the incumbent but when the Mutapaship returned to his house, because, theoretically, after the seventeenth century the throne had to rotate between two houses. Clearly then, the *Nevanje* fulfilled only one of the *Nengomasha's* roles, that of being the second most important personage in the state.[49]

The second role, that of chief minister, seems to have been performed by the *Nevinga*.[50] The *Nevinga* is first mentioned in the records in the seventeenth century but Abraham uses oral evidence to show that the *Nevinga's* main role to act as regent goes back to the sixteenth century.[51] We meet the *Nevinga* in the records first in 1652 in a letter by Mutapa Siti Kazurukumusapa. In that letter he tells us that *Nengomasha* and *Nevinga* were the two leading nobles in his state.[52] This is a most important statement for our understanding of how families lost their roles and positions. Before this date the two leading noble families were always the *Nengomasha* and the *Mukomohasha*. During the seventeenth century, the *Mukomohasha* family provided two Mutapas, Gatsi Rusere (*c.* 1585 to *c.* 1623) and his son Kapararidze (*c.* 1623 to *c.* 1629). Mavhura successfully challenged Kapararidze's succession as being contrary to the principles of collateral succession. With Portuguese help, he deposed Kapararidze, first in 1629 and then finally in 1632. From the latter date the house of *Mukomohasha* never succeeded to the Mutapaship. Only descendants of Mavhura succeeded. Later we shall see what became of the *Mukomohasha*, but for the time being it is sufficient for us to point out that their status as the second most important nobles after the *Nengomasha* seems to have moved to the *Nevinga*. However, the *Nevinga* family seems to have held the post of chief minister during the eighteenth century but lost it in the nineteenth century. During the early part of the eighteenth century, councillor *Nevinga* was, as we have already pointed out, to act as regent for three days after the death of each Mutapa. But after the accession of a new Mutapa the old *Nevinga* had to commit suicide in order to allow the new Mutapa to choose his own *Nevinga*. This custom was stopped by Mutapa Nyamhandu (*c.* 1723 to *c.* 1740s) who pointed out that many

good men were refusing the Nevingaship because of the requirement to commit suicide after the Mutapa's death. However, other sources say it was the conflict preceding most successions in the late eighteenth century that rendered the interregnum of the *Nevinga* unnecessary.[53]

During the nineteenth century the position of chief minister moved to the *Nechinanga* clan, which in the eighteenth century used to provide the captain-general of the army. As chief minister, the *Nechinanga* is said to have had the responsibility of seeing to it that the orders of Mutapa were carried out and of reporting to him on all that happened at court. Incidentally, this is further evidence to show that the chief minister was, as Bocarro and others pointed out, a 'household officer' who, as we have argued, lived at court. Otherwise how could he report on everything that happened at court?[54]

(b) Captain-General of the Armies

The next court officer in the sixteenth and part of the seventeenth century was the *Mukomohasha*, described as Captain of the Armies of the Mutapa.[55] In the sixteenth century he was also known as the 'general and captain of the gates of the Kingdom'.[56] This would appear to be so because Hondosaka, the kingdom of the Mukomohasha family, was by then the outer province still loyal to the Mutapa which anyone from Tete had to pass through first before entering the interior parts of the empire. It was in effect a border province. The post of 'Captain of the Gates' was later to be held by a Portuguese trader in charge of the market place of Masapa. Then every Portuguese entering the Mutapa state had first to report at Masapa for clearance. According to Monclaro, the *Mukomohasha* was 'always with warriors on the field and quartering in sundry villages all about and in the district wherein he resides'.[57]

Two points need to be made about this statement. The first is, as we shall show later, the impression that the Mutapa had a standing army is wrong. The reason why the *Mukomohasha* described by Monclaro had forces 'in sundry villages' was that at the time Monclaro collected his information the Mutapa state was being threatened by the biggest Portuguese army ever to be sent against the Shona rulers before the nineteenth century. Monclaro was himself a member of that ill-fated Barreto expedition. The second point is that Monclaro is not clear as to where the *Mukomohasha*

himself was to be found. Was he in the 'sundry villages' or 'in the district wherein he resides'? He could not have been in all of these places at one and the same time. We feel that the important point about this document is that it describes a war situation, and therefore cannot help us to pinpoint where the *Mukomohasha* normally lived.

There is another seventeenth-century document which refers to the role of the Mukomohasha family during the early seventeenth century, especially at the time of the Mavhura–Kapararidze conflict. This document is important also because it is the only one we know to state that the *Mukomohasha* used to reside in Hondosaka. Let us quote the relevant passage:

> This emperor [Mutapa] is in the habit of appointing a captain-general who is the second person, after himself, and is called Macomoana [Mukomohasha], to reside in the lands of Botonga, at a place called Condessaca [Hondosaka] . . . the negroes of these parts . . . publicly assisted Caprasine [Kapararidze] in his wars.[58]

The fact that people of Hondosaka supported Kapararidze against Mavhura is no surprise because Hondosaka was the home area of the *Mukomohasha*. The claim that the *Mukomohasha* was the second most important person after the king is not supported by any other sources. However this does not necessarily show that Rezende was wrong. Rezende was summarizing reports on the Mutapa covering the reigns of Gatsi Rusere and Kapararidze. We have mentioned the fact that, in the late 1590s and early 1600s, Gatsi Rusere was engaged in trying to suppress a serious revolt engineered by some members of the Nengomasha family led by one *Matuzianhe*. It would appear that during the revolt of the *Nengomasha*, the *Mukomohasha* may have become the second most important person after the king himself. In this way we may be able to reconcile Rezende's comment with those of all other observers. But this situation could not have lasted for too long because around 1610 a new *Nengomasha* 'the second person of his kingdom' is said to have already been appointed and to have been supporting Mutapa Gatsi Rusere.[59] Therefore, if Rezende's comment is directed to the period after 1610 then it cannot be accepted as accurate.

Finally, on the question of residence at Hondosaka again, the continual wars of Gatsi Rusere's reign in the seventeenth century, and later the Mavhura–Kapararidze wars, may have made continuous presence of the *Mukomohasha* in Hondosaka vital. The second point

is that since Gatsi Rusere, a former *Mukomohasha*, was himself the Mutapa and after him also his son Kapararidze, again another possible former *Mukomohasha*, it may well be that during their reigns it was found unnecessary to have a *Mukomohasha* as captain-general staying at the *zimbabwe*. True, these are only inferences based on no particular documentation but at least they seem to have the virtue of being consistent with the other pieces of the jigsaw. For the time being however, we would want to leave the question of the *Mukomohasha's* (normal) residence open.

In chapter two, the story of the rise of the house of Mukomohasha has been reconstructed. There it was pointed out that the title *Mukomohasha* was first applied to Nyandoro Mukomohasha.[60]

After Nyandoro, his son Gatsi Rusere became the *Mukomohasha*.[61] And when Gatsi Rusere became Mutapa in 1585 it may be that his own son Nyambo Kapararidze was made the *Mukomohasha* and it may very well be that Kapararidze was able to succeed his father around 1623 because of his position as the *Mukomohasha*. There is no evidence to confirm or deny these possibilities. That there was a *Mukomohasha* when Kapararidze was Mutapa is confirmed by Rezende. So is the fact that, in the struggle between Kapararidze and Mavhura, the *Mukomohasha* supported Kapararidze.[62] As has already been indicated, when Mavhura finally emerged victorious over Kapararidze it appears he did not give the post of captain-general of the armies to the Mukomohasha family. Their role as the second most powerful family after the *Nengomasha* was then taken by the *Nevinga*. Yet their province of Hondosaka was too strategic to be easily neglected. So in the eighteenth century the Mukomohasha family was still represented at court.[63] It is not clear what role they then actually held. But one thing clear is that they were no longer the captains-general of the armies. They are described only as grandees of the court.

The position of captain-general of the armies did not disappear with the temporary demise of the Mukomohasha family because from eighteenth-century sources it is known that the position was given to a *Nechinanga*.[64] However, there is no evidence that the *Shumba Nechinanga* people of Noedza were the sole providers of the *Nechinanga*.[65] This seems unlikely because Pacheco tells us that future Mutapa Kabwe was a *Nechinanga* before his own succession.[66] Kabwe was of course not a member of the *Shumba Nechinanga* clan

but that of the royal Mutapa *Nzou Samanyanga* clan. So it does not seem that these positions were necessarily reserved for any particular family. This may well explain why Nyandoro's family was able to take over the title/name of *Mukomohasha* although present descendants of *Mukomohasha* are said to be *Nhari Unendoro* and not *Nzou Samanyanga*. By the nineteenth century, the *Nechinanga* had replaced *Nevinga* as the chief minister. The position of chief captain of Mutapa's armies was held by the *Chimumo*.[67] It would therefore seem that, throughout its history, the Mutapa state always had a post of captain-general of the armies.

In case of war the *Mukomohasha* was not necessarily sent as head of the army. For example, Gatsi Rusere sent the *Nengomasha* as leader of the army which confronted the followers of Chunzo.[68] In the eighteenth century it is said that in case of war the Mutapa could either appoint the *Nechinanga*, who was then captain-general of the armies, or the *Mbokorume* or the *Mwendamberi*, described as the Lt General, to be in charge of an expedition. However, the commander-in-chief would be a prince of the blood, representing the Mutapa for the duration of the campaign.[69] During the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, the *Mukomohasha* was assisted in military matters by the *Nyarukawo (Inharucao)*, the ruler of Russini, who was described as having been captain of the vanguard in time of war.[70] Since the Mutapa did not have a standing army we may infer that during peace time the chief function of the 'military brass' was to advise the Mutapa on military affairs — strategies, weaponry, intelligence, etc.

(c) Steward/Treasurer

The third office was the *Ambuya* or Major-Domo (Chief Steward). According to Bocarro, in the seventeenth century *Ambuya* was also the ruler of Choe (Choma?),[71] where the Tavara rain-cult centre of *Dzivaguru* was to be found. He was a Tavara by origin.[72] During the seventeenth century it was the duty of *Ambuya* to name the chief wife of the Mutapa known as *Mazvarira* (*Mazarira*).[73] Abraham says that the court steward during the sixteenth century was the *Chivanga*. For this claim he relies on oral evidence.[74] The existence of the *Chivanga* at court in the sixteenth century must at this stage remain speculative. This becomes even more problematic when we find in de Barros that, during the sixteenth century, the chief keeper of the

Mutapa *zimbabwes* and wives was known as *Symbacayo* (*Zimbakayo?*).[75] His role was that of a steward in the same way as *Ambuya*. If this *Zimbakayo* was the *Chivanga* why does de Barros not say so? The appointment of *Ambuya*, a member of the aboriginal Tavara subject peoples, as a chief steward must be seen as an attempt to give these people a point of contact at court.

In the eighteenth century the post of chief steward or treasurer was known as *Nenzou* (owner or keeper of the elephants). It is not clear whether the post of *Nenzou* was held by the *Ambuya* family. What is said is that it was the duty of the *Nenzou* to receive all the presents brought to the Mutapa court and that the *Nenzou* was also in charge of the *fazenda* (trade goods), i.e. cloth and beads used as salaries for the Portuguese garrison of Mutapa's court. This *fazenda* was paid by the government of Mozambique. In addition, the *Nenzou* kept the Mutapa's ivory, and supervised every aspect of the royal finances, disposing of it as directed by the Mutapa.[76]

The functions of the court steward/major-domo/treasurer clearly meant he had to live at the palace. Under the section on economy more will be said about what the treasurer was in charge of.

(d) Chief Musician and Chief Door-Keeper

These two important posts were held by different persons. In the seventeenth century the Chief Musician is given as *Inhantouo* (*Nyandovo*?). He was in charge of a large troupe of court musicians.[77] In later centuries, although it is known that musicians continued to be important at the royal court, the title of their leader is not given.[78] At the same time the Chief Door-Keeper (*Nyamasuo*) was one nobleman known as *Nehonho*. During the eighteenth century it is said that the Mutapa had six *Bandazios* (*Bandadzi*) or keepers of the gates who were part of his usual entourage.[79] From the title it may be inferred that nobody could see the Mutapa without passing through and explaining his business to the door-keeper(s). This was a powerful position. It certainly was a post requiring great tact, firmness and discretion, knowledge of protocol and, above all, loyalty to the Mutapa. It may be reasonably assumed from their duties that the *Nyamasuo* and the head musician lived at the court.

(e) Mbokorume: Chief Confidant (Son-in-Law)

One of the oldest surviving offices at the Mutapa's court was that of

the *mbokorume* (*Bucurume*). From the sixteenth through the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the *mbokorume* was always described as one of the grandees of a Mutapa court and the right-hand man of the Mutapa himself.[80] According to one scholar, the *mbokorume* was the chief son-in-law or brother-in-law of the Mutapa.[81] The son-in-law was regarded as being especially loyal to the ruler. This seems to have been true also in the Rozvi state. It is even possible that a *muzukuru* (grandson or nephew) could have held such a position. It was a position of great confidence, and absolute loyalty was expected from the holder. The *mbokorume* could be and was used in almost any role. As mentioned above, he could even be made general of a military expedition. Indeed, some of the eighteenth-century sources describe him as having been one of the chief generals of the armies.[82] By its very description, the mbokorumeship was not necessarily restricted to any one family. As confidants and close advisors on many issues, the *mbokorumes* had to stay at court.

(f) Priesthood/Diviners

A discussion of the religious system as a whole and its political implications in the Mutapa state falls under its own section; at this stage we want to examine only its involvement with and physical presence at court. Religico-magico fields were also represented at court. In the seventeenth century Bocarro tells us that *Mangwende* (*Maguende*) was the Mutapa's chief *n'anga* (diviner); *Netambe* was his chief herbalist and keeper of the royal spells and unguents.[83] During the eighteenth century the Mutapa had three priests, viz. *Netondo, Bushu* (*Buxo*) and *Chikara* (*Chicara*).[84] Another eighteenth century document also gives *Simboti* (*Cimbote*) as a priest of the Mutapa.[85] However, only *Netondo* is mentioned in the nineteenth century by Pacheco.[86]

According to Pacheco, Netondo was a Tonga (Tavara) from Chidima who brought some cloth and salt to Mutota, the founder of the Mutapa dynasty, and through that cloth excited his appetite for the conquest of Chidima.[87] Abraham calls him Nyakatonda, a trusted servant of Mutota.[88] This suggests that the Netondoship may have been the preserve of that family. In the nineteenth century Pacheco mentions that one of *Netondo's* roles was to hand over the state to every new Mutapa or provincial ruler at coronation.[89] The role played

by *Netondo* at the burial of a Mutapa has already been mentioned. Furthermore, whenever one of the royal Mutapa *mhondoro* was possessed for the first time it was the duty of *Netondo* and other priests to inform the Mutapa.[90] The other priest was called *Bushu*. *Bushu* is almost certainly represented today by Chief Bushu, a descendant of Karuva, an early priest of the *Dzivaguru* cult. And therefore, like *Netondo*, he was of Tavara origin. He also took part in the burial rites of dead Mutapas. The sources are very specific as to where these priests lived. They tell us that *Netondo* and *Bushu* accompanied the Mutapa everywhere he went.[91] In contrast, *Chikara*, described as the chief priest of the Mutapa, hardly ever appeared before his ruler. Instead, it was the Mutapa's duty to send messengers to *Chikara* every time before the planting season to ask for rain because *Chikara* is said to have been responsible for rain calling in the state.[92] The section under religion will return to a discussion on the origins of *Chikara*. There it will be shown that *Chikara* was the chief priest of the *Dzivaguru* shrine.

The composition of the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century priesthood at Mutapa's court represented *varidzi vevhu* (the owners of the soil), that is, the conquered Tavara dynasties. *Netondo, Bushu* and *Chikara* were clearly Tavara and *Simboti* was probably non-Karanga. Today, the people of praise name *Nhewa Simboti* refer to themselves in their praise name as *muSena* (showing that they originated from the Tonga/Sena of the Zambezi valley). And even the *Netambe* and *Mangwende* of the seventeenth century may very well have been Tonga/Sena in origin. But by the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the state of Mutapa had moved further east into Chidima where Tavara influence was paramount. This meant that the need for the Mutapa regime to live at peace with their Tavara subjects and their spirits increased, and for that reason the Tavara *Dzivaguru* cult may well have assumed greater significance at the royal court. The role of the Mutapa royal *mhondoro* will be considered under religion as these were not resident at the court itself.

Besides the above chief ministers/advisors of the Mutapa, it is known that he had other advisors as well. For example, he was also advised by close relatives such as his mother, uncles, and *machinda* (princes of the blood) who, although they did not hold any special posts at court, could attend the royal *dare*.

Before concluding discussion on the chief ministers of Mutapa, it

Modern *n'anga*/diviner. Religico-magico aspects were also represented at the court of the Mutapas.

is now necessary to return to the question of their residence. Dr Livneh maintained that all these 'household officers' with the titles of *reis* (kings) 'were first and foremost resident in the provinces and occupied with their local problems. Only intermittently were they called upon to serve the central ruler.'[93] In the seventeenth century, the *Nengomasha, Mukomohasha, Ambuya, mbokorume* and *Nyakurukawo* were all titled 'kings'. From the above list, Livneh concedes that *Ambuya* 'was by definition of his role a resident of the *zimbabwe*.'[94] The question to be asked here is who was in charge of his *reino* (kingdom) when *Ambuya* was at court? Although Livneh does not answer the question directly, he implies it by suggesting that the distance from *Ambuya's* kingdom, given as Choma, and the Mutapa's *zimbabwe* may have been two day's journey, i.e. near enough. But this cannot be accepted as a satisfactory explanation. It is simply unrealistic to imply a commuting *Ambuya*. But Livneh might justifiably protest that he does not in fact mean to make such a ridiculous proposition. Fine. But neither does he want us to believe that the kingdom of Choma functioned without a ruler.

In the seventeenth century Bocarro is quite clear where 'most of these lords' like *Ambuya, mbokorume, Nengomasha, Mukomohasha*, etc. lived. Having described their kingdoms and those of other rulers, he goes on to say,

> Besides all these there is also a larger and principal kingdom, which is that of Mokaranga, where the monomotapa resides with his court, ***and most of these lords or their sons, of whom the monomotapa makes use.*** [95] **(emphasis added)**

The discussion of the roles and duties of the other officers with the possible exception of the *Mukomohasha*, General of the Armies, has established that their functions required them to be resident at court. The documentary evidence from the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries deliberately describes these officers as: 'The officers of the king's household'; 'The grandees at his court'; 'The court of Monomotapa is composed of'. It is said that, whatever assembly or meeting the Mutapa was at, he was always attended by his court grandees so that if it happened that he yawned, exhaled, spat or expectorated, the grandees would laud him saying, 'Thou art the Lion, the Leopard, the Elephant, Thou the Invincible One, the Mighty One, the Immortal One'. With these laudatory evocations would go the clapping of hands. The court grandees had to be very

much at hand to be able to fulfil their many-sided duties![96] Surely if these court officers did not reside at the court/capital this should have been such a striking feature that it could hardly have escaped all the Portuguese observers.

Finally, the question must be faced as to what happened when these regional rulers were chosen to serve at court? In each chiefdom/kingdom there must have been, like at the centre itself, a number of successors to each position. Quite a few people could have become effective rulers of Hondosaka or Choma, to mention only two. For example, a son or a brother or a paternal uncle of a man called to serve at court could act as the effective ruler or it could be decided that the one invited to serve at court would merely hold a ritualistic authority over his region. Each Mutapa was free to choose his own advisors/ministers on his succession and therefore, if our hypothesis is correct, the lords who were killed or removed when a new Mutapa succeeded would be mainly those who served the previous Mutapa. Those in charge of provinces would be largely left alone.[97]

In short then, the sources reviewed above as well as the actual roles of 'household officers' can be said to be opposed to the theory of non- residence for the 'household officers'. Therefore, on the basis of present evidence, it can only be concluded that the 'household officers' did in fact live at the *zimbabwe* of the Mutapa.

iv. The Mutapa minor officers

The sources mention that besides his chief ministers already discussed, the Mutapa had 'many other officers of lower rank'.[98] Among these junior officers serving at the Mutapa *zimbabwe* can be mentioned personal bodyguards, court praise-singers, musicians, jesters, valets and cooks.

(a) Bodyguards

The evidence of Mutapa's bodyguard comes from sources in the sixteenth, seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. During the sixteenth century they were known as *inficis*.[99] They were also used as executioners. Dos Santos has left us a description of Sachiteve's *inficis*, whom he says were similar to those of Mutapa. These 'very brutal' and 'bloodthirsty' savages are[100]

> girt round the neck and waist with a thick cord, and carry in

> their hands a very bright iron hatchet and a wooden club about three quarters of a yard long. With these instruments they kill all those whom the king commands to be put to death, first striking them on the head with the club as if killing a pig, and having thus brought any one whom they strike to the ground, they cut off his head with their hatchet. These men generally go round and round the house and enclosure of the king, shouting 'Inhama, Inhama' [sic *inyama, inyama*], which signifies 'flesh, flesh!'[101]

Apparently the *inficis* of Mutapa preferred the less gruesome method of stabbing a condemned man with assegais rather than the pig-bashing style favoured by the Sachiteve's men. In the sixteenth century, the Sachiteve had about 200-300 *inficis*. But according to de Barros, during the sixteenth century the Mutapa had more than 500 jesters-bodyguards and their captain who followed him 'wherever he may be . . . [and] take turns to keep watch outside the house where he sleeps, talking and singing jokes, and in time of war they fight and render any other service.'[102] By the eighteenth century the term *inficis* seems to have disappeared, but the role and functions of the *inficis* continued. The Mutapa's bodyguard in the eighteenth century performed other duties besides guarding him. They carried the Mutapa's and his wife's *manchila* (hammock), fetched firewood and water, and performed other house chores. The person in charge of these *varanda* (servants) was known as *Mapuru* (*Mapuro*). There were still about 500 of these *varanda* in the eighteenth century. Among their duties was the administration of *mwavi/muteyo*, or trial by ordeal, to any of the Mutapa's wives accused of committing adultery.[103] The use of the bodyguard for household chores in the eighteenth century may well reflect the more humble circumstances of the Mutapa in comparison with the previous centuries.

(b) Musicians/dancers and jesters

Besides the bodyguard, the Mutapa hád a number of professional musicians, dancers, praise-singers and jesters for the amusement of the court and for ceremonial occasions. In Sachiteve's kingdom the praise-singers and jesters were known as *marombe*, a term today used in standard Shona to refer to beggars but in Manyika, a Shona dialect closer to Teve, it means the cuckoo birds. These *marombe* used to

> go round and round the royal dwelling, shouting . . . many songs and discourses in praise of the king, in the course of which they

> call him lord of the sun and moon, king of the land and of the rivers, conqueror of his enemies, great in all things, great thief, great wizard, great lion . . . When the king goes out he is surrounded and encircled by these *marombes*, who recite these praises to him with loud cries, to the sound of small drums, irons, and bells, which help them to make a louder noise and clamour.[104]

Besides the *marombes*, dos Santos says there were also to be found

> great musicians and dancers, who have no other office than to sit in the first room of the king's palace, at the outer door, and round his dwelling, playing many different musical instruments, and singing to them a great variety of songs and discourses in praise of the king, in very high and sonorous voices.[105]

Among the musical instruments described by dos Santos were two types of *mbira* or xylophones, the marimba-type of *mbira*, which produced 'a sweet and rhythmical harmony' and the smaller finger marimba, which 'produce altogether a sweet and gentle harmony of accordant sounds'.[106] During the eighteenth century, Mutapa Debwe Mupunzagutu, it is said, used to spend hours without end composing songs on the small marimba or *mbira*.[107] For trumpets they had large horns of certain wild animals which the Teve called *parapandas* but which today the Shona-speakers call *hwamanda*. In addition,

> They make use of many drums after the fasion of kettle-drums, some large and some small, which they temper so that some have a treble sound and others yield other tones, and to these those who play upon them sing with voices so loud and harsh that the whole of the surrounding country is stunned by the noise of their singing and playing.[108]

But as already mentioned they had 'many [other] different musical instruments' besides the ones mentioned above.[109] It would appear that at least in the seventeenth century, if not later as well, the Shona rulers had the makings of veritable orchestras.

(c) Pages/valets/cooks

The last category of servants were the pages/valets/cooks. The chief valet of the Mutapa was given in the sixteenth century as *Mafocarira*. He at times carried the king's bow and was almost certainly the captain of the pages, who were known as *massacorira* in the seventeenth century. The *massacorira* were 'sons of the nobles of his kingdom'.[110] They were between the ages of 15 and 20 years. Their

number is not given, but they cannot have been too many as their duties were limited and close to the Mutapa's person. Two of them are described as having been his cooks, two others as his waiters; and the others as having been responsible for serving him within doors. It is hard to imagine anything more than ten or so pages. Indeed, de Barros specifically says that 'His [Mutapa's] state does not consist of great pomp, ornaments, or furniture for the service of his person, for the greatest ornaments in his house are cotton cloths made in the country with much labour.' The young men had to remain chaste during their period of service in the Mutapa's chambers – a wise precaution, no doubt, seeing that there must have been dozens of man-starved royal females prowling the palace grounds! When the *massacorira* reached 20 years of age they were removed from indoor to outdoor duties. They then lived outside the palace. They also had their own leader/captain and the king gave them lands from which to subsist. They were then referred to as *maueiro (marerwa?)* and served the king for several years. In time they became mature married men and were called *chureiro* (*chirerwa?)* and were then ready to assume higher offices in the state, as ambassadors, court officers or provincial rulers, especially as successors to those lands their own fathers once governed.[111]

During the nineteenth century the Mutapa's valet seems to have been a *muranda* known as *Chinanze*. Whether he was the leader of other *Zvinanze* (*Bzenauze*) we are never told.[112]

Of some interest are the speculations by various writers as to the significance of pagery at Mutapa's court. The earlier writers have tended to agree with Goes that Mutapa

> constantly keeps at his court all the sons of the kings and lords who are his vassals, the former that they may have filial affection for him, and the latter that their fathers may not rise against him with the lands which they hold from him.[113]

However, the more knowledgeable dos Santos, writing some years after Goes, bluntly states that previous writers on this topic relied

> upon very incorrect information, because had they known the truth concerning the customs of this king they would not have said that . . . the sons of [other kings of this coast] were brought up and resided at his court to learn there the laws and customs of his kingdom, the contrary being an absolute certainty.[114]

Dos Santos continues:

> And if at any time any of these things were as thus described,

> which I greatly doubt, at the present day not even the memory of them remains, but on the contrary Monomotapa's suite is very limited and he uses little pomp, and is served in the same way as Quiteve.[115]

The Sachiteve used some of his bodyguards, praise-singers and musicians as grooms in his chamber and as ambassadors. We have already seen that in the eighteenth century *Mapuru* was in charge of *varanda* who ministered to the Mutapa and his chief wife. Livingstone makes reference to a practice in mid-nineteenth-century Chidima whereby sons of what he called 'freemen' were sent, when they reached puberty, to live under an important chief who taught them good manners and the wisdom of their forefathers. Their parents paid for this and after the apprenticeship they returned to their own people. This practice, later writers claim, originated from the Mutapa pagery.[116]

It is true that dos Santos was primarily denying that the rulers along the coast, some of whom he had personally visited and interviewed, ever sent their sons as pages to the Mutapa. In the last part of the quotation, he specifically draws attention to the fact that the Mutapa's court resembled that of the Sachiteve where there was no such practice. So that in fact and intent his denial is not restricted to coastal rulers but all other Mutapa subjects. Dos Santos was perfectly aware of the existence of *massacorira*, the pages of Mutapa.[117] Pagery in the Mutapa of the seventeenth century seems to resemble a well-known practice among the Shona whereby if parents find out that one of their sons has an aptitude towards a certain skill or craft they would arrange for him to live under a *nyanzvi* (expert) to learn the trade. Just as in Livingstone's story, the parents of the child have to pay the *nyanzvi* something. It would seem reasonable to assume that pagery at the Mutapa's court must have been a highly sought after appointment which many of the princes of the blood ruling in the provinces would have schemed and vied to procure for their sons. For at court their sons learned the arts of kingship, the politics of the state, the history and culture of the nation. And as has been pointed out, royal favours awaited those who successfully served the Mutapa as pages. The demands of the pagery were hard for if one was not chaste he was 'severely punished and *expelled from the king's service*'.[118] (my emphasis) If these boys were 'prisoners' held to keep their fathers in check, what a delightful way to have

escaped this imprisonment; sample a royal princess and he would have been expelled from the 'king's service'!

The evidence does not support the prisoner thesis. Pagery provided the Mutapa with well-trained future 'civil servants' who had intimate knowledge of the workings of the government, as well as providing a channel through which courtly etiquette and concepts of government could find their way to the provinces.

Finally, if the concept of pagery was ever thought of as a means of keeping all provincial rulers in check by having their sons as 'prisoners' at court, it can only be concluded that it was an ineffectual device for the state, in the end, disintegrated nevertheless. And at no time do we find any instances of these provincial rulers' desperate efforts to ransom their sons. It is probably true that those rulers with sons at court as pages were likely to have a vested interest in supporting the ruling Mutapa as he would have shown them favours by taking their sons as pages. But this has little to do with taking prisoners.

v. The royal wives

The last group of important court personalities were the somewhat legendary wives of Mutapa. Some say they were as many as 3 000,[119] but others claim they were little more than 300.[120] Many claim they were unlimited.[121] Even in the twilight days of the state in the nineteenth century, David Livingstone gives a figure of 100 wives.[122] In the seventeenth century the wives of Mutapa were divided into nine 'houses'. The nine wives, in order of seniority, are given as *Mazvarira* (*Mazarira*), *Nehanda* (*Inhahanda*), *Nyazvidza*? (*Nabuiza*), *Navemba* (*Nokavemba*), *Nemangore*, *Nizingoapangi*, *Nemangoro*, *Nessanhi* and *Necharunda*. Not all of these wives lived in the palace. In the seventeenth century only the third wife, *Nabuiza*, did in fact live in the palace with the Mutapa. She was served by personal servants in much the same way as the Mutapa was served by his pages, except that hers were female and not male.[123] It is possible that her servants were some of the junior wives who had to 'obey the chief wives in whose houses they live, and wait upon them as their servants'.[124] In the nineteenth century Pacheco tells us that the chief wife of Mutapa was called *Zingua* (Dzingwa?) but that, unlike *Mazvarira*, the sons of *Zingua*, like those of *Nabuiza*, could succeed to the throne.[125] There is a sense in which, even in the sixteenth and seven

teenth century, *Nabuiza* was in fact the first true wife of the Mutapa. This was so because the first two *Mazvarira* and *Nehanda* were 'ritualistic wives' as they usually were sisters or other close relatives of the Mutapa. The practice of royal incest is said to have started with Matope who, fulfilling his father's demand, committed incest with his half-sister Nyamhita, better known as Nehanda or the ruler of Handa, before he could take the throne.[126] *Mazvarira's* importance seems to have become pronounced with the coming of the Portuguese for her special role is said to have been as a spokesperson for the Portuguese causes at Mutapa's court.

> She is the mother of the Portuguese, speaks for them, and treats of their concerns with the king, therefore the Portuguese send their presents to her; and the monomotapa sends no ambassador to the Portuguese without one of Mazarira's servants with him.[127]

When a *Mazvarira* died, it was the duty of the *Ambuya* to 'name another Mazarira to inherit her house and state . . . from among the king's sisters.'[128]

The second wife of the Mutapa in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries is given as *Nehanda*. She, too, was a sister or close relation. We are told that she was to the moors (Swahili traders) what *Mazvarira* was to the Portuguese.[129] Why *Nehanda* should have been second to *Mazvarira* in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries is never explained. In the fifteenth century Matope 'married', from among his close clanswomen, only his half-sister Nehanda.[130] During that time she must have been the chief 'sister-wife'. And in the eighteenth century Miranda tells us that,

> The principal wife of the Emperor is a princess, indeed she is his own sister or close kinswoman. She is called *Neanda* [*Nehanda*] and enjoys all the privileges and rights of the Emperor, her husband. She treats the other *Mucarambas* [*Mukarangas*, i.e. junior wives] as her subjects or slaves. The respect shown to her is so great that she may rightly be accorded the title of Empress.[131]

It is therefore unclear why *Mazvarira* became number one wife in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. It is possible the Portuguese sources are deliberately misleading in an attempt to show their importance at Mutapa's court in relation to the moors whose interests they claim were looked after by the second wife. Again, they may very well have been deliberately misled by the court itself into believing

that *Mazvarira* was the first wife. A possible hypothesis is that *Mazvarira* may have been the second wife but as the Portuguese role increased in the Mutapa state so did her status. Of course there is always the possibility that for reasons probably internal and now lost to us, *Mazvarira* was elevated to the position of wife number one. After all, if Abraham's informants are correct, the original Mazvarira was a sister to the original Mutota and as an 'aunt' (*vatete*) to *Nehanda* she would have enjoyed a superior role once it had been decided that her successors were to become wives of the Mutapas.[132]

Did the Mutapas have children with their sister-wives? Dr Livneh has argued that it was highly improbable that the Mutapa in fact did have children with his sister- or daughter-wives. This was contrary to Shona custom of exogamy. He goes on to claim that the very name of Mazvarira (whom he calls *Mazarira* after the Portuguese documents) suggests that she may have been a virgin.

> Mutapa's marriage to Mazarira, "whom he dearly loves", was then, most probably, a symbolical one. This may be referred to in her official name, which seems to be related to the Shona *zarira*, to close; and *zariro*, a bar for closing entrance. By extention (sic) it is probably related to her virginity.[133]

These ingenious speculations are unnecessary as well as wrong. In the first place, Pacheco specifically stated that the *nehandas*, or Mutapa's female relatives who were also his wives, did have children. But the sons of these women could never succeed to the throne of Chidima or any other district because their mothers being princesses were more free and liberal with their persons, 'that . . . the princes have doubt as to the legitimacy of *the sons they have with them*'.[134] (my emphasis) A late eighteenth-century source also makes clear that, 'the said princesses [wives of Mutapa] know that their sons cannot succeed to the throne and remain as princes of blood.' This same source makes the following interesting point that the wives or *vakáranga* of the Mutapa were there 'for the enjoyment of the emperor, of his vassals and his soldiers'.[135] Since we are told in other sources that adultery for Mutapa's wives was a crime punishable by death, could it be that the princesses who were wives of Mutapa were exempt from this punishment since their issue had no claim to the throne and so they could take the liberties mentioned here? Finally, dos Santos states that among the Teve, also a Mutapa-related Shona group, the Sachiteve also married his own sisters, aunts, nieces and daughters

because he believed

> that the children born of them are the true heirs of the kingdom, having no admixture of alien blood . . . will defend and sustain the kingdom much better than those descended from a strange people and kingdom.[136]

Dos Santos makes clear that among the Teve only the Sachiteve was exempt from the Shona laws of incest. 'This law [permitting incest] only applies to the kings, for the other Kaffirs, though they may be great lords, cannot marry their sisters or daughters, under pain of death.'[137] In chapter two it was pointed out that Mutapa Nyahuma Mukombero was a son of the union of the first Nehanda and her half-brother Mutapa Matope.

The second argument by Livneh that *Mazarira* (*Mazvarira*) is derived from the verb *kuzarura* (*-zarira*), to close or bar, is a result of his unfortunate acceptance of Portuguese orthography. The Portuguese, and other Europeans, have always found the Shona *zv* sound combination difficult to pronounce. The name *Mazvarira* comes from *kuzvara* (*-zvara*), to give birth, and *kuzvarira* (*-zvarira*), to pledge a daughter in marriage. *Mazvarira*, literally, could mean 'you have pledged a daughter in marriage'. Today in Shona, *Muzvarira* means one's mother's sister married to one's own father. And among the Manyika the term *muzvare* is used to refer to a chief's daughter. The name/title *Mazvarira* also appears in the history of the people of Nematombo in Urungwe district.[138]

In conclusion, there is no reason to postulate the virginity of *Mazvarira*, or *Nehanda* and other princesses. If anything these royal women seem to have been a fairly lively and generous bunch. Also, there is no reason to associate marrying of sisters and kinswomen with moribund views of divine kingship ideas in Africa south of the Sahara.[139] In the nineteenth century, Moshoeshoe I of Lesotho arranged for a royal incest as a mechanism to ensure the unity of his kingdom by bringing together the houses of his two chief sons.[140] The 'Hyena of Matlama' was not thinking of divine kingship when he made these arrangements. It was simply a pragmatic response to what he saw as a potentially dangerous situation threatening the political unity of his state after his death. To this day, intermarriage among Moshoeshoe's direct descendants continues for much the same reasons. Nobody thinks of this in terms of 'divine kingship'. Nor is there any reason to think that the Mutapas married their kinswomen in response to some Egyptian concepts of 'divine kingship'. Certainly

the Sachiteves did not justify it on those grounds. Their logic may well have had much in common with that of Moshoeshoe on this point.

Turning now to Mutapa's other remaining six chief wives. The sources do not say if they had any special roles. What they say is that they all had their own houses, lands and vassals, and some of them, like the first three, even had 'kingdoms pertaining to their houses'. They had complete jurisdiction over their vassals. They lived away from the palace on their own estates. But it does not seem that these estates were too far away from the capital. Sometimes the Mutapa visited them on their estates and at other times he asked them to visit him at his palace. Each of the nine wives 'has many more [women], whom [the king] uses at his pleasure.' These were known as the Mutapa's *vakaranga* or junior wives.[141] However from the eighteenth century onwards, as the state contracted, the sources seem to imply that the royal wives lived mostly at court and that even the *Nehanda*, then regarded as chief wife, had 'no authority or any power' of her own.[142] It has to be remembered that in the latter half of the eighteenth century, when the above document was written, the Mutapa had lost Dande where Handa, the land of *Nehanda*, was located.

Recruitment of the Mutapa's wives in the eighteenth century appears, from the records, to have been a haphazard affair, for Dionízio tells us that,

> when the emperor has any reports of a desirable woman corresponding to his lascivious appetite he will have her brought to him to be added to his harem of *mucarangas* [*vakaranga*] without much ceremony.[143]

The wives of Mutapa were chosen from among 'the daughters of the kings and lords who are his vassals.'[144] And, as Miranda and Pacheco make clear, it was only from among the sons of these women that a future Mutapa could come.[145] Here we have a very ancient device of keeping together a state. The fact that Mutapa married the daughters of his vassals must have strengthened his relations with his vassals. We may assume that the Mutapa would have tried to get a wife from as many of his key vassals as possible. In this way the periphery would have been represented at court and regional rulers would have had nephews or cousins who in theory could become future Mutapas. We may be sure that the Mutapa himself did not miss the opportunity to use his daughters in similar roles.

The political and carnal inducements for polygamy in African

states were robustly defended by Moshoeshoe, the great Basotho ruler of the nineteenth century. Challenged by the young French missionary Casalis on the subject of polygamy, he replied,

> it is an affair of our manners and of our tastes. Our women age quickly, and then we cannot resist the temptation of taking younger ones . . . *For, as chiefs, it is a means of contracting alliances with the chiefs of other peoples, and this helps to maintain peace.* And then we have a great many travellers and strangers who visit us. How could we lodge them or board them, if we had not several wives? . . . Ah! polygamy; . . . you are attacking there a strong citadel![146] (emphasis added)

Finally, we will now turn to Dr Livneh's thesis that the wealth on which the Mutapa's state was based was produced in the fields by the royal wives. Dr Livneh even calls his hypothesis the 'Zambezian rule that richness lay in women' which applied to all, including the Mutapas.[147] Elsewhere in this study the topics of production and distribution in the Mutapa's state are dealt with. There it is shown that the wealth of the Mutapas was derived from the appropriation of surplus produced by the labour of the subjects. Dr Livneh has misunderstood the meaning of the references in Conceição and Monclaro[148] which state that the Mutapa and/or his wives worked in the fields. The fact that sometimes they worked in their fields does not necessarily mean that their labour was the critical element in working those fields. In the section on the economy, stress is laid on the importance of *zunde* or labour tribute paid to all Shona chiefs including the Mutapas. Furthermore, in the discussion on minor officers at court it has been shown that the chores of fetching water, firewood etc. at court were done by servants. Other sources have even claimed that the cooking for the Mutapa was done by special cooks. During the eighteenth century, the *vakaranga* of Mutapa had a reputation for cleanliness. According to a Portuguese officer who spent three years as captain of the garrison of the court of Mutapa, the royal ladies had enough time to walk down to a stream near the court to wash themselves two or three times every day.[149] This does not sound like a description of hard-working ladies. There can be no question that any of the ordinary Shona women could have enjoyed such leisure, a bath once a week or a month being not unusual for them. That the wives of chiefs worked in the fields and that Mutapa's wives also did some field work cannot be contested. But to suggest, as Livneh does, that these courtly ladies, protected from many of the household chores,

were especially reserved for farm labour requires more justification than is offered. It appears that these ladies had more in common with the queen bees and the drones than with the worker bees!

Conclusion

The discussion of the Mutapa court institutions, practices and officers has shown that the Mutapas were assisted by a fairly large bureaucracy. This meant that they had the necessary machinery to gather information, to be offered advice, and to see to the implementation of decisions taken. However the weakest link in the Mutapa state system was the system of succession. The adelphic collateral system of succession often produced more than one pretender to the throne, usually of advanced age. This situation enabled, from time to time, outside interference in the Mutapa state matters to take place.

Furthermore, it was noted that although the Mutapas were in some cases, especially where the chief ministers were concerned, bound to select their officers from certain families, they nevertheless were free to choose any one of a number of possible candidates from those families. This was an important aspect which encouraged a degree of meritocracy to enter into the recruitment process. And the fact that a new Mutapa was free to choose his own ministers worked to strengthen the hand of the Mutapas. However, the need to appoint ministers from certain families meant that those families became imperial institutions with a vested interest in the continuation of the empire.

It seems that the apparent appetite for polygamy by the Mutapas was primarily designed to foster loyalty from the vassals to the Mutapas. It also increased the number of assistants at the court. But this did not mean that they were the main producers of the wealth on which the state was based, as some writers have suggested.

CHAPTER 3

Notes

1. E. Alpers, 'The Mutapa and Malawi Political Systems', in *Aspects of Central African History*, (ed) T.O. Ranger, (London, 1968), 14.
2. P. Curtin, S. Feierman, L. Thompson and J. Vansina, *African History* (London, 1978), 286.
3. Livingstone, *Researches*, 660; D. Chanaiwa,'Politics and Long-Distance Trade in the Mwene Mutapa Empire during the Sixteenth Century', *Intern. Journ. Afric. Hist. Stud. 5*, 3 (1972), 424; T.O. Ranger, *Revolt in Southern Rhodesia* (London, 1967), 4, 6; Garlake, *Great Zimbabwe*, 176–177.
4. Chanaiwa, 'Long-Distance Trade', 424–425, 434–435.
5. Livneh, 'Pre-colonial Polities', 108.
6. Alpers, 'Mutapa and Malawi Political Systems', 13.
7. D.P. Abraham, 'The Roles of "Chaminuka" and the Mhondoro Cults in Shona Political History', in the *Zambesian Past*, (ed) E. Stokes and R. Brown, (Manchester, 1966), 37, 39; Pacheco, *Uma Viagem*, 24–25, 44.
8. Livneh, 'Pre-colonial Polities', 57–221.
9. Livingstone, *Researches*, 660–661.
10. Diogo de Alcáçova to king, Cochin, 20 November 1506, op. cit. 395; Gaspar Veloso, 'Apontamentos', op. cit. 183. From these sources we can state categorically that Munhumutapa Nyahuma Mukombero, in about 1490, was living in 'houses . . . which were of stone and clay and very large' and were known as 'Zunbanhy [*zimbabwe*]'(Alcáçova, 393); and that when António Fernandes visited Mutapa Chikuyo Chisamarengu in the early sixteenth century in Embire (Dande) he found him in his fortress 'made of stone without mortar' called *Camanhaya* [Samanyai Hill near the Musengezi River] (Veloso, 183).
11. Bocarro, 'Década', *RSEA, 3*, 356; Faria e Sousa, 'Ásia Portuguesa', *RSEA*, I, 23; [Anon 1790s], 'Descripção do Império Moanamotapa daquem do Rio Zambeze' in *Memória e Documentos ácerca do Direitos de Portugal aos Territórios de Machona e Nyassa* (Lisboa, 1890), doc. No. 78, 222; Abraham, 'Monomotapa Dynasty', 77.
12. 'Descripção do Império Moanamotapa', 222, 224; Abraham, 'Monomotapa Dynasty', 76–77; Ignácio Caetano Xavier, 'Relação do Estado presente de Moçambique, Sena, Sofala, Inhambane e todo o continente da África Oriental', *Anais, IX*, 1, 201.
13. Rezende, 'Estado da Índia', 418.
14. Bocarro, 'Década', 356. Says a palace of old Mutapas was found in Bedza district; Abraham, 'Monomotapa Dynasty', 64, 65, 67, 69, 70, 76–78; Faria e Sousa, 'Ásia Portuguesa', 23.
15. Bocarro, 'Década', 356–7; Faria e Sousa, 'Ásia Portuguesa', 23; By the eighteenth century the *zimbabwe* is said to have consisted of small round wooden huts, grass-thatched but with only one door each. See [Anon] 'Descripção do Império Moanamotapa', 222.
16. Ibid; F. de Sousa, *Oriente Conquistado a Jesú Christo*, 837.
17. Dos Santos, 'Ethiopia Oriental', 208.
18. An approx. ratio of two children and one wife to every man being assumed and only one third of the men being married. Grandparents and other wives are disregarded.
19. During the eighteenth century Col. Dionízio de Mello e Castro and others give a

figure of 500 men at the palace who did odd jobs like fetching water, firewood and carrying the Mutapa's and his wife's manchila or palanquin; 15 criers, six door-keepers and an unspecified number of courtiers. To these must be added over 300 wives of the Mutapa, then apparently living at court. If we include children we come to a figure of about 3 000 people. But this is counting only those people who had to be in the town because of their immediate functions to the Mutapa. To these we must add another number perhaps similar in size to the above who lived in the town/'city' simply because it was their home whether the Mutapa happened to be there or not and who would have remained there when the Mutapaship changed houses. Mello e Castro, 'Notícia', 134, 135, 136; Miranda, 'Monarchia', 113, 115, 116.

20. J.D. Omer-Cooper, *The Zulu Aftermath* (London, 1972), 15.
21. Livneh, 'Pre-colonial Polities', 71.
22. See Chapters 8 and 9.
23. Dos Santos, 'Ethiópia Oriental', 289.
24. Manuel da Costa, 'Projecto de restabelecimento da Feira de Dambarare', Zumbo, 2 March 1769, *Inventário do Fundo de Século (IdFds) XVIII, 84*, (1955), 86; 'Descripção do Império Moanamotapa', 223; Mello e Castro, 'Notícia', 135, 138–139; Miranda, 'Monarchia', 114; Dos Santos, 'Ethiópia Oriental', 290; M. Gelfand, *Shona Religion*, 18, 25. In sixteenth-century Uteve kingdom the succession system was quite similar to what we know from eighteenth-century Mutapa, with a few modifications. Succession was adelphic collateral like in the Mutapa state. When Sachiteve died the first day was spent with funeral arrangements. But the next day the prince chosen by the dead Sachiteve to succeed him goes to the palace at dawn where some of the wives of the previous Sachiteve would be waiting for him. (The chief wives were expected to take poison and die when their husband died.) If they allow him to sit among them in a public place then he has in fact succeeded; however, if they do not or if they have invited some other prince instead,then the previously chosen prince cannot succeed against the will of the wives. Once a prince has succeeded peacefully, word is then sent out for his vassals to come and do him homage. This entailed entering the room where the king was, dragging oneself along the ground *(kuzvambaira)* to the king, and then swearing allegiance without raising one's eyes to look at the king, who would be hidden behind a curtain with his wives. After a group had paid him homage he would then reveal himself and the group would start clapping. This went on for nearly the whole day. The following day the king would send word throughout the kingdom telling all that the former king was dead and the new one had taken peaceful possession of the kingdom, and ordering the lords and nobles to come to court to see him 'break the bow', which signified his taking possession of the kingdom and government. When these assembled, the new king would order some of them, especially those whom he feared or disliked, to be put to death on the pretext that they were to serve the former Sachiteve in the other world. He would then appoint his favourites in place of those he had ordered to be killed. For this reason many nobles fled into exile once they were invited to come and see the new ruler 'break the bow'. This of course allowed the new ruler to appoint his trusted allies as new nobles and lords. See dos Santos, 'Ethiópia Oriental', 191–194. It is possible that the pre-eighteenth-century Mutapa ceremonies may well have been quite similar to the above Uteve practice.

Indeed, Fr dos Santos specifically says that details touching on Mutapa's 'government and mode of life, and his vassals, are very similar, and almost exactly

the same as what I have related of Quiteve . . . which I shall not repeat here for the sake of brevity'. Dos Santos, 'Ethiópia Oriental', 290. We may therefore regard the above description as being pretty close to the practice in pre-sixteenth-century Mutapa state.

25. Dos Santos, 'Ethiópia Oriental', 191; Monclaro, 'Relação', 377, 379; A. da Conceição, 'Tratado dos Rios de Cuama', *O Chronista de Tissuary*, (ed) J.H. da Cunha Rivara,(Nova Goa, 1866–9), 67, para 51; Pacheco, *Uma Viagem*, 28; Abraham, 'Political History', 74.
26. G. K. Garbett, 'Religious Aspects of Political Succession among the Valley Korekore (N. Shona)', in *Zambesian Past*, 152–154.
27. Dos Santos, 'Ethiópia Oriental', 191.
28. Pacheco, *Uma Viagem*, 28.
29. Ibid., 26.
30. See Mutapa list and genealogies in the appendixes.
31. Pacheco, *Uma Viagem*, 29; Miranda, 'Monarchia', 112, 114–115; Mello e Castro, 'Notícia', 133, 135; Monclaro, 'Relação', 377; Dos Santos, 'Ethiópia Oriental', 288. Some records claim that, 'The said king [Mutapa] uses two insignia, one being a small hoe with an ivory point [handle], which he always wears in his girdle to show his subjects that they should cultivate and profit by the land, so that they may live in peace on what they obtain from it, without taking another's property; the other consists of two assagais, showing that with one the king administers justice and with the other defends his people'. Goes, 'Gloriosa Memória', 130; see also de Barros, 'Da Ásia', 271.

However, dos Santos categorically denies that the above was the case. He argues that the Mutapa carried a golden-tipped assegai or three *svimbo* (knobkerries), like any other Shona, whenever leaving his house. Dos Santos, 'Ethiopia Oriental', 287–288. On this occasion it seems dos Santos has underestimated the significance of the royal spear and knobkerry, for even from his own testimony the Mutapa's three *svimbo* had powerful symbolism since, to quote dos Santos himself: 'when he is talking to a Kaffir whom he wishes to kill, he lets one of these three *fimbos* [*svimbo*] fall from his hand, and his executioners, called infices, who are present, take him away and kill him with their assagais in the same manner as all condemned persons', p. 288. Certainly, assegais and *svimbo* were part of the royal regalia. What is less clear is the ivory-handled hoe. However, on balance we are inclined to accept the testimony of the other writers because there is nothing culturally repugnant in their interpretation to the known Shona culture of that time.

32. 'Descripção do Império Moanamotapa', 222; Pacheco, *Uma Viagem*, 28, says Mutapa government was 'despotic and hereditary'.
33. Mutapa Domingos or Siti Kazurukumusapa, *Zimbabwe*, 14 August 1652 [Letter written by his secretary, Fr António Suarez], *RSEA, II*, 447. He gives the *Nengomasha* and the *Nevinga* as 'the two chief nobles of our kingdom'. Before this time the two chief nobles were always given as the *Nengomasha* and the *Mukomohasha*. This is the earliest reference to the *Nevinga* known to us.
34. Bocarro, 'Década', 357.
35. Ibid., 358.
36. Ibid., 357.
37. Livneh, 'Pre-colonial Polities', 63, 97, 108; Bocarro, 'Década', 360.
38. Bocarro, 'Década', 357.
39. Ibid., 360, 357.

40. Ibid., 362.
41. Ibid, 365–380.
42. Dos Santos, 'Ethiópia Oriental', 27, 194; Miranda, 'Monarchia', 113; Mello e Castro, 'Notícia', 134; Pacheco, *Uma Viagem*, 29.
43. Bocarro, 'Década', 360; De Barros, 'Da Ásia', 269. De Barros gives ten days of rest, i.e., 1st, 6th, 7th, 11th, 16th, 17th, 21st, 26th, 27th, 28th; H.F., 'Chisi or *Zwisi*', *NADA, XI*, (1933), 32.
44. Mello e Castro, 'Notícia', 138.
45. Ibid., 134.
46. 'Descripção do Império Moanamotapa', 222.
47. Ibid.
48. Miranda, 'Monarchia', 111.
49. 'Descripção do Império Moanamotapa', 222.
50. Ibid.; Miranda, 'Monarchia', 114; Mello e Castro, 'Notícia', 135.
51. Mutapa Domingos, *Zimbabwe*, 14 August 1652, *RSEA, II*, 447; Abraham, 'Early Political History', 74, 90 note 91.
52. Mutapa Domingos, *Zimbabwe*, 14 August 1652, *RSEA, II*, 447.
53. Miranda, 'Monarchia', 114; Mello e Castro, 'Notícia', 135; 'Descripção do Império Moanamotapa', 223.
54. Pacheco, *Uma Viagem*, 28; 'Descripção do Império Moanamotapa', 222.
55. Bocarro, 'Década', 357; Monclaro, 'Relação', 417. However, before the *Mukomohasha* became the captain-general of the armies, there is a figure given in the records as *Sono* or *Zono*. His duties read very much like those later to be performed by the *Mukomohasha*. Damião de Goes says of *Zono*, 'Whether in time of peace or war he always maintains a large standing army, of which the commander-in-chief is called Zono, to keep the land in a state of quietness and to prevent the lords and kings who are subject to him from rising in rebellion'. Goes 'Gloriosa Memória', 130. Another source says, 'This king has continually on the field a captain of his whom they call *Sono*, with a great number of warriors among whom are five or six thousand women who also take up arms and fight; with these warriors this captain of his goes about bringing agreement and peace among some of the kings who rebel or seek to rebel against their lord'. [Anon], 'Descrição do Situação, Costumes e Produtos de Alguns Lugares de África' [*c.* 1518], 361, 363.

    Elsewhere in this study we shall show that the Mutapa did not have a standing army or fighting 'amazons' but this is no proof that 'Sono' or 'Zono' never existed. Indeed we are told that in 1516 one 'O-Sono' was in revolt against Mutapa Chikuyo Chisamarengu. O-Sono and Sachiteve Nyamunda and one 'Omboyro' were said to have been the three great men in the Empire of Mutapa in the early sixteenth century, João Vaz de Almada to King, Sofala, 26 June 1516, *DPMAC, IV*, 291. However, we know from Veloso that António Fernandes passed the king of Ynhacouee who 'is the captain-major of the king of Menamotapa'. Veloso, 183. In chapter two we have suggested that this land may have been in the same area as the future *feira* of Bandire was to be found, between Sofala and Manyika. It is possible that this key kingdom, where there was a major *feira* compared to that of Vertudes in Portugal, may have been Sono's kingdom. Like future Hondosaka, Ynhacouee controlled the trade route (gate) into the Mutapa empire during its time.
56. Monclaro, 'Relação', 417.
57. Ibid.

58. Rezende, 'Estado da Índia', 416.
59. Bocarro, 'Década', 382, 383.
60. Abraham, 'Early Political History', 68.
61. Ibid., 74.
62. Rezende, 'Estado da Índia', 416.
63. 'Descripção do Império Moanamotapa', 222.
64. Ibid.
65. Bourdillon, 'Peoples of Darwin', 104. It is interesting to note that the *Nechinanga* people say they were given their lands by Mutapa Mukombwe, i.e. late seventeenth century. It seems logical therefore that they only become important in the Mutapa state in the eighteenth century.
66. Pacheco, *Uma Viagem*, 26.
67. Ibid., 28.
68. Bocarro, 'Década', 362.
69. Mello e Castro, 'Notícia', 136; 'Descripção do Império Moanamotapa', 222.
70. Bocarro, 'Década', 356, 357.
71. Ibid.
72. Abraham, 'Monomotapa Dynasty', 76.
73. Bocarro, 'Década', 357.
74. Abraham, 'Early Political History', 68, 86 note 61.
75. De Barros, 'Da Ásia', 267.
76. Mello e Castro, 'Notícia', 134; Miranda, 'Monarchia', 112.
77. Bocarro, 'Década', 357.
78. 'Descripção do Império Moanamotapa', 222.
79. Bocarro, 'Década', 357; Miranda, 'Monarchia', 113; Mello e Castro, 'Notícia', 134.
80. Bocarro, 'Década', 357; 'Descripção do Império Moanamotapa', 222.
81. Abraham, 'Early Political History', 86 note 65.
82. Miranda, 'Monarchia', 115; Mello e Castro, 'Notícia', 136.
83. Bocarro, 'Década', 357.
84. 'Descripção do Império Moanamotapa', 223.
85. Miranda, 'Monarchia', 115; Mello e Castro, 'Notícia', 136.
86. Pacheco, *Uma Viagem*, 29.
87. Ibid., 23.
88. Abraham, 'Early Political History', 62.
89. Pacheco, *Uma Viagem*, 29.
90. 'Descripção do Império Moanamotapa', 223.
91. Ibid; Bourdillon, 'Peoples of Darwin', 105.
92. 'Descripção do Império Moanamotapa', 223.
93. Livneh, 'Pre-colonial Polities', 97. Dr Livneh's assertion seems to be supported by Fr Conceição when he states that,

> The grandees of the Empire are very little around their King for each one lives on his own land and only at the time of St. John's moon do they all, grandees and commoners, come to him in order to celebrate a rite and pagan ceremony they call *Mandó*, at which they have innumerable dirty practices . . . it is a time when treason or rebellion is most feared.

Conceição, 'Tratado', 67 para 49. But the very opposite is stated by Francisco de Sousa, writing about the same time (1697) as Conceição, when he states that,

> All the towns have their *choangas* [*chuanga*]. that is, representatives at

the Court, and they have to sponsor and seek access to the Court for the petitioners from their own towns.

De Sousa, *O Oriente Conquistado*, 844. It appears that Fr Conceição is describing a specific time in Mutapa history, i.e. the time when the Mutapa empire was conquered by the Rozvi Changamire Dombo. Conceição finished his report in 1696, i.e. one year after the Changamire wars and a time when the Mutapa throne itself was controlled either by the Portuguese captains or the Rozvi *mambos*. See Chapter 8.

94. Livneh, 'Pre-colonial Polities', 95.
95. Ibid., 97; Bocarro, 'Década', 356.
96. Bocarro, 'Década', 357; 'Descripção do Império Moanamotapa', 222; Pacheco, *Uma Viagem*, 28; Mello e Castro, 'Notícia', 135; Goes, 'Gloriosa Memória', *RSEA*, 130, says that 'When he [Mutapa] drinks, coughs, or sighs, every person in the house wishes him well in a loud voice, and the same thing is done by those outside the house, the word being passed from mouth to mouth all round the town so that it is known that the king has drunk, or coughed, or sighed'. See also de Barros, 'Da Ásia', 270.
97. Miranda, 'Monarchia', 114; Mello e Castro, 'Notícia', 135; Dos Santos, 'Ethiópia Oriental', 194; Gomes, 'Viagem', 189–190.
98. Bocarro, 'Década', 357.
99. Dos Santos, 'Ethiópia Oriental', 201, 288.
100. Ibid., 201, 204.
101. Ibid., 201–202.
102. De Barros, 'Da Ásia', 271. De Barros says that the Mutapa keeps more than 200 dogs as his most trusted defenders in war.
103. Mello e Castro, 'Notícia', 136; Miranda, 'Monarchia', 116.
104. Dos Santos, 'Ethiópia Oriental', 202. For the praise name of the Mutapas, see A.C. Hodza, *Ugo Hwamadzinza AvaShona* (Salisbury, 1972), 22.
105. Dos Santos, 'Ethiópia Oriental', 202.
106. Ibid., 202, 203.
107. Abraham, 'Monomotapa Dynasty', 70.
108. Dos Santos, 'Ethiópia Oriental', 203.
109. Ibid., 202, 203.
110. Ibid., 288; Bocarro, 'Década', 357.
111. De Barros, 'Da Ásia', 270; Faria e Sousa, 'Ásia Portuguesa', 23; Bocarro, 'Década', 356–357; Dos Santos, 'Ethiopia Oriental', 287. Although cooking is not a male function in Shona society the reference to young men as cooks for the Mutapa is paralleled today in Swaziland where young men similar to the Mutapa ones also cook for the Dlamini or Swazi king. As in Shona society, so too in Swazi society cooking is not normally a male role. The two boys who were his cooks and the two waiters are said to have been sons of his principal lords, his relations in whom he had most confidence. Writing about the two waiters, Bocarro says, 'These are also employed to lay the food when the king wishes to eat, which they spread upon the ground, upon a carpet or mat, with muslin extended above, and many different kinds of meat are set before him, all roasted or boiled, such as hens, pigeons,partridges, capons, sheep, venison, hares, rabbits, cows, rats [mice], and other game, of which, after the king has eaten a portion is given to some of his servants who are always provided from his table'. Bocarro, 'Década', 356–357.

In the titles of these valets there seems to be the Shona word stem *rera*, to rear or bring up (a child).

112. Pacheco, *Uma Viagem*, 29.
113. Goes, 'Gloriosa Memória', 130.
114. Dos Santos, 'Ethiópia Oriental', 286.
115. Ibid., 287.
116. Livingstone, *Researches*, 661; Livneh, 'Pre-colonial Polities', 79–80. See also Barretto, 'Informação', 448. The writer makes reference to *maparu*, a name given to elephant-hunters.
117. Dos Santos, 'Ethiópia Oriental', 288.
118. Bocarro, 'Década', 357.
119. Monclaro, 'Relação', 381.
120. Mello e Castro, 'Notícia', 135.
121. Pacheco, *Uma Viagem*, 28.
122. Livingstone, *Researches*, 660.
123. Bocarro, 'Década', 356, 358.
124. Ibid., 358.
125. Pacheco, *Uma Viagem*, 28.
126. Ibid., 23–24; Abraham, 'Early Political History', 63, 64; Bocarro, 'Década', 358.
127. Bocarro, 'Década', 358.
128. Ibid., 357.
129. Ibid., 358; Faria e Sousa, 'Ásia Portuguesa', 24.
130. Pacheco, *Uma Viagem*, 23–24.
131. Miranda, 'Monarchia', 117.
132. Abraham, 'Monomotapa Dynasty', 61.
133. Livneh. 'Pre-colonial Polities', 89.
134. Pacheco, *Uma Viagem*, 28.
135. 'Descripção do Império Moanamotapa', 222.
136. Dos Santos, 'Ethiópia Oriental', 191. See also Ferão, 'Account of Portuguese Possessions', *RSEA, 7*, 378.
137. Ibid; for evidence that incest is regarded as a major crime among the Shona see also Gelfand, *Shona Religion*, 6, 27, 30; Murphree, *Christianity and the Shona*, 49. Gelfand says that before Karuva (he calls him Dzivaguru) left this world his last words were 'Should anyone practice incest, that man must be burnt alive with fire', 27. It is noteworthy that it was Karuva who is reputed to have uttered those words before his departure for the other world. The man who dispatched him thither was none other than the incestuous Mutapa Matope! Seen in this light, the famous words just quoted may well be a bit of Tavara nationalist anti-Mutapa propaganda.
138. White, 'Urungwe District', 50.
139. Livneh, 'Pre-colonial Polities', 88.
140. This he did by mating Josepha, the son of Molapo, his second son, and Senate, the daughter of Letsie, his first son. Mostoene was the product of the union. L. Thompson, *Survival in Two Worlds: Moshoeshoe of Lesotho 1786–1870* (London, 1975), 315–316.
141. Bocarro, 'Década', 358; Monclaro, 'Relação', 381.
142. 'Descripção do Império Moanamotapa', 222. This must be contrasted with Miranda's already quoted favourable assessment of *Nehanda's* authority in note

132. The reason may well be that Miranda wrote in the 1760s while the 'Descripção' comes from around 1790 when the kingdom had moved to Chidima.
143. Mello e Castro, 'Notícia', 137.
144. Bocarro, 'Década', 358.
145. Miranda, 'Monarchia', 117; Pacheco, *Uma Viagem*, 28.
146. E. Casalis, *My Life in Basutoland* (Cape Town, Reprint 1971), 226–227.
147. Livneh, 'Pre-colonial Polities', 108.
148. Monclaro, 'Relação', 381, 383; Conceição, 'Tratado', 66 para 45.
149. Mello e Castro, 'Notícia', 135.

CHAPTER 4

Religious, Military and Diplomatic Organization and Usages in the Mutapa State

Religion, military forces and foreign relations are three facets of the Mutapa state that deserve separate treatment. The three aspects had to be carefully handled by the Mutapas for each had the potential to distabilize the state, indeed each could threaten the very existence of the state. For that reason, Mutapas paid particular attention to these potentially disruptive and integrative forces. But how, by whom, and with what consequences, was each of the three sectors organized and controlled?

i. Role of religion

> . . . the key integrative factor in the Shona political system was religion. As *mambo*, the Mwene Mutapa was the ultimate religious authority in his kingdom, for he alone could communicate with the spirits of his ancestors.[1]

Mention has already been made of religious functionaries who played the role of advisors on religious affairs at court, but the ways in which religion helped to bind the state together have not been examined fully. A second element in the examination of Shona religion revolves around the whole question of the relationship between the concept of the High God and ancestor veneration. This is a particularly controversial topic among scholars today.[2] The present study has revealed the existence of two key elements in traditional Shona religion, i.e. the concept of a High God and ancestor veneration.

According to Goes, a sixteenth-century writer, the Shona 'do not make or worship idols, but believe in one God, the creator of all things, whom they adore and to whom they pray.'[3] A little later in the same century, the somewhat biased Monclaro in one place stated that the Shona were 'lacking all manner of worship and knowledge of God.'[4] But in another place he conceded that 'some give to God the name of Mulungo, but all this in much confusion, darkness and obscurity.'[5]

Manuel Faria e Sousa, writing in the seventeenth century, claimed that the Shona

> have no religion nor idols, but acknowledge one only God . . . They believe their kings go to heaven, and call them Muzimos, and call upon them in time of need, as we on the saints.[6]

Bocarro repeated much the same views for he wrote that,

> they know that there is a God in heaven. They believe that their kings go to heaven, and when they are there they call them muzimos, and ask them for whatever they require.[7]

In the eighteenth century, the Portuguese recorded much the same picture:

> The Emperor and all the other people of the empire have the knowledge that there is one God to whom they give the name of *Muzimo* [*Mudzimu*] but they neither call him by name nor do they call on him in times of need and affliction. They worship all their dead emperors, and it is these who are their Gods, some with more reverence than others.[8]

And lastly, in the nineteenth century, Pacheco recorded that,

> The religion of the *Adimas* is truly a mumbo jumbo of beliefs so superstitious as to be ridiculous. They believe entirely that there is one God to whom they give the name of *Murungo*, but who does not interfere in the affairs of the world. They do not have idols or temples wherein to worship. To the sun, moon, comets, stars, thunderstorm and lightning they also give the name *Murungo*, since they believe these heavenly bodies to be emanations of divinity.[9]

From the above quotations, spanning the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries, two elements of Shona religion stand out. The first is a belief in one Supreme Being; the second is the veneration of ancestral spirits or *midzimu*. These two aspects are still the cornerstone of traditional Shona religion to this day.

Therefore let us turn to each of the two elements – ancestor veneration and belief in the High God – to see how they were connected to each other and the roles they played in the state. The Portuguese sources give relatively more information on ancestor veneration than on the worship of the High God. The most graphic descriptions of spirit possession among the Shona before the twentieth century were made by dos Santos in the seventeenth century and Pacheco in the nineteenth century. Both are about royal *mhondoro* cults. Pacheco gives us his own observations of the *mhondoro* Nebedza or Nyanhehwe, i.e. Matope's *mhondoro*.

According to Pacheco, Nebedza lived in Dande but his authority, which was both temporal and spiritual, extended also to Chidima and other lands. He received presents from the Mutapas and other rulers. His prophesies were believed as gospel truth by the people and this prompted Pacheco to lament that 'only God knows the reason why the majority of those people continue to place confidence in the prophesies of this man when time has already taught them to make better use of reason.'[10]

When the medium was not possessed he was known as *mvura*.[11] The village he lived in was called *zumba* and 'the house in which he performs his sorcery, speaks to the *mesimos* [*midzimu*], mixes his *michonga* [*mishonga* – medicines] and receives the supernatural inspirations is a *Mutumba*.'[12] We are told that the *mvura* has countless women, usually the most attractive women, who are offered to him by their parents, 'for him to [ravish and] sweeten his life' with. Pacheco remarks that these women were not too bothered about committing adultery.[13]

When the *mvura* wanted to get possessed he swallowed snuff tobacco mixed with water, and then took his *mwangato*[14] (*muangato*) or staff in his right hand. He then appeared to the public in a *dendemaro*[15] (a kind of barrack where a *mhondoro* presents itself to the public). At this stage the *mhondoro* is asked all sorts of questions, relating to war and peace, rain and famine, succession disputes, etc.[16]

Dos Santos gives us a graphic description of Sachiteve's encounter with a royal *mhondoro* of that kingdom:

> When the king [sachiteve] has feasted for eight days, he begins his lamentation for the dead who are buried there . . . until the devil enters into one of the Kaffirs of the assembly, saying that he is the soul of the dead king, father of him who is engaged in these ceremonies, come to converse with his son. The demoniac becomes as one into whose body the devil has entered, stretched on the ground disfigured, deformed, and out of his senses, and while he is in this state the devil speaks through his mouth in all the foreign tongues of other Kaffir nations, which are understood by many of those present. Besides this, he begins to cough and speak like the dead king whom he represents, in such a manner that it seems to be his very self, both in voice and movements, by which signs the Kaffirs recognise that the soul of the dead king has come as they expected. The king . . . being informed of this, comes accompanied by all his nobles to the place where the demoniac is, and all prostrate themselves before him, showing him great honour. Then all withdraw, leaving the

> king alone with the demoniac, with whom he converses amicably as if with his dead father, asking him if there will be war, and if he will trimph over his enemies, and if there will be famine or misfortunes in his kingdom, and everything else which he wishes to know. The devil answers all these questions, and counsels him as to what he is to do ... After this conference the devil goes out of the man's body, leaving the negro very exhausted and broken down, and still disfigured. This being done, the king returns to his house with all those who came to assist at the obsequies, and the Kaffirs loudly praise their king for being so fortunate that the dead kings come to converse with him, whom they hold to be happy and powerful in the other world, and able to grant the living king everything which he may ask for.[17]

Pacheco adds that before a medium or *mvura* of Nebedza is accepted as genuine, he must pass tests when he is possessed which

> consist in the naming of all Muanamotapuas, from Mutota up to the one actually ruling; and in recounting the more notable events of each reign as well as identifying by name the principal owners of various large bundles of arms which they keep only for this purpose; as well as [giving] a summary of all the public calamities which took place in this period.[18]

After he had passed this test he was accepted as a genuine *mhondoro* Nebedza. When Nebedza had completed his duties it is said that he retired, roaring like a lion, by himself into a thick grove known as *Mussauraunga* (Muswaraunga?) where the tomb of Matope was found. This place was only known to the *mhondoro*. There the medium was unpossessed. He returned to his village 'with the face of a fool' and was welcomed by the people with *mhururumbe* (*meurumbe*), a special song-and-dance, with stomping and hand-clapping, welcome for a *mhondoro*.[19]

When spirit possession and ancestor veneration began among the Shona is not known. But the origins of the Mutapa royal *mhondoro* cult can be reconstructed reasonably well. Abraham implies, without ever specifically saying so, that Nyamhita Nehanda had supernatural powers. In one place he suggests that the spirit of the dead Mutota helped Nehanda to part the waters of the Zambezi. In another place he says that she had a role in 'ensuring the fertility of the nation and the crops'.[20] What is never clear is how she got these powers. Was she a spirit medium? If so, whose medium was she? Was she a Mutota *mhondoro* since it is said that the dead Mutota helped her to part the waters of the Zambezi? This is never made clear.

But from Pacheco it is known that the first Mutapa *mhondoro* was

that of Matope, known by the names of Nebedza or Nyanhehwe.[21] It is said that Matope announced before he died that his spirit was immortal and as a result after his death it would enter a lion or *mhondoro* to enable him to work among and guide his people forever. His sister-wife, Nyamhita Nehanda, followed Matope's example, as did his brothers Samarengo and Nemangoro.[22]

According to eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Portuguese sources, Nebedza, the *mhondoro* of Matope, was the most senior of all the royal Mutapa *mhondoro*.[23] But with the return of Mutota's spirit in the late nineteenth century or early twentieth century, seniority is now claimed by the *mhondoro* of Mutota since the royal *mhondoro* are arranged in a hierarchical structure based on their position in the Mutapa genealogy and on whether they did or did not hold the Mutapaship.[24] Table B shows our own reconstruction of the apical Mutapa *mhondoro*.

Portuguese sources in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries made reference to the following royal Mutapa *mhondoro*. *Mhondoro* Nebedza (Nyanhehwe), described as the chief *mhondoro* in the whole Rivers of Sena, was said to have lived near Musengezi river in Dande.[25] From other sources it is known that he lived in Bedza where Matope is buried.[26] *Mhondoro* Samarengu lived north of the Zambezi in Chief Nyapende's country.[27] *Mhondoro* Nyamasoka (*Nyamatsoka*) lived in Dande as did Nyamapfeka.[28] Today, *mhondoro* Nyamapfeka is associated with Chief Chundu's country, not far from Dande. Nyamapfeka is 'regarded as the senior of the Makorekore interest in the Urungwe district.'[29] The last of the important eighteenth-century *mhondoro* was Nyamukova (*Namcova*).[30] It is not clear where he was to be found but from his name it may be assumed that he may have lived around Chikova. *Mhondoro* Nemangoro is mentioned by Pacheco but it is not clear where he lived. *Mhondoro* Nehanda is also mentioned.[31]

Each *mhondoro* appears to have had its own 'spirit province' or 'realm' as the above evidence has shown. Spirit provinces may be made up of one or a number of chiefdoms; but in all cases it is a clearly-defined geographic area. A *mhondoro* must live and reside in its 'spirit province'.[32] This means that the spirit mediums did not necessarily live at the Mutapa court. Besides the above apical *mhondoro* there were/are a number of other *mhondoro* belonging to latter-day Mutapas. These *mhondoro* tend to be associated with the interests of particular houses/families involved in succession rivalries.

APICAL MUTAPA MHONDORO



1. From eighteenth and nineteenth century Portuguese records we are told the chief Mutapa *mhondoro* was Nebedza or Nyanhehwe.
2. Among the other chief *mhondoro* in the eighteenth century were *mhondoro* Nyamapfeka and Nyamasoka of Dande/Urungwe. The other is called *mhondoro Namcova* (Nyamukova) of whom not much is known other than that he may have been associated with Chikova.
3. There are other *mhondoro* mentioned in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries like *mhondoro* Chisamharu and Dako-Dako, but these *mhondoro* were associated with certain Mutapa 'houses' and therefore seen as partial to the interests of those 'houses'.

For that reason their influence was somewhat limited by their partisanship. These too had their own well-defined 'spirit provinces'. Politically and spiritually most of these latter-day Mutapa *mhondoro* may be equated to the chiefly *mhondoro* found in each chiefdom.[33]

The apical *mhondoro* were interested in, and concerned about, matters which touched on national issues: war and peace, succession disputes, plagues, rain-making, epidemics, locust invasions, nation-wide famines, etc. Their duties were twofold, (a) to their immediate spirit province, (b) to the nation as a whole. Therefore the authority of the apical *mhondoro* was not restricted only to their 'spirit provinces' but, in certain circumstances, as shall be seen later, it went beyond their immediate 'realms'. Issues of a specifically regional, family or personal nature were dealt with by the appropriate minor mediums. According to one eighteenth-century source, the royal *mhondoro* could

> order the Emperor that he may or may not declare war; that he may go to this or that place; whom he may or may not slay; whom he may or may not rob. Everything is gospel for the Emperor and he must toe the line. And when the said Emperor does any of those things without consultation he is at once censured by the said Pondoro [*mhondoro*].[34]

The above claims are an overstatement of a *mhondoro*'s powers. The Mutapas were not as controlled as all that. More accurate is the observation by Pacheco in the nineteenth century when he tells us the *mhondoro* claimed that,

> he gives them [people] sun and rains as it pleases him; foretells about the future happiness of those same people; prophesises disasters which will happen at a given time; *decides all issues which are submitted for his judgement*; condemns or absolves according to the gravity or levity of the transgression.[35] (emphasis added)

It would be wrong to assume that the *mhondoro* were consulted on a day-to-day basis or that they were possessed every other day. A medium exercises the powers of a *mhondoro* when he is possessed. The very role of the *mhondoro* militates against regular possessions. A *mhondoro*'s role has always been primarily one of articulating consensus in society. Before he can pronounce what that consensus is, it must be there. It is possible for a *mhondoro* to try to create consensus; but this is rather risky as he/she runs the danger of going contrary to the wishes of the society, or the politically relevant segment of society,

and thereby risking being denounced as an imposter and a fraud, or at best of having been deliberately misled by the spirit because of some personal failing of the medium.

Dr Garbett states that the twentieth-century Korekore *mhondoro* are primarily 'concerned with the moral order of the universe and the relation of the people to the earth' while the chiefs are responsible for maintaining law and order.[36] This broad delimitation of spheres of competence can only be accepted as a guiding statement for the pre-1900 days, for there is evidence, especially from the eighteenth century, that the *mhondoro* played the roles of temporal rulers on some questions including law and order, e.g. conflict between chiefs or between chiefs and Portuguese traders. It must be added, however, that the evidence in question comes at a time and from areas when and where the Mutapas had lost effective control. In place of the Mutapa, we find that *mhondoro* Nebedza played the role of final authority in the Zambezi valley during the period. The story of Prince Ganda dealt with in chapter nine is a case in point. On that occasion in 1788, all the *mhondoro* of Dande were summoned by *mhondoro* Nebedza to sit in judgement over the case arising from the death of Prince Ganda. A judgement was passed by the *mhondoro* and Prince Bereko [Mbereko?] was requested to enforce the decision which he duly did. Another case comes from 1784, when Portuguese traders at Zumbo were being harrassed by Chief Nyapende. The Portuguese traders appealed to *mhondoro* Nebedza to use his good offices to stop the harrassment. Again *mhondoro* Nebedza co-operated by requesting Prince Changara to deal with Nyapende and his friend Prince Bereko.[37] It is worth pointing out that, in each of the above cases, Nebedza sided with the most powerful force at that stage. In 1854, David Livingstone confirmed the importance of Nebedza/Nyanhehwe when he stated that the chiefs from Dande to Chidima, including 'Katolósa . . . "the Emperor Monomotapa" of history', all 'acknowledge the supremacy of one called Nyatéwe [Nyanhehwe], who is reported to decide all disputes respecting land'.[38]

But what was the power of the *mhondoro* based on? Primarily it was based on his supernatural powers to punish those who defied him by causing personal or general misfortunes. This was a powerful sanction not to be easily flouted. Secondly, and perhaps even more important, was that a *mhondoro*'s views had the uncanny characteristic of being in accord with those held by the politically relevant majority, often including the Mutapas themselves.

In conclusion it may be said that the royal *mhondoro* cult had a hierarchical structure which ascribed great powers to the apical *mhondoro*. As mediums of early Mutapas, these *mhondoro* were interested in the fate of the Mutapa state. As long as a ruling Mutapa respected their authority and gave them presents – cloth, beads, cattle and young women – they used their authority to support his rule. The royal *mhondoro* cult had a strong hierarchical structure favouring centralization and unity. And long after the demise of the Mutapa political empire the royal *mhondoro* cult continued to provide a broad 'spiritual empire' within which co-operation, sometimes of a political nature, has been possible. But to say that this was the most important element in keeping the Mutapa state together is both an exaggeration of the political relevance of the cult and a gross underestimation of the significance of the other sources of strength in the state. It is equally inaccurate to claim that 'the Mwene Mutapa was the ultimate religious authority in his kingdom' or that 'he alone could communicate with the spirits of his ancestors'.[39] Among the Shona, unlike some other African societies, there seems to have been a deliberate and successful attempt to separate the spiritual and temporal powers from the control of one man, the Mutapa not excluded. In the Mutapa state, neither the royal *mhondoro* nor the *Dzivaguru–Karuva* cults were under the control of the Mutapas. Both cults claimed spiritual authority over the Mutapas and their subjects and in the case of the *Dzivaguru–Karuva* cult this was largely controlled by the conquered Tavara people and not by the Karangas of Mutapa.

The earliest reference to the *Dzivaguru–Karuva* cult known at present comes from the mid-eighteenth century. This is found in an intriguing story in Miranda and Dionízio de Mello e Castro in connection with some coronation rites of the Mutapas. Miranda claims that as part of the coronation ceremony the Mutapas used to kill a cow for sacrifice. Parts of the cow were offered first to the *vadzimu* of the dead Mutapas. The remainder

> is then given to his priests and they make a similar sacrifice to Vazimo [*Vadzimu*] Chicara [Chikara], who was a chief who tried through insurrection to become emperor, but when he could not achieve [his ambition] he drowned himself with his whole progeny in a pool in order to escape from a well-deserved punishment by the then Emperor for his revolt and outrage. In memory of the said sad story they make the above-mentioned offering to him.[40]

One's initial reaction to the above story might well be to say what an

event to commemorate! How strange that the priests should make an offering to the 'rebel' *Chikara*! But who was this *Chikara* anyhow? In chapter two, evidence has been cited from Pacheco which refers to one 'Princess Chicara' who resisted and fought against Mutapa Matope. There it was noted that Pacheco's 'Princess Chicara' was none other than Karuva, a famous Tavara rain-maker of the *Nhari Unendoro* clan.[41] But no attempt was made to identify who *Chikara* was. Furthermore, it was also noted that there are today many variants of the Karuva legends which describe Karuva as *Dzivaguru* or *Murungu*.[42] Under this section, an attempt will be made to show the relationships of *Chikara, Dzivaguru, Murungu* and *Karuva* as given in these legends. Some of the legends say *Chikara* is the name for God,[43] while others see him only as another human being.[44] *Dzivaguru*, too, is sometimes said to have been *Karuva*'s father,[45] while in other sources *Dzivaguru* is given as another name of *Karuva*;[46] then again others assert *Karuva* was related to *Dzivaguru*;[47] but some other sources claim that *Dzivaguru* is merely another name of *Chikara*, i.e. God, and *Karuva* was only a famous priest of *Dzivaguru*.[48] The same is true with the term 'Murungu'; sometimes it is used to refer to God[49] and at other times to refer to a man called Karuva.[50]

What is one to make of these conflicting and confusing claims? Are the informants and the outside observers confused? Perhaps. But the consistency of this confusion suggests that there seems to be 'method' to this 'madness'. On present evidence it appears that what is preserved in these legends is either the end product of a subtle process of the deification of Karuva or the incarnation of *Chikara/Dzivaguru/Murungu* into the person of Karuva. The hypothesis for the attempt at deifying Karuva seems to be supported by the following observations. In Tavara the term *chikara* translates the English term 'heaven' and, by extension, *Chikara* is used to refer to 'He who Dwells in Heaven', i.e. God. *Dzivaguru* literally means the 'Big Pool'; but used figuratively it refers to the provider of rain, indeed the ultimate 'Source of Water' itself, i.e. God. Even in some of the legends it is said that *Dzivaguru* could only be seen but not touched for he was 'never a living person' but 'only a vision.'[51] He had no fixed abode but was omnipresent.[52] No one knows what happened to him. He simply disappeared leaving no trace.[53]

The term *Murungu* (*Mulungu*) is used by some of the Zambezi valley people, e.g. the Tonga, to refer to God.[54] As has been noted,

these people consistently applied the term *Murungu* whenever the Portuguese asked them a term to translate the concept of God. On the other hand, *Karuva* means the 'little attractive flower' and may be used when referring to one who is dearly loved but not necessarily implying divinity, certainly not to the degree contained in the terms *Chikara, Dzivaguru* or *Murungu*. The name Karuva is never used in the sources to refer to God. Apotheosis is attained by Karuva when some sources call him either *Chikara* or *Dzivaguru* or *Murungu*. What needs explaining is how far this 'confusion' is/was consciously fostered, by whom, when and why? These and other related questions cannot be satisfactorily dealt with in this study without thorough field research. What can be attempted is to indicate the very broad processes suggested by the evidence to date.

It appears that two processes/stages may have been responsible for the 'confusion'. The first of these is deduced from the perceived self-interest of the *Nhari Unendoro* clan, or Karuva's kinsmen, who were the officers at the Mitimichena shrine. After the death of Karuva by drowning in Nyamakate pool near Mitimichena, they either continued or decided to make the place the centre of the *Dzivaguru* cult. But since Karuva had died there they also decided to make it a shrine of Karuva, rain-maker and hero of the Tavara resistance movement to Korekore conquest. The *Nhari Unendoro* clan's primacy at the centre was as a result of their relationship to Karuva. Perhaps through a slow process, and by stages, Karuva changed, from being a mere *mudzimu* interceding with *Dzivaguru* on behalf of the people to being the son of *Dzivaguru*, and in time the difference between the 'father' and the 'son' almost vanished. In the minds of mere mortals it became a matter of theological hair-splitting to emphasize the distinction between the two, for *Dzivaguru/Chikara* the 'father' and Karuva the 'son' had such an identity of 'mind' that to treat them as two entities was merely an academic exercise. This process need not have been deliberately or consciously initiated by anyone with the intention to mislead the people, it may just have been allowed to grow, for it hurt nobody but clearly benefited the *Nhari Unendoro* clan, who therefore felt no urge to clarify the position.

Parallel to the above development, and in a sense abetting it, was the growth of the Mutapa royal *mhondoro* cult. Through another similarly slow development, the descendants of Mutota, founder of the Mutapa state, began a process of rearranging the Shona spirit world

to reflect their political domination of the temporal state. Under the umbrella of the High God, today better known as *Mwari* or *Chikara* or *Dzivaguru*, [55] they created a spiritual hierarchy dominated by the spirit of Matope Nyanhehwe, the conqueror of Karuva. It would appear that a similar move by the *Nhari Unendoro* clan resulted in their emphasizing the importance of the spirit of Karuva at the *Dzivaguru* cult centre so much that eventually the personages of Karuva and *Dzivaguru* got confused. This confusion elevated the position of the *Nhari Unendoro* clan by making that clan to appear to be direct descendants of High God (*Dzivaguru*) alias Karuva.

It is important to point out that the original Karuva seems to have been a rain-maker and priest of the *Dzivaguru* cult in Choma, near or at Nyamakate Pool. It is most likely that during his lifetime Karuva worshipped *Dzivaguru* at Nyamakate. It is most instructive that all the Portuguese sources herein quoted never use the name Karuva for the Nyamakate cult or priesthood. They all use one name, i.e. *Chikara*. *Chikara* means 'heaven' or 'God' in Tavara. It is the modern references which say that the Mitimichena cult centre is Karuva's cult centre, and that *Dzivaguru* alias *Chikara* has no fixed centre. The records show that Nyamakate was *Chikara's* centre. It would seem that Karuva's descendants have successfully 'expelled' *Chikara/Dzivaguru* from Mitimichena and replaced him with their own ancestor Karuva who is now a kind of a *mhondoro* of the Mutapa genre. Modern anthropologists seem to have 'accepted' the reformation and are now doing a mopping up operation of a few 'confused' faithfuls who still associate Mitimichena with *Dzivaguru* and the latter with *Chikara*, i.e. God!

The result of the two processes described above was an ambiguity and imprecision of concepts which allowed divinity and humanity to meet in a manner that left the faithful undisturbed in the veracity of their beliefs. And it would appear that neither the Mutapa rulers nor the *Nhari Unendoro* clansmen of Karuva had much to gain by clearing the ambiguity.

The *Dzivaguru* (Karuva?) priesthood was last described for us in the 1920s. Then it was found in Choma or Chief Chigango's *dunhu*, the overall chief of the area being Chizwiti, a direct descendant of Karuva through Chikuma. When people wished to make any request to the shrine they had to go through Chigango who was not a clansman of Karuva, being of *mutupo Shava Mwendamberi*, but was the acolyte

or *nechombo* to the shrine. The shrine, called Mitimichena (white trees, i.e. *Mituwa*), was found on Nhenhene ridge close to Matombwe river at the foothills of Mavhuradonha range. At the shrine itself was to be found the *Nochiswa* or virgin 'wife' (*mbonga)* of Karuva. The original *Nochiswa* who drowned in Nyamakate pool with Karuva was said to have been a daughter of Chief Gosa.[56] Since that time Chief Gosa, now living in modern Mozambique, had an obligation to provide the *Nochiswa* for the Mitimichena shrine. The *Nochiswa* was under the charge of a woman past child-bearing age chosen from the *Nhari Unendoro* clan of Karuva. The woman was known as *Mashongavudzi.* It was the duty of Chigango to provide for her welfare. At the shrine she was the 'representative' of Karuva. In olden days she is said to have exercised the powers of a chief. Besides the above two women, there were two male priests, also members of the *Nhari Unendoro* clan, known as Chiriseri[57] and Chikuyo, bearing the title of *Nohetera* or *Tenzi.* Only one of them was to officiate at any given time. The two priests were never allowed to meet. If for any reason the officiating priest could not carry out his duties the second one took over. Chief Chigango was responsible for the change of priests and each priest chose his own *Mashongavudzi.*

When a sacrifice was to be made at the shrine the spirit medium of Chimanyonga or Chirimanyonga, a daughter of Karuva, was consulted as to the necessary sacrifices. Karuva himself did not speak through a medium. The beer for the sacrifice was prepared by the *Mashongavudzi* assisted by the *Nochiswa.* The offering was made by the officiating priest and *Mashongavudzi.* According to Posselt a prayer to Karuva might go something like:

> We bring you this beer.
> Let rain fall and crops grow.
> Give a plentiful harvest.
> Give us all we need.[58]

The *Dzivaguru–Karuva* cult hit the headlines in 1923 in the so-called 'rain goddess murder case'. This arose when, after the failure of rains, the people of Choma, as was traditional, questioned the *Nochiswa* to find out if she had been interfered with in any way. When a son of Chief Chigango was accused of interfering with her, he was apprehended and burnt alive to atone for the sacrilege. This case came to the notice of the government.[59] There was such adverse publicity given to it and the government was so opposed to the practice that the cult

found it impossible to operate as in the past. All later investigations have been able to establish is that today in times of drought people still come from other regions to ask for rain at the shrine and that offerings are still made at the shrine. But the priesthood of the 1920s has either disappeared or is now never revealed to outside investigators.[60]

The influence of the *Dzivaguru–Karuva* cult spread over the Tavara, Budya, Korekore and some Tonga people of the Mutapa state in the Zambezi valley. In the twentieth century its influence has spread among some of the Zezuru-speaking Shona.[61] In pre-colonial times, the Mutapas tried to exploit the influence of the cult as one of the pillars for integrating their state. The priests who lived at the *zimbabwe* in the eighteenth century included *Netondo* and *Bushu*, both of whom were Tavara/Tonga, i.e., non-Korekore. *Bushu* is said to have been a descendant of Karuva, perhaps through the female line, seeing that he was of the *Nguruve Matsiwu* and not *Nhari Unendoro* like Karuva.[62] Elsewhere it was noted that the *Netondo* had the duty to hand over authority to govern to every new Mutapa and to the regional rulers, and that when a royal Mutapa *mhondoro* got possessed for the first time it was the duty of the priests *Bushu* and *Netondo* to inform the Mutapa and his grandees about it; furthermore, it is known that *Bushu* and *Netondo* had an important role to play in the burial ceremonies of the Mutapas. Although it is not specifically mentioned in the records it can however be inferred that when the Mutapa wanted to consult or request a favour from the *Dzivaguru/Chikara–Karuva* shrine he would have used *Bushu* and/or *Netondo* to initiate the necessary steps. The fact that the Mutapas often contacted the shrine at Mitimichena is recorded in an eighteenth-century document which tells us that,

> Chicara [*Chikara*] ... never appears in the presence of the Emperor nor can he be ordered to do so, except that when it is the planting season, an envoy is sent to him to ask for rain. He is a sharp thief who is capable of fleecing the Emperor as well as robbing his subjects so as to make himself powerful. For this reason the Emperor is unable to get at him.[63]

By *Chikara* in this document we should more accurately be reading *Tenzi* or *Nohetera,* i.e. officiating priest at the Mitimichena shrine, as well as the *Nochiswa* and *Mashongavudzi.* The document describes *Chikara* as the 'chief priest' of the Mutapas.

Even today the descendants of Mutapa and royal Mutapa

mhondoro concede, if grudgingly, the seniority of the *Dzivaguru/Chikara–Karuva* cult over the royal Mutapa *mhondoro* cult. Gelfand says that although his Mutapa-related informants claimed that the fact that the original Nyanhehwe (Matope) defeated the original Karuva (given as *Dzivaguru*) 'shows that *mhondoro* Nyanhehwe is more powerful than *Dzivaguru*[*Karuva*], but as *Dzivaguru* [*Karuva*] was already living in the country when Nyanhehwe arrived *he is accepted as being senior* . . . Chakoma's people *admit the greatness of Dzivaguru* [*Karuva*] *and remember to thank his spirit every few years for bringing good rains.*'[64] (emphasis added) Elsewhere Gelfand says that his informants told him that *mhondoro* Nyanhehwe consults and seeks *Dzivaguru's (Karuva's)* help when in difficulties.[65] But does this mean that what has been presented as a struggle for supremacy has now been finally resolved in favour of the *Dzivaguru–Karuva* cult? Apparently this is not so because some years after Gelfand's researches Bourdillon found the rivalry still going strong. For example, the Korekore of *mhondoro* Nyabapa Nyanhehwe 'maintain that [*mhondoro*] Nyabapa is greater than Karuva: they call Karuva the wife of Nyabapa because Karuva provides him with rain just as a wife fetches water for her husband'.[66] In this ingenious twist the rain-making powers of Karuva are mentioned but his superiority is denied. However the descendants of Karuva retorted by saying that the reason the people of Nyanhehwe called Karuva a wife was not because Nyanhehwe was greater than Karuva but because Nyanhehwe married Chirimanyonga, a daughter of Karuva, and so 'they confuse Karuva with his daughter'. It is needless to say that Chirimanyonga was killed and not married by Matope Nyanhehwe.[67]

In conclusion it should be stressed that the royal Mutapa *mhondoro* cult and the *Dzivaguru–Karuva* cult had a number of important points of contact especially at the Mutapa *zimbabwe*, They were/are not two separate religions.[68] They are merely modes of approaching the one Supreme Being in whom all Shona believe. But politically their relationships with the state were not identical. The royal *mhondoro* were particularly important within the Mutapa royal lineage and their Korekore (Karanga) followers while the *Dzivaguru–Karuva* cult was associated with the conquered Tavara/Tonga, i.e. owners of the land in the north-east of the state. The grip the *Dzivaguru–Karuva* cult had on its followers can be glimpsed in the 1923 'rain goddess murder case' when a son of Chief Chigango was burnt to

death in the presence of his father. Posselt shows that the two victims before Chigango's son included a brother of a former shrine priest and a chief. Much faith must have been required to sacrifice such notables with such equanimity.[69] Such a force as this was best harnessed to the service of the state, for to confront it could have been suicidal for the Mutapas. Hence we see the Mutapas keeping Tavara/Tonga priests and giving yearly presents to the *Dzivaguru–Karuva* shrine. In the light of the above discussion it must be obvious that the claim that a Mutapa was the head of the religious system in his state is not supported by the evidence. Furthermore, although religion was indeed one of the integrative forces binding together the state, it would seem to be an overstatement to say that it was 'the key integrative factor'. Indeed there is a sense in which it was also an important constitutional check on the powers of the Mutapas.

ii. Military forces

The Mutapa state survived for about 500 years, 300 of which it retained control of much of the highly-coveted highlands of central and northern Zimbabwe. This achievement is remarkable in the history of southern Africa. Since it is known that there were a number of rivals, e.g. Maravi peoples, Portuguese *prazo*-holders, and the kingdom of Uteve, Guruuswa,! etc., desirous to possess those lands, the question that arises is how the Mutapas were able to defend their possessions. In pre-colonial times for a state to survive it required defensive forces and to expand it needed offensive forces. In its long history the Mutapa state had at one time or another to have one or both of these two things.

But what kind of forces were available to the Mutapa state? Information on this topic is somewhat fragmentary and at times confusing. Sometimes the Mutapas are said to have had a standing army[70] which included 5 000–6 000 'Amazons' to guard them.[71] But other sources dismiss both views as figments of the imagination.[72] In another place it is said that they had armies numbering 300 000 men.[73] Again other sources give figures of 100 000[74] and even 3 000 men.[75] Why these contradictions? Three factors are largely responsible for this confusion. The first is simply ignorance. Early writers like Goes based themselves on hearsay evidence. For this reason, fictitious female 'Amazons' are introduced to spice the story. The second reason is that those Portuguese captains who were either defeated in battle or

who out of fear did not attack the Mutapa found it expedient to excuse their failure by exaggerating the numbers in the army of Mutapa. Indeed, even victorious captains knew how to give significance to their victories by exaggerating the enemy casualties. The third factor was simply that the Mutapa state was not a static polity but an ever-shrinking entity. For this reason the numbers of men available to the Mutapas would tend to decrease over the centuries. This decrease was not necessarily in proportion to the territory lost for, over time, the population as a whole was probably increasing.

The Mutapa never had a standing army throughout the history of the state. The army was mobilized largely from the peasant farmers any time there was an emergency. Before declaring war, the Mutapa would convene a 'Council of War' *(Dare reHondo).* Messengers *(vanyai* or *nhume)* would be sent to outlying districts to summon the members of *Dare reHondo.* Miranda tells us that during the eighteenth century the Mutapa, whose state was by then reduced only to the province of Chidima, whenever he wanted to undertake a military expedition, summoned a *Dare reHondo* made up of what he terms *Mutumbzes* or dukes, marquises and counts of the realm as well as viscounts and barons, who included Mukwegure, Akumbe, Dombo, Wechivo (Nechivo), Musumbo, Masora and Kasumbadeza. In addition to the above, councillors such as the *nechinanga, mbokorume* and *mwendamberi* as well as the priest *Simboti* and others also attended.[76] Although the sources are not specific as to who these notables were, it seems more than plausible that they probably included key *machinda* (princes of blood), district chiefs *(madzishe)* and *makurukota* (counsellors). After the *Dare reHondo* had taken the decision to go to war, the Mutapa would appoint a prince of the blood to act as commander-in-chief and his representative on the expedition. This was so if the Mutapa himself was not on the expedition. In addition, the Mutapa would nominate one, two or three of his court 'generals' to lead the forces. A system of alternates and a chain of command would be established among them depending in part on the 'antiquity of their titles'. [77]

After this the district chiefs or their representatives would return to their homes to announce the declaration of war. The announcement of a declaration of war was done by beating the war drums. At every ruler's headquarters there was a special drum, beaten in a particular way to announce that the people were being summoned to the chief's

court. Sometimes a horn was blown or a gun fired to summon the populace. In addition criers would be sent to tell the people to assemble at the chief's court. It should not be imagined that all the chiefdoms were expected to send contingents to join every expedition. Sometimes surprise and speed were the essence and therefore a partial mobilization of troops conveniently located in relation to the target was ordered. Depending on the exigencies of the situation the forces would be ordered to rendezvous at the *zimbabwe* or some other advantageous pre-arranged location.

The troops appeared to Portuguese observers to be divided into 'innumerable battalions or regiments of men of war which they call Condo [Hondo] and Binzo'. The number in each battalion/regiment during the eighteenth century was uncertain but appeared to have varied from as low as 200 to as many as 500 men and in some cases to have been 1 000 men strong. In charge of each of these battalions was a field commander. In mid-eighteenth century the names/titles of these 'field commanders' were *Macota* (Makota), *Pase, Machenge, Massungue, Urigamise, Matename, Marambakunzwa, Nyuno, Macikwa, Mapuvizere, Makurura, Vasika, Matemachane, Maravasaga, Mariaravana, Mafuta* and others. Each battalion was subdivided into companies of 100 men known as *missoca (mitsoka?)*. The leader of a *mutsoka* was known as a *nhambeze (nyambedzi?)*. He was assisted by other minor subordinates.[78] According to Fr Monclaro, each unit has its own banner/badge 'representing various figures, like oxen, elephants and other beasts, all being big and made of straw and covered over with cloth; by these badges are known their captains and rulers with their men in war'.[79] But who were these captains/field commanders and *nhambezes?* 'All these officers control the lands and the soldiers.' In other words they were the major and lesser chiefs and headmen, or their representatives, from whence the troops were recruited.[80] The documents are very clear that the bulk of the Mutapa troops were volunteer troops mobilized from the peasant farmers in the various chiefdoms.[81] It must be partly for this reason that the so-called battalions were not of uniform numbers. Some chiefdoms were bigger than others.

A sixteenth-century report by Fr Luís says, 'such is the promptness in executing the king's commands . . . [and] besides . . . there is so much people that it is said that within the compass of eight days the king, whenever he wishes, can bring on the field three hundred

thousand warriors *paratos ad prelium* [ready for battle].'[82] The good friar is no doubt exaggerating both the speed and size of the Mutapa's army. From our knowledge of the political and social organization of the Shona already discussed, it must be clear that the easiest people to mobilize were, (a) those who served at the *zimbabwe*, (b) those who lived within or close to the royal city, and (c) those found in the *dunhu* where a *zimbabwe* was located. At no time before the late nineteenth century would these have been less than 2 000 men. It may well be that throughout the greater part of history the Mutapas could always be able to mobilize 3 000–5 000 warriors within 24 hours. The remaining part of their army would have taken some time to mobilize; distance, the imperative to travel on foot, and the state of political relations between the centre and each province would have influenced how quickly a Mutapa could mobilize his forces.

In battle, it is said, they favoured fighting in an open field, used no ambushes, or as Monclaro puts it 'nor do they resort to cunningly hidden snares or attack by night, but rather at dawn'.[83] Their battle formation was something along the following lines. First they probably sent out scouts, *marimbirimbi*, for reconnaisance work. The remaining forces were divided into the *muromo*, literally the mouth, which was made up of the two flanks or 'horns' of the vanguard whose role was presumably to envelope the enemy. The main body of fighters were the *guru (guro)*, literally the 'big one'.[84] One seventeenth-century source claims that at the sound of a *hwamanda* the Shona used to form a square fortress with their shields. However the fortress had its rear open. The 'fortress' was used in case of retreat. Their weapons were mainly bows and arrows, assegais, clubs *(svimbo)*, shields and battleaxes. Fr Gomes says that in battle the people of Mutapa used a

> *parapanda* [*hwamanda*] . . . to give orders to attack, to withdraw, etc. They have kettledrums, in sets of eight or ten in sizes that vary from the very small one to a big one; they make a very good sound and military roar; there is a big one they call *funda* which can be carried only by the Captain-General; it must be eight or ten *palmos* long, narrow at one end and about one *palmo* wide at the other end, it is played on one side, half of it is made of ivory and the other half is of elaborately carved wood; it is a royal instrument, there is never more than one of these in any army, no matter how big, so that everyone will come to the side it sounds from, as the strongest point of the army. There is another kind of atabel kettledrums they call *enocassas* which are also royal drums and are played when they are to attack on all fronts.
>
> ... the shields are the height of a man and three *palmos* wide,

Traditional daggers decorated with brass wire-work.



above: Traditional Shona ceremonial and battle axes.
below: Shona spear and knobkerry.



made of wooden planks as light as cork, with a stick across the back from top to bottom for holding purposes, and at the bottom an iron spike so they can stick them on the ground when necessary and fight more freely; when the time comes, they give the sign with the *parapanda* and the men lock the shields in such a way that they form a square defence with an open rear . . . [they] put the baggage in the middle and move very easily and jump about and the defence advances or stops as they are told to do and in the same hand they hold the shield, the bow and the arrows and the hand holds a large assegai with which they attack; . . . if they stop, they stick the iron end of the shield in the ground and make use of the bow to throw arrows. Any Kaffir who is proud of himself carries but one arrow on him and says that a good soldier never loses his weapons, but takes others from the enemy to defend himself and attack; he also has on him two assegais, one to throw if he has to and another to keep all the time; from his waist hangs a small axe from one side and from the other a sort of dagger which he also uses as a knife; they are all so obedient that they only do as their Captain-General says and he, if this can be done, sends for counsel from his *fumos* who, because old age, cannot fight and sit under a tree, if it is inside the *mozinda* [*muzinda*], and from there they say what must be done. And it is what they do.[85]

One source claims that because of the close-combat fighting with battleaxes, the battles were often short and furious and the carnage remarkable.[86]

Before going into battle the warriors were doctored by the diviners *(n'anga)*. One eighteenth-century document claims that it was a practice among the people of the Mutapa to cook beef mixed with human flesh and then serve it to the warriors so as to fortify them and make them brave. They called this practice *sunga (tsunga)*. The warriors were not ignorant of what they were eating. The same document declares that the 'vassals [of Mutapa] esteem death in battle more than from sickness'.[87] In the late eighteenth century the governor of the Rivers of Sena, António de Mello e Castro, declared that 'the *monhaes,* who are the soldiers of the empire of Moanamotapa . . . after these [Rozvi], are more daring than anybody else.' In battle and before, in order to bolster their morale and intimidate the enemy, they chanted war songs, beat drums and blew horns. On their heads they wore *'garas* [*ngara*], which are some sort of headgear made up of many porcupine quills . . . During their war-like exercises which they call *pemberaçoens* . . . [they perform] many leapings and multi-articulated movements . . . with their heads.'[88]

Finally, turning now to the question of the numbers in the armies of the Mutapas. In the sixteenth century it is said by one authority that these forces numbered 300 000 men,[89] but another source gives the figure of 100 000 men.[90] In the seventeenth century the Mutapas could lose as many as 2 000[91] to 5 000[92] men in one campaign. But in the eighteenth century it is said that the ruler of Chidima, the residual part of the once powerful Mutapa state, could only field about 3 000 men.[93] One writer has warned us that most of our figures for the Mutapa armies come from Portuguese sources which, 'naturally, would exaggerate their strength, to augment their achievements, or explain failures'.[94] Before one can agree with that judgement it is necessary to clarify some points. As has been noted the Mutapas did not have a standing army but recruited their forces from *all* the male peasants in the state. Theoretically every man capable of bearing arms could be mobilized. What the records seem to be describing was the potential and not necessarily the actual army of a Mutapa. The figures of 300 000 or 100 000 are never given in the sources in connection with any actual known campaign or battle. They are always mentioned as Mutapa's *potential army.*[95] It is true that the sources state that a Mutapa was capable of raising those figures, but they nowhere claim that they actually ever saw him doing it except in the case of Fr Luís as already mentioned above. It would seem therefore that the estimated Mutapa armies are very often an estimate of the active male population of the state. Looked at from this perspective the figures need not be such a gross exaggeration.

The forces that could actually be mobilized for an engagement were governed by a number of variables – political, economic, geographic and military considerations. The nature of the relationship of a particular chiefdom to the target, the relative importance of speed and secrecy necessary, etc., all played a part in determining the composition of each expeditionary force. But above all else, the forces a Mutapa could send on any expedition were controlled by the availability of commissariat. Since these armies lived largely off the land, the logistics of feeding armies of 100 000 to 300 000 men would have been a daunting proposition. Even if some cattle were taken along as food this would not have been enough.[96] Nor was the fact that each warrior was required to bring his own supplies from his home sufficient to provide all the food needed.[97] In the end 'all his men [soldiers] eat at the cost of the places to which [they] . . . go'.[98] This was more so in

the case of a long engagement when the armies would have been forced to pillage many enemy lands as well as districts loyal to the Mutapa. The Portuguese *prazo*-holders, and at times the Mutapas themselves, used cloth to buy commissariat and to win friends.[99] But even this could not have solved the problem completely. We do not know enough about the amount of food necessary to feed each warrior a day in order to get an estimate of the commissariat needed and to find the optimum figures for an army of the kind we are describing. But that this was a critical consideration in determining the duration of a campaign is attested to by Fr Monclaro who claims, perhaps with some exaggeration, that

> Their sieges of any place are of short duration, three days at the most, it is said, because the land is so lacking in food that, even if they resort to the filthiest food, no body of people, however small, may be provided for in any part thereof for longer than these three days, and so they leave no green thing behind.[100]

Indeed, two of the three reasons given by Captain Rezende as to why the Shona of Mutapa did not exploit the advantages of their numerical superiority in war were closely related to the issues of commissariat.[101]

Finally, the numbers that could go on a campaign depended on whether the campaign was to be fought during the dry or rainy season. If it was the latter, most peasants would be too preoccupied with their gardens to worry about joining a military campaign. Indeed if a campaign continued until planting or harvesting time there were usually grave dangers that the warriors would desert. Being cultivators, they knew that if they did not cultivate or harvest their gardens they would be in trouble the following season.[102] Since it is known that in the seventeenth century Portuguese *prazo*-holders could raise armies of 15 000 – 40 000 men for a campaign it should be surprising if the Mutapas could not do the same.[103] After all, even during the eighteenth century, as will be shown in chapter nine, the Mutapa armies used to terrorise the Portuguese traders and *prazo*-holders in the Zambezi valley. In addition, wars, if successful, often meant the capture of booty – livestock, women, etc. – and, if one were to accept what de Barros says, 'All the booty taken in war is divided among the men by the captains and the king . . .'[104] This was powerful incentive for many of the peasants to join the armies of the Mutapas.

There is no evidence of any military training of these fighters. Hunting seems to have provided the best means of acquiring know-

ledge of weaponry. Nor is there evidence for the existence of age groups or initiation schools which could be turned into military schools and regiments.

Finally, by their very nature these peasant armies had limited offensive capacity.[105] Wars of aggression would not have been as popular as defensive wars. More people were likely to join a defensive rather than an offensive campaign.[106] Throughout the history of the Mutapa state there is enough evidence of the Mutapas using their armies to impose their authority on their vassals. Sometimes this was successfully done, as at the time of *Matuzianhe* and for a time against the Samungazi Tonga.[107] Indeed, even when the Mutapas lost control of provinces like Guruuswa and Uteve this was not without bitter and at times protracted wars.[108] It is a very mistaken view to ascribe the fragmentation of the Mutapa empire solely to a lack of effective military forces. The low offensive capacity of these forces was certainly a factor but by no means the decisive one. The enormity of size of the original empire and the presence of able and ambitious princes governing these regions brought sections of the imperial armies to fight against each other. The failure was largely political and not military.

iii. Foreign relations

Throughout its history the Mutapa state maintained close relations with foreign communities. Historical evidence exists showing the Mutapas trading and negotiating with these communities. Embassies and ambassadors were exchanged between the Mutapas and these communities. Our knowledge of the Mutapa's relations with other African rulers is virtually non-existent. But what is known about is the court envoys sent from the capital to the provincial rulers and vice versa. This section will deal with such questions as who were recruited as ambassadors; what training or qualities they had; what powers/immunities they enjoyed; and how effective they were in their roles.

The Portuguese used a number of terms to describe these ambassadors. They called them *mutume*[109] (*mutumwa* or *nhume* in standard Shona), *munhae*[110] (*munyai*) and *manamucate*[111] (*mwanamukati*, i.e. nephew in Shona). Sometimes they used *patamares*,[112] which is a non-Shona word. *Nhume* was the favoured term before the eighteenth century, while *munyai* and *mwanamukati* dominate eighteenth- and nineteenth-century sources. There does not appear

to have been any significance as to which particular term was used. They used them interchangeably. In present-day Shona each of the three terms has its own subtle meanings. For example, in marriage negotiations one sends a *munyai* and not a *mwanamukati*. Although *nhume* might be used in this connection it is not the preferred term. A chief sends a *nhume* or a *munyai* to summon someone or announce a new decree.

Although Portuguese sources do not make any distinction of the ambassadors and messengers of the Mutapas, there is no doubt that the Mutapas themselves did. From the sources it is possible to deduce that envoys of different ranks were sent on missions appropriate to their status at court and the Mutapas received visiting envoys differently depending on their ranks and whom they represented.[113] But what criterion was used to choose the Mutapa ambassadors? To begin with, there is no evidence of resident ambassadors of the Mutapa. It appears ambassadors were chosen and sent on specific missions. It is never clear what criteria were used to choose the individuals to go on a particular mission. This creates the impression of a haphazard operation leading inevitably to the conclusion that these embassies could hardly have been effective. But was this the case? According to dos Santos, Mutapa embassies to the Portuguese came 'in the same way as the mutumes of Quiteve'[114] of which he wrote,

> He sends four ambassadors chosen for the purpose, whom the Kaffirs call *mutumes*. One of these represents the person of the king upon this journey, and only while it lasts do the Kaffirs show him the same respect and reverence. The second *mutume* is called the king's mouth, it being his office to speak and do the king's embassy. The third is called the king's eye, his office being to watch all that is done upon this journey and embassy, both good and bad, in order to relate it all to his king upon his return to court, and also to see how much and what kind of cloth is delivered to him. The fourth *mutume* is called the king's ear, his office being to listen to what is said upon this embassy both on the part of the king and on the part of the captain of Sofala, and to observe if the ambassadors add to or deduct from their embassy.[115]

Although it is not specifically mentioned how and why each officer was chosen, from their functions it may legitimately be deduced that the *muromo* or mouth must have been a man with a gift of the gab – a polished, eloquent and persuasive speaker. The eye or *meso*, to be effective, had to be an observant fellow, quick to detect any indica-

tion of sharp practice, perhaps inquisitive too. Intelligence-gathering would have come quite naturally to him. The ear or *zheve* was probably a quiet and aloof type, the sort of person who is perpetually underestimated but with the memory of an elephant to remember all that was being said.

But who among Mutapas' officers was sent on these missions? The embassies to the Portuguese in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were often very high-powered affairs. Court officials such as the *mbokorume*, *mukomohasha* and *nechinanga* were sent on these missions.[116] In addition, princes or princesses of the blood could be sent on such missions.[117] During those centuries it is said that every mission to the Portuguese included a representative of the house of *Mazvarira*, the chief wife, whose duties, as mentioned above, included being the contact point in the state for the Portuguese.[118] Contact with the moslems involved the house of *Nehanda*, the second wife.[119] One can easily exaggerate the degree of specialisation implied in these arrangements by describing the houses of *Mazvarira* and *Nehanda* as the Portuguese and moslem 'desks', respectively, in Mutapa's 'foreign affairs department', but something akin to these functions seems to be adumbrated. The fact that these embassies contained such ministerial dignitaries suggests they were high-powered delegations, thoroughly versed in the affairs of the state.

Other functionaries used as envoys were the former pages. After years of apprenticeship some of these were later used as envoys.[120] Again these officials knew the court and its workings inside out and must have been greatly aware of the issues of the times. Such envoys could be trusted with fairly important missions, either as leaders of these missions or as members of the more powerful types of embassies described in the last paragraph.

Those used as messengers to provincial rulers were not necessarily so high-powered. Very often knowledge of the province – geographic and political – would have been an important asset. Former pages would probably have been sent as part of delegations to their home areas. But many lesser chiefs would have received 'criers', or even court praise-singers and dancers, valued more perhaps for their strong vocal cords, their ability to elaborate and spice a tale, than for the attributes required of the members of the more high-powered embassies. In the eighteenth century it seems the Mutapas had fifteen such *vanyai* at court.[121]

There were no fixed numbers sent on each embassy; there is evi-

dence of missions of three or 200 men[122] depending on the nature of the business to be transacted. The arrival of such an embassy at a Portuguese settlement was quite a spectacle.

> First come, in front, certain drummers and players of other instruments, together with certain dancers, all singing and playing as they march, deafening the surrounding country with their harsh and discordant voices, their heads ornamented with cock's-tail feathers. After them come the other Kaffirs in single file, and after them the four mutumes in their proper order, he who represents the king coming last.[123]

But what powers and immunities did these envoys enjoy? Were they ambassadors plenipotentiary or did they have to refer all issues back to the Mutapas? Unfortunately not much is known about this. But if the evidence coming from the Ganyambadzi missions is anything to go by then they were in fact not ambassadors plenipotentiary. The final decisions had to be taken by the court. Because they were often so powerful in their composition they would probably have been given some discretionary powers to negotiate on a number of issues. However, in the end they had to refer the matters to the Mutapa for final resolution.[124] It was, and still is, a fairly accepted practice among the Shona that an envoy should not be harmed. As a well-known Shona axiom goes, '*Mutumwa haana mbonje*'. Literally it means 'A messenger has no wound', i.e. is not responsible for the wound he inflicts or should not be harmed for any injury he may cause by word or deed. The Mutapa ambassadors used to carry special royal staffs or *mibhadha* (*chibatas* or *rota*) as a symbol of their office.[125] These were a kind of *laissez passer* which invested them with the king's authority. As long as they carried these *mibhadha* they could not be harmed.

An interesting demonstration of the mystique associated with these *mibhadha* is shown in the story of Mutapa Chifombo and Lt Governor António Norberto Villas Boas Truão related in chapter nine. In that story, Mutapa Chifombo made sure that Truão had surrendered the *rota* before he could be killed.[126] Even in war time, envoys were meant to enjoy immunity. To kill an envoy was regarded as an outrage often leading to war or an exaction of heavy compensation. Besides the *mibhadha* the envoys were usually regaled with striking feathers, cock or ostrich, and perhaps some royal skin like leopard skin. Their flamboyant dress, their *mibhadha*, and the airs surrounding their entourage set them apart from ordinary travellers and made

them an easily recognizable team. But their diplomatic accreditation or passports were the *mibhadha* or *rota*.

According to Miranda and Castro, during the eighteenth century the vassal kings were obliged to send their sons to the court of Mutapa every year as ambassadors with presents of gold, ivory, slaves, cattle, and small livestock. For three days the ambassadors were entertained in the houses of some court grandees. After that period the Mutapa summoned his court to receive the embassy.

> [Court] was invariably held in the courtyard outside his Palace. As soon as the ambassador enters the Royal Courtyard he starts clapping his hands until he comes before the royal presence. The Emperor [receives ambassadors] sitting on his throne under two *sombreiros* which the Most Faithful Majesty [king of Portugal] gives as his [Mutapa's] state.
>
> When the visiting ambassador is close to the Emperor he finds a convenient place and sits himself on the ground. [From that position] he offers the presents from his king, not to the Emperor directly but to the lowest in rank of the court grandees. That grandee in turn relays the message to the next in rank until it reaches the highest nobleman who in turn communicates it to the Emperor himself. The Emperor's reply follows the same course but in descending order until it reaches the ambassador.
>
> With these formalities over, the ambassador returns for some days to the same house he has been staying at, awaiting the Emperor's final message. A few days later the ambassador is summoned to the Royal Court where similar procedures are followed as on the previous occasion. The Emperor directs the ambassador to return to his king and also sends the latter a present of some items or cloth of high quality and orders the ambassador to be given some clothes for him to wear . . .
>
> The petty chiefs have an obligation of personally bringing their presents to the Emperor. They could only send their sons if for some very good reason they themselves could not undertake the journey. Embassies from these petty chiefs are not received with the pomp accorded the ambassadors from kingly principalities. They are received anywhere and dealt with quickly with the minimum of formalities. The only other ambassador who enjoyed as much attention as ambassadors from kingly principalities was the occasional envoy of the Changamira.[127]

The documents say that all the grandees at court and envoys had to clap after each word as they spoke to the Mutapa and even these grandees had to sit on the ground. Every envoy who visited the Mutapa court had to follow the above procedures. The Portuguese found these

procedures somewhat taxing and demeaning with the result that for a time during the seventeenth century they were exempt from some of these formalities. These concessions were granted to them by Mutapa Mavhura who had gained the throne with Portuguese assistance. According to the treaty of vassalage signed by Mavhura,

> [Portuguese] ambassadors who come to speak to him shall enter his *zimbahe* [*zimbabwe*] shod and covered, with their arms in their belts, as they speak to the king of Portugal, and he shall give them a chair on which to seat themselves without clapping their hands; and other Portuguese shall speak to him in the manner of ambassadors, and shall be given a karros to sit upon.[128]

The Portuguese had two types of ambassadors sent to the Mutapa's court, i.e. 'visiting ambassadors' or envoys and resident 'consuls' or agents. Examples of envoys were those sent to negotiate peace treaties or safe conduct for traders as well as those sent to pay tribute or *curva* (*kuruva*) of the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. Dos Santos tells us that the *curva* was delivered to the Mutapas by

> a Portuguese chosen for this purpose by the captain [of Sena], who after his election is called viceroy, as he is going as ambassador to Monomotapa, in the name of the captain of Mozambique, whom the Kaffirs call viceroy. This Portuguese receives the said curva in the factory of Sena in presence of the mutumes of Monomotapa, that they may see all the cloth that is being sent to him, and after its delivery he takes it under his charge to the court of Monomotapa, accompanied by the mutumes, and there he delivers this curva to Monomotapa in the name of the captain of Mozambique.[129]

Such Portuguese ambassadors were not plenipotentiary nor were they trained ambassadors. Knowledge of the customs and language(s) of the region were their major assets. Of greater significance in maintaining good relations between the Mutapas and the Portuguese were what has been called 'consuls' or 'agents'. In the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries this role was embodied in the office of the captain of Masapa or 'Captain of the Gates'. The functions of this officer are discussed more fully in chapter five. There it is clear that the duties of the 'Captain of the Gates' are well beyond those of a consul. He was in part an officer of the Mutapa's administration. But he

> also receives from the viceroys of India power to act as judge and chief of all the Portuguese who frequent these kingdoms,

> and as such he gives judgement in all cases affecting Portuguese that are brought into court in these parts . . .
>
> The captain of Massapa in this office serves as agent in all matters between the Portuguese and Monomotapa.[130]

In the seventeenth century there is evidence of a Portuguese garrison being sent to guard the Mutapa. With the coming of the garrison during Mavhura's reign the role of the captain of Masapa disappeared.[131] During the seventeenth, eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries a Portuguese garrison was, from time to time, stationed at the Mutapa court.[132] In theory it was meant to protect the Mutapa but in practice it was too small and ineffectual to do that. What it served was more as a Portuguese listening post at the Mutapa court. The duties and functions and cost of the Portuguese garrison at the Mutapa's *zimbabwe* are stated in a document of 19 April 1771, known as the 'Regimento, e Instrucçoẽns dos Capitaens Mores do Prezídio de Zimboae' by the Governor and Captain-General of Mozambique, Balthazar Manoel Pereira do Lago.[133] This is a long document with 19 clauses. According to clause 12 of the document, among the various duties of the Portuguese captain-major in charge of the garrison was that,

> The said Captain Major should take greater care to make himself the Master of all the intelligence related to the interests of this state and its commerce; advising, without delay, him who happens to govern these Rivers of all and every movement of the said Emperor or of his decisions, as well as of his allies or enemies and whether the traders of Zumbo ought to pass through the territory of the same Emperor on their way to that *Feira*. The route [through his territory] is more convenient and more secure and following on his alliance the Captain Major, as our emissary, ought to represent our interests to him; [making clear] the hardship we undergo and the ruin to which the traders of Zumbo have been reduced so that he ensures, by his orders and the fear of his castigations, that the roads would not only be free but cleared of robbers and of any other obstacle which is prejudicial to commerce and thus make safe the route not only to the subjects of the King of Portugal but to all the *Mussambazes* [*Vashambadzi*] who go to trade in his dominions or pass through them to those of other chiefs in the same trade. And any deviation from this order of fair play, of friendship and reason would be followed neither by his being secure on his throne nor peace for us in these lands.[134]

The document tells us that the garrison as originally established by

the Portuguese kings had 25 soldiers, one captain, one second lieutenant and one sergeant until the time of the governorship of Francisco de Mello de Castro when it was increased, by the addition of a captain, a lieutenant, a second sergeant, a chaplain and an interpreter, from 28 to 33 men. Pereira do Lago decided to abolish the position of the lieutenant and reduce the privates to 23 thus having a total of 30 people. However, from other sources it is known that it was Dom Nuno Alvares Pereira who first sent a company of 30 soldiers and one captain as a personal bodyguard for Mutapa Gatsi Rusere in 1609.[135] There is no evidence that this arrangement continued beyond the suppression of the *Matuzianhe* revolt. But the arrangement was reintroduced by the same Dom Nuno Alvares Pereira after the succession of Mavhura. On that occasion a fort was built at the Mutapa *zimbabwe*, only to be abandoned and burnt down when Mavhura changed the site of his capital.[136] Fr Assumpção, who spent 14 years in the Rivers and was chaplain to the garrison at the time Mutapa Nyakunembire came to power, says that the garrison had 25 soldiers and a captain-major, all paid 20 *bares* of *fato* a year. The figure of 25 soldiers is corroborated by Fr Conceição.[137] But Custodio de Almeida, writing at the same time, says the garrison had 30 soldiers and a captain-major.[138]

What is evident from these sources is a conflict between the actual and the legal number of soldiers in the garrison. Legally there should have been 30 but in practice this was not necessarily true all the time. At the time Fr Assumpção and Fr Conceição were writing there were only 25 soldiers. Even the do Lago document itself makes clear that most of the time, especially after the death of Mutapa Debwe Mupunzagutu in 1760, either there had been no garrison or one much reduced in number at the Mutapa *zimbabwe*, with the result that, so he claimed, civil wars and other disturbances took place in the Mutapa state. The reason why there had been no garrison was that the salary of the captain-major of only four *bares* of *fato* a year was too meagre to attract anybody. To remedy this he decided to increase the salary to six *bares* a year. He also decided to add the 15 *corjas* saved by the abolition of the lieutenant's position to the *congrua* of the chaplain which, at the original 15 *corjas* 'was in truth known that it could not meet his legitimate expenses'. The garrison was to be given 120 *panos* to meet expenses for *manamucates* (envoys). The other members of the garrison were to be treated as stipulated in what is only referred to as 'Provedoria de Mossambique'.[139]

The captain-major was to be a man of sound judgement, diplomacy and some note if he was to be effective in his role as advisor and protector of Portuguese interests. He was to keep his garrison busy; ensure that his men carried their guns every day; that the guns were cleaned, ammunition on the ready; and the men were disciplined and trained. He should be firm and fair in the way he dealt with them, ensuring that they did not transgress the customs and conventions of these people. For this reason, and to avoid any misunderstanding with the Mutapa, the captain-major ought to

> write on a piece of paper, to be posted at a public place, the main regulations which the garrison ought to observe. These may be related to their military duties as well as pertaining to the customs of those Kaffirs and the laws and regulations which they receive from the Emperor. That piece of paper should be read out loudly every day to the garrison so that none of them may be ignorant as to his obligations.[140]

The captain-major was entitled to two months leave a year. The two months could not be taken at one go but in instalments. The other members of the garrison were entitled to three months leave a year. But if there were reports of possible disturbances no leave could be taken. The garrison had to be kept at full strength. Desertion, illness or death had to be reported promptly to the Lt Governor of the Rivers of Sena. The captain-major of the garrison was not to make any troop movement without first clearing it with the Mutapa. This was to be done in order to avoid any misunderstandings. He was to collect information about the various rebel princes and their activities and pass it on not only to the governor of the Rivers but as quickly as possible to the Mutapa as well. In such an event he should impress upon the Mutapa that he, the Mutapa, should suppress the revolt. In all his dealings with the Mutapa the captain-major had to show great subservience.

> As soon as the said Captain Major enters the *Zimboae* [*Zimbabwe*] of Emperor Moanamotapa, with the due ceremonies and salutations, [he should show] as much deference, attentions and submissions as are due to the legitimate sovereign whom he goes to serve. The accident of colour ought not to make any difference when these are legitimate Kings, whom God allows [to rule] either by the right of conquest or by the voice of the same God in the acclamation of the people. He should ask the said Emperor for a place for residence which is convenient and where he could do everything in his service. He should declare

> to him that he goes there sent by the Most High, Most Powerful, the Sovereign and Most Faithful King of Portugal to provide him with a guard as was the practice with past Emperors as a sign of our friendship and good alliance which we wish to have with him and for which that garrison is sent over there to be always at his disposal.[141]

From all this it is quite clear that the Portuguese garrison could never, nor did it ever, become the chief basis of a Mutapa's power. It was primarily a Portuguese listening post providing a guard of honour to the Mutapas.[142] This does not mean to say that it was completely useless militarily. It could be employed to stiffen a Mutapa's own bodyguard and troops in case of trouble. This was so at the time of Gatsi Rusere and Mavhura[143] in the seventeenth century as well as in 1718 when a Prince Kamota was harrassing Mutapa Nyamhandu.[144] Between 1634 and 1692 it must have derived influence from the fact that it was a representative of Portuguese power which then dominated the lower Zambezi. But even then it did not prevent the assassination of Mutapa Afonso in about 1663,[145] nor did it stop the so-called usurpation of the anti-Portuguese Nyakunembire in 1692,[146] who, with the help of the Rozvi, ejected the garrison from his *zimbabwe*. In short, the garrison was as important as the power it represented, and during much of the time Portuguese power was a fairly scarce commodity. Fr Assumpção says at least 70 men were needed to make the garrison effective.[147] In the eighteenth century one Rozvi *mambo* requested a similar embassy for his court, but the Portuguese were unable to oblige.

Finally there is the question of lack of writing in the Mutapa state and hence the inability to exploit this means of communication. It is remarkable that in spite of having some of their sons educated by the Portuguese – indeed a number of these sons became priests and brothers and one even received the equivalent of today's Doctor of Divinity degree – there is no evidence that the Mutapas ever used any of their own people to write letters to the Portuguese. All that survives today are a few letters written for the Mutapa by the Portuguese at his court. The authenticity of these letters was doubted even by the contemporary Portuguese. It is even said that the fact that the Mutapas had a royal seal to affix to all their letters did not improve the accuracy or authenticity of these documents as the seal was accessible to the Portuguese who wrote the letters for them.[148] So a letter could be a complete forgery but bearing the royal seal, or the Mutapa could

have been told quite a different story from what was on paper. Part of the reason for the failure to have local scribes was that no schools were ever opened in the Mutapa state proper and only two of the educated sons of the Mutapas ever succeeded to the throne.

However the absence of literacy did not prevent the Mutapas from giving precise instructions. It has already been mentioned that when messengers came to the court they presented their embassy to the lowest courtiers who passed it on to the next in rank until it reached the Mutapa himself. The Mutapa in turn gave his acknowledgement to the next in rank following the same route but in a descending order until it reached the intended person. This apparently laborious repetition, which to this day the Shona traditionalists relish, was designed to make a point clearly understood by all present so that there could be little room for misunderstanding in future. Every decision was repeated and noted by all councillors. So before an embassy left on its mission, and when it returned, the information was imparted by a similar procedure. This meant that if a mission had many officers there were a lot of people who heard and repeated the messages. As Fr Monclaro tells us,

> They receive and give their embassies by word of mouth, and describe to the king even the smallest thing that befell them since they left and until their return; these tales take many hours, and if they forget anything their companions remind them of the omission.[149]

In conclusion it may be noted that the Mutapa state does not seem to have had a special minister of foreign relations. The Mutapa himself was ultimately in charge. Through his first two wives he had a degree of specialization on aspects of foreign affairs. But so little is known of the way these houses were organized that it is difficult to assess how effective they were in their roles. The ambassadors of Mutapa were men of substance, well-versed in the affairs of the state. Some degree of competence and skill seems to have been required before people were used on embassies. Experience through years of service at court was the 'school' through which virtually all the *nhume* had to pass. Diplomacy was not an amateur's province. The evidence shows that the Mutapa foreign relations were effectively handled, the way Negomo Mupunzagutu handled the Barreto invasion being a case in point.[150]

Conclusion

The picture of the Mutapa state as a kind of a theocracy loosely held together by some occult forces is one that should now be discarded as too simplistic. For in truth while religion was both an integrative factor as well as a constitutional check on a Mutapa's powers it could in no sense be described as the key integrative factor in the Mutapa political system. It was only one of the factors favouring integration.

The image of the Mutapa state as a moribund confederacy devoid of any military capacity is equally untenable. The Mutapa state while not militaristic in character nevertheless possessed meaningful military structures and forces to be able to defend itself and to allow the Mutapas to enforce their authority over their subjects. But perhaps the most striking demonstration of the reality of *Pax Munhumutapaia* is shown by the practice that houses of ordinary people needed no doors, because 'They say that houses are built with doors for fear of thieves and malefactors, from whom it is the king's duty to protect his people, and above all the poor.' Putting of doors at the entrance of houses was a privilege granted by the Mutapa to a few nobles.[151]

And in the diplomatic field there existed sufficiently developed structures to serve the interests of the state fairly well.

CHAPTER 4

Notes

1. Alpers, 'Mutapa and Malawi political systems', 13.
2. For a summary of the controversy see Mudenge, 'Rozvi Empire and Feira of Zumbo', 126–128.
3. Goes, 'Gloriosa Memória', 129.
4. Monclaro, 'Relação', 379.
5. Ibid., 383.
6. Faria e Sousa, 'Ásia Portuguesa', 24–25.
7. Bocarro, 'Década', 358–359.
8. 'Descripção do Império Moanamotapa', 223. In Manyika dialect they use the term *Mudzimu* when referring to God. However in other Shona dialects *Mudzimu* may be used to refer to God when the adjective *Mukuru*, i.e. the Big One, is added. *Mudzimu Mukuru.*
9. Pacheco, *Uma Viagem*, 32. *Murungu* is not a Shona term but a Nyungwe–Maravi word. The Korekore sometimes use the name *Murenga* for God.
10. Ibid., 44.
11. Ibid., 44–45; J.F. Holleman, 'Accommodating the spirit amongst some north-eastern Shona tribes', *Rhodes-Livingstone Institute Papers, 22,* (1953), IX. The *mhondoro* was known as *Vamvura* because he was said to be responsible for rain-making. *Mvura* means water or rain.
12. Pacheco, *Uma Viagem*, 45.
13. Ibid., 44; Gelfand, *Shona Religion*, 28.
14. Pacheco, *Uma Viagem*, 45; Gelfand, *Shona Religion*, 20. Gelfand calls it a *mangato* and tells us that *mhondoro* Nyanhehwe's was four feet long and one inch in diameter.
15. Pacheco, *Uma Viagem*, 45; Gelfand, *Shona Religion*, 14.
16. Pacheco, *Uma Viagem*, 45; Gelfand, *Shona Religion*, 10.
17. Dos Santos, 'Ethiopia Oriental', 197–198. Since these 'grand obsequies' were done every year in September on the day of the new moon, we may therefore conclude that they were probably meant as prayers for good rains just before the beginning of the planting season.
18. Pacheco, *Uma Viagem*, 45; Gelfand, *Shona Religion*, 10.
19. Pacheco, *Uma Viagem*, 46; Gelfand, *Shona Religion*, 50.
20. Abraham, 'Early Political History', 64.
21. Pacheco, *Uma Viagem*, 24–25.
22. Ibid., 24.
23. Mudenge, 'Rozvi Empire and Feira of Zumbo', 189.
24. Abraham, 'Chaminuka', 31 note 3. Gives a reference to a *mhondoro* Mutota of the 1880s. However the most famous *mhondoro* Mutota is George Kupara, Abraham's chief informant. For a picture of George Kupara see Abraham, 'Monomotapa Dynasty', 58. However both Pacheco and Gelfand present Nyanhehwe as the chief Mutapa *mhondoro.*
25. Mudenge, 'Rozvi Empire and Feira of Zumbo', 189.
26. Abraham, 'Monomotapa Dynasty', 65; White, 'Urungwe District', 38.
27. Mudenge, 'Rozvi Empire and Feira of Zumbo', 189.
28. Ibid.
29. White, 'Urungwe District', 39, 42.

30. Mudenge, 'Rozvi Empire and Feira of Zumbo', 189.
31. Pacheco, *Uma Viagem*, 24.
32. Garbett, 'Valley Korekore', 141–144; Gelfand, *Shona Religion*, 10, 21; 'Descripção do Império Moanamotapa', 223.
33. Garbett, 'Valley Korekore', 141–142, 144–145.
34. 'Descripção do Império Moanamotapa', 223.
35. Pacheco, *Uma Viagem*, 45.
36. Garbett, 'Valley Korekore', 151.
37. See Chapter 9 below.
38. Livingstone, *Researches*, 660.
39. Alpers, 'Mutapa and Malawi Political System', 13.
40. Miranda, 'Monarchia', 114–115; Mello e Castro, 'Notícia', 135.
41. See Chapter 2.
42. See Chapter 2, Note 29.
43. Gelfand, *Shona Religion*, 8, 9.
44. Pacheco, *Uma Viagem*, 24.
45. Bourdillon, 'Manipulation of Myth', 115. The information that Dzivaguru was the father of Karuva comes from members of the agnatic lineage of Karuva; Gelfand, *Shona Religion*, 24.
46. Bullock, *The Mashona*, 128.
47. Gelfand, *Shona Religion*, 24; Bourdillon, 'Manipulation of Myth', 115; Bourdillon, 'Peoples of Darwin', 105.
48. Murphree, *Christianity and the Shona*, 49; Abraham, 'Early Political History', 64.
49. Pacheco, *Uma Viagem*, 32; Posselt, 'Watawara', 86.
50. Posselt, 'Watawara', 86.
51. Gelfand, *Shona Religion*, 248.
52. Posselt, 'Watawara', 86; Gelfand, *Shona Religion*, 8; Gelfand also says of Dzivaguru that, 'He was everywhere, anywhere, and revealed himself rather to groups of people than to individuals.' Bourdillon, 'Peoples of Darwin', 105.
53. Gelfand, *Shona Religion*, 9.
54. See note 9 above.
55. Murphree, *Christianity and the Shona*, 49; M. Hannan (S.J.), *Standard Shona Dictionary*, 70.
56. Gosa (Gosva), *mutupo nguruve* is a Tavara/Nyungwe chief related to Chief Makombe of Barwe. Posselt, 'Watawara', 84; Bourdillon, 'Peoples of Darwin', 104, 105–106.
57. Posselt, 'Watawara', 84–85.
58. Ibid., 85; according to Gelfand the prayer is 'We have no rains. We are thirsty. Our crops are dying. May you please give us some rain.' Gelfand, *Shona Religion*, 28.
59. Posselt, *Fact and Fiction*, 121–125.
60. Gelfand. *Shona Religion*, 28. Today the offering at the shrine is said to be made by a special *nechombo* called Nyamungunda assisted by the *nechombo* of *mhondoro* Nyanhehwe. Bourdillon, 'Manipulation of Myth', 114.
61. Posselt, 'Watawara', 86; Murphree, *Christianity and the Shona*, 8–9, 23–24, 28.
62. Bourdillon, 'Peoples of Darwin', 105; Pacheco, *Uma Viagem*. 23.
63. 'Descripção do Império Moanamotapa', 223. For Sachiteve's ceremonies for rains before planting season see note 17 in this chapter on possession in that kingdom.

64. Gelfand, *Shona Religion*, 25–26, 28.
65. Ibid., 23, 24, 28.
66. Bourdillon, 'Manipulation of Myth', 114.
67. Ibid., 115; Posselt, 'Watawara', 84.
68. For evidence that today both the royal *mhondoro nechombo* and a *Dzivaguru–Karuva* cult officer offer sacrifices together at the *Dzivaguru–Karuva* shrine see note 60 above.
69. Posselt, *Fact and Fiction*, 124, 125–126.
70. Goes, 'Gloriosa Memória', 130; E. Barbuse, 'Descripção da Situação, costumes e Produtos de Alguns Lugares de África', *DPMAC, V*, 377.
71. Barbuse, 'Descripção', 377; [Anon.], 'Descrição da Situação, Costumes e Produtos de Alguns Lugares de África', *DPMAC, V*, 361.
72. Dos Santos, 'Ethiópia Oriental', 287.
73. Fr Luís Fróis to Fr Bento Toscano, Goa, 15 December 1561, *DPMAC, VIII*, 27.
74. Monclaro, 'Relação', 427; Couto, 'Da Ásia', 283; Fr Luís to Provincial, 3 February 1630, *RSEA, 2*, 427.
75. 'Descripção do Império Moanamotapa', 223.
76. Miranda, 'Monarchia', 115; Mello e Castro, 'Notícia', 136.
77. Ibid.
78. Ibid.; 'Descripção do Império Moanamotapa', 222. Fr André Fernandes to the Brothers and Fathers of the Society of Jesus in Portugal, Goa, 5 December 1562, RSEA, 2, 149–150. Says a war drum could be heard three to four leagues.
79. Monclaro, 'Relação', 379, 381.
80. Miranda, 'Monarchia', 115.
81. Ibid., 115, 116; Rezende, 'Estado da Índia', 419.
82. Fr Luís Fróis to Fr Bento Toscano, 15 December 1561, op. cit. 27. 'Paratos ad prelium' (prepared for battle).
83. Monclaro, 'Relação', 379.
84. 'Descripção do Império Moanamotapa', 222. The imagery evoked is that of a locust invasion. First appears the *marimbirimbi* or scouts and then comes the *Guru* (main body of locusts). I am grateful to Dr E.K. Mashingaidze for drawing my attention to the locust imagery.
85. Monclaro, 'Relação', 379; Mello e Castro, 'Notícia', 136; Gomes, 'Viagem', 206–207.
86. 'Descripção do Império Moanamotapa', 222–223.
87. Ibid., 224.
88. A.H.U. Av. de Moç. Cx 22, António Manoel de Mello e Castro, Tette, 11 June 1785.
89. See note 73 above.
90. See note 74 above.
91. Fr L. Cacegas and Fr L. de Sousa, 'História de S. Domingos', *RSEA, I*, 400.
92. A.H.U. Av. de Moç. Cx. 2, Caetano de Mello de Castro to King, Senna, 24 July 1685; Biblioteca Pública da Ajuda, 51–VII–34, fl. 50, Manoel Reballo, 'Proposta que fizerão os Moradores dos Rios de Cuama ao Senhor V. Rey', Senna, 27 June 1698.
93. See note 75 above.
94. Livneh, 'Pre-colonial Polities', 196.
95. See notes 73 and 74 above. The exception to this observation is the letter of Fr Luís already quoted. Luís to Provincial, 3 February 1630, op. cit. 427.Fr Luís is probably exaggerating the numbers of the Mutapa's army for effect.

96. De Barros, 'Da Ásia', 272.
97. Ibid.
98. [Anon.], 'Descrição da Situação, Costumes e Produtos de África', 363.
99. Cacegas and Sousa, 'História de S. Domingos', 399; Conceição, 'Tratado', 108 para 115.
100. Monclaro, 'Relação', 381.
101. Rezende, 'Estado da Índia', 419.
102. Ibid.
103. If Mutapas could lose 2 000–5 000 warriors in one campaign then they must have had many more warriors to sustain such casualties. For evidence that Portuguese *prazo*-holders could and *did* raise armies of 15 000–40 000 warriors see Luís to Provincial 3 February 1630, *RSEA*, 2, 427; 'Advices from Goa of 1630', *RSEA*, 2, 429; Cacegas and Sousa, 'História de S. Domingos', 400; Rezende, 'Estado da Índia', 410, 413. Some sources claim that Fumo Pango, a sixteenth-century vassal of Mutapa, could raise over 70 000 men. Monclaro, 'Relação', 379. See also Bocarro, 'Década', 378, for evidence that Matuzianye raised an army of 20 000 men. The message from the records is that the Mutapas had, potentially and in practice, the biggest armies south of the Zambezi, at least prior to the eighteenth century before they lost that advantage to the Rozvi *Mambos*.
104. De Barros, 'Da Ásia', 272.
105. Rezende, 'Estado da Índia', 419; Monclaro, 'Relação', 381.
106. 'Inquérito', 235, 241, 245. Shows that the king of Manyika could raise about 30 to 50 per cent more warriors for war inside his kingdom than for war outside his borders.
107. See Chapter 6 below.
108. See Chapters 2 and 6.
109. Dos Santos, 'Ethiópia Oriental', 220; Monclaro, 'Relação', 397.
110. Miranda, 'Monarchia', 115.
111. See Chapter 9 below, section i. 'Alexandre Jozé Pereira's Report'.
112. Ibid.
113. Miranda, 'Monarchia', 112, 113; Mello e Castro, 'Notícia', 133, 134.
114. Dos Santos, 'Ethiópia Oriental', 272.
115. Ibid., 220.
116. Monclaro, 'Relação', 417. See also Chapter 9 below, section i. 'Alexandre Jozé Pereira's Report'.
117. Dos Santos, 'Ethiópia Oriental', 220, 272–273; see Chapter 9 below.
118. Bocarro, 'Década', 358.
119. Ibid.
120. Ibid., 357.
121. Miranda, 'Monarchia', 115.
122. Monclaro, 'Relação', 417; see Chapter 9 for a discussion of numbers of persons allowed per embassy in the eighteenth century.
123. Dos Santos, 'Ethiópia Oriental', 221, 272–273.
124. See Chapter 9 below; Monclaro, 'Relação', 417–419, 427.
125. Miranda, 'Monarchia', 115; see Chapter 9 for the story of António Norberto Villas Boas Truão and Mutapa Chifombo's *rota*.
126. See Chapter 9 below.
127. Miranda, 'Monarchia', 112–113; also Mello e Castro, 'Notícia', 133–134.
128. Manuza [Mavhura], 'Treslado das Capitulações que fizeram os Portuguezes Com

El-Rey de Monomotapa', copied by João Coelho, Tete, 28 June 1629, *RSEA, 5,* 290.

129. Dos Santos, 'Ethiópia Oriental', 273.
130. Ibid., 271.
131. Rezende, 'Estado da Índia', 418, 415.
132. Ibid; see Chapters 8 and 9; Bocarro, 'Década', 374.
133. A.H.U. Av. de Moç. Códice 1332 No 35, fol. 142–149; Balthazar Manoel Pereira do Lago, 'Regimento, e Instrucçoens dos Capitaens Mores do Prezídio do Zimboaé, Tette, 19 April 1771.
134. Ibid.
135. Bocarro, 'Década', 374.
136. Rezende, 'Estado da Índia', 418.
137. Ajuda, 51–VII–34, fol. 37, Fr Philipe de Assumpção, 'Breve informação dos Rios de Cuama, due da o P.e Frey Philipe de Assumpção por andar nas ditas terras quartorze annos, e estado em todas as feiras eter larga notícia dos uzos, e costumes dellas'; Conceição, 'Tratado', 66 para. 48.
138. Ajuda, 51–VII–34 fol. 40, Custódio de Almeida e Souza, 'Rezumo breve de Alguas noticias que da Custódio de Almeida e Souza, de estado dos Rios de Senna e Sofala'.
139. Do Lago, 'Regimento do Prezídio de Zimboaé'.
140. Ibid.
141. Ibid.
142. Botelho, *Memória Estatística,* 313; Livingstone, *Researches,* 660.
143. Bocarro, 'Década', 374; Rezende, 'Estado da Índia', 418.
144. Dom Luís de Menezes to Monomotapa João, Goa, 26 January 1719, *RSEA, 5,* 67.
145. Barretto, 'Informação', 483; see also Chapter 7 below.
146. Conceição, 'Tratado', 67 para. 51.
147. Assumpção, 'Breve informação', fol. 37.
148. A.H.U. Av. Moç. Cx. 2, António Pais Sande, Lisboa, 8 February 1684; A.H.U. Av. Moç. Cx. 2, Gaspar de Sousa de Lacerda to King, Senna, 3 July 1682.
149. Monclaro, 'Relação', 381.
150. See Chapter 6 below.
151. Goes, 'Gloriosa Memória', 130; De Barros, 'Da Ásia', 270.



It is possible that cattle were more important than all other factors in the formation of states between the Limpopo and Zambezi in pre-colonial times.

CHAPTER 5

The Economic Base of the Mutapa State

Chapter one dealt with, among other topics, production and appropriation of surplus at the local and provincial levels. However it did not show how the Mutapa central administration produced and/or appropriated the resources it needed to maintain its administrative apparatus. In chapter three, mention was made of an imperial officer going by the title of 'treasurer'. In this chapter it is necessary to find out something about the 'treasure' he was in charge of. What and how much was being produced? How was it being produced? By whom and for whom? And finally how did the Mutapa acquire this 'treasure'? In short, this chapter has to deal with the questions of production and distribution in the Mutapa state. These are vitally important questions which will have to be answered if the whole exercise of establishing the existence of a Mutapa central bureaucracy is to have credibility. Without an economic base the Mutapas could never have maintained a bureaucracy of hundreds of people as has been suggested. Indeed all the big titles mentioned above would be nothing but shades and shadows, mere mirages in the minds of contemporary Portuguese writers. Clearly this study does not subscribe to that view and that is why it has accepted that the Mutapas did have a bureaucracy.

But what were the sources of the economic base of the Mutapa state? The wealth enjoyed by the Mutapas was derived from the following main branches of production: agriculture, pastoral activities, trade, mining, hunting, tribute/taxation/presents, and small-scale crafts and industries. But the dominant economic activity throughout the whole history of the Mutapa state was agriculture. Without cultivation it is hard to see how this state could have existed for as long as it did. The second source of economic power before the eighteenth century was pastoralism, especially cattle. Indeed it is even possible that cattle were more important than all other factors in the formation of states between the Limpopo and Zambezi in pre-

nial times. However, from the late seventeenth century until its

fall the Mutapa state had moved into the non-cattle-keeping, tsetse-infested Zambezi valley regions of Dande and Chidima. In these regions cattle became less significant and the main livestock that could be kept was sheep, goats and pigs.

i. Agriculture and pastoralism

The fact that cultivation and cattle-keeping were the chief sources of wealth for the Mutapa and his subjects before 1800 is attested to even in contemporary Portuguese sources. During the seventeenth century, António Bocarro noted that the people of Munhumutapa

> will not exert themselves to seek gold unless they are constrained by necessity for want of clothes or provisions, which are not wanting in the land, for it abounds with them, namely millet, some rice, many vegetables, large and small cattle, and many hens. The land abounds with rivers of good water, and the greater number of the Kaffirs are inclined to agricultural and pastoral pursuits, in which their riches consist.[1]

That cattle were important and that the Mutapas before the eighteenth century must have had considerable numbers are propositions which are deducible from the evidence. Before the eighteenth century the Mutapa herds were such that they had to be kept by provincial barons even as far away from the capital as 150 km. The most famous and documented example of this was Dombo I, founder of the Rozvi empire. Fr Conceição and others confirm that Dombo was, before his revolt, a keeper of the cattle of Mutapa in the Mbire–Njanja grasslands of central Zimbabwe.[2] This is good cattle country. The system under which one person keeps another person's cattle is called *kuronzera* in Shona. The person to whom cattle are *ronzerwa'd* has the right to *usufruct* but may not dispose of them without the owner's permission. The number of cattle belonging to the Mutapa is not known, but the fact that he found it necessary to have cattle posts as far away from his centre as Mbire suggests that they must have been considerable. This is more so when it is realized that the country immediately to the south of the Zambezi escarpment, i.e. Mutapa's centre, was equally good cattle country. In addition, it is said that when Gatsi Rusere defeated *Matuzianhe*, a herdsman of one of his vassals, he captured about 8 000 cattle.[3] In the fifteenth century, Changamire Togwa is said to have sent 4 000 hornless cattle to Mutapa Mukombero.[4] The point of giving these

numbers is to suggest that if at provincial levels there were so many cattle what then are the likely numbers when one comes to the central government level? The Mutapa cattle increased through reproduction as well as through the tribute system. Of all of the forms through which vassal rulers could pay tribute or give presents to the Mutapas, cattle were probably the most convenient and relatively easy to find. The Portuguese documents do mention cattle being used to pay tribute.[5]

Cattle, besides being a form of storing wealth and investment where a man can literally see his 'money' grow and multiply, were used by the Mutapas as food in war,[6] during famines, for feasts and to feed their court. It is known that Mutapas gave cattle as presents to those to whom they wanted to show favours, e.g. Fr Dom Gonçalo da Silveira,[7] and when they wanted gold they would give a cow or two for food to the labourers who dug for the gold.[8] In the Rozvi empire it is known for certain that cattle were used for riding and as baggage animals. Although there is no written evidence that the same was true in the Mutapa state this cannot be ruled out altogether, at any rate for those decades when Guruuswa was still part of the Mutapa state.

Agriculture was the dominant source of subsistence in the Mutapa state throughout its history. In chapter one, reference has been made to pre-colonial Shona peasant agriculture. Elsewhere in this study evidence is given to show how preoccupation with cultivation affected other facets of life, like making war and/or seeking for gold. Insofar as agriculture tied the peasants to the land and enabled them to lead a settled life, it made it possible and easier for the Mutapas to control their subjects. And since it provided the means of subsistence to the greater number of the subjects of the Mutapa it was indeed the economic basis upon which all else could be and was built. But having said that, however, the problem of showing the mechanism by which the Mutapas could or did appropriate the surplus (if any) from agricultural produce for their own benefit still remains.

Perhaps the first set of problems that must be addressed is to find out where and how the Mutapas obtained the food to feed the many people they kept at their *zimbabwes*. The second set is related to the questions of quantities and storage. Contemporary records are all agreed that the Mutapas had their own fields worked in their names.[9] One recent scholar has suggested that the reason why the

Mutapas married so many wives was because they needed them to work in their fields. We have already argued against this line of reasoning. But perhaps the best argument against it is given in the records which show that a Mutapa did not lack manpower to work his fields. According to de Barros, the Munhumutapas had

> a system of service instead of tribute, which is that all the officers and servants of his court, and the captains of the soldiers, each with his men, must serve him in the cultivation of his fields or other work seven days in every thirty.[10]

In chapter one, the above system, known as *zunde*, was described. There it was stated that the people of a *dunhu* worked in a *sadunhu's* fields and those of a *nyika* worked in the chief's fields. Likewise, the people in the *dunhu* in which a Mutapa's *zimbabwe* was located, as well as the chiefdom as a whole where the *dunhu* was found, would have paid their tribute to the Mutapa through 'labour tribute'. Such a labour catchment area would have produced thousands of men and women. It is unlikely that all chiefdoms did in fact send labourers to do service to the Mutapa. The questions of distance and numbers militated against it. It is, as shall become clear later, more likely that most paid their tribute in kind. Compared to the labour available to the Mutapas through *zunde*, the contribution of the royal ladies in this regard pales into insignificance. In addition to his own fields, the wives of the Mutapa had their own fields,[11] just like the wife of the common man had hers but, unlike her, the royal wives' fields benefitted from *zunde* or 'labour service' because, as Bocarro tells us, 'the king's chief wives . . . have houses and estates of their own ... *and many lands and vassals*'.[12] (emphasis added) Besides the above way of producing food crops the Mutapas would have received grains as tribute, especially from those chiefdoms which were too poor to pay tribute in such precious items as gold/ivory or livestock. The argument that grain was too bulky to carry as an item of tribute[13] is probably predicated on an assumption of a scarcity of manpower to carry the grain. That assumption can hardly be taken too seriously for an embassy of 40 men with each one carrying 25 kg of baggage was enough to carry 20 bags each weighing 50 kg. Besides, donkeys could be used for the purpose.[14] In short, the problem of weight should not be regarded as sufficient reason to argue against grain having been an important item of tribute. It is more likely however that the Mutapa usually had so much of his own

grain that he would have encouraged payment of tribute in a form other than grain.

The second set of problems is related to the questions of volume and storage. Some sources emphasize the laziness and poverty of the subjects of Mutapa,[15] while others present the opposite view.[16] The two views seem to arise for two major reasons. The first one is whether the writer had lived in Zambezia during a period of drought or not. The second, and perhaps the chief one, is whether one was describing the situation on the Zimbabwean highlands or the lowlands of Mozambique. The descriptions from the highlands or heartland of the Shona tend to be more favourable than those from the lowlands. Indeed Portuguese sources, even those arguing for the sloth and poverty of the Shona, emphasize the spendthrift nature of the Shona.[17] True Epicurians who would have warmed the heart of Bacchus himself! People who could impress observers with so much of their feasting and merry-making for a period of nearly 500 years could hardly have been poor, hard-to-make-ends-meet peasants. Fr Conceição states categorically that the Mutapa's fields, which stretched beyond 'where the eyes cannot see', usually produced enough for him and his wives to live 'in plenty and also in luxury'. And Fr Gomes claims that the subjects of Mutapa had 'plenty of food and cattle' and never saw the bottom of their *quituras* (*matura*) or granaries, i.e. they were always full of grain.[18] More recently, scholars have argued that during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the Shona, using their traditional agricultural methods, not only produced enough to feed themselves but enough to feed the new mines and towns in the colony of Southern Rhodesia. The only way Shona cultivators were overcome by 'modern' farmers was through a series of legislative actions by the settler regime robbing the Shona of their lands and propping up settler farmers.[19] The existence of this capacity to expand in traditional Shona agriculture is no proof that it was automatically always used, but it is an indication that if needed, for any reason, during the pre-colonial era it could have been used. And since chiefs and Mutapa rulers needed surpluses to support their bureaucracies, it may be assumed that it was often used. The many feasts and drinking parties that so impressed and infuriated the Portuguese observers may well indicate how the surplus was consumed; and those who were rich enough to throw parties had a way of finding themselves as leaders of men[20] or increasing their influence in the councils of men.

Turning now to the problem of storage. It is all very well to say

that the Mutapas received much grain from their fields and through tribute but for how long could they preserve it? One scholar says that the Shona could not preserve a crop for more than one year without it going bad.[21] And another claims that such was the prevalence of droughts that Shona agriculture was perpetually in a state of disequilibrium.[22] Since it is claimed a crop could not be kept for more than one year it is argued that those nearly-once-every-five-years minor droughts and those once-about-every-ten-years severe droughts must have played havoc with Shona society.[23] Both arguments do not stand empirical evidence of any sort. Using their air-tight, stone-raised granaries to store their well sun-dried crops, the Shona can and do keep crops like finger millet easily for three to five years without evidence of deterioration. Some scholars even assert that they could do it for up to 10 years.[24] For the present argument three to five years is perfectly adequate to counter the implied devastating effects of droughts.

In conclusion, the Mutapas, with thousands of hoe-using labourers working their fields, may very well have exploited their fields more effectively than many Shona today using the extensive but destructive modern plough, which usually digs deeper than the rich top soil, have been able to do. And they would have been able to store against a rainy day the surplus from their fields and the tribute from their subjects. It was from such reserves that the ruler was expected to help his subjects during periods of severe famines, the crops grown being exactly the same as has been described in chapter one.

ii. Gold-mining

Conventional wisdom has led some modern scholars to assume that trade, mainly in gold and ivory, provided the wealth that enabled the Mutapas to create and continue to dominate their state. They have argued that trade was so important that the Mutapas were forced to monopolize it. They have even termed this assumption the 'Trade Stimulus Hypothesis'. It is clear from the discussion of the roles of cattle and agriculture in the Mutapa state that in this study we do not share the views of those propounding the primacy of trade as the economic basis of the Mutapa state. But saying that is not the same as claiming that external trade had no role whatsoever in the Mutapa

state. It is accepted that the proceeds of external trade had a role to play in the Mutapa state; but this was a supportive role, reinforcing, modifying perhaps, but never ultimately determining the political system of the state.

The first aspect of Shona gold-mining worth investigating is its technological framework. Much interesting work has already been done in this respect by Roger Summers and I. Phimister.[25] Their reconstructions are basically supported by contemporary Portuguese documents. It is clear that the Shona gold-mining technology was closely influenced by the agricultural background of the Shona people. It is our view that both mining technology and trade in gold were largely secondary to, and dependent upon, agricultural activities. The first problem was prospecting for gold. According to contemporary Portuguese sources, the Shona could tell where gold was to be found by observing soil types and vegetation. It is also possible that they found out where gold was by studying anthills. Termites or 'white ants' can often dig down to depths of between 30 m and 60 m in search of water. By studying the surface deposits one can tell whether there is gold in the ground below. Gold panning and outcrop recognition were other ways gold deposits were identified. So good was Shona prospecting that almost all the goldmines found in Zimbabwe since its occupation by the British settlers in the late nineteenth century are near pre-colonial Shona ancient mines.[26]

After finding the deposits the Shona had to mine the gold. Gold was found as alluvial gold or in reef form. Gold-reef mining was done in three ways. The usual and most popular method was 'to open . . . [a] marondo in the fashion of a well'.[27] These open slopes were usually v-shaped and had average depths of 6–24 metres. They followed the generally-vertical quartz reefs. The second method was shaft-sinking. Where the reef was flat, they sank shafts which averaged 6–24 metres in depth and one metre in diameter and when the reef was reached, 'they do not desist until it is exhausted, following the vein under the earth in every direction'.[28] The third reef-gold mining method was the driving of tunnels or adits into the sides of hills if reasonably flat reefs existed. Besides reef mining, gold was also obtained by simple river washing. A variant of which was 'obtaining gold . . . by going during the rainy season to the furrows where the water runs down, where they find many small nuggets and pieces of gold left exposed by the current.'[29]

For tools in the mining of gold, the Shona used mainly the same

The main problems for Shona mining were connected with haulage, ventilation and underground water.

iron hoe as was used for cultivation. Other tools were iron or steel hammers, gads and picks. To break hard rocks the Shona used to build fires on the rocks for hours and then crack them by pouring cold water. The technique was used in breaking stones for the construction of the *zimbabwes*.[30]

The major problems for Shona mining were connected with haulage, ventilation and underground water. For haulage the Shona used wooden bowls (*pande*); or they used clay, hide or bark buckets. These were passed on from person to person, from hand to hand, until they reached the surface. This was a slow and cumbersome process. Ventilation posed a major problem and may have influenced the depths to which the miners could go. It would appear that natural convection was the most important method of ventilation. It has been suggested that a wetted hide may have been used to expel heavy gases like sulphur and carbon dioxide. The problem of underground water was quite serious. According to the sources, once the water table was reached the mine was almost invariably abandoned. However on those occasions when efforts were made to control the water by passing bowls full of water from hand to hand this was done for some time only. As soon as it was realized that the mine could not be emptied or the water level controlled sufficiently, the mine was abandoned. The problem of underground water partially influenced the period of the year when mining could take place, i.e. during the dry season before the onset of the heavy rains in November. After November most mines were flooded and abandoned. The lack of pumping technology was one of the major constraints on Shona mining activities.[31]

To separate gold from the ore-bearing quartz, the Shona used to roast the quartz on piles of wood in order to facilitate crushing; at times auriferous soil was boiled in earthen pots to separate the gold from the earth. After the cooking or roasting, the ore was then crushed or milled on grinding stones in the so-called 'dolly holes' found in hard outcrop rock. The final process was the washing of the crushed quartz. This process of recovering gold was known as *kangare*. But the washing of alluvial gold and gold from reef-mining was done in wooden trays called *zambas* through a process known as *kuunga*. In the *kuunga* process,

> The soil taken out of the pits is washed in square trays two spans across and a little under four inches deep, called zambas, which

> are placed in water and kept moving to and fro until the earth is all washed away; then the deposit appears at the bottom of the zamba, usually without any metal, but at other times with greater or lesser quantities.[32]

Water was so important that, according to the Portuguese, the Shona almost invariably dug for gold only in places near to water supplies. Concentration of the quartz was achieved by repeated washing. The Shona milling and recovery processes suffered from the constraint of scale. To work through a tonne of ore in doily holes was a slow and time-consuming affair. To try and capture fine gold dust through hand concentration was not an easy exercise. Some gold was inevitably lost in the process. One writer has suggested that as much as 40 per cent of the gold mined was lost in the milling and recovery processes.[33]

When and by whom was gold mined in the Mutapa state? Gold-mining was chiefly done 'in the three months which are called *do crimo* [*chirimo*], that is August, September and October', i.e. summer months, and then in winter, i.e. May, June and July.[34] But it was possible, if necessity so dictated, to do river washing throughout the year. And in the province of Manyika all the three methods of mining gold could be used throughout the year.[35] There are two reasons why gold was mined during the months mentioned above. One reason was that November to March was the time when heavy rains fell; flooding and rising water-tables made mining difficult.[36] Secondly, and perhaps more important, was the fact that the miners of the gold of Munhumutapa were largely the ordinary peasant farmers, who during the months from November through April would be involved in planting, weeding and harvesting their gardens. As Baretto says:

> The method of extracting it [gold] is as follows: a countless number of Kaffirs with their wives and children assemble in the place where they choose to open marondos, the chief of each village forms a separate party with his people, and each begins to open his marondo in the fashion of a well.

And Fr Gomes concurs thus,

> the cafre and his wife go there and so do his children no matter how young for they are given a small or big bowl according to their age; the cafre goes down while the wife remains up to pull the bowls as he fills them up down there, and she pulls them up by means of a rope;[37]

It should be noted that Barretto uses the title 'chief' here rather loosely. What he means by 'chief of each village' is a village headman

or samusha. Although Barretto does not explain to whom the gold was handed, Diego de Couto leaves us in no doubt that it was for personal use. For he writes that the Shona

> are so lazy that they will stop work as soon as they find enough gold to buy two pieces of cloth to dress themselves . . . [they] have neither . . . eagerness nor greed . . . as they always rest content with but little.[38]

Bocarro, Couto, dos Santos and other contemporary sources categorically state that gold-mining was a secondary activity to the Shona peasants of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.[39] Part of the reason why Portuguese traders had to send *vashambadzi* or itinerant traders to the villages was that the ordinary villagers did not, as a rule, have sufficient quantities of gold to justify a journey to Tete or one of the nearby *feiras* (market-places).[40] Indeed the existence of so many *feiras* in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Mutapa state shows that trade was carried on with more persons than just the Mutapas. The mistaken view that the Mutapas monopolized and controlled the gold trade in their state is a result of the misunderstanding of the many references which show that the Mutapas and other Shona rulers forbade their subjects to let the Portuguese know of the existence of rich gold deposits in their countries. Time and again references are met claiming that rich gold-mines had to be closed as soon as they were discovered.[41] At first even the Portuguese were puzzled by this for,

> if they find any large piece [of gold] they hide it so that it may not be found, and he [Mutapa] orders the mines to be covered up . . . leaving there sundry spells so that no one pursues the digging further. And they commit many abuses in this . . . the intent whereof is not to be discovered inasmuch as they are overfond of gold and make therewith pieces they carry about their necks like beads, and also for the cloth trade.[42]

Some writers have assumed that this hiding of the gold-mines had something to do with trying to enforce the Mutapa's alleged monopoly in gold trade and another writer has suggested that it was a reaction to falling prices. But the reason for this action is given elsewhere in contemporary Portuguese sources. According to Fr Barretto, this was done in order 'that the Portuguese may not covet them'.[43] Some vassal rulers closed rich gold-mines in their regions during the sixteenth century because they did not want the assessment of the tribute payable to Mutapa to rise as would

inevitably have happened if such discovery was known by the Mutapa. There is also evidence of subjects killing their own ruler who showed rich gold-mines to the Portuguese. However there is no evidence that provincial rulers had to pay as much as 50 per cent of the gold they mined as tax to the Mutapas as was the case in some kingdoms in the early sixteenth century. According to Veloso, the traveller Fernandes told him that in Manzovo and in the kingdom called 'Amçoce' all miners had to pay 50 per cent of what they mined as tax to the local ruler. It is not clear what percentage of this was paid to the Mutapa but presumably it was fairly substantial.[44] Clearly then the hiding of the mines was not done in order to enforce a supposed monopoly of the gold trade by the Mutapa or, as a response to the assumed terms of trade, but to avoid seizure of land by the Portuguese and at times to avoid increased tribute assessment. Besides the hiding of the mines, no other evidence has ever been suggested to argue for a monopoly of gold trade by the Mutapas. From the discussion so far it can safely be concluded that no positive evidence of the Mutapas monopolizing the gold trade has been presented.

The question remains as to how the Mutapas got their gold. Most of the gold of the Mutapas came, as Goes pointed out, from 'several kings and lords who obey him and pay him a tribute of gold.'[45] Gold was paid as tribute to the Mutapas throughout the history of their state. Besides the gold the Mutapa received as tribute there was also the gold which was mined especially for him at his specific request. On such occasions,

> When the Monomotapa wants gold, he sends kine [cows] to his men to extract it, the kine being distributed among the diggers in accordance with the work performed, and a certain number of days being accorded; each one extracts per day one *cruzado* or one *cruzado* and a half at the most.[46]

It is most unlikely that the gold so produced and the one or two cows paid by the Mutapa were of the same value, more likely was it that the gold was of greater value than the cow(s). But that possibility notwithstanding it is nevertheless correct to say that these people were probably being hired, employed and paid by the Mutapas for the gold they produced. The gold they produced should not be confused with the gold paid by the vassal rulers which was given as direct tribute. More on the question of tribute later.

Finally, how much was being produced in the Mutapa state? Two

broad observations can be made straightaway. First of all, it can be assumed that more gold was produced per year in the Mutapa state in the fifteenth century before the revolt of Guruuswa than in any year after that. Next it can be said that after the kingdom of Manyika broke away in the sixteenth century Mutapa gold again declined. But the last major decline connected with reduction in size was after 1695 when the Rozvi took most of the gold-producing regions of central and northern central Zimbabwe. This decline was entirely a function of geography. The second factor was that with every century the easier deposits were being exhausted and harder ones had to be mined with basically the same technology. Only river washing was less affected by the technological conservatism. What records there are of the gold trade from the Rivers of Sena south of the Zambezi from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century all confirm a picture of decreasing volume. Table C gives figures which confirm the downward trend described above. A word of caution needs to be added lest misleading conclusions are drawn from the data. First of all, these figures are often estimates of what gold passed through the ports of Sena. They never include the gold that was used by the Shona to make their own bangles and ornaments which included Fr Gomes' famous 'big chains with little devils worked in gold which are worn by people in the zimbaoe of the Monomatapa and which represent his ancestors'.[47] Therefore the figures do not tell how much gold was being produced but only the gold that was being exported. Indeed, whatever gold was used by the Portuguese traders for their own personal purposes would also not be included. In short, these figures are all on the low side. Secondly, the figures over a period of one year or two are sometimes affected by political upheavals which reduce the volumes and therefore may appear to distort the gradual trend of decline.

For the little peasant the process of producing gold was slow and dangerous, and the returns were, at the individual level, not always predictable. A digger might produce one to one-and-a-half *cruzado's* worth of gold a day if he was lucky.[48] Sometimes he might even strike a rich vein or find an odd nugget.[49] But this was rare and far between. It was also possible for him to get nothing. And then there was the risk that the mine might fall in and cover him up. As dos Santos tells us,

> When the Portuguese found themselves in the land of gold [Manyika] they thought that they would immediately be able to


Gold Exports From The Mutapa Empire
Weight in kilogrammes
8000
7000
6000
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
0
1500
1550
1600
1650
1700
1750
1800
1850
Year 1500 Thru 1850

Gold Exports From The Mutapa Empire



> fill sacks with it and carry off as much as they chose; but when they had spent a few days near the mines, and saw the difficulty and labour of the Kaffirs, and with what risk and peril of their lives they extracted it from the bowels of the earth and from the stones, they found their hopes frustrated.[50]

Fr Monclaro tells us that some Portuguese were given gold-mines by the Munhumutapa 'but they would not accept inasmuch as there is greater expenditure in extracting the gold, and but little is taken in a day; business and trade are more profitable.'[51] It has already been argued that the ordinary peasant had such small quantities of gold that often it was not worth his while to visit the *feiras* and so waited until the *vashambadzi* came to his, or the *sadunhu's*, village before he could trade his gold. The greater amounts of gold recovered from trade in the Mutapa state came from trade with the peasants and the regional rulers. What Mutapa received in tribute and from his own mining operations is never recorded but as a percentage of the total of gold trade it should not be exaggerated. Besides, if the gold trade had been the main source of the wealth on which his empire was based then he took very little care to ensure that he controlled this important product. Instead what is found is a free trade situation where the Mutapas are at times said to have given gold-mines to the Portuguese.[52] Later it shall be shown why the Mutapas did not have to control the gold trade in order to benefit from its trade. Another, and in the circumstances perhaps more effective, way of benefiting from foreign trade was devised. But more on that topic a little later.

iii. Elephant-hunting

Turning now to elephant-hunting as a source of wealth for the Mutapas; according to de Barros and Goes about 4 000–5 000 elephants were killed every year in south Zambezia during the sixteenth century.[53] The figure of 4 000–5 000 need not be on the up side.[54] The people had two methods of killing elephants. The first was to dig pits which were then covered with branches and grass to hide the hole. When the unsuspecting elephant fell in, it could not get out and the hunters came and killed it. The second was for a hunter, usually under the moonlight, to approach a sleeping elephant and to pierce its entrails with a long and wide-bladed assegai so that as it woke up it pushed the blade further into the entrails. After a time the elephant bled to death or was so weakened that the hunters could

finish it off. This latter method was rather dangerous, as a wounded elephant could be strong enough sometimes to attack and kill the hunter.

According to dos Santos, the peasant farmers hunted elephants for three main reasons: 'The principal reason why the Kaffirs hunt elephants and kill them is to obtain the flesh for food, and secondly to sell the tusks, that is the ivory', and thirdly because they 'cause great damage to the plantations of millet and rice, which they eat and tread under foot.'[55] It is important to stress that, ivory or no ivory, elephants would have been hunted for the two other reasons mentioned above.

In view of the fact that some writers have seen ivory trade as a merely extractive trade that could not lead to development but only contributed to underdevelopment,[56] it has to be pointed out that the more elephants were killed the more protein was available from the meat and the more land that could be brought under cultivation. In a region where protein-deficiency is a major killer, the slaughter of 4 000–5 000 elephants, each weighing two to five tonnes and hence producing 10 000–25 000 tonnes of meat a year from elephant flesh alone, had beneficent dietary effects. For, as dos Santos observed, 'When the hunters have killed an elephant they call all their family, relations, and friends together, who proceed to the place where the dead animal is lying, and there they eat its flesh boiled and roasted, doing nothing else all the time'.[57] During periods of famine, elephants are a particularly valuable source of food.

Elephant-hunting both for flesh and ivory became an important source of protein and wealth for the Mutapa state, especially after it had lost much of its gold- and cattle-producing areas to the Rozvi in the late seventeenth century. It is significant that, beginning in the eighteenth century, the 'treasurer' of the Mutapas was known as *nenzou*[58] (the master of the elephants). Although there is no evidence to support it, it may be postulated that from the eighteenth through the nineteenth centuries hunting became as important, if not more so, than pastoral activities as a source of wealth and protein, especially in the tsetse-infested Chidima.

As has already been said, one tusk from every elephant killed by a hunter belonged to the chief of the area where the elephant was killed. The meat and the proceeds from the second tusk were shared among the hunters. In the Mutapa state, ivory was one of the popular

forms in which tribute was paid by the vassal rulers. Besides the ivory they received as tribute, the Mutapas, like the Sachiteves, organized their own royal hunts.[59] Hunting was a favoured sport because, besides the material benefits of meat, ivory and skins, it helped to develop martial qualities such as bravery, scouting, accurate shooting (arrows), throwing of assegais, and endurance. Besides selling the ivory from the elephants, they probably sold skins and dried meat of other animals to the Portuguese in the Rivers of Sena.[60]

iv. External trade

From the gold and ivory produced from their state the Mutapas traded, before the sixteenth century, with the moslem traders; then in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries with the moslem and the Portuguese; and in the eighteenth and part of the nineteenth centuries mainly with the Portuguese. The role played by foreign trade in the Mutapa political system is a subject that has been commented upon, if not always analysed, by a number of writers. Almost to a person they have concluded that external trade played an important role in the Mutapa state. For example, Dr David Chanaiwa, in an intriguing article entitled 'Politics and Long-Distance Trade in the Mwene Mutapa Empire during the Sixteenth Century', strongly asserted the 'Trade Stimulus Hypothesis' in the pristine, if not necessarily perceptive, form. According to Chanaiwa, 'During most of the sixteenth century the Mwene Mutapas controlled not *only the political organization but also the internal and international trade within their empire* . . . At the time long-distance-trade took place mainly in *state-regulated markets with prices, weights and measures determined by the state.*'[61] (emphasis added) Thanks to 'his monopolistic control of that trade' the Mutapa was able, despite his 'loosely centralized political system', to use trade 'as an instrument for exercising his authority on the political, social, and religious activities of his subjects'.[62] The Mutapa's authority, as well as the unity and integration of his empire, are said to have depended 'very heavily on his ability to promote and control economic activities within his domain, *especially* long-distance trade.'[63] (emphasis added) Dr Chanaiwa concludes thus,

> The puppet Mwene Mutapas of the seventeenth century were unpopular and *thus incapable of maintaining the order and peace necessary for the success of long-distance trade. As a result the*

economy was disrupted, and the major instrument of the Mutapa's power, as well as the unity and integration of the empire, was gone. (emphasis added)[64]

It should be noted that in the above quotation Dr Chanaiwa virtually equates what he calls 'long-distance trade' with 'the economy' of the Mutapa state.

The evidence, however, does not accord with most of Dr Chanaiwa's sweeping statements. For example, the references cited by Chanaiwa, from dos Santos and Bocarro, to show that the state regulated the 'prices, weights and measures' have nothing at all to say on those aspects.[65] Secondly, as has already been argued, and Chanaiwa brings no other evidence than that discussed here, there was no machinery through which the Mutapas could or did impose a monopoly on the extraction of gold and hunting for ivory. Furthermore, there is not a shred of evidence to support the speculation that the Mutapas controlled internal trade within their state. And thirdly, we do not share the conclusion that external trade was the main support of the Mutapa economy. Nor do we accept that it was the disruption of trade during the seventeenth century that led to the decline of the power of the Mutapas. If anything the weakening of the Mutapas led to, and was in part caused by, a steadily confident and powerful Portuguese trading and *prazo*-holding community, as will be shown later in chapters six and seven.

How then was the Mutapa–Moslem/Portuguese trade conducted and with what results? Chapter two has already given some detail about this trade as it operated and evolved from the early days of the state to the seventeenth century. This section will deal with its main characteristics as they help us to assess its impact on the Mutapa political system. From Sena, Portuguese traders and/or their *vashambadzi* either carried goods overland through Barwe to Manyika or to the *feiras* of Mukaranga. But some of the traders sailed up the Zambezi to Tete from where they went over-land to the *feiras* of Mukaranga.[66] During the eighteenth century and periods in the nineteenth century the traders of Tete proceeded along the Zambezi to Zumbo which had become the major trading centre for the Rozvi, Dande and even much of Chidima.[67] In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries a number of market-places were established in Mukaranga and Manyika. Some of these centres may well have been frequented by moslem traders even before the Portuguese arrival, just like Tete

and Sena further down the Zambezi. In the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries the *feira* of Masapa was the most important of these,[68] but in the second half of the seventeenth century the *feira* of Dambarare had become the key centre.[69] In the north and north-east of present Zimbabwe there was a complex of these *feiras* which were important in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. Among these were the *feiras* of Manzovo, Ruhanje, Bukutu, Masapa, Dambarare, Chipiriviri, Matafunya and the *zimbabwes* of the Mutapas.[70] In central and north-east Zimbabwe was found another complex which grew in importance as the seventeenth century progressed. These *feiras* were dominated by Dambarare and included the *feiras* of Chitomborwizi, Makaha, Maramuka, and Hwangwa.[71] Manyika had the longest-surviving *feiras* of Zimbabwe, spanning the whole Portuguese period from sixteenth to nineteenth centuries. It is true that from 1695 to about 1719 all the Manyika *feiras* were closed as a result of the Dombo wars, but this was a temporary closure unlike that in the rest of Zimbabwe which was more or less permanent.[72] After 1695 there were to be no permanently-settled Portuguese *feiras* on the Zimbabwe highlands except in Manyika. The eastern *feiras* were dominated by the *feira* of Chipangura in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The other *feiras* included the *feiras* of Matuka, Vumba, Masekesa, Aruangwa, Mutare and the adjoining province of Chief Makoni had as its *feira*, Maungwe. The eighteenth-century *feiras* in Uteve–Madanda, like the *feira* of Bandire, could not have served the Mutapa state at any time. Of course if our association of the Sembaza *feiras* of *Ynhacouee*, as mentioned by Veloso, with the future *feira* of Bandire is correct, then it is possible that in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries the Mutapa did use *feiras* in Uteve. All these *feiras* of south Zambezi were never all functioning at the same time.

Before the eighteenth century it was to these *feiras* that the Portuguese traders and/or their caravans of *vashambadzi* came with cloths, beads and other trade items to barter with the local peoples. These caravans could have as many as 200–500 people.[73] Each of these persons normally carried a small bundle wrapped in wild-palm-tree mat weighing one *mutoro* or two *corjas* (40 pieces of cloth). Apparently the dates of the arrival of a caravan were agreed upon in advance so that those with gold and ivory could come to barter. The traders started selling and buying at the *feiras* of Ruhanje

and Bukutu and then moved on to Masapa which before the 1630s was known as the gate to the Mutapa state.[74] Nobody was allowed to move from Masapa to the Mutapa *zimbabwe* without the express permission of the Mutapa himself, or his 'Captain of the Gates'. The first recorded 'Captain of the Gates' of the Kingdom of Mutapa was the ruler of Hondosaka, i.e. the *Mukomohasha* or general of the armies of Mutapa.[75] It would appear that all the foreigners coming along the Zambezi had to pass through Hondosaka before entering the Mutapa heartland. But in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries the post of 'Captain of the Gates' was refashioned to serve both a security and an economic role. A Portuguese trader chosen by the other Portuguese traders, but acceptable to and confirmed by the Munhumutapa, was given the title of 'Captain of the Gates'. He was stationed at the *feira* of Masapa, i.e. two days' journey to the Mutapa's *zimbabwe*. His role as a Portuguese agent has already been dealt with. Here the discussion will be limited only to his role as an officer in the Mutapa's administration. The Mutapa called him his 'great wife'[76] and gave him jurisdiction over Africans around Masapa and over all the Portuguese in his domain. He advised the Mutapa on matters pertaining to the Portuguese. The office was for life, provided the holder did not betray or abuse his position, and he was not allowed to resign or leave his post without the Mutapa's permission 'lest he be killed'. The insignia of his office was a golden bracelet and a gold-tipped wooden spear about a metre in length.

However, the most important role of this officer, as far as the Mutapas were concerned, was that 'he acts here also as factor of Monomatapa to receive all the duties paid to him by the merchants, both Christians and Moors, which are one piece of cloth in every twenty brought into these lands to be sold.'[77] The above information, although not confirmed by any other source, seems to be fairly accurate. This is so because we are told by Captain Rezende that in the seventeenth century after the Portuguese had deposed one Chikanga and put in his place another more amenable to them and prepared to accept Portuguese suzerainty, they ordered that he should pay three *pastas* of gold a year as tribute to the Portuguese but that in turn he should be free to levy one piece of cloth in each *mutoro* entering his kingdom.[78] This meant one cloth out of every 40 pieces of cloth or 2½ per cent tax. If a defeated Chikanga was free to levy a 2½ per cent tax then there is no reason to doubt that unconquered

Mutapas were able to impose a 5 per cent tax on imported goods.

Throughout the history of the Mutapa state, tolls/tariffs were always imposed and collected from foreign traders. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, contemporary commentators often claimed that these tariffs sometimes reached extortionist proportions.[79] The abolition of the role of the Captain of Masapa from the 1630s onwards in no way abolished the regulation demanding the payment of tolls and tariffs. What seems doubtful however is the assumption that 5 per cent of all cloth entering the Mutapa state was paid to the Mutapas. To begin with, we are told that even before coming to Masapa where the traders had to pay the 5 per cent they traded at the *feiras* of Ruhanje, Manzovo and Bukutu.[80] Traders who went through Manyika could have entered Mukaranga or traded with subjects of the Mutapa state without going through Masapa. This does not mean they would have avoided paying tolls. These tariffs, as documents from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries reveal, were to be paid to every chief through whose lands the traders traversed.[81] But there was no way in which the Mutapas could force these rulers to remit the tolls to the central treasury. However, for security reasons the traders would have preferred to go through Masapa. Therefore it may be confidently assumed that while the Mutapas did not receive 5 per cent of *all* the cloth brought into their state for trade, they did receive 5 per cent of the substantial amount passing through Masapa.

The second way in which the Mutapas profited from this trade was through the *curva* (*kuruva*).[82] This was a tax which, originally, the moslem traders used to pay to the Mutapas in order to be allowed to trade in their state. The Portuguese continued paying this tax in the sixteenth century and part of the seventeenth century. Every three years each new Captain of Mozambique had to send 3 000 *cruzados* in cloth and beads as *kuruva* to the Mutapas.[83] If the captain failed or delayed to pay *kuruva*, the Mutapa

> commands an *empata [mupeto]* of all the merchandise throughout his lands, and seizes all that is found, as this is what they call an empata, and in this way he liberally pays himself what is due and takes satisfaction for the affront he has received . . . in these empatas which he orders he confiscates many thousands of cruzados from the merchants, without any restitution being made of them.[84]

This was not an idle threat. In the seventeenth century there were two

recorded such Mutapa-authorized *mipeto*.[85] After Mavhura had signed a treaty in 1629 saying that he was a Portuguese vassal, the Portuguese king was not willing to have the *kuruva* paid, claiming that he could not pay tax to his vassal but instead Mavhura had to pay a tax of three *pastas* of gold, initially to the Captain of Mozambique and later to the King of Portugal himself.[86] As compensation for the loss of *kuruva*, the Portuguese king thought that Mavhura might be allowed to import an agreed amount of duty-free goods into his kingdom.[87] During the eighteenth century some kind of *kuruva* continued to be paid. Before 1771 this consisted of an annual tribute of 15½ *corjas* (310 pieces of cloth weighing 401 lbs 7½ ozs–182½ kg) as well as, every three years, a present of two sombreiros,[88] one chair, one cushion, one carpet, one jug, and one basin, all in excellent condition.[89] From 1771 the annual cloth payment was increased to 20 *corjas* or cloth weighing about 518 pounds (235 kg).[90] This official payment should not be confused with the tariffs paid by every trader who passed through the Mutapa state.

In addition to the above sources of income from trade, the Mutapas received presents from traders as well as from their subjects who visited their *zimbabwes*. It seems Portuguese traders were interested to meet the Mutapas since not to be 'allowed to appear before Benomotapa . . . is considered a great disgrace by them.'[91] And dos Santos says that,

> No person speaks to the king or to this wife [*Mazvarira*] without offering a present. The Portuguese take him cloth, the Kaffirs a cow or a goat, or some pieces of cloth. And when they are so poor that they have nothing to offer him, they take him a sack of earth in acknowledgement of their vassalage, or a bundle of straw to thatch his houses.[92]

Besides the above sources of income, the Mutapas used the gold and ivory paid to them as tribute, or obtained through their own direct efforts, to trade with the Portuguese. There can be little doubt that the Mutapas must have been major trading partners to the Portuguese.

Other than ways outlined above, there does not seem to have been any other means through which the Mutapas could have benefited from, or controlled, external trade. From Masapa, the pre-eighteenth century traders visited other Portuguese *feiras* in the Mutapa state. Most preferred to wait for the Shona subjects of the Mutapas to come and barter at these centres where the traders had their store houses

or *churros* (*dura* or pl. *matura*). But others sent out African agents or *vashambadzi* to travel through the state selling the trade goods at the headquarters of chiefs, *sadunhus* and important villages. As dos Santos points out, at the Mukaranga *feiras* the Portuguese traders of Sena and Tete 'have houses called churros, where they store their merchandise, and *from which they sell it and send it to be sold throughout all the country*.'[93] (emphasis added) At the *feiras* the man in charge was a Portuguese trader chosen by the Captain of Mozambique. He was known as a captain-major but had no salary, his only compensation being that he had the privilege of selling his goods before the other traders. He exercised authority over Portuguese traders in the name of the Captain of Mozambique.[94] Unlike the 'Captain of the Gates' at Masapa, the other captains at the *feiras* were not officers of the Mutapas. There is no evidence that the Mutapas appointed any representatives to oversee the *feira* affairs.[95] It can only be assumed that the local chiefs in effect kept a watching brief on the goings on at those places. Only in the eighteenth-century Manyika *feira* of Masekesa is there evidence of the king of Manyika appointing one of his wives to oversee *feira* affairs.[96] Also in Manyika there is evidence of one João da Costa owning the *feira* of Matuka as a personal fief.[97] Once the traders had left Masapa, the mechanisms of controlling trade by the Mutapas were over. From there on, the traders had to deal with local chiefs who demanded their own separate *sagoate* and *boca*. This they did in their own right and not as vassals of the Mutapas. True when tribute time came they might pay part of it as their contribution. But this is not the same as saying they were acting as Mutapa's agents in collecting it.

What was the volume of the trade between the Portuguese and the Munhumutapa state? Although the precise answer to that question will probably never be known accurately, there can be little doubt that it must have been considerable, at least before the eighteenth century. At any rate the Captains of Mozambique must have thought so, for they usually bought their post at an auction in Goa and then bought the monopoly of the trade of the Rivers of Sena at a price of 40 000 *pardos* a year as well as paying the Mutapas 3 000 *cruzados* as *kuruva*. This was a lot of capital sunk as an initial investment for a post held only for a three-year period, and it can only be assumed that since so many bade for the post every three years the returns must have more than justified the risks involved. What

indications there are seem to bear out that assumption. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, profits in the ranges of 100 to 200 per cent seem to have been normal for the Tete traders. There are even claims of profits of 300 to 400 per cent.[98] Since these are Portuguese claims there are no good reasons why they should be doubted. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the picture is somewhat different. The Shona were driving hard bargains and sometimes forced the traders to sell at prices too close to those of Tete with the result that bankruptcies and debts plagued the Portuguese traders at Zumbo.[99] Although the amounts given of the gold and ivory produced in the Rivers of Sena represent not only the Mutapa contribution but that of other regions such as Uteve, Barwe, Manyika and Guruuswa, there can be little doubt that before the eighteenth century the bulk was produced in the Mutapa state. Exactly how much this was is not known. However during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries this was not the case. Then the bulk came from the Rozvi empire.[100] It can be assumed, therefore, that the Mutapas before the eighteenth century must have acquired considerable quantities of trade goods.

But of what value were these trade items to the Mutapas? The cloth and beads the Mutapas received were used to clothe the many wives, children and courtly assistants of the Mutapas. Together these ran to a couple of hundreds, if not thousands. Although during the sixteenth century some sources claim that the Mutapas did not wear cloths of foreign manufacture,[101] there is concrete evidence that this was not the case in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.[102] The court must have been one of the biggest consumers of cloth and beads. In the Rozvi empire it is known that calico was sent by the emperor at the investiture of new provincial chiefs, as part of the regalia.[103] Although there is no positive evidence that this was the practice in the Mutapa state it is possible it may have been done. Certainly presents to the Mutapa *mhondoro* like Nyanhehwe would have included cloth, beads, tobacco and maybe cattle. Perhaps potentially the most important use of beads and cloth by the Mutapas was to buy commissariat in times of war and as presents to some of the provincial rulers, especially in times of war. The Portuguese *prazo*-holders used cloth and beads precisely for such purposes. As one writer pointed out, cloth and beads were the true bullets and ammunition with which the Portuguese fought their wars in the Rivers of Sena. There is no

evidence that this was true of the Mutapas or Rozvi Emperors or that they needed to rely on these to the same extent as did the Portuguese. However there is evidence to show that provincial rulers and their envoys who brought tribute yearly to the *zimbabwe* were rewarded with cloth and other items.[104] And, in 1631, the king of Portugal wrote that Mutapa Mavhura, then still insecure on his throne, asked him

> to give order for the yearly present to be made to him [Mavhura] which it was customary for the captains of Mozambique to give him, or to grant him license to put three or four thousand miticals worth of cloth for his money into the trade, to enable him to make gifts to the grandees of his kingdom.[105]

From all these observations it may be concluded that the proceeds of trade were, before the eighteenth century, a useful addition for buttressing and enhancing the hegemony of the Mutapas. Beads and cloth could be used to buy grain, cattle, and possibly men's loyalties (warriors in time of war), and since power and wealth were counted in terms of men, cattle and crops, these trade items provided the Mutapas with another mechanism with which to increase their power. But these theoretical and actual benefits from the proceeds of trade must be balanced by the actual detrimental role played by its agents – Portuguese traders – in the Mutapa political system especially between 1629 and 1684. Their greed, obsession with profit and resultant disorders did much to strain, and at times subvert, the loyalty of the subjects of the Mutapas, thereby preparing the ground for the Rozvi revolt and near-fatal mutilation of the Mutapa state.[106] It is not without significance that during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries when the Mutapa state was less important as a trading state and relied even more on its internal sources of power, it exhibited greater vitality in its relations with the Portuguese than during the seventeenth century when the volume of its trade was still quite significant. Some eighteenth-century Mutapas literally terrorized the Portuguese in the Rivers of Sena. An early-nineteenth-century Mutapa had a Lt Governor of the Rivers of Sena killed when the latter misbehaved.[107] During the seventeenth century the reverse was the case.

Finally, how important was trade to the ordinary peasants? To the broad masses, external trade was quite peripheral to their economic lives. The time they spent on trade-related activities was

minimal. And on the evidence of Portuguese observers, their taste for imported goods was quite 'underdeveloped',[108] the occasional over-priced piece of cloth or string of beads they bought being more than enough for the limited occasions they were to be used. Throughout the history of their relations with coastal traders until the twentieth century, the Shona never replaced their indigenous products for imported ones. The animal skins and the roughly woven *machira* cloth both saw the dawn of the twentieth century. The animal skin reigned supreme as the ordinary man's form of dress in spite of all manner of artifice by moslem and Portuguese traders, who were happy not only to sell their merchandise on credit but who even entertained thoughts of forcing the Shona to wear imported cloth. If anything, external trade found itself reinforcing some traditional crafts. For example, *machira* cloth became a very important item of trade and hence more had to be produced.[109]

From the sixteenth century until the late nineteenth century, evidence of the ever increasing importance of the locally-produced *machira* cloth is plentiful. From these sources we know that the Portuguese tried quite unsuccessfully to stifle this local industry. The Africans of Mutapa became so skilled that they were able to weave threads of imported cloth together with locally-produced cotton so as to produce cloths of rich silk, damask and satin laced with gold. By the mid-eighteenth century the Portuguese authorities were taking severe measures to stop the cultivation of cotton in the Sena region in order to undermine this local industry. But it took the industrial revolution in Europe to successfully overcome the local *machira* industry. That is another story. According to one eighteenth-century source, one worker took 10 to 12 days to weave a cloth 3.3 to 4.4 square metres. Hoes produced by the Shona and Maravi smiths found a market in the Portuguese communities of the Zambezi.[110] Along the Zambezi, boat-making increased as more were needed to carry trade goods up and down the river.[111] Elephant-hunting for the ivory trade required more and better axes and spears. Perhaps the often underestimated way in which the peasants benefited most from external trade was in the slaughter of elephants. As has been suggested, the protein provided may well have had positive dietary effects on the peasants, not to mention the additional advantage of clearing agricultural lands of elephants. Trade also introduced maize, which is not as labour intensive as millet. Throughout the pre-

colonial period, locally-manufactured bangles, trinkets and beads continued to be used. There is no known traditional industry/craft that was replaced, stunted, arrested, or in any way negatively affected as a result of external trade.

It is true the Shona political elites may have at times been able to enhance their exploitative tendencies because of their profits from external trade. But the resultant exploitation was only marginal, the chief exploitation of the peasants having already been built into the traditional political system, independent of external trade. The main trading activities of the peasants were connected with internal and inter-African trade. It has already been suggested that the 'renaissance man' image of the pre-colonial Shona is often overdrawn. In areas like iron-working, wood-carving, basketry, weaving, pottery and even hunting there were specialists or *nyanzvi* who produced for the market. Much of the peasant bartering was involved with such internal trade. In times of drought, grain and cattle became important items of barter. Inter-regional trade may well have been carried on in copper and salt with areas like Guruuswa. The traditional trade in *machira* was to be organized on a massive scale between northern (Maravi) and southern (Tonga and Shona) parts of Zambezia. Locally-manufactured bangles and trinkets continued to be produced and circulated through the internal trade networks. As Fr Gomes says,

> There is a great quantity of copper and they use it to make their jewelry. They turn it into wire and so shiny and thin that it looks like gold and with it they make bracelets for the arms of both men and women, the men wear them only on the left arm and the women on both, others are thick, smooth and round, for the arms, and thicker for the ankles, they blend this copper with a metal that is like tin but somewhat different . . . it is called *calaim* in India and kaffirs call it *motõve* [*mutobvu*, i.e. lead].[112]

Unlike external trade, internal trade did not produce a class of professional middlemen whose very lives depended on making profits of 100 to 400 per cent. It was normally a trade of two producers. It may very well be that, like in the *machira* trade, the agents of external trade did try to play a role in the internal trade; if so this does not appear to have been too successful for it does not appear in the records they left.

v. Tribute and presents

The last source of the income of the Mutapas was tribute/taxation/

presents and judicial fees. Under the various paragraphs, evidence of some of this source of income has been shown, e.g. evidence of 'labour-service' as tribute, taxation imposed on trade goods, on traders and the government of Mozambique; and finally, presents paid by all who appeared before or held audience with the Mutapas. Normally this should have been enough to establish the importance of these as sources of income. But one scholar has suggested that tribute/taxation/presents were not a one-way traffic, that the Mutapas paid for whatever they got and that in fact, this was simple trade,[113] the Munhumutapas were only the famous 'recycling centres' so beloved by some bourgeois anthropologists. We do not share this view.

As already quoted, '*Every year the vassal kings of the Emperor are obliged to send* their sons to him as ambassadors with presents of gold, ivory, slaves, cattle, sheep, and small livestock.'[114] (emphasis added) This seems to be clear enough. But another sentence in the same document says that before the embassy returns to the home of its king, 'The Emperor . . . also sends the latter a present of some items of cloth of high quality and orders the ambassador to be given some clothes for him to wear.'[115] It is this latter statement that is said to show that tribute was in effect trade. This is reading more into the document than would seem justifiable. In the first place, the sources never say whether what a Mutapa gave in return embodied the true 'exchange value' of the tribute brought from the vassal rulers. Besides if this was meant to be simple trading it is intriguing that it should have taken place at the court of the Mutapas, for there were Portuguese *vashambadzi* who visited most of the provincial centres to trade. It would seem logical to assume that the provincial rulers would have exchanged their goods with these traders. That they did trade with the *vashambadzi* there is no doubt. But why then did they save some of their commodities for the Mutapas every year if this was simple trading? It cannot be because they obtained a better exchange rate at the court of the Mutapas or else the Mutapas would have long gone bankrupt. The reason they brought tribute yearly was because they were 'obliged' to do it 'in acknowledgement of their vassalage'. If they did not do it they were punished.

The present given by a Mutapa in return for the tribute was as a sign of appreciation, valued more for what it represented, i.e. a Mutapa's friendship, than its actual material 'exchange value'.

Before the eighteenth century there is no reference to such counter-presents from the Mutapas. A sixteenth-century document makes clear that the other kings brought the Mutapa 'many great gifts' but says nothing about counter-presents. In fact we have evidence from the 1690s of Mutapa Dom Pedro Nyamaende Mhande trying, but without success, to become a 'recycling centre' by offering counter-presents of cloth for silver. Sousa tells us that when Mutapa Mhande heard that silver was discovered by one of his *fumos*,

> The emperor was very pleased at this news because as the Changamira, his and our enemy, ruled over the gold mines and wanted to extend his dominion down to the bars of Quilimane and Luabo,he did not have the money to buy the clothes befitting his family's dignity and wanted to make use of the silver to provide this need. To serve this purpose he . . . sent a confidant of his to say to the *fumo* that he should send him, in great secrecy, all the silver he could get and in return he would take care to send him cloth with which to clothe all his people. [But] *it did not seem right to the fumo having to buy the cloth through a third hand* [i.e. Mutapa's] *when he had to dig the silver with his own hands.*[116]
>
> (emphasis added)

As we pointed out above, the presence of the *feiras* and the roles of the *vashambadzi* made the introduction of a monopoly difficult. It was much cheaper to buy cloth directly from the Portuguese at the *feiras* or from the itinerant *vashambadzi* than it would have been from 'a third hand' and, anyway, 'it did not seem right' to do it that way, for, it had never been done that way before! As dos Santos pointed out, no persons appeared before a Mutapa without giving him a present and if the persons were too poor that they had 'nothing to offer him, they take him a sack of earth in acknowledgement of their vassalage.'[117] In this case it is hard to see what the Mutapa could give them in return. De Barros makes clear that *zunde* (labour service) was in fact a form of tribute.[118] And Goes specifically says that 'several kings and lords . . . obey him [Mutapa] and pay him a tribute of gold.'[119] It is important to note that the vassal rulers were 'obliged' to give the 'presents' every year and that these 'presents' were 'in acknowledgement of their vassalage'. Other sources, too, confirm that vassals paid tribute but do not mention Mutapa's counter-presents. As an anonymous document of 1683 makes clear, during part of the seventeenth century,

> When the appropriate signs [for gold] were spotted, news of it was sent to the Captain of the Portuguese at Dambarare and he

would write to the King [Munhumutapa] informing him of the find . . . The King immediately sent two or three Motumes, i.e. Ambassadors, to be present at the mine in question and collect his tribute. They had instructions to, in their way, make proclamations to summon the people and this was done and 60 and 80 blacks turned up and sometimes 90 and they all got to work in this manner: in the first place was built one big house where the ambassadors would live and keep the property of the King. Immediately afterwards each 4 or 5 blacks would open a hole in the shape of an ordinary well . . . *each black gave the King one caminho each day* and as it was a lamb's skin turned into a bag and so many as there were of blacks: it would make a bigger treasure than the one of Venice to be seen and shown. When the mine was closed . . . the gold was taken to the King by the blacks appointed by the ambassadors . . . *And this was the tribute the King got.*[120] (emphasis added)

It is known from contemporary sources that in the sixteenth century, and possibly the seventeenth century as well, there was a custom of giving new 'royal fires' every year or at the succession of each new Mutapa, and whoever refused to accept the 'royal fire' was taken to be a rebel and dealt with accordingly. As one source says:

> This king of Benematapa sends many of the leading citizens yearly throughout his kingdom to all his lordships and cities to give them new fire so that he may know whether they are under obedience to him – namely – each one of these citizens arrives at one of these places and, since he comes in the name of the king, he orders all the fires of that place to be put out, and when these fires are out they come to him to get it again and light their fires as a sign of total obedience, and any place that does not do this is denounced to the king as under rebellion and the king forthwith sends his captain against it, for which he is always prepared, and he goes out to destroy them or place them under the king's orders.[121]

Those who refused to pay their *kuruva* (tax) had an *empata* declared against them. It did not matter whether they were Portuguese traders or provincial rulers. Refusal to acknowledge the suzerainty of the Mutapa by local rulers as a rule did not go unpunished. Successful rebels like Sachiteve, Makombe or Chikanga won their independence through 'armed struggle'.

Even in the nineteenth century, Livingstone asserts that when one of the vassal rulers

> becomes tired of this state of vassalage and sets up his own village, it is not unusual for the elected chief to send a number of

> the young men, who congregate about himself, to visit him. If he does not receive them with the usual amount of clapping of hands and humility, they, in obedience to orders, at once burn his village.[122]

The concept of tribute as evidence of admission of vassalage is sufficiently ingrained in Shona culture that we should not be seduced by anthropological studies from other regions to claim that tribute payment in the Mutapa state must have been, in effect, a form of trade. Unfortunately, this was not so. The Shona terms *kuruva (curva)* and *mupeto (empata)* in no sense connote exchange. They mean obligatory tribute/taxes. Indeed, as we have already pointed out, during the sixteenth century some vassal rulers were so concerned about the amount of tribute they paid that when they discovered rich mines in their lands they had them closed at once for fear of having the tribute they paid raised by the Mutapa. This is an important piece of evidence in that it suggests that tribute was paid according to one's ability to pay. Furthermore it is important to note that tribute was paid in whatever form was available to a particular vassal. As Fr Conceição points out, the Mutapa

> had the contributions sent to him by the minor rulers as well as other important Kaffirs to whom he has given some parts of his empire . . . according to what the land produces, so do they pay their tribute in that particular produce.[123]

The only class which enjoyed the bounty of the Mutapa outside his immediate family and officers seems to have been those least able to repay him, i.e. the blind and the disabled. According to Bocarro, the Munhumutapa

> shows great charity to the blind and maimed, for these are called the king's poor, and have land and revenues for their subsistence, and when they wish to pass through the kingdoms, wherever they come food and drinks are given to them at the public cost as long as they remain there, and when they leave that place to go to another they are provided with what is necessary for their journey, and a guide, and some one to carry their wallet to the next village. In every place where they come there is the same obligation, under penalty that those who fail therein shall be punished by the king.[124]

The above redistribution of wealth has nothing in common with the capitalist recycling of wealth so beloved by bourgeois anthropologists, but with aspects of social welfare and social justice.

Finally, Mutapas also received an income from court fees. Only

important cases, such as disputes between chiefs or crimes by and among the royal elites, reached the imperial courts. Issues connected with such nation-wide institutions as cult centres, priests and *mhondoro* would find their way to the *zimbabwe;* so, too, might cases involving foreign traders, if they were very serious. Cases of witchcraft from the chiefdom where the *zimbabwe* was located, and all questions touching the royal wives, would have ended up at a Mutapa's court. Anyone bringing a case before the courts of the Mutapas had to pay court fees which swelled the royal coffers.[125] These fees were not just symbolic but had to be negotiated. As Fr Fernandes informs us of what happened in the Shona kingdom of Inhambane, a plaintiff goes to the king, 'carrying him a present which is called a "mouth" because if it is not sufficient to content him he says: "I have ears to hear you, but you have no mouth to speak to me". The suitor then returns for more gifts until the king is satisfied.'[126] When the case was decided, 'Penalties of money or property to which the defendants are condemned by the king, or by any chief, are divided between the judge and the plaintiff, the defendant paying all the costs'.[127] Fr Conceição shows how important this source of income was to the Mutapa when he says that,

> he [Mutapa] . . . collects . . . quite a lot . . . on judging all the disputes of his *Kaffirs* because all the more serious ones come to him for resolution and for that some pay in ivory, others in gold, others in cattle, and others in our cloths which provides him with a permanent stock of cloths for himself and all his household and he normally dresses in silk of which damask is the cheapest.[128]

Tribute/taxes/presents and judicial fees provided the Mutapas with the material wherewithal to support their state structures which in turn were maintained to appropriate more tribute/presents and fees from the subject peoples. In this cycle the descendants of Mutota did very well for themselves.

Conclusion

The discussion of the Mutapa economic system has confirmed, modified and, at times, disproved some of the interpretations offered by previous writers. Among the chief views that have been found untenable in the light of the evidence are the claims that external trade was the main support for the Mutapa state and that the Mutapa

had a monopoly of external trade. This study shows that the Mutapas did not have a monopoly of external or internal trade and that while they profited from external trade this source of income was a double-edged sword. It has even been noted that during those periods when the proceeds of trade had diminished, the Mutapa state showed evidence of greater independence and vigour. The second explanation which could not be sustained by the evidence is the claim that the exploitation of his wives' labour produced the economic base on which the Mutapa state was based. This so-called Zambezian rule that 'richness lay in women' has been found inapplicable with reference to the Mutapa and other Shona elites. Instead exploitation of peasant labour through *zunde* (labour service) has been found to be more important in the agricultural activities of the Mutapas than the contribution of the courtly ladies. Finally, the analysis has shown that the claim that tribute in the Mutapa state was a form of trade cannot be sustained by the evidence available.

The Mutapa political and economic base emerging from the evidence discussed here seems to be the exploitation of a basically agricultural/pastoralist/peasant form of society. In this pattern of exploitation, external trade sometimes strengthened the existing exploitative tendencies of the elites and at other times weakened them. Indeed in some areas the peasant way of life may well have, quite accidentally, qualitatively improved as a result of external trade.

CHAPTER 5

Notes

1. Bocarro, 'Década', 355.
2. Conceição, 'Tratado', 105 para 103; Miranda, 'Monarchia', 111; Mello e Castro, 'Notícia', 133; A.H.U. Av. de Moç, Cx. 17 [Anon], 'Discripção Corográfica do Reino da Manica, seus Custumes e Leis'.
3. Bocarro, 'Década', 380.
4. Diogo de Alcáçova to King, Cochin, 20 November 1506, *DPMAC, I,* 392.
5. Miranda, 'Monarchia', 112; Mello e Castro, 'Notícia', 133.
6. De Barros, 'Da Ásia', 272.
7. Luís Fróis, Goa, 15 December 1561, *DPMAC, VIII,* 43.
8. Monclaro, 'Relação', 391; De Barros, 'Da Ásia', 271.
9. Monclaro, 'Relação', 381, 383; De Barros, 'Da Ásia', 271; Conceição, 'Tratado', 66 para 45.
10. De Barros, 'Da Ásia', 271. See also dos Santos, 'Ethiópia Oriental', 222.
11. Bocarro, 'Década', 358; Conceição, 'Tratado', 66 para 45; Faria e Sousa, 'Ásia Portuguesa', 24.
12. Bocarro, 'Década', 358.
13. Livneh, 'Pre-colonial Polities', 190.
14. For evidence of donkeys in Lower Zambezia see Vasco Fernandes Homem to Luís da Silva. Sena, 15 February 1576, *DPMAC, VIII,* 449; Couto, 'Da Ásia', 265.
15. Monclaro, 'Relação', 385.
16. Bocarro, 'Década', 355; Conceição, 'Tratado', 66 para 45; Mauch, 'The Makalaka', 71–72.
17. Monclaro, 'Relaçao', 385; Dos Santos, 'Ethiópia Oriental', 208.
18. Conceição, 'Tratado', 66 para 45; Gomes, 'Viagem', 220.
19. R. Palmer, *Land and Racial Domination in Rhodesia* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1977), 13–17, 80–99; G. Arrighi, 'Labour supplies in historical perspective: a study of the proletarianization of the African peasantry in Rhodesia', *Journal of Development Studies, 6,* (1970), 197–234; I.R. Phimister, 'Peasant Production and Underdevelopment in Southern Rhodesia 1890–1914', *African Affairs, 73,* 291, (1974), 217–228.
20. Monclaro, 'Relação', 377.
21. Livneh, 'Pre-colonial Polities', 191.
22. D.N. Beach, 'The Shona Economy: branches of production', *University of Rhodesia, History Department Henderson Seminar, 29,* (1974), 7–9, 24–25.
23. Ibid.
24. Personal communication from Dr M. Zinowera (1979).
25. I.R. Phimister, 'Pre-colonial gold mining in Southern Zambezia: a reassessment', *African Social Research, 21,* (1976), 1–30; R. Summers, *Ancient Mining in Rhodesia* (Salisbury, 1969).
26. Phimister, 'Pre-colonial gold mining', 7–9; De Barros, 'Da Ásia', 226.
27. Barretto, 'Informação', 490.
28. Ibid.
29. Dos Santos, 'Ethiópia Oriental', 280; Barretto, 'Informação', 489.
30. Phimister, 'Pre-colonial gold mining', 11.
31. Ibid., 12–13; Barretto, 'Informação', 490; A.C.P. Gamitto, *King Kazembe* (translated by I. Cunnison) (Lisboa, 1960), *I,* 41.

32. Gramitto, *King Kazembe*, op. cit., *1*, 41; Dos Santos, 'Ethiópia Oriental', 280.
33. Phimister, 'Pre-colonial gold mining', 13–14; Diogo de Alcáçova to King, Cochin, 20 November 1506, op. cit., 391.
34. Barretto, 'Informação', 489–490; De Barros, 'Da Ásia', 266–267; Couto, 'Da Ásia', 271.
35. Barretto, 'Informação', 489.
36. Ibid., 490.
37. Ibid. However in the seventeenth century, before mining could start the miners had to ask for permission (licence?) from the chief of the land or even from the Mutapa himself if it was in the *dunhu* where he lived. In this case they paid a certain portion of the gold mined to the ruler. It is not clear how much, but we are told that it was a percentage of what was first mined. Gomes, 'Viagem', 187. However a document of 1683 cited in footnote 120 says that the Mutapa got a portion of what was mined on a daily basis.
38. Couto, 'Da Ásia', 271.
39. Ibid; Bocarro, 'Década',355; Barretto, 'Informação', 489–490; De Barros, 'Da Ásia', 267; Dos Santos, 'Ethiópia Oriental', 277.
40. Barretto, 'Informação', 490; De Barros, 'Da Ásia', 267; Dos Santos, 'Ethiópia Oriental', 274, 277; Bocarro, 'Década', 355.
41. Monclaro, 'Relação', 391; Barretto, 'Informação', 490–491; Dos Santos, 'Ethiópia Oriental', 280–281.
42. Monclaro, 'Relação', 391.
43. Barretto, 'Informação', 491. See also dos Santos, 'Ethiópia Oriental', 281; Phimister, 'Pre-colonial gold mining', 18, 19, 22, 27. It is not an accident that the closing of gold mines in the Mutapa state is associated with Portuguese aggressiveness in that state. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the closing of gold mines was no more of an issue as it was especially in the seventeenth century and parts of the sixteenth century. Phimister's speculation is not based on any documentary evidence from contemporary sources.
44. Nuno Velho Pereira to King, Moçambique, 29 October 1585, *DPMAC, VIII*, 529;Mudenge, 'Rozvi Empire and Feira of Zumbo', 71 note 1; Veloso to King, [1512], *DPMAC, III*, 183. Conceição says that vassal rulers paid the Mutapa 'very little' compared to what the Portuguese paid him. See Conceição, 'Tratado', 66 para 46.
45. Goes, 'Gloriosa Memória', 128–9. See also Miranda 'Monarchia', 112; Mello e Castro, 'Notícia', 133.
46. Monclaro, 'Relação',391; see also de Barros, 'Da Ásia', 271.
47. Gomes, 'Viagem', 189; Monclaro, 'Relação', 381, 391.
48. Monclaro, 'Relação', 391; De Barros, 'Da Ásia', 271.
49. Monclaro, 'Relação', 391; Dos Santos, 'Ethiópia Oriental', 219, 281.
50. Dos Santos, 'Ethiópia Oriental', 218, 219; see also Monclaro 'Relação', 391.
51. Monclaro, 'Relação', 391.
52. Ibid.
53. De Barros, 'Da Ásia', 266; Goes, 'Glorjosa Memória', 129.
54. According to the official estimates, in 1983 Zimbabwe had between 45 000 and 55 000 elephants. Mozambique's estimated elephant population in the same year was about 40 000.
55. Dos Santos, 'Ethiópia Oriental', 321, 322.
56. E.A.Alpers, *Ivory and Slaves in East Central Africa* (London, 1975), 265–267.
57. Dos Santos, 'Ethiópia Oriental', 322. In 1935 Junod observed the following

among the Tonga or Barwe of Mozambique: '. . . we had the good fortune of killing an elephant at night . . . As an elephant means plenty of meat, more than one can ever dream of, a great crowd of men, women and children gathered on the spot. The scene was in itself extremely picturesque . . . Two or three men were busy with knives and axes, cutting the mass of meat . . . The chief comes and takes the legs which touch the ground, because he is 'the earth' [*yaphatsi ya mambo.*] The tusks belong to the hunter.' H. PH. Junod, 'Notes on the ethnological situation in Portuguese East Africa on the South of the Zambezi', *BS, X,* (1936), 301–302.

58. Miranda, 'Monarchia', 112; Mello e Castro, 'Notícia', 134.
59. Dos Santos, 'Ethiópia Oriental', 208.
60. Livingstone, *Researches,* 669.
61. D. Chanaiwa, 'Politics and Long-distance Trade', 424.
62. Ibid., 424–425.
63. Ibid., 434.
64. Ibid., 435.
65. Although Chanaiwa's sources do not make any reference to weights and measures this is not to say that in fact these did not exist. They did, but these are found in other sources and not those quoted by Chanaiwa. However, these references to Africans using scales and weights are found in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century sources. In the sixteenth century, we are told, Africans sold their gold without necessarily having it weighed. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the Africans made their own scales of copper or iron and for weights they used stones weighing as follows:

Xivinge	0,0054 g
Dogado	0,0216 g
Muromo	0,1089 g
Inhamusira	0,318 g

See Botelho, *Memória Estatística, 1,* 189; [Anon.], 'Descrição da Situação, Costumes e Produtos de Alguns Lugares de África', *DPMAC, V,* 357. See also Chapter 9 below note 62 on the Zezuru weights.

66. See Chapter 6 below.
67. See Chapter 9 below.
68. Dos Santos, 'Ethiópia Oriental', 270–272; Couto, 'Da Ásia', 273, 275.
69. Barretto, 'Informação', 482.
70. Rezende, 'Estado da Índia', 414–418; Couto, 'Da Ásia', 273.
71. Barretto, 'Informação', 482; Assumpção, 'Breve Informação', fol. 37. It is possible that Hwangwa may well be the same as the old *feira* of Urupande.
72. For evidence that some of the Mukaranga *feiras* were, for a very short time, opened during Nyamhandu's or João V's reign see Chapter 8 below.
73. Couto, 'Da Ásia', 271; Gomes, 'Viagem', 192.
74. Couto, 'Da Ásia', 271, 273, 275.
75. Monclaro, 'Relação', 417. In Chapter 3 note 55 we have implied that Sono, the ruler of *Ynhacouee,* could have been a captain of the gates to the Mutapa empire in the early days.
76. The title 'great wife', according to dos Santos, was 'a name by which he [Mutapa] honours the Portuguese whom he esteems and holds in great respect'. Dos Santos, 'Ethiópia Oriental', 271. This is partly correct. The full sense of the title however contained an implication of inferiority on the person so referred.

Subjects, vassals and conquered people are usually given that 'honorific' title. As we saw under the section on religion *mhondoro* Nyanhehwe refers to Karuva and his descendants as his 'wives', i.e., conquered subjects. However there is a sense in which these are not just ordinary subjects but, like wives, they were subjects who were especially beneficient to the ruler and hence very important subjects indeed.

77. Dos Santos, 'Ethiópia Oriental', 270, 271, 272; Bocarro, 'Década', 354; Couto, 'Da Ásia', 273, 275.
78. Rezende, 'Estado da Índia', 387. See also dos Santos, 'Ethiópia Oriental', 222, for evidence that Sachiteve charged three in every 20 pieces of cloth or strings of beads as duty to African merchants who traded with the Portuguese; and one in every 20 pieces of cloth or string of beads as transit tolls for Manyika-bound Portuguese traders.
79. e.g. Livingstone, *Researches*, 661–662, 669.
80. Couto, 'Da Ásia', 273; Bocarro, 'Década', 354.
81. See Chapter 9 below for Portuguese attempts to have all tolls abolished except the one to the Mutapa himself. Mudenge, 'Rozvi Empire and Feira of Zumbo', 194–195.
82. In a personal communication to the writer, Dr Beach quotes D.P. Abraham as claiming that *curva* is derived from the Arabic word *qurban*. But the word *qurban* in Arabic means offering, usually to the gods. It seems unlikely that such a word would have been used in the context of tribute to an infidel ruler. It seems to me that *curva* (pronounced kur'va) is derived from the Shona word *kuruva*, i.e. to pay tax or tribute. Couto says that the cloths paid to the Sachiteve by the Portuguese were 'called *curvas* by them [Shona], *moçararias* by the Persians, and xagoates by the Moorish kings in the East'. Couto, 'Da Ásia', 319.
83. Dos Santos, 'Ethiópia Oriental', 272; Rezende, 'Estado da Índia', 414. Rezende says that the figure for *curva* was 15 000 or 16 000 *cruzados* every year in the early seventeenth century. This should be compared with the figure of 5 000 *cruzados* given by Bocarro as the amount Estavão should have paid to Gatsi Rusere. Bocarro, 'Década', 386.
84. Dos Santos, 'Ethiópia Oriental', 272; 3 000 *cruzados* at four shillings a *cruzado* in the seventeenth century would have come to £600. Converted to today's equivalent, this would be a substantial amount of money.
85. One was carried out on the orders of Mutapa Gatsi Rusere and the second was declared by Mutapa Nyambo Kapararidze in 1628. See Chapters 6 and 7 below.
86. Rezende, 'Estado da Índia', 415. Claims that payment of three *pastas* had to be done every year. But in the treaty itself signed by Mavhura it is not clear whether payment was to be made every year or every three years. See Manuza [Muvhura], 'Capitulações', 291. However the king of Portugal makes it clear that it was every year.King to Viceroy, Madrid, 31 April 1631, *RSEA*, 4, 221–222.
87. King to Viceroy, Madrid, 31 April 1631, *RSEA*, 4, 223–224; King to Monomatapa, Madrid, 31 April 1631, *RSEA*, 4, 225–227.
88. For evidence that the Mutapa used to hold audience sitting under two sombreiros received from the Portuguese king, see Miranda, 'Monarchia', 112; Mello e Castro, 'Notícia', 133.
89. Do Lago, 'Regimento e Instrucçoens do Prezídio de Zimboaé'.
90. Ibid.
91. De Barros, 'Da Ásia', 271.
92. Dos Santos, 'Ethiópia Oriental', 288.

93. Ibid., 270. Gomes, 'Viagem', 192. Fr Gomes claims that by 1648 Portuguese greed had pushed them to bring beads and cloth to the doorsteps of the Africans of the interior.
94. Rezende, 'Estado da Índia', 417.
95. Chanaiwa, 'Long-distance Trade', 429, 432, 433, 434. He claims, without citing any evidence, that such agents both Portuguese and indigenous existed.
96. Manuel Galvão da Silva, 'Diário das Viagens, feitas pelas terras de Manica', *Anais, IX*, I, (1954), 327.
97. Rezende, 'Estado da Índia', 412.
98. Monclaro, 'Relação', 391, 393; Couto, 'Da Ásia', 273; [Anon.], 'Descrição da Situação, Costumes e Produtos de Alguns Lugares de África', 357.
99. Mudenge, 'Rozvi Empire and Feira of Zumbo', 195–229.
100. A.H.U. Av. de Moç. Cx., 14, Inácio de Mello e Alvim, Senna, 15 July 1770.
101. De Barros, 'Da Ásia', 270.
102. See Chapter 8 for evidence that Mutapa Nyamhandu or João V used to dress like a Portuguese. See also Chapter 6 where Gatsi Rusere is said to have been dressed in silk cloth when he received Ambassador Bocarro in 1620.
103. Mudenge, 'Rozvi Empire and Feira of Zumbo', 144.
104. Miranda, 'Monarchia', 112; Mello e Castro, 'Notícia', 134.
105. King to Viceroy, Madrid, 31 April 1631, *RSEA, 4*, 223.
106. See Chapter 7 below.
107. See Chapter 9 below.
108. De Barros, 'Da Ásia', 267; Gomes, 'Viagem', 192–3, 209; Barretto, 'Informação', 493.
109. e.g. Monclaro, 'Relação', 391; [Anon.], 'Descripção do Império Moanomatapa', 224; Francisco de Mello e Castro, 'Rios de Sena . . . (1750)', *Annaes*, (Parte não official) (1859–1861), II, 107; Gomes, 'Viagem', 209, 222.
110. Alpers, *Ivory and Slaves in East Central Africa*, 26, 229, 232, 242; Manuel Galvão da Silva, 'Diário das Viagens', 328; [Anon.], 'Descripção do Império do Moanamotapa', 224; Gomes 'Vagem', 209 Fr Gomes has left us a full description of dressing in the seventeenth-century Mutapa kingdom showing that imported clothing did not replace traditional weaving craft. According to Gomes,

> The people dress in various ways: at court and *Zimboôe* [sic] of the Kings their grandees wear cloths of rich silk, damask, satin, gold and silk cloth; these are three widths of satin, each width four *covados* [2,64 m], each sewn to the next, sometimes with gold lace in between, trimmed on two sides, like a carpet, with a gold and silk fringe, sewn in place with a two fingers' wide ribbon, woven with gold roses on silk – a very well made thing manufactured by the *kaffirs* themselves . . . These cloths are worn from the waist down the right side trailing along the floor and the left just down to the knee. Others dress in cotton cloth with coloured stripes, black being their favourite colour. Of all the women, the Mocranga are the ones who dress best, the cloth coming down to one *palmo* above the feet; that part of the leg showing is covered with bright copper bands.
>
> At some other places where they do not have so much cloth, the men wear skins, one in front, one at the back, and the women dress in a very short cloth and those who do not have one wear a piece of threshed bark that becomes cinnamon coloured and is as soft as cloth and woven by nature as if it were cloth.
>
> In other places the men wear skins and the women a little net made of

coloured beads and nothing else . . . Elephant hunters and their wives dress in the stomachs of the animals they kill, very nice grey cloth which divided in two, is enough for two people and is so soft that it feels like satin.

111. Mudenge, 'Rozvi Empire and Feira of Zumbo', 197. Shows that traders on the Zambezi trade route needed canoes which had at times to be hired from African owners.
112. Gomes, 'Viagem', 196; Monclaro, 'Relação', 391, 393. Since copper, iron and tin deposits were not evenly distributed, the areas which controlled especially copper and tin deposits probably manufactured most of the bangles and trinkets or sold bars of those metals. For evidence that these metals were used for such items, see Monclaro, 'Relação', 381.
113. Livneh, 'Pre-colonial Polities', 178–199; L. Gann, *A History of Southern Rhodesia* (London, 1965), 9.
114. Mello e Castro, 'Notícia', 133.
115. Ibid., 134.
116. Sousa, *O Oriente Conquistado*, 847–8; [Anon.], 'Descrição da Situação Costumes e Produtos de Alguns Lugares de África', 361.
117. Dos Santos, 'Ethiópia Oriental', 288.
118. De Barros, 'Da Ásia', 271.
119. Goes, 'Gloriosa Memória', 128–129.
120. Ajuda, 51–VII–43, [Anon.], 'Descripção dos Rios de Cuama' (1683), fols 473–483 V; Conceição, 'Tratado', 66 para 46.
121. [Anon.] 'Descrição da Situação, Costumes e Produtos de Alguns Lugares de África', 363; Goes, 'Gloriosa Memória', 130–131.
122. Livingstone, *Researches,* 661.
123. Conceição, 'Tratado',66 para 46; Nuno Velho Pereira to King, Moçambique, 29 October 1585, *DPMAC, VIII,* 529. Theal translates a sixteenth-century document which he ascribes to Duarte Barbosa as saying 'he [Mutapa] is each day served with very large presents, which the other kings and lords send to him, *each one in a fixed quantity*'. (emphasis added) Theal, *RSEA, 1,* 96. But a recent translation of the same document renders the same passage thus, 'Every day he is given many great gifts that the other kings and lords send, which gifts are in good number . . .' *DPMAC, V,* 361.
124. Bocarro, 'Década', 359; Faria e Sousa, 'Ásia Portuguesa', 25.
125. De Barros, 'Da Ásia', 271–272, Dos Santos, 'Ethiopia Oriental', 208–209, 211–212.
126. Fr André to the Brothers and Fathers of the Society of Jesus in Portugal, Goa, 5 December 1562, *RSEA, 2,* 145.
127. Dos Santos, 'Ethiópia Oriental', 209.
128. Conceição, 'Tratado', 66 para 47.

CHAPTER 6

Portuguese Penetration of Mukaranga *c.* 1562 to *c.* 1624: The Wars of Francisco Barreto and Gatsi Rusere

Following the death of Fr Dom Gonçalo da Silveira, the Portuguese were temporarily galvanized into continuing the work he had started in the Mutapa state. The Jesuit Society sent two of its members to continue Silveira's work, but these two only reached as far as Mozambique where they were hindered from proceeding to the Mutapa state and had to return to Goa in 1562.[1] The Jesuit revival had to wait for more propitious times. Of greater importance for the future were a number of developments which took place outside the Mutapa empire. One of these was another failure by a Jesuit mission to Angola led by Paulo de Novais and Fr Francisco Gouveia. The Ngola, or ruler, of Angola proved difficult and even kept de Novais and Fr Gouveia as prisoners at his court.[2] By 1568 the Jesuit faction at the court of Portugal was quite strong. In 1568, King Sebastião, a saintly boy of 15 who had been educated by the Jesuits and whose religious advisor was also a Jesuit, was on the throne of Portugal. His queen was equally under Jesuit influence. The Jesuit lobby began to campaign for more activist policies in Angola and Munhumutapa.[3]

Some of the Jesuits, after the failures in the above two regions, were advocating evangelization through the 'sword and fire', i.e. conquest and colonization were seen as necessary aids to spreading the gospel.[4] Professor Silva Rego has argued that the theological climate in Europe was also moving in that general direction, in particular the writings of the Jesuit theologian Fr José Acosta, professor at the University of Salamanca in Spain.[5] King Sebastião gave Paulo Dias de Novais a 'donatario' or charter to conquer and colonize Angola, [6] and in Munhumutapa he was persuaded to appoint, as leader of an expeditionary force for the conquest of Mutapa, Francisco Barreto, a nobleman, former governor of India, friend of Fr Dom Gonçalo da Silveira and the general of the Portuguese galleys.[7] From both Angola and Munhumutapa reports had reached Lisbon of the existence of rich mineral deposits; silver in the case of Angola and gold in Mutapa.[8] Since Spain was growing rich

on its Latin American mines, it was hoped that the mines of Mutapa and Angola would make Portugal no less prosperous.

It is in the light of the above developments that we should view the conclusions of the so-called 'men of learning' whom the Portuguese crown consulted on whether or not it was justified to make war against the Munhumutapa.[9] The document is reeking with the exigences of jesuitical casuistry. In the document, the Munhumutapa is accused of harbouring moslems in his empire. Yet, as has been shown in chapter two, those same moslems traded with goods sold to them by the Portuguese captain of Mozambique. They were vital for Portuguese trade with the interior, and at Sofala evidence has been cited showing how Captain Jorge profited from his relations with the Mafamede Joane. Besides, the Portuguese had never requested the Mutapa to expel the moslems from his empire. Indeed one can go further to ask by what right the Portuguese had the temerity to demand that the Mutapa should have expelled his and their trading partners? In the same document the same 'learned men' go on to claim that 'hospitality and commerce . . . are the common right of peoples' which, if denied to the Portuguese by the Mutapa, war could justly be made against him. It did not seem to strike the learned gentlemen that moslems were also people with the same 'rights' as the Portuguese.

Secondly, the learned men claimed that the Mutapas often caused their own subjects and other innocent people to be put to death or robbed. But this wild accusation is proffered without any supporting evidence. Furthermore, Mutapas are accused of having caused some unnamed Portuguese to be slain. Yet the history of the Portuguese–Mutapa relations reviewed up to this stage showed that, with the exception of Fr Silveira's sad death, the Mutapas were always desirous to establish good relations with the Portuguese. Some unnamed Portuguese ambassadors are said to have been killed in the Mutapa state. It is true that envoy Proemça never came back, but the logic of evidence in no way suggests foul play on the Mutapa's part. Wars between the Sachiteves and the Mutapa made the first half of the sixteenth century a particularly dangerous period to travel through that region. When Barreto ordered an *Inquérito* which included a question on how badly Portuguese traders had been treated by the Mutapas, not one of the Mozambique-based traders gave evidence against the Mutapas. Evidence was cited of some bad

treatment from the king of Manyika. One witness said those traders failing to pay what the latter, i.e. king of Manyika, demanded were punished but another witness claimed that those who paid were also punished.[10]

It was also argued by the 'men of learning' that Papal Bulls gave authority to the Portuguese king to enjoy the hospitality of the lands of Mutapa, to travel and cause the conversion of the people of the area. And if these privileges were not granted then the Portuguese king could enforce the above 'rights' by force. This of course cannot be defined as a criterion for a just war in any objective sense of the word. It is part and parcel of the bigoted arrogance inspired by a mixture of Christocentric and Eurocentric world views which have afflicted men of European descent over the centuries and to which the rest of mankind is expected to acquiesce. However, the more serious charge against the Mutapa was the killing of Fr Gonçalo da Silveira who, in the document by the learned men, is described as having been an 'ambassador' of the Portuguese king. Finally, the learned men said that before war could be declared against the Mutapa, he should be asked: (i) to expel all moslems from his kingdom, (ii) to pay reparations in gold, land or tribute for the death of Portuguese killed in his kingdom and expenses of the whole expedition sent out to conquer him. The learned gentlemen knew very well that there was no way a sovereign ruler could accept such conditions and remain independent. They must have been aware that they were giving their king a blank cheque to commit aggression.

In spite of the verbal camouflage deployed by the 'men of learning' in the above document there is no doubt that the chief motive behind the Barreto expedition was to procure 'the abundance of the wealth' in the Mutapa state for the purposes of raising funds for the administration of Portugal and the *Estado da Índia*.[11] Fr Silveira's death was merely the excuse for it. This is also confirmed by Sousa who wrote that 'The great inducement to this conquest was the information and experience of the vast quantity of gold found, particularly at Manika in the kingdom of Makaranga.'[12]

i. Francisco Barreto's wars of aggression

In 1569 the king of Portugal appointed Francisco Barreto as captain-major of the conquest of Mutapa.[13] In 1571 he was given the title of Governor of Sofala, Mozambique and all parts of the conquest of the

lordship of Munhumutapa.[14] It is said that the flower of Portugal's nobility volunteered for this expedition and noble ladies knitted banners for the troops. Four Jesuits joined the expedition.[15] Great gains were expected from this venture.[16] The invasion fleet left Lisbon in April 1569 and arrived at Mozambique Island on 16 May 1570.[17] Because reports from the mainland said there was a scarcity of provisions, and because one of his ships had not yet arrived, Barreto decided to sail to the East African ports and islands, in particular to Pate whose ruler he wanted to discipline and also in the hope of getting some provisions.[18] His journey to East Africa and stay at Mozambique Island lasted one year and a half and cost him more than 100 men dead. When he left Mozambique Island for the lands of Mutapa, in November 1571, he had to leave behind over 200 of his men sick on the island.[19] This had been an expensive delay in terms of manpower. The position was nearly aggravated by Barreto's decision to set sail for India to help the city of Chaul, then under siege, but, fortunately for the expedition, the incoming viceroy of India, Dom António de Noronha, an old rival of Barreto's, happened to pass through Mozambique with a powerful fleet. He turned down Barreto's offer of help and urged him to go on with the conquest of the mines of Munhumutapa.[20]

Before undertaking the journey to Munhumutapa the question arose as to which route to follow. At a council attended by the Viceroy António de Noronha, Francisco Barreto, the four Jesuit priests and over 20 Dominican fathers, as well as other notables then at Mozambique, two routes were proposed: (i) to go through Sofala and from there overland across Uteve and Manyika into Mukaranga province where the Mutapa's *zimbabwe* was found, or, (ii) to go along the Zambezi by way of Sena and from there overland into Mukaranga. The arguments in favour of Sofala were that it was 'shorter as well as safer' and an 'easier' route to negotiate[21] because it passed through the kingdom of Sachiteve, an avowed enemy of the Munhumutapa, and Manyika province ruled by Chikanga who, although at that time was a loyal tribute-paying vassal of the Mutapa, had formerly quarrelled often with him.[22] Furthermore, the *Inquérito* had established that the king of Manyika on his own could not raise more than 2 000–5 000 men for the defence of his kingdom,[23] whereas the Mutapa was reputed to be able to raise up to 100 000 men.[24] It was therefore better to conquer the gold-rich province of Manyika



above: Remains of the old *feira* of Ruhanje.
below: Part of earthworks surrounding the *feira* of Ruhanje.

and, by exploiting its mines, produce the wealth, and recruit the manpower, needed to conquer the Mutapa himself.[25] This was supported by those with personal knowledge of the region.[26]

The case against the Sena–Zambezi route was said to be that before entering Mukaranga the Portuguese army would have to traverse the lands of king 'Omegas, the most high of all the kaffirs'.[27] It is possible that *Omegas* referred to the *Mukomohasha* of Hondosaka, captain of the gates of Mutapa, through whose lands passed the Zambezi overland route to the Mutapa *zimbabwe*. The fact that Fr Monclaro spells the name as *Moagem*[28] strengthens the speculation that *Omegas* may have been the *Mukomohasha*. Those arguing against taking the Zambezi route pointed out that once Barreto had clashed with the *Mukomohasha* he could be so weakened that he would find it hard to proceed with the conquest.[29] But the leader of the faction in favour of the Zambezi route was none other than Fr Monclaro, confessor to Francisco Barreto and the voice of the powerful Jesuit lobby at the court of King Sebastião of Portugal.[30] Monclaro's reasons for wanting to go along the Zambezi route were, first of all, that it was the best and quickest way of coming in contact with the Munhumutapa who, he felt, had to be punished for Silveira's death and, secondly, because he wanted to retrieve Fr Silveira's bones which, as Couto pointed out somewhat caustically,

> was not possible . . . the body of the holy father Dom Gonçalo had been straightaway devoured and swallowed by the lizards or crocodiles as soon as it was thrown into the river. From there they will never come out until Doomsday, when they will be gathered together and all bodies shall rise again wheresoever they may be.[31]

The force of the argument favoured the Sofala route; a decision to do that was therefore reached and all those present at the meeting signed a document agreeing with that decision.[32]

Barreto started sending war materials to Sofala.[33] But Fr Monclaro in the meantime began to have second thoughts about the previous decision, which he had opposed at the beginning anyhow. He felt that his authority and the king's trust in him had been slighted by that decision. He therefore sought to have it reversed, and such was Monclaro's power, or rather Jesuit influence, at the court of Portugal that Barreto agreed to call another meeting. At this second meeting, Monclaro, supported by the other Jesuit priests, told the

assembly that their superiors had told them to seek out only the Munhumutapa and they were ready to follow Barreto anytime he meant to do this, but when he started doing other things they felt that that did not accord with the orders they had received. Barreto was shaken by this and asked for another vote, and on this occasion all present voted for the Zambezi or Sena route.[34] Professor Axelson accuses the much-criticized Fr Welch of falsely stating that a second meeting was called to reverse the first decision. Axelson claims that the decision was unilaterally reversed by Barreto.[35] It is true that a reading of Homem's summary of events gives the latter impression,[36] but Couto clearly shows that a second meeting was in fact held, for he writes that Barreto

> had the [first] resolution recalled, that which had been passed by so many and so eminent men . . . and summoned another meeting wherein he proposed that the discussion of that affair should be resumed. The father [Monclaro] appears to have done therein with those who were called, what he had purposed to get, and the case being again debated, they all voted for the governor's journey to be made by way of Cena (sic), and not by way of Sofala.[37]

Clearly Fr Welch had a basis for his statement and Axelson accuses him incorrectly of being misleading on this issue.

On 4 November 1571 the expedition left Mozambique for Sena.[38] On 17 December 1571 they arrived at Sena.[39] The expedition, numbering about 700 musketeers,[40] was well-received by Chief Mopango or Sumopango, a tribute-paying vassal of the Mutapa who was reputed to have been able to put 70 000 men in the field and who, in the past, had fought against the Mutapa.[41] While the army was near Sena, the Portuguese were able to buy cattle from Guruuswa for provisions and to draw their carts. These oxen of Guruuswa were said to be quite large compared with those of Portugal.[42] Unfortunately, many of these cattle died soon after they arrived. Fr Monclaro felt they were poisoned by the moslems. But Barreto and others thought this was because the oxen 'had eaten a certain noisome kind of grass there was in that land.'[43] Recent studies on toxic plants in Zimbabwe show that 'fat and fair'[44] cattle can die suddenly when they eat these plants. This tends to happen during periods of drought and when the animals are strangers in an environment, just as must have been the case with the Guruuswa cattle when they came to Sena.[45] In addition to the death of the oxen, some horses also died. These were 25 to 30

in number 'albeit of poor breed and most of them old',[46] except for two very good Arabian horses. Monclaro ascribed the death of 15 of these horses to poison.[47]But, as is known from the nineteenth-century experience, unsalted horses had very little chance to survive the Zimbabwean and Zambezi valley environments.[48] No moorish poison plot need be invented. Finally, some of the soldiers also died during this period. Even Monclaro conceded that not all died of poison 'but also of illness and poor food'.[49] However he maintained that Barreto's son who 'ate whatever he was sent [by the moslems], and in their houses too'[50] died of poison. Again this is not convincing evidence. Malaria and other tropical diseases, against which the noble gentlemen in the expedition had no resistance, could have accounted for the greater part of the casualties. Monclaro had a young moslem stable-hand beaten and tortured until he confessed to the existence of a poison plot by the moslems.[51] Couto claims that a moslem by the name of Manhoessa had advised Barreto to close a well he was opening lest it be poisoned.[52] According to Couto, the tortured stable-hand confessed that the plot was that 'one Muslim *cacis* would bring them some poison which they must administer to the horses.' Luckily this was discovered in time and forestalled.[53]

The case of poisoning levelled against the moslems of Sena is weak. These moslems 'shewed tokens of amity and kindness'[54] to the Portuguese. They invited them to their houses and one even lent Barreto 3 000 *maticals* of gold so that the latter could pay his soldiers and apparently was willing to advise Barreto on matters pertaining to the affairs of the interior.[55] Yet Monclaro saw this as feigning and dissimulating friendship.[56] But it is hard to see why a man like the above-mentioned moslem would have wished to poison Barreto before he was repaid the said big debt. On the other hand it is not hard to see why Fr Monclaro displayed what amounted to congenital distrust of the moslems. As far as he was concerned, they were the instigators of the death of Fr Silveira as well as mortal enemies of the christian faith.[57] To the other Portuguese the massacre of the Sena moslems was to result in the confiscation of the property of the latter and cancelling of all debts owed to them.[58] According to Monclaro, the Portuguese crown gained 15 000 *maticals* in gold from the exercise.[59] The accusations levelled against the moslems must remain questionable. In the end, only the Portuguese became the true beneficiaries of the poison saga.

The Portuguese disposed of the moslems in the most gruesome ways. According to Monclaro, chaplain to the expedition, some were

> slain with strange inventions. Some were impaled alive, others tied to trees in the extreme branches thereof, the branches being forcibly brought together and then released, the victim being thus rent asunder. Others still were cut up with axes from the back, others with bombards . . . others were delivered up to the soldiers, who had their sport by shooting them with arquebuses.[60]

While Barreto was around Sena he heard about the silver-mines of Chikova said to have been discovered by one Gonçalo de Araújo.[61] Nothing could be done about them at that stage until the conquest of Mutapa had been accomplished. From Sena, Barreto sent an ambassador to Munhumutapa Negomo Mupunzagutu, who was carefully monitoring Barreto's progress inland. The ambassador, Manuel Bernardez, an old Portuguese trader well-acquainted with the region and the Mutapa personally,[62] was sent to the Mutapa. Old Bernardez travelled until he was a few days from the *zimbabwe* and then he sent a message to the Mutapa asking him if he would be received according to European practices and not Shona customs which required all people visiting the Mutapas to approach him 'bare-footed, unarmed and on their knees, whilst clapping their hands and, when they were near them, they ought to lie flat down on their bellies.'[63]

At first the Mutapa was reluctant to grant these privileges. Couto says it must have been the moslems who made him unwilling to grant the favours. But no evidence is given to support such suspicions. However, after a few days of deliberation, the Mutapa agreed to Bernardez's request. Mutapa Negomo provided Bernardez with a chair and a carpet. When the fully-clad and armed ambassador and his entourage entered, Negomo stood up and warmly welcomed his good friend, the old man Bernardez, and then sat down. The ambassador began by conveying Barreto's felicitations and greetings to the Mutapa, after which he proceeded to outline the purpose of his embassy. He falsely informed Negomo that Barreto was asking for permission from him to make war against the Tonga of Samungazi since they had rebelled against him (the Mutapa). In addition, Barreto asked to be allowed to proceed to the mines of Manyika and Guruuswa.[64] He explained to the emperor that the men Barreto was leading were for no other purpose than clearing 'the thorns in the

Portuguese envoys paying homage *zvambaira* to the Mutapa: 'the ceremony was to cl
hands as he went on a ground spread with fresh dung.' Gomes



crawl on one's stomach like a crocodile, barefooted, and clap one's

paths and open them up for trade'.[65] He assured Negomo of Portuguese peaceful intentions and continued friendship, and concluded by requesting that the Mutapa should send a *mutume (nhume* – ambassador) to Barreto to discuss some of these matters.[66]

Negomo cunningly replied that he was pleased with what the embassy had to say, in particular he appreciated Barreto's concern to have the rebellious Samungazi Tonga punished. For that purpose the Mutapa was willing to send down 100 000 of his men of war and all else that was necessary to help Barreto bring the Samungazi Tonga to heel. Furthermore, the Mutapa was not opposed to have Barreto march to the mines of Guruuswa (not that the Mutapa controlled them) and Manyika. But the prospect of the reputedly 100 000-man-strong Mutapa forces descending on Sena was rather alarming to Bernardez; and so he replied quickly that for the time being no help was necessary from the Mutapa as Barreto had everything he needed and all he required was the emperor's permission to proceed with his journey.[67] After that verbal fencing, the discussions came to an end and the embassy was allowed to leave for Sena; but unfortunately old Bernardez drowned when his boat capsized and the outcome of the embassy was brought to Barreto by the other members of the mission.[68]

Even before the embassy had returned, Barreto felt that he had stayed long enough around Sena and decided to commence his journey of conquest.[69] On 19 July 1572, Barreto's army of about 650 arquebusiers, nearly 30 ox-drawn wagons,[70] eight donkeys and five camels left Sena by overland route into the interior, while over 20 *luzios* (canoes?) sailed up the river loaded with provisions, merchandise and ammunition. In addition they had 2 000 Africans, described as slaves, to carry their commissariat, as well as an additional 200 Maravi people to act as guides and carriers contributed by Chief Chombe of Bororo.[71] Barreto's first target was to be the Samungazi Tonga, who were accused of having maltreated Portuguese traders in the past.[72] According to Monclaro, a year or two before the arrival of the Barreto expedition some Portuguese traders were slain by these Tonga and in retaliation about 10 traders of Tete attacked some villages of these Tonga. In response to this, the latter attacked Tete and killed 79 women and children at that settlement. For these reasons it was deemed necessary to destroy these Tonga.[73] The people of Samungazi were also making preparations to meet the

threat.[74] The journey from Sena with wagons and all was rather slow and cumbersome with the result that only 50 leagues were covered in a period of one month. The expedition was on the move continuously, in part because of the fear the Samungazi Tonga inspired. False alarms were often sounded. To compound their problems as they came closer to the Samungazi people, they found that a scorched-earth policy was in operation – all wells were filled up and no food could be found. The men lived on small meat rations given every two days. Some soldiers fell sick on the way.[75] In addition, all their movements were being carefully monitored by the Samungazi scouts and spies.[76]

It was sometime in August that the expedition had its contact with the Samungazi warriors. The first signs they saw to indicate that Samungazi's men must be nearby were grasses tied into knots which the Africans in the expedition explained as a warning from the people of Samungazi that they intended to tie up all the Portuguese like they had done with the grass.[77] This was part of pyschological warfare by the Samungazi forces. At the first encounter, both Portuguese and Samungazi men were lodged in good defensive positions on nearby hills. To draw out the Portuguese army from their defendable position the Samungazi forces decided to retire half a league further inland without engaging the enemy. There they spent the night playing war-drums until the small hours of the morning when they stopped. Barreto thought since the drums had stopped the Samungazi men must be on their way to his camp. In anticipation he sent out some scouts who confirmed his guess and so he put all his men on fuil alert until daybreak. But Samungazi's warriors were too astute to attack Barreto while he held a good defensive position. Barreto sent out another scouting party which reported that Samungazi's warriors were nowhere to be seen. Barreto then ordered his men to march on. All this was making Barreto's men rather restless,[78] as the Samungazi warriors must have no doubt intended. It was only when Barreto's men were crossing a flat open plain that the warriors of Samungazi appeared.[79] Barreto quickly drew up a defensive position by having a square formed. It is possible the wagons were also part of the square; if so, on that day southern Africa witnessed its first laager.[80]

The Samungazi forces were drawn in the traditional southern African crescent, bull-horn or half-moon formation later to be ef-

fectively used by, and wrongly ascribed to, the genius of Shaka, the Zulu. The Samungazi squadrons are said to have numbered between 10 000 and 13 000 men. The largest number of warriors were in the middle while the 'horns' had less forces.[81] As these forces surged forward to engage the enemy, an old woman, a *n'anga*, preceded them, carrying a calabash full of war-medicines which she sprayed into the air claiming that it would turn the Portuguese blind. On the Portuguese side, invocation of supernatural help was performed by Fr Monclaro carrying his crucifix, now in the rear and at another time in the vanguard.[82] Since Barreto had had some experience in India of the role of medicine-men as morale-boosters in war, he quickly understood the significance of the old *n'anga* and asked one of his sharp-shooters to kill the old lady. This was successfully accomplished.[83] When the Samungazi forces saw what had happened they sallied forth in a fierce noisesome charge called *pemberar* (*kupembera*) in response to which the Portuguese, with great fury, raised the Lusitanian war cry, 'Santiago!' (St James!). The Samungazi warriors fought under various straw-made banners representing things like a hat, a bull, an elephant, etc. But such was the effect of the Portuguese 'fire-spitting sticks' (arquebuses) that the Samungazi warriors were forced to withdraw. The Portuguese won an indecisive victory.

At first Barreto was determined to press his advantage by forcing his way to the Samungazi's *muzinda* (capital), but after marching for a distance a thicket of shrubs arrested his progress and he decided to strike camp until the following morning. At ten in the morning, a large Samungazi force fell upon the Portuguese camp 'in the shape of a moon line, and encircling the whole field with its two wings.'[84] In this engagement both sides suffered some casualties, especially the Samungazi warriors. Again the Portuguese won an indecisive victory when the Samungazi warriors withdrew. But three days after the above encounter the Samungazi warriors returned with an even larger army, said to have numbered 16 000 men.[85] So confident of victory were the latter forces that they are said to have brought some ropes to tie up the Portuguese as they had been advised by one of their *n'anga*. During the battle the warriors continually urged each other to '*funga muzongo, funga muzongo*' (in standard Shona it would be '*Sunga muzungu, sunga muzungu*'), tie the white man.[86] The warriors made four determined charges against the Portuguese. But each time artillery and arquebuses blunted their attack. Monclaro says that so

many firearms were fired that the valley where the battle took place was so dark that it looked like a blanket of black mist had descended upon it. Again on this occasion the Samungazi warriors were forced to retreat.[87]

In his encounters with the Portuguese, Samungazi is said to have lost between 4 000 and 6 000 men dead and many injured.[88] Although he still had about 10 000 men, he decided to sue for peace. On their side, the Portuguese had lost 40 Portuguese men dead and many had been injured in these encounters. The Samungazi envoys who offered peace to Barreto brought some cattle, a little gold, two large ivory tusks and some sheep. They promised to be friends and vassals of the Portuguese in future, if Barreto did not burn their land. According to Vasco Homem, the Portuguese leader, Francisco Barreto, realizing that if

> in two encounters against sixteen thousand men forty Portuguese had been lost, what would the Manomotapa not do, who could muster one hundred thousand men; wherefore, and for other deficiencies in the camp, he returned to winter quarters at Sena, whence he had started.[89]

But before returning to Sena, Barreto decided to sign a peace treaty with Samungazi. To the envoys who brought the request for peace Barreto gave a hoe in return as a sign that he too desired peaceful relations but informed them that the final peace treaty could only be ratified at Samungazi's *muzinda*. Barreto then decided to march on Samungazi's *muzinda*, but lack of porters and water (the little that could be found tasted like that of human excrement) as well as sickness and deaths made this objective impossible to realize. Even those soldiers remaining in good health were much enfeebled and dispirited. Apparently the Samungazi warriors were aware of the full Portuguese plight and disarray and therefore it became quite risky to continue the expedition to their capital, and so Barreto decided to return to Sena 'without anything having been concluded with the *mongazes* (sic)'.[90] In late September Barreto set out for Sena and arrived there in early October.[91]

The expedition against Samungazi's Tonga was an unmitigated disaster on the part of Barreto. Beginning with a confident army in search of adventure and thirsting for glory, he returned to Sena with a tattered rabble of malcontents, worn out by Samungazi's tactics and the severity of the Zambezi valley environment. Attacking a

Zambezi-valley peasant-army between July and September, i.e. after harvesting time, was tactically foolish. This meant that the invading army could easily be starved of provisions while the defending forces were well-provided. Since it was the dry season in the area, lack of water was a major threat to a foreign invading army ignorant of the land. Both the timing and choice of route by the Barreto expedition were cardinal military errors. As for Samungazi and his people, although they had blunted the forces of invasion, they had been made to pay a heavy price in manpower by the arquebus. The true victor, as shall be seen later, was cunningly watching the events with hawk-like eyes away from the theatre of war on the verdant Zimbabwe highlands. His full name was Munhumutapa Negomo Mupunzagutu, the man Barreto was sent to conquer in the first place as being the owner of the gold-mines and responsible for Fr Silveira's death.

After Barreto had returned to Sena, Mutapa Mupunzagutu decided to send a powerful embassy to parley with the former. Altogether the embassy consisted of 200 men 'all in good array' and 10 or 12 noblemen. The embassy was led by three officers. The first one was called the 'king's major', the other the 'king's first wife', and the third the *moagem* (*Mukomohasha*), the captain of the gates to the Mutapa state. It is tempting to speculate that the *Mukomohasha* was added to this embassy in part to allow him to assess the state of Barreto's army and the effect of the recent war on Samungazi's Tonga. The embassy stated its mission as being that, (i) Mutapa Negomo wanted to be a friend of the king of Portugal, (ii) he intended to clear the 'thorns' between his people and the Portuguese, and, (iii) he wanted continuation of trade and commerce with the Portuguese.

Barreto replied by asking Negomo to cast out the moslems from his state and to allow priests to return to his empire, and to promise that he himself would keep the faith as well as to give many gold-mines in his empire to the Portuguese. Barreto added that he would respond to the Mutapa's requests only on his return from Mozambique Island, where he was going to get some merchandise and receive a message from the king of Portugal, and, after the Mutapa had replied to his own conditions for friendship, would be available for further discussions. The Mutapa embassy then informed Barreto that the Mutapa intended to finish clearing the Samungazi 'thorns' which Barreto had done so much to render less troublesome. The two sides then exchanged presents. The Mutapa

had sent eight arm and leg bracelets of gold, of very fine thread weighing less than 10 *maticals*. In return, Barreto sent Mutapa goods worth 6 000 *cruzados*, which was equivalent to Barreto's yearly salary. A Portuguese embassy under Francisco de Megalhaens, a Portuguese nobleman, and Francisco Rafaxo was dispatched to Mutapa by Barreto.[92]

When Barreto returned from Mozambique Island with fresh provisions for his men he found many of them very ill and dispirited. He also found that an embassy from the Mutapa had come and gone. The embassy is said to have stated that the Mutapa intended to cast out the moslems from his state; that he, Mutapa, was not to blame for Silveira's death seeing that he had acted under moslem influence; that the Portuguese could take the silver-mines near Chikova and that they were free to take the rich gold-mines (of Guruuswa and Manyika?). But as pertaining to his return to christianity, he asked that the fathers should go to his court so that he could discuss the matter with them. The embassy reported that, because during the Barreto struggle against Samungazi the Mutapa had seen how good his Portuguese 'wives', i.e. subjects, were, he now wished to live at peace with them. After receiving some clothes from these Portuguese at Sena, the Mutapa ambassador returned home without waiting for Barreto. Mutapa Negomo was furious because his message had not been conveyed to 'his first wife, Francisco Barreto' and so had the ambassador put to death.[93]

ii. Vasco Homem assumes command of the invasion forces

Barreto was so dejected by the way matters were going that after his return to Sena he soon died, some time in May 1573. He was succeeded as leader of the expedition by Vasco Fernandes Homem. Although Vasco Homem was willing to continue with the expedition, under pressure from Fr Monclaro a decision was taken to abandon the conquest project.[94] Of the original over-650 men who had left for Sena with Barreto, only 180 were still alive.[95] Vasco Homem returned to Mozambique Island where he started to recruit new men for the conquest of the gold-mines. In 1574 he set sail from Mozambique Island for Sofala with a force of 412 men. In December he commenced his expedition through Uteve to Manyika kingdom.[96] The Sachiteve and the Chikanga were enemies of long standing.[97] Homem sent an envoy to the Sachiteve with presents to ask for a free

passage to Manyika. The Portuguese envoy promised the Sachiteve that if he granted the favour requested of him trade between himself and the Portuguese would be increased. But the Sachiteve was not willing to have a direct route between Sofala and Manyika opened, for he feared that his own trade with the Portuguese would suffer as the latter would concentrate on the more lucrative gold trade of Manyika at the expense of the largely ivory-oriented trade of Uteve. This, Fr dos Santos tells us, would have made Chikanga rich and powerful, a thing the Sachiteve did not want his enemy to be. Furthermore, the Sachiteve did not want the Portuguese to have an intimate knowledge of his kingdom which they would do by traversing it. Homem decided to defy the Sachiteve by marching through his kingdom against his will.[98]

Following the Buzi river, Homem marched and sailed along that river until he came to 'Bandamataqua' where he spent the period from December to July 1575.[99] On his way to Bandamataqua and while he was there, Homem was continually harrassed by the people of Uteve, but each time he was able to prevail against them. The Sachiteve instructed his people not to sell any food to Homem's men but instead to hide the food, close up all water-holes and abandon their villages.[100] This was reminiscent of Samungazi's scorched-earth policy. While at Bandamataqua, Homem attacked and burned a number of villages. He was able to capture a wife, three children and a brother of the Sachiteve during this period.[101]

On 7 July 1575, Homem started his march to Manyika. But before leaving Bandamataqua he set fire to it as well as to the boats in which he had brought his provisions. The latter he did to make sure his soldiers understood that from that point on there was no going back. Homem's passage to Manyika was blocked at Sitabotonga hill by the Sachiteve's men. A fierce battle was fought in which Homem emerged victorious and was able to capture some weapons and provisions when the Teve forces had fled. From there he proceeded to the Sachiteve's *zimbabwe* where the latter's forces tried in vain to resist him. Homem routed them and set fire to the whole town.[102] But when he saw that the Sachiteve and his people had taken refuge in some rocky and strongly-defended area he ordered his men not to pursue them but instead to march towards Manyika. Homem first came to 'Bire', then a disaffected vassal of Mutapa, who was quite friendly to him and received much provision from him.[103]

When Homem came to Manyika kingdom, he was received

without resistance. The then Chikanga sent out an envoy with provisions and a message of friendship welcoming Homem into his kingdom. Homem reciprocated the friendly welcome by sending him a present. Afterwards, Chikanga personally welcomed Homem to his *binga* (capital), and ensured that Homem's men were well-provisioned during their stay in Manyika. Soon a friendship treaty was signed between the two. The major provisions of which were that from then onwards Portuguese traders would be free to come and go with their merchandise through Manyika kingdom and were free to work its mines and barter for gold.[104] These were important provisions from the Portuguese point of view because the *Inquérito* ordered by Barreto before leaving Mozambique Island for the mainland had shown that the Chikangas had often mistreated Portuguese traders.[105]

Since Manyika was the famed gold-mining region, the men of Homem had assumed that once they reached the place they would find gold everywhere, even on the roads, and all they would need to do was to pick it up and fill their bags. The reality was quite sobering. When they visited the places where gold was washed from the rivers they realized just how laborious the process of recovering gold was. And when they saw how and where it was dug from they began to appreciate just how risky the work was. Above all, they were struck by the meagreness of the returns for such effort. The assays carried out by Agostinho do Soutomayor, a gold-mining expert with the expedition, confirmed that while the Manyika mines were richer than those in Spanish Latin America, they were by no means the imagined *Eldorado* of the Lisbon dreamers. His experiments are said to have proved that one *quintal* (128 lbs or 58 kg) of crushed rock yielded two gold *cruzados*. To exploit these mines effectively, machinery, men and capital would be needed.[106] While it is possible that Homem's men may not have been shown Manyika's richest mines there is no reason to feel that the problems of exploiting them could have been any easier.

As Homem was concluding that there was little he could do at that stage to exploit the gold-mines of Manyika, reports reached him that Mutapa Negomo was dispatching his reputedly 100 000-man-strong army to Manyika.[107] The prospect of confronting such a large enemy force was too daunting for Homem and his men and so they decided to withdraw from Manyika. After reaffirming their friendship with Chikanga and presenting him with more presents as well as

bartering some cloths with his people, Homem and his men left Manyika[108] by way of Uteve where they were received in a friendly manner by the Sachiteve and his men who then wanted peace and friendship with the Portuguese. The Sachiteve was no doubt worried by the new Chikanga–Portuguese friendship – a prospect that Sachiteve Nyamunda had fought so hard to prevent. To minimize its effect the ruling Sachiteve realized that he also had to come to terms with the Portuguese. Homem demanded that the Sachiteve should allow free passage to all the Portuguese traders bound for the mines of Manyika seeing that 'there was no gold in his kingdom'.[109] It was agreed that in return for a free passage for all Portuguese traders, the captains of Sofala would pay a yearly tax of 200 pieces of cloth worth 200 *tostois* to the Sachiteve. This consolidated *curva* (*kuruva*) was to replace the *kuruvas* which each trader used to pay in the past.[110] In addition, Homem agreed to release the Sachiteve's great wife, three sons and a brother whom he had taken prisoners.[111]

By September 1575 Homem had reached Sofala, and by October of the same year he was at Sena planning to proceed with the occupation of the silver-mines of Chikova, wrongfully reported to be in Boquisa (Uchiza).[112] Homem had a fort built at Tete and was able to get some fresh reinforcements from Portugal. From Tete, Homem marched to Chikova in search of silver-mines. The people there, so it is reported, feared that if they showed the mines to the Portuguese they would lose their lands; therefore some of them are said to have planted pieces of silver in places where they knew there was no silver at all so that when Homem and his men dug at those places they found nothing except the pieces that had been planted. These planted pieces raised false hopes which were quickly dashed when nothing else could be found. While the Portuguese were following up such false leads, the people of Chikova fled their homes leaving no provisions for Homem and his men. Frustrated at not finding the silver-mines and running short of provisions, Homem decided to abandon the search for the silver-mines himself but instead left captain António Cardoso Almeida with 200 men to continue the quest for the mines. Cardoso and his men fared no better; lack of provisions, hunger and desperation drove them to sheer banditry in order to obtain food. For that reason, the people of Chikova decided to eliminate them by a ruse. By promising to show them some silver-mines they lured them into a trap where many were killed and the few

that escaped the death-trap by running to the temporary fort at Chikova were also eventually killed. The elimination of the 200 men led by Cardoso prompted Sousa to remark that, 'This may convince those who affirm that numbers of Kaffirs would fly from a gun, as not having before seen them, since here two hundred men fighting with them for their lives were all slain by their darts and arrows.'[113] Although formally the Barreto–Homem expedition to conquer the Munhumutapa came to an end on 13 March 1577 when Homem handed over the governorship to Dom Fernando de Monrroy, in effect the Chikova disaster had already destroyed it.[114]

That the Barreto–Homem expedition was a complete disaster cannot be gainsaid. But why it failed has sometimes been misunderstood. Sousa sums up the reasons for the failure thus, 'This was the end of that government, scarce begun sooner than ended . . . the first killed by rash words, the second expelled by a prudent, not barbarous, stratagem.'[115] No doubt Fr Monclaro's bad advice and the Chikanga's pliant diplomacy did play their part, but in addition the stubborn guerrilla-type resistance offered by the peoples of Samungazi and Uteve made their mark on Portuguese calculations. The tactical and forceful resistance by the people of Chikova was equally important. However, benefitting from the lessons the Portuguese were taught by the three peoples mentioned above was the true victor of the Barreto–Homem expedition, viz. Mutapa Negomo Mupunzagutu, the man who ordered that Fr Silveira be killed and the man the expedition was sent to conquer. By offering Barreto a force of 100 000 men he signalled to him that any attempt to attack him was going to be a stiff proposition. The message was never lost to either Barreto or Homem. After Barreto had weakened but not destroyed Samungazi's forces, Negomo sent his own forces down the Zambezi to discipline the Samungazi Tonga. The Mutapa army smashed the Samungazi forces, burnt their lands and succeeded in bringing to heel that difficult vassal. The Sachiteve's fate at the hands of Homem was particularly pleasing to the Mutapa in view of the history of hostility between Mukaranga and Uteve since the days of Nyamunda. At the end of these wars Negomo was in a relatively stronger position south of the Zambezi than before the Barreto expedition.

iii. Portuguese feiras and the penetration of Mutapa

The Barreto–Homem expedition introduced a large number of Portu-

guese into south Zambezia, increased interest and knowledge of the region among the Portuguese and, in spite of its failure militarily, demonstrated to the Africans in the area that the Portuguese traders came from a country where men were brave warriors fighting with death-spitting devices. A new era had been born in which the Portuguese were men to be respected. However this era was not primarily brought about through further military expeditions as the viceroy Dom Francisco or captain Nuno Velho Pereira had advocated, but through trade as some other Portuguese had suggested.[116]

Trade between the Portuguese and the Mutapa continued peacefully after the Barreto–Homem expedition.[117] With the formal establishment of Portuguese *feiras* (market-places) on the Zimbabwe highlands, commercial intercourse between the Portuguese and the Mutapa increased considerably. Some of these *feiras* may have been frequented originally by the moslem traders and then later by both moslem and Portuguese traders. At the time of the Barreto expedition no reference is made to the existence of Portuguese *feiras* in the interior. This is in spite of the fact that places like *Masapa, Masekesa, Arouva, Chevide* or *Chibide, Chipondo, Dioa, Carangua, Quicina, Macarara, Botare* are mentioned.[118] These are described at this stage only as mines where Sena traders sent their goods for for trading. In the case of Masapa it is even said that some Sena merchants had correspondents there.[119] The moslems used to call Masapa by the name Aufur (Mt Fura).[120] It is possible that Ruhanje, Manzovo and Bukutu were some of these mining centres where trading was carried out. These were probably some of the old moslem *bazaars* in operation before the arrival of the Portuguese. Therefore they would have continued as market-places since the Portuguese arrival in the area. For that reason it is necessary to distinguish between the existence of these places as trading centres and their legal establishment as Portuguese *feiras*. According to the Portuguese, a *feira* or *vila* is only established when a document, *Regimento*, establishing it through the appointment of a captain or some such officially-appointed officer has been issued. In other words, Masapa may have had Portuguese traders and existed as a trading market for many years but would not be regarded as having been established until the time when the captain of Mozambique appointed or recognized the first Portuguese captain of Masapa. It is in the latter sense of the use of the word that the establishment of Portuguese

feiras on the Zimbabwe highlands can be said to begin, not much earlier than the 1580s, with Masapa, Ruhanje and Bukutu being the three earliest.[121] Couto says that at these three *feiras* Dominican priests kept churches to minister to the christians living or passing through there.

Of the three, Masapa was the key place for there was to be found a Portuguese captain then said to have been appointed by the captain of Mozambique and confirmed by the Munhumutapa as 'captain of the gates' of the state of Munhumutapa. In the latter role, he had full authority to judge all the cases among the Portuguese and among the Africans over whom the Mutapa gave him jurisdiction. No one was allowed to proceed to Mutapa's *zimbabwe* from the coast without passing through Masapa. But this 'captain of the gates' was never allowed, under pain of death, to leave his post without Mutapa's permission. It may be noted that this Portuguese had taken over one aspect of the *Mukomohasha*'s functions which was to be 'captain of the gates'. From that time on, the *Mukomohasha* was to be known only as 'captain-general of the armies' of Mutapa. The full significance of the role of the captain of the gates has been discussed in chapter five where it was shown that this was an important development in Mutapa–Portuguese relations.

During the captaincy of Nuno Velho Pereira, thoughts of conquering Mutapa by force were still being entertained in some official circles.[122] One sore point was that apparently Mutapa Negomo was preventing the Portuguese traders from coming in direct contact with the Togwa ruler of Guruuswa who, so it would seem, was keen to establish trade contacts with the Portuguese.[123] However, during the captaincy of Dom Jorge de Menezes, which ended in 1589, relations had so improved that Negomo was sent what is said to have been a very beautiful greyhound by the latter. Apparently he so cherished that animal as well as a tame sheep which he had brought up himself that before he died he left instructions that those two were to be buried with him.[124] During the captaincy of de Menezes, the Portuguese king received advice from one Augustinian friar by the name of Augustine da Zevedo, who had travelled through the lands of Mutapa, to the effect that the Portuguese had such friendly relations with the Africans that it was unnecessary for the Portuguese to contemplate the use of armed force for the conquest of those lands. All that was needed was to increase trade by removing the captain's

monopoly. According to da Zevedo, the crown could make from duty taxes in one trading season (monsoon), i.e. six months, more than the 150 000 *cruzados* the captain paid the crown to lease the trade of the Rivers.[125] In addition, Fr da Zevedo warned the king about the danger posed by many moslems in the lands of Mutapa because they were involved in energetic proselytization.[126]

iv. Maravi invasions and the wars of Gatsi Rusere

Although the Zimba–Mumbo rising north of the Zambezi and around Tete took place during Negomo's reign these did not directly involve his empire during his time.[127] It was to his successor that the Maravi invasions became a threat. When Negomo died, shortly after receiving the greyhound from de Menezes, it is said his own chief wife also drank poison and died with him, a custom apparently much practised in those days.[128]

The successor to Negomo was a son of Nyandoro Mukomohasha known as Gatsi Rusere and most probably the general, i.e. the *Mukomohasha*, of the armies of Mutapa Negomo.[129] Among the senior sons of Negomo was Mavhura Mhande who expected to succeed his uncle, Gatsi Rusere. Negomo's death and Gatsi Rusere's succession took place between 1586 and 1589.[130]

Gatsi Rusere's reign was long and eventful, spanning in all a period of about 34 years. Gatsi himself was a mercurial, impetuous and proud man, apparently much addicted to dagga (marijuana). His reign witnessed Maravi invasions of Mukaranga, a major civil war and the growth of Portuguese influence in Zambezia in general as well as in the Mutapa state in particular. Although the Zimba and Mumbo, both Maravi-based societies described as having been much given to the consumption of human flesh, or any flesh for that matter, were playing havoc north of the Zambezi as early as around 1585, it was not until 1597 that their activities overflowed south of the Zambezi.[131] Some writers have explained the rise of the Zimba as a struggle for control of trade among the Maravi polities.[132] On the other hand, it is possible to see this movement as being a consequence of the processes of state formation. This struggle prevented normal food-producing activities and an acute shortage of resources reduced some of these people, especially the Zimba, to eating human flesh, a practice the Portuguese found so horrifying that they exaggerated its practice among these people. Flowing from

this expansionist policy, one ruler among these Maravi-based people known as Chunzo made careful plans before sending two of his captains, Kapampo *(Capampo)* and Chikanda *(Chicanda)* to invade and conquer the lands of Mutapa in 1597. According to one source, these Zimba were probably Shona-related refugees who went north of the Zambezi as refugees but were soon mobilized by Lundu of Maravi, who became their ruler. It has even been suggested that the return of the Zimba south of the Zambezi made them the first army of liberation in this region.[133]

Kapampo crossed the Zambezi and started occupying the lands of *Chirungo, Chironga* and *Nhanha* (Nehanda?) south of the Zambezi. This was an important gold-producing region 'where the captain of Masapa and other Portuguese merchants go and trade'.[134] Gatsi Rusere responded to this challenge immediately. He promptly mobilized his forces and chose the *Nengomasha* to be its commanding officer. At the same time, he called upon those few Portuguese then trading in his empire to accompany his forces against Kapampo, which the Portuguese willingly did. On hearing of these preparations against him, Kapampo abandoned his temporary conquests. In his retreat Kapampo practised a scorched-earth policy so that the pursuing army of the Mutapa could find no provisions and as a result was soon forced, by lack of provisions, to give up the chase. This episode is a good example in support of the view expressed in chapter four that the policy of living off the land was a major limiting factor in the Mutapa's ability to prosecute an offensive war. Bocarro's claim that Chunzo ran away because he had heard that Portuguese armed with guns accompanied Gatsi Rusere's army is wishful thinking on his part.[135] Larger Portuguese forces with muskets and cannons had previously attacked Maravi peoples before 1597 without great success and had often ended up as a much-needed source of protein to those people.[136] It is most likely that the size and promptness of Gatsi Rusere's response surprised Kapampo who by then had not yet consolidated his position.

However, the biggest disaster was brought about by Gatsi Rusere's own impetuosity for when he was told of how Kapampo had escaped he, in a fit of temper, ordered the *Nengomasha* to be put to death. By this act, Rusere triggered a civil war which led to his temporary deposition. The *Nengomasha* was the second most powerful man in the state and an uncle to Gatsi Rusere.[137] The

Nengomasha's family and its allies decided to revolt against Gatsi Rusere. The latter found himself with fewer supporters and so was forced to rely on Portuguese support. But before we can follow these civil wars let us look at the activities of Chikanda, the second captain of Chunzo to enter the Mutapa state.

Chikanda entered the Mutapa empire by the lands along the Marope river, where he fought, defeated and robbed many *vashambadzi* of Portuguese traders. After that he moved close to the Motambo river which was close to the Mutapa *zimbabwe*.[138] According to Bocarro, Chikanda began to fear that the Mutapa might attack and destroy him and therefore he decided to send an embassy with a rich present begging the emperor's pardon for having entered his state without his permission and claiming that his motive in so doing was to become a vassal of the Mutapa and not of Chunzo.[139] It would appear that the decision by Kapampo not to fight against the Mutapa must have taken Chikanda by surprise and therefore left him little choice but to abandon all immediate plans to continue with the invasion. The Mutapa accepted Chikanda's pledge of vassalage and allowed him to remain in the lands he had occupied. Chikanda stayed there for two years, i.e. until *c.* 1599,[140] before rebelling against the Mutapa. He started by attacking the lands belonging to some of Gatsi Rusere's wives, which were near where Chikanda was. Many of these lands were ravaged. Gatsi Rusere is said to have ordered the then *Mukomohasha* to lead a force of 30 000 men against Chikanda's 600 men who fought behind a well-defended stockade or *chuambo*.[141] This fortress is said to have been very high and built of thick, strong wood. A trench 25 palms in depth and as much in width surrounded it. The soil from the trench was banked very high against the wood, with only small loopholes left for firing arrows. Against similar Maravi fortifications north of the Zambezi, Portuguese armies using cannons made very little impression.[142] In the seventeenth century, the Portuguese built similar fortresses in southern Zambezi and the famous nineteenth-century *aringas* were a development from these Maravi fortifications.

Besides his 30 000 men, the Mutapa asked and received help from the Portuguese at Tete. About 75 Portuguese and 2 000 Africans from Tete came to fight Chikanda and his 600-man-strong force. For a whole day, from morning till night time, over 32 000 Portuguese and Mutapa forces battled against Chikanda's fortress

without destroying it. Chikanda lost so many men that he decided to sue for peace but Gatsi Rusere would not hear of it. He wanted a complete annihilation of Chikanda's forces. In the middle of the night Chikanda and his men tried to make a dash for their lives but many of them were killed in the attempt.[143]

It is said that Gatsi Rusere was so pleased with the Portuguese contribution that he decreed that from that day on the Portuguese would be allowed 'to enter his country with guns, a thing which was strictly forbidden by him before'.[144] This unwise decision of Gatsi Rusere contributed to the growth of Portuguese power in Mukaranga during the seventeenth century. Gatsi Rusere is also credited with having granted permission to the Portuguese priests to build churches at the *feiras* of Ruhanje, Bukutu and Masapa.[145] These churches were under the Dominican fathers.[146] Portuguese–Mutapa relations at this time were governed by the understanding that since the captains of Tete had been given jurisdiction over some 11 surrounding *fumos* or land chiefs by the Mutapa,[147] they were required to come to the aid of the central authority in times of emergency just like any other provincial ruler. These captains were Mutapa's special 'wives', i.e., vassals. The Portuguese captain of Masapa was seen much in the same light. Portuguese *prazos* of the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries had their origins in land grants like the one given to the captains of Tete. The full significance of the growing importance of the Portuguese connection to the Mutapa was to become even more evident in the first decade of the seventeenth century during the *Matuzianhe* (Matuzianye?) civil wars.

(a) Matuzianhe's revolt

When Gatsi Rusere executed the *Nengomasha*, after Kapampo had been chased out of the empire, the relations and friends of the *Nengomasha,* leading noblemen, decided, and were able, to rebel against Gatsi Rusere. The initial leader of this revolt was one *Chiraramuro* (Chireramhuru or Chiraramauro?) who attacked and took over a large part of Mutavara (*Antavoa*), which was ruled by Chikuma.[148] But *Chiraramuro's* revolt was short-lived because Gatsi Rusere raised an army which included some Portuguese and the captain of Masapa, Francisco da Cunha. When *Chiraramuro* received this information he escaped to one of the Mutapa vassals whom he

had assumed would be sympathetic to his cause, but to his misfortune this man, instead of giving him refuge, seized him and had him beheaded. In this way the initial revolt fizzled out. Mutapa's army burnt the villages and lands of *Chiraramuro*.[149]

But the mantle of leadership was soon assumed by one *Matuzianhe* described as 'a man of great spirit and lofty ambition' and a *pastor de vaccas* (keeper of the cattle) of *Chiraramuro*.[150] *Matuzianhe* was such a capable leader that he was able to seize some strategic lands and then place some of his henchmen over these lands. One by the name of Nyagonye (?) *(Anconhe)* was placed over *Antavoa* while Chirovadanda *(Chorouadanda)* was given Nyombwe (?) *(Nhemboe)* and Nyamazino *(Inhamazino)* received Chizinga (*Quizinga*). *Matuzianhe* himself at first occupied the lands between the *zimbabwe* and Masapa dominated by the mountains of Matarira. In addition, *Matuzianhe* declared himself the new Mutapa and some groups recognized his pretensions.[151] *Matuzianhe* and his men waged relentless war against Gatsi Rusere and obstructed the trade of the Portuguese. The Portuguese traders from Tete and their followers, led by Diogo Simões Madeira, successfully attacked the rebels of Chizinga since these and those of *Antavoa* were closest to the Portuguese *feiras* and had done the most to hinder trade. However, the planned attack on *Antavoa* by António Fereira had to be put off when Nyagonye promised Fereira that there was no quarrel between the rebels and the Portuguese. All the rebels wanted was to fight against Gatsi Rusere.[152]

Gatsi Rusere responded to this challenge by mobilizing his remaining forces to confront the rebels. He also asked for help from the Portuguese of Sena but this was not forthcoming. Gatsi was disappointed by this lack of co-operation from the Portuguese and therefore sent an ultimatum to the captain of Masapa, António Fereira, stating that if the Portuguese found in his empire did not come to his aid he, before proceeding to wipe out the rebels on his own, would first of all attack Masapa and order all the Portuguese in his lands to be plundered. The threat worked and the Portuguese quickly put together some sort of a force, which included Diogo Simões Madeira, to assist Gatsi Rusere. It is said that the force which Gatsi Rusere assembled was able to win some victories against the rebels but not much is known of these victories; the only thing certain being that they cannot have been decisive as the civil wars continued

for some years and Gatsi Rusere even lost his capital and empire to *Matuzianhe*.[153]

It is said that Simões Madeira acquitted himself so well in his help to Gatsi Rusere during these wars that, on 1 August 1607, the latter, camped on the banks of the river Manzovo opposite the villages of Nyamakutu (?) *(Inyamakoto)* and Marenga, gave all the mines of gold, silver, copper, iron, lead and pewter to be found in his empire to Madeira who immediately donated them to the Portuguese king.[154] It will be recalled that silver-mines in the Mutapa empire in theory already 'belonged' to the king of Portugal through the so-called donation of Negomo Mupunzagutu.[155] Besides, some of the gold-mines had already been given to some Portuguese traders but those traders preferred trade and commerce to working the mines.[156] For these reasons, aspects of the Madeira donation were simply an exercise in superfluity. More curious, however, is the fact that the document purported to give power to Gatsi Rusere to hand over to Madeira what the former did not possess. The concept of personal ownership implied in the document for such natural resources as land, minerals, wood, water, etc., was quite alien and not capable of being comprehended by Gatsi Rusere and his people. In addition, the time Gatsi Rusere made the donation he was virtually a refugee who had lost his capital to *Matuzianhe* who then claimed to be the rightful Mutapa, Gatsi having been deposed.[157] As the document was never respected by anybody, including Mutapa Gatsi Rusere himself, perhaps there is no need to spend too much space on it. Of some interest for the future was the fact that Gatsi gave two of his sons and promised two daughters to Madeira to bring up and educate in the christian way.[158] For this service to the Portuguese crown in these civil wars, Madeira was awarded the coveted Habit of the Order of Christ, a pension of 40 000 *reis* and a promise of enoblement.[159] But, as things turned out, he never received any of these awards.[160]

After the signing of the above document, the composite Gatsi Rusere–Portuguese forces successfully engaged the enemy at *Antavoa*, forcing Nyagonye to flee to Chizinga then under *Gurapaza* (Gurabadza). Although some villages in Chizinga were attacked and burnt by the forces of Gatsi Rusere, the latter failed to hold these areas of Chizinga. Gatsi then decided to retreat with his wives and children towards the Manzovo river and released the exhausted Portuguese forces so that they could retire to Tete.[161]

Gatsi stayed around the Manzovo river until 1608[162] before

deciding to renew his wars. Instead of fighting *Matuzianhe*, Gatsi decided first to deal with Makombe of Barwe because he was then refusing to pay tribute to Gatsi as in the past.[163] In other words, 1608 may be taken as the limit after which Barwe ceased to be a part of the Mutapa empire. To get to Barwe, Gatsi had to traverse the lands of the Samungazi Tonga. Although the Samungazi ruler brought him a rich present as an acknowledgement of his vassalage, Gatsi was not impressed, for reports reaching him had indicated that the former had espoused *Matuzianhe*'s cause, and so he had that ruler killed. This act turned the Samungazi Tonga into open enemies of Gatsi and declared supporters of *Matuzianhe*. In engagements fought between these Tonga and Gatsi's forces, the former were always victorious. Gatsi decided to abandon his intention to crush the Samungazi Tonga and proceed with his campaign against Makombe. But lack of provisions soon forced him to abandon that expedition too. In the end, Gatsi was forced to spend a miserable winter in Barwe after losing many men.[164]

Gatsi's failure rebounded well on *Matuzianhe* who gained an increasing number of adherents, including those previously counted as Gatsi's allies. Apparently *Matuzianhe* seduced some of these by pointing out that his victory would mean that they would be exempt from paying tribute to the Mutapa.[165] So bold had *Matuzianhe* become that he pushed the lands loyal to his cause as far down as Nyambanzou *(Inhabanzo)*, not far from Tete, but he was unable to hold Nyambanzou for long because Simões Madeira pushed him out of that area.[166] Afterwards Gatsi granted Nyambanzou to Madeira who in turn asked the Portuguese crown to confirm the grant, which the latter gladly did. This story illustrates best how some of the *prazos* of the Zambezi valley were established.[167]

In the meantime, Gatsi and his forces in Barwe were in such dire straits – threatened by starvation, the Samungazi Tonga and the people of Barwe – that he sent a distress message to Simões Madeira asking him to help him to extricate himself from his predicament, then deteriorating as Samungazi Tonga attacks increased. Madeira obliged by sending a relief column which arrived none too early, for many of Gatsi's people, including his eldest son, had been killed and he himself wounded twice by the arrows of the Samungazi Tonga. With the help of the relief column, Gatsi was able to retreat to Nyambanzou where Madeira was waiting for him. He remained there

for three months resting and recuperating. But Nyambanzou could not produce all the needed provisions because *Matuzianhe* had plundered and ravaged the land before retreating. At the suggestion of Madeira, Gatsi decided to move up to Chidima where provisions were available. It is said Madeira's other motive in suggesting this move was that he wanted Gatsi to be nearer to the silver-mines of Chikova so that he could hand them over to him. Gatsi followed Madeira's advice and, accompanied by 20 guns and 1 000 Africans from Tete, left for Chidima where he spent the rest of 1608.[168]

Gatsi remained at Chidima until June 1609 when Simões Madeira came to his aid with 70 guns and 2 000 African warriors. This was in addition to another 30 soldiers under the command of António de Bairros de Almeida who had been sent to Chidima in April of that year to defend Gatsi from rebel attacks. Madeira also brought a present from the viceroy to Gatsi. It is claimed that Gatsi was so pleased by this latest evidence of Portuguese friendship that he offered to show the silver-mines of Chikova to Madeira. The ruler of Chikova was made to accept vassalage to Madeira. But, as it turned out, in reality Gatsi had no intention of handing over the silver-mines of Chikova to Madeira. To ensure that these mines would not be handed over, Gatsi ordered his wives and children, for their own safety, to go ahead of the army together with the ruler of Chikova. When the latter reached Chikova he secretly disappeared so that when Gatsi, Madeira and the army arrived at Chikova to take over the mines, nobody could be found who knew where the silver-mines were. Everyone said only the ruler of Chikova, who had escaped, knew their whereabouts.[169] Since nothing more could be done about the matter, Gatsi urged that the army should proceed along the Zambezi towards Mukaranga. After 18 days at Chikova, they marched up the Zambezi until they came opposite a small island where some sympathizers of the rebels had fled with their women and children. From their sanctuary they began abusing Gatsi with opprobrious names. This incensed him so much that he ordered that those people should be punished. The Portuguese turned their swivel guns on them and forced them to abandon the island hurriedly, with the result that many were killed by the guns and others drowned when their overloaded canoes capsized. Gatsi's anger was assuaged by this turn of events and so he ordered the army to proceed with its journey.[170]

Two leagues from the island the army came to a mountain where

they were ambushed by a combined force of the survivors from the island and the people of *mambo Musviba* (Muzipa; Musvipa? – the Black One). Many of Gatsi's people were killed but in the end the attackers were forced to withdraw. After the defeat of *Musviba*, Gatsi and his army went in search of *mambo* Motoposo who had taken the opportunity of *Matuzianhe's* revolt to become independent and hence 'exempt from paying tribute'. In the first clash between Gatsi and Motoposo the latter was defeated and forced to abandon two of his forts. But the very following day he came with a bigger force, which fared no better than the first one. Many of Motoposo's people were either killed or taken prisoners, e.g., one of his sons-in-law *(mbokorume)* who was captain of the force. Gatsi then had the country sacked and pillaged for eight days.[171]

The stage was now set for the showdown between the two Munhumutapas — the exiled Gatsi Rusere and *Matuzianhe*, then in possession of the capital and 'obeyed by all the natives'. A day before his army reached the river *Magida Cochena* (Madzi-Chena or Mamvura Machena? – White Waters), Gatsi Rusere rested his men for the night. While in that place some of *Matuzianhe's* men came to taunt Gatsi Rusere. They called him all sorts of names including a 'thief' and 'Monomotapa *bangueiro*', meaning to say the Munhumutapa who is always drunk from taking *mbanje* or marijuana. Gatsi, as already noted, was much addicted to this herb. They also told him that *Matuzianhe* was waiting to sober him up near the river Machena. It is said Gatsi was beside himself as a result of these abuses, especially when he saw that nothing could be done to his tormentors at that stage.[172]

The following morning he struck camp and proceeded to the Mamvura Machena river. On the way there some of his vassals who had supported *Matuzianhe* came to pledge their loyalty to him. He accepted their pledge for renewed loyalty and allowed bygones to be bygones. When he reached the river Mamvura Machena, *Matuzianhe* was nowhere to be found. He pitched camp and spent an uneasy night there.

The following morning *Matuzianhe* appeared with a force said to have been 20 000-strong. He ordered two-thirds of his men to engage the forces of Gatsi Rusere and the other one-third to fight the Portuguese forces. *Matuzianhe's* forces facing those of Gatsi Rusere were drawn in a half moon and soon attacked and encircled Gatsi's

army 'with loud cries and such a din of trumpets and drums that it seemed as if the heavens were falling'.[173] While those forces turned against Gatsi Rusere's army were making progress, those engaging the Portuguese, although they fought valiantly, were soon put to flight. The Portuguese forces then came to the assistance of Gatsi's men, who 'would certainly have been defeated'[174] had this not happened. In the end, *Matuzianhe's* warriors were forced to retreat, many of them being captured or killed in the process. *Matuzianhe* and those of his men who survived escaped to the capital, a distance of two days' journey, from where *Matuzianhe* took his wives and children and continued withdrawing until he reached Mt Matarira, whence he had started his revolt. Gatsi Rusere followed and entered his capital after nearly three years of exile.[175]

But *Matuzianhe* was far from being destroyed. While at Matarira he decided to take some rest to allow two wounds he had received in the battle to recover. But during that time he slowly began to assemble another force which included his supporters from Chizinga. When he was ready he divided his men into two battalions, one to attack the Portuguese and the other to attack Gatsi Rusere's *zimbabwe*. The battalion to attack the Portuguese was captained by Nyagonye who had previously taken part in a successful attack, led by Gurabadza, the lord of Chizinga, against the Portuguese at Bukutu. The second battalion was led by *Matuzianhe* himself and this attacked the *zimbabwe* at night. The latter force entered the *zimbabwe* and started burning many houses until they reached the apartments of the great wife, who secretly escaped to the Portuguese quarters. The position was rather precarious for Gatsi Rusere. But thanks again to Madeira who was able to contain the forces led by Nyagonye and then turn to succour Gatsi, the situation was saved and *Matuzianhe* was forced to abandon the attack. *Matuzianhe* lost many people and was saved from further punishment that night only because it was dark and cloudy.

As *Matuzianhe's* defeat became known, many more provincial rulers began to pledge their loyalty to Gatsi Rusere. But Gatsi realized that so long as *Matuzianhe* was safe at Matarira he would try again to attack him. He therefore raised an army which included some Portuguese and their followers. He ordered Madeira and the greater number of the Portuguese forces to remain at his *zimbabwe* while he himself proceeded to Mt Matarira. When Gatsi reached Matarira,

Matuzianhe was not ready for battle, seeing that he had only a small force with him, and so he was forced to flee from Matarira to Chizinga. In his hurried escape he abandoned his women, children and more than 8 000 head of cattle as well as other spoils. All these were captured by Gatsi Rusere without any resistance.[176]

After the victory over *Matuzianhe*, Gatsi felt sufficiently secure on his throne that he asked Madeira and his men to return to Tete and leave him only 10 armed soldiers to act as his personal bodyguard.[177] This was done and Madeira left for Tete. But Gatsi was rather uneasy that *Matuzianhe* was still alive and so he arranged with one of the latter's old allies to have him murdered. *Matuzianhe* had no reason to suspect that man he allowed the latter to visit him in private. During their conversation the traitor raised his dagger and assassinated *Matuzianhe*. He then secretly returned to Gatsi to tell him that he had accomplished his mission. After that Munhumutapa Gatsi Rusere felt much safer 'and remained in peace, obeyed by the kings who had formerly disowned and overthrown him.'[178]

v. The silver-mines of Chikova

When Diogo Simões Madeira was given leave by Gatsi to return to Tete with his men he was also accompanied by some ambassadors of the Mutapa who were to put him in possession of the silver-mines of Chikova.[179] These ambassadors were brought to Sena where they met Dom Estevão de Ataide, the new Portuguese 'Captain of the Conquest of Mutapa'.[180] Dom Estevão appointed Diogo Carvalho to be Captain of Masapa and gave him 50 soldiers to be his garrison in view of the continued threat posed by the rebels of Chizinga. Carvalho left for the interior with the 50 soldiers and the ambassadors of Mutapa. When Carvalho came to Mutapa Gatsi Rusere, he verbally, and apparently falsely, promised that the *kuruva* would soon be paid by the Portuguese and that much trade goods were on the way. In return he asked that the silver-mines should be handed over to him.[181] Gatsi was happy with this and promised to transfer the silver-mines. Carvalho then proceeded to Masapa where he built a fortress.[182] But the appointment of Dom Estevão as Captain of the Conquest of Munhumutapa, and that of Carvalho to reopen Masapa and build a fort there to be garrisoned by 50 soldiers, was in line with the Portuguese king's instructions aimed at

capitalizing on Gatsi's temporary weakness in order to occupy his country.

In the meantime, the rebels of Chizinga not only harrassed those Portuguese traders trying to come into contact with Gatsi Rusere but on two separate occasions also attacked those Portuguese who had reoccupied the *feira* of Masapa. It is said that on each of the two occasions they captured some cattle and wounded some Portuguese soldiers. When the Mutapa heard about this he sent an army under a new *Nengomasha* to go and defend Masapa. This the *Nengomasha* did. He constructed a *chuambo* for his men and successfully prevented any further attacks from Chizinga for six months.[183]

But when Gatsi realized that Carvalho and his leader Estevão had no intention of paying the customary *kuruva* he declared a *mupeto* (*empata*), i.e. limited war, to allow for the confiscation of all Portuguese property in the Mutapa empire. Much Portuguese property was seized and some Portuguese traders and their agents were killed. Among the Portuguese traders whose property was seized but whose lives were spared was Diogo Simões Madeira who was then trading at the market-place of Urupande (Hwangwa *feira*?). When Carvalho heard of this he secretly sent emissaries to the rebels of Chizinga to ask them to join him in attacking the forces of the *Nengomasha* which were guarding Masapa. The Chizinga rebels readily agreed and one night the combined Portuguese–Chizinga forces treacherously fell upon the unsuspecting *Nengomasha*, killing and wounding many of his warriors. The *Nengomasha* himself was wounded but managed to escape to the Mutapa's *zimbabwe*. Fearing the consequences of his dastardly act, Carvalho hurriedly abandoned Masapa and returned to Tete.[184]

When Dom Estevão heard of these reports he continued to hold to his previous resolution of not paying the *kuruva* and, in addition, decided to conquer the silver–mines of Chikova by force of arms.[185] Estevão moved from Sena to Tete from where he ordered Carvalho to proceed two days' journey up the river. There Carvalho built a new fortress known as São Estevão Fort. The construction of this fort was in line with the Portuguese king's instructions of 1608. But soon Estevão received intelligence that the Dutch intended to attack Mozambique Island. He then left the Rivers of Sena for that island in 1612 leaving Simões Madeira in charge of Tete.[186]

In his desire to consolidate his authority, Gatsi sent an army

against one Chief Marenga living near Tete who was refusing to acknowledge vassalage to him. Although Marenga was twice forced to flee his country, on each occasion, through Portuguese help, he was able to regain control of it. From this it is clear that Portuguese relations with Gatsi had deteriorated considerably.[187] But when Gatsi heard that Estevão had returned from Mozambique he sent some ambassadors to tell him that he was prepared to hand over the silver-mines provided Estevão paid the *kuruva*. But Estevão, who had already expended 18 000 *maticals* of gold, or 30 000 *cruzados*, on the Carvalho mission to establish Masapa, refused not only to pay the 5 000 *cruzados* for the *kuruva* but would not even speak to the ambassadors sent to him. Instead he prepared an army to go and conquer the Mutapa. With 125 soldiers he moved to Fort São Estevão. But while he was there, in July 1613, he received letters relieving him of his command and entrusting the conquest of the mines to Simões Madeira.[188]

On 10 August 1613 Madeira left Sena with an army to go and occupy the silver-mines of Chikova, but not far from Sena he came to Chombe's country. Chombe was a powerful ruler who was then unwilling to pay tribute to Sena.[189] The many battles against Chombe delayed Madeira's journey to Chikova until 15 April 1614.[190] Such was the effectiveness of Chombe's resistance,[191] and such the amount of firearms at his disposal, that Bocarro ruefully remarked that Chombe

> surreptitiously and in secret . . . had furnished himself with firearms, in order that he might now grow proud and fortify himself against our people. This should have been carefully looked to, for the Kaffirs who were formerly terrified by the discharge of a gun now use them, and most of the powerful Kaffirs in these parts have a better arsenal of guns than there can be in the captain's factory.[192]

Before leaving for Chikova in 1614, Madeira put together a powerful invasion force to which even the then Lundu (*Rundo*) of the Maravi people contributed. When these reports reached Gatsi Rusere he sent envoys to Madeira advising him that he was happy to give him the silver-mines peacefully so long as he did not come with armed men and provided he sent him some clothes. Madeira accepted these conditions and asked for a high-ranking ambassador to put him in charge of the mines and to receive 4 000 *cruzados* worth of merchandise. Gatsi sent an embassy led by his nephew Neshangwe

(Inhaxangue) to receive the goods and put Madeira in possession of the mines.[193]

With 100 soldiers, and 600 Africans to carry provisions, Madeira left Tete in April and arrived in Chikova on 8 May 1614.[194] As soon as they reached Chikova, Neshangwe summoned the ruler of Chikova and his notables and publicly told him that jurisdiction over the lands of Chikova had been given to Madeira as a representative of the king of Portugal and that it was the Mutapa's will that the silver-mines should be shown to the Portuguese. The ruler of Chikova and his men replied that the will of the Mutapa will be done in Chikova. Madeira was happy with that and gave them some clothes. A few days later when Madeira asked the ruler of Chikova to come and show him the mines the latter disappeared leaving no trace. Madeira recalled that this same character had behaved in much the same way in 1608 when Gatsi and Madeira passed through Chikova. He therefore sent an embassy to Gatsi asking him to depose that ruler and to replace him with one more amenable.[195]

In the meantime, Madeira was building a fortress which he called São Miguel.[196] When the ambassadors were gone to see Gatsi, Madeira received envoys from a ruler across the Zambezi opposite Chikova, whose name was *Sapoe* (Sapwe?) who offered friendship, trade and a village near the Zambezi bank to Madeira. Madeira was happy to accept the offer.[197] On the land given by *Sapoe*, Madiera was to build a Portuguese fort known as Fort São António being the first and furthest of the interior Portuguese settlements north of the Zambezi before the eighteenth century.[198] In the meantime, the ambassadors sent to Mutapa Gatsi Rusere returned with a cripple known as *Cherema* (Chirema) and a lamp of silver ore weighing half an *arratel* which Chirema had taken to Mutapa Gatsi Rusere. The embassy told Madeira that since Chikova was already handed over to him as a representative of the ruler of Portugal he was free to depose and appoint whomsoever he wished to the chieftaincy of Chikova. Since Chirema knew where the silver-mines were found and as he claimed to be a son of a former ruler of Chikova, Madeira should have him made the new ruler of Chikova.[199]

Madeira then deposed the missing ruler of Chikova and in his place appointed Chirema. But Chirema proved no more amenable than the last man for he too claimed that he did not actually know where the silver-mines were to be found, as such, but had to rely on the *vadzimu* who told him in his dreams where silver was to be found

whenever he wanted it. Madeira had to put pressure on him before he started squealing. At first Chirema planted pieces of silver in various places and claimed that these places were the famous silver-mines of Chikova. Madeira was not taken in but instead had Chirema tortured until he confessed that he was only obeying a plot hatched by Mutapa Gatsi Rusere not to betray where the silver-mines were. After that, Chirema showed Madeira what he claimed was an old silver-mine which could not be worked at the time because it was the dry season.[200] Madeira decided to let matters rest there for the time being. Instead he decided to explore the northern bank of the Zambezi. Since *Sapoe* had already offered him the opportunity to explore the possibility of a route to Tete by the other side of the Zambezi, Madeira sent an expedition to do just that. The apparent treachery of Mutapa Gatsi Rusere over the question of the silver-mines probably further convinced him of the wisdom of finding a northern route. The expedition to establish the feasibility of a northern route successfully completed its mission but concluded that the route was unsuitable for regular trade traffic.[201]

In the meantime, Madeira felt that he needed more provisions if his work at Chikova was to succeed and so after strengthening the fort he decided to leave a force of 44 soldiers at the fort while he himself, accompanied by Neshangwe, returned to Sena.[202] From Sena he sent word to Mutapa Gatsi asking him to send envoys to receive presents which Madeira wished to give to Gatsi as a sign of his appreciation for having been put in charge of Chikova. These presents included a horse, a gold *ndoro* (pendant), a silk banner[203] and some other items. The Mutapa's envoys came down to receive these items but asked that since it was then the dry season the horse should be kept at Sena until a more suitable time. Madeira then sent some of his own envoys to accompany the goods.[204] Apparently Gatsi was not satisfied with the presents from Madeira and so he detained the latter's envoys and directed them to write to Madeira saying that the Mutapa wanted, in addition to what he had already received, mirrors, pins, needles, knives, scissors, silk thread, candles, pepper, soap, porcelain ware, Portuguese saffron and several rich silk cloths. Madeira felt that Gatsi was looking for a pretext to revoke the donation of Chikova.[205] Therefore to give him no alibi, and to secure the release of his envoys held by Gatsi, he complied with his demands. Later Madeira was to learn that the diviners (*n'anga*), *mhondoro* and other spiritual leaders

had warned Gatsi that the discovery of silver would lead to the destruction of the empire. A not altogether inaccurate assessment of the position, it might be added.[206]

But two events were to provide Gatsi Rusere with the excuse he needed to attack the Portuguese at Chikova. The first was the actions of one of his sons, Prince Dom Filippe. It will be recalled that on the occasion the exiled Gatsi is purported to have granted rights over the minerals in his empire to Madeira, he also gave two of his sons to be brought up as christians by Madeira. This Madeira did and had the two princes baptized, the eldest by Fr Jorónymo Baptista who gave him the name Dom Filippe and the second by Fr Francisco do Avellar who named the prince Dom Diogo. Madeira was godfather to both. But a few months later Gatsi recalled Filippe claiming that his mother wanted to see him. Once he returned, dressed in silken clothes as befitted a Portuguese gentleman of his station, Gatsi removed those frills and clothed him like a true Shona prince and had him brought up in the customs of his people. However the younger son, Dom Diogo, remained at Tete and learnt how to speak, read and write Portuguese very well. He understood christian doctrine and was able to serve at mass.[207]

Prince Filippe always hungered to go back to Tete and a number of times tried unsuccessfully to escape to Tete. Once he reached as far as the lands of Tete before he was recaptured. On that occasion Gatsi ordered all those who had helped his son to escape to be put to death. But when his father released Madeira's ambassadors whom he was holding prisoner, Prince Filippe decided to follow them to Chikova. When he reached Chikova, Madeira was still at Tete. At Chikova, Filippe was told that Chirema was proving unco-operative and was unwilling to show the Portuguese where the silver-mines were located. In addition he would not come to the Fort São Miguel when ordered to do so by its captain. Dom Filippe, pretending he was an ambassador from his father, summoned Chirema to the fort. The latter came to do him homage, but Filippe reprimanded him for not showing the silver-mines to the Portuguese claiming that in so doing he had defied his father. He then ordered him to be kept prisoner at the fort until he agreed to co-operate. After that, Dom Filippe proceeded to Tete via the northern bank of the Zambezi. At Tete he was warmly welcomed by Madeira who allocated some land to him. When Gatsi Rusere heard all this he put a price on his son's head.

But, so it is said, nobody dared to spill royal blood save in war.[208]

To compound the situation still further, the Portuguese captain at Chikova, Diogo Teixeira Barroso, shot and killed a son of *sadunhu Inhamoċucura* (Nyamukukura?) because one of the Portuguese soldiers claimed that he felt humiliated when that boy told him not to tread down his father's millet or take fruit from a tree in the field as both acts were displeasing to him. *Inhamocucura* was naturally very aggrieved by this act. When Gatsi heard of this story he resolved to attack the Portuguese fort at Chikova.[209]

Gatsi mobilized an army said to have numbered 9 000 or 10 000 men to ambush Madeira on his way from Tete to Chikova. According to Madeira's reported testimony the Mutapa army was led by Gatsi's eldest son with the name/title *Sachikova*.[210] During the eighteenth century there is a report which says that one of the Mutapa's *nevanjes* (heirs) was always made ruler of Chikova. It is possible this *Sachikova* of Gatsi was the future Mutapa Nyambo Kapararidze. But Madeira received intelligence about the trap and so decided to return to Chikova through the northern route. Gatsi got to know of Madeira's decision to use the northern route and so lifted the ambush and instead ordered his men to go and attack Fort São Miguel at Chikova before Madeira arrived. On 18 March 1615 the Mutapa army attacked the fortress but failed to take it. They decided to spend a day resting and making wickers to act as shields for the purpose of storming the fortress. Plans were made to take the fortress on March 20, but on that very day Madeira arrived with reinforcements. The Mutapa army decided to abandon the siege almost immediately.[211] And when Gatsi heard these reports he sent some ambassadors to the fort to inform Madeira that the attack on the fortress did not have his permission and those who took part in it had deservedly suffered at the hands of the Portuguese. But this did not fool anyone, least of all Madeira.[212] Both sides were biding their time and the Tonga subjects of Mutapa around Chikova remained hostile to the Portuguese.[213]

Madeira, using Chirema as chief informant, discovered a number of silver deposits in April 1615.[214] Samples were taken to Goa and Madrid.[215] Gaspar Bocarro tried to carry some of the silver by overland route to Kilwa and from there to Spain but this proved impossible once he reached Kilwa and so he had to return to the Rivers of Sena.[216] The life at Chikova was not all about silver but also about fevers and strange diseases that attacked the garrison, as well

as about lack of labourers and provisions which were hard to procure, partly because of Tonga hostility and partly for lack of merchandise with which to buy them.[217] The garrison was lucky to get the famous Fr João dos Santos as its chaplain in January 1616.[218]

Besides the hostile environment in which the Chikova miners/soldiers found themselves, they shouldered on in the hope of reinforcements from Goa; but when these arrived they were led by judge Francisco da Fonseca Pinto who soon took a strong dislike to Madeira, preferring to use the supplies he had brought for his own trade. He refused to send him any help, invited the Mutapa to destroy him and later even sent a Portuguese force to try to kill Madeira.[219] Mutapa Gatsi was delighted to hear that judge Francisco Pinto described Madeira as a rebel who must be killed. Gatsi promised to take action against Madeira without delay.[220] In the light of all these difficulties Madeira decided to abandon Fort São Miguel, Chikova, on 17 August and to return to Tete.[221] At great risk to his life he was able to enter his lands of Nyambanzou near Tete.[222] When judge Pinto heard that Madeira was at Nyambanzou he again sent an embassy to Gatsi asking him to come and attack Madeira. Gatsi agreed to this but demanded that Pinto first send him merchandise (*kuruva*?). Pinto's reply to Gatsi's demand is unknown but a month after Pinto left Sena, Mutapa Gatsi Rusere himself commanded an army that attacked and drove Madeira away from the lands of Nyambanzou. He attacked the area around Tete and made himself master of all of the territory of Tete. He then sent word to the captain of Tete that he wanted the merchandise that judge Fonseca Pinto had promised him if he took Nyambanzou. He added ominously that if they did not send it to him he would oblige them by descending on Tete to fetch it himself. At first the Portuguese thought of fleeing away from Tete but on further reflection decided to collect as much merchandise as possible to sent to Gatsi Rusere. The latter was happy with their 'present' and also about the fact that he had reconquered all the villages around Tete over which he reappointed new lords from among his Shona nobles.[223] By this action Gatsi had undone the harm he had brought upon himself by his ill-judged action against the *Nengomasha*. The civil wars following on that action led to his temporary deposition and forced him to rely on Madeira to an unhealthy degree. Failure to learn from this example was to lead to a similar situation from 1629 to the late seventeenth century.

The Maravi and Mutapa wars from 1585 to 1617 demonstrated the vast numbers that were available to fight wars in Lower Zambezia. In spite of claims to the contrary by Portuguese chroniclers, it was not Portuguese firearms that proved decisive in these wars but rather the Maravi introduction of the *chuambos* (forts) in the interior and the availability of large African levies ready to join an expedition for booty and adventure. By paying cloth to these levies before undertaking an expedition, the Portuguese, especially Madeira, were creating what was largely a mercenary force. In this way they were weaning vassals from paying allegiance to central authorities. North of the Zambezi, Portuguese intervention was largely unsuccessful but south of the Zambezi the civil wars in the Mutapa empire allowed Madeira to throw his weight behind one of the factions; in this way he became an important force in the region. Madeira understood that his success was based on his ability to win support from a number of local African rulers. Portuguese soldiers might win an engagement but they could not effectively occupy the country. Disease and lack of provisions always so weakened their position that in the end it always became untenable. As Castelbranco put it:

> Experienced persons are therefore of opinion that the conquest should be carried on *with a small force and a large quantity of cloth, which is also the opinion of Diogo Simões [Madeira], for this is more effectual against the Kaffirs than arms* . . . it being sufficient to give presents to the petty kings to gain free access among them . . .
>
> All agree that two hundred Portuguese would be sufficient to go over all the territory of Monomotapa, and survey the territory of Chicova, especially by bribing the fumos and rulers of the surrounding districts.[224] (emphasis added)

The same point was made with greater clarity by Captain Rezende in 1634 when he wrote that,

> The power of the natives is vastly greater than that of the few Portuguese who are found in the country, but the conditions are now very different from what they were in former times, for we fight them with the same Kaffirs with whom they formerly fought us, and it is noteworthy that among these our slaves or vassals who fight for us, till the present there has been found no treason, but they fight against those who are Kaffirs like themselves, with all their might and fidelity.[225]

When Gatsi sought the destruction of Madeira he singled out the one man who understood where power resided in the Zambezi valley and,

by appointing his own Shona rulers of the villages around Tete, Gatsi undercut Portuguese and Madeira's real source of power and stabilized his own authority. But by far the biggest loss was the breakaway of the kingdom of Barwe, which drastically reduced the size of the Mutapa empire. It appears that the Manyika kingdom, being closely related to Barwe in origin, also took the opportunity to secede from the empire.[226] From 1618 until his death around 1623 Gatsi Rusere was merely the ruler of the kingdom of Mukaranga, rather than of an empire. However he had not abandoned his pretensions to suzerainty over Uteve, Barwe and Manyika. In addition to the above problems it does not seem he was in fact able to completely squash the revolts by his other subordinate chiefs and sons.[227]

Since the Portuguese authorities were aware of the Mutapa weaknesses and because the desire to possess the silver-mines had been whetted by the samples Madeira and his men had obtained from Chikova, the Portuguese continued to hatch plans for the occupation of the silver-mines until Gatsi's death. As early as March 1618, the Portuguese king, spurred on by Fr Francisco do Avellar's report of 1617, had resolved that a powerful force should be put together for the conquest of the silver-mines. For this mission Dom Nuno Alvares was put in charge and the king contributed 22 000 *cruzados* worth of clothes.[228] But before Alvares arrived to the Rivers of Sena, Simões Madeira is supposed to have been asked in 1618 by the Governor of India to continue with the discovery of the silver-mines. Although he is said to have actually assembled some soldiers for the mission to Chikova,[229] we do not know if in fact he ever left for or reached Chikova on that occasion. In July 1619 Nuno Alvares arrived at Tete. From there he sent to Gatsi Rusere a letter patent of brotherhood and a banner from the king of Portugal.[230] He probably asked for permission to go to Chikova. These presents seem to be the ones the king of Portugal sent to Goa in 1609 but were never delivered.[231] Gatsi was pleased to receive the presents[232] but expressed his opposition to Diogo Carvalho, former Captain of Masapa, Diogo Teixeira Barroso, the one-time acting Captain of Fort São Miguel, Chikova, who shot chief *Inhamocucura's* son, and Diogo Simões Madeira being included in Nuno Alvares' suspicious expedition to Chikova. Furthermore, he objected to certain Maravi people accompanying Pereira. And finally, he asked that he should be given

masons and tile-makers in order to build him stone houses and a church. Sousa tells us that when ambassador Gaspar Bocarro, accompanied by the Italian Jesuit priest Fr Júlio Ceasar, came to Gatsi Rusere's *zimbabwe* at *Chiromee* (Chiromwe?) they found that he had just asked his people to bring him thatching grass for his *casa de sobrado* (storeyed house) which some Canarins or Macoques had built for him. The *zimbabwe* at Chiromwe was about a league in circumference. It is said that Gatsi had about one thousand wives and a countless number of children who are said to have been 'as many as flies'. When he gave audience to Bocarro,

> He wrapped a piece of silk cloth round his waist and put another one on his back, that hung from his shoulders and covered him all over: and thus attired he received ambassador Gaspar Bocarro, the companion of the priest. The throne was the doorway in which he sat on an upper step covered with a *machira* . . . and all the other decorations and hangings were also *machiras* . . .[233]

Pereira assured Gatsi that he would not take along any undesirable character and would only have with him some Portuguese of Sena and Tete and their African followers. The only Maravi people he had were some 30 Africans from *Samacanga* (Makanga). He had nobody from Lundu (*Rundo*) or Muzura as Gatsi had alleged. He added that if any of his men misbehaved he himself would pay compensation. Finally he told Gatsi that as soon as he granted him the permission to proceed to Chikova he would forward to him the *kuruva*.[234] Gatsi expressed his satisfaction with the reply of Pereira and so the latter was able to proceed to Chikova.[235] Not much is known of what Pereira did at Chikova, but according to his own report he faced untold difficulties and treacheries while there and was unable to find any silver.[236] To add to his misfortune, the Mutapa's *kuruva* was misused by some officers of the crown and so Pereira had to give presents to the Mutapa from his own money.[237] It appears Pereira, like other Portuguese before him, was a victim of Gatsi Rusere's dilatory tactics.

In 1622 the Portuguese king was so frustrated by the reports from the Pereira expedition that he commanded that all operations should desist and Pereira withdraw to India. In the same letter he mentioned that he had received a letter from Mutapa Gatsi Rusere in 1621 complaining that his *kuruva* and a present called 'mouth' (*boca*) had not been paid; furthermore he claimed that he had been promised by Pereira two horses complete with harness which had still not arrived;

in addition he asked for liveries and three or four pieces of Chinese brocade; and finally he demanded that Diogo Carvalho and Diogo Teixeira Barroso (wrongly given as Diogo *Peixeira*) should be expelled from the Rivers of Sena and Mozambique as a whole.[238] The Portuguese king ordered that Gatsi's requests should be complied with in full.[239] As late as 1624 the Portuguese king was still urging the viceroy to have the presents mentioned above sent to Gatsi Rusere.[240]

But sometime in late 1623 or early 1624[241] Rusere gave up the ghost and was succeeded by his son Nyambo Kapararidze, in violation of the principles of collateral adelphic succession. His own brothers, his uncle Mavhura Mhande, who was the senior son of Mutapa Negomo Mupunzagutu, and Karonga Muzura of the Maravi, all sought to fish in the Mutapa troubled waters. Kapararidze received a much-diminished state, comprising only the kingdom of Mukaranga, his father having lost Barwe and Manyika. The Portuguese of the Rivers of Sena were well aware of these realities and were also ready to do their own fishing. By the time of Gatsi Rusere's death the Portuguese had penetrated the Zimbabwe highlands as far as Urupande (Hwangwa) and Dambarare where they had *feiras*. The *prazos* had come into existence in the Lower Zambezi valley. These developments opened the way for an activist policy by the Portuguese during much of the remaining part of the seventeenth century.

CHAPTER 6

Notes

1. Padre Paio Correia to Bento Toscano, Cochin, 12 January 1562, *DPMAC, VIII*, 79; Padre Pedro de Arboleda to Colégio de Évora, Goa, 27 December 1562, *DPMAC, VIII*, 101–102. Padre Fernão da Cunha to Fathers and Brothers of Colégio de Évora (SJ), Baçaim, 3 December 1562, *DPMAC, VIII*, 107, 109; Padre Balthasar to Fathers and Brothers (SJ) in Europe, Goa, 4 December 1562, *DPMAC, VIII*, 115.
2. D. Birmingham, *The Portuguese Conquest of Angola* (London, 1965), 10.
3. Ibid; Couto, 'Da Ásia', 263.
4. Birmingham, *Conquest of Angola*, 10.
5. A da Silva Rego, *Portuguese Colonisation in the Sixteenth Century: A Study of the Royal Ordinances* (Johannesburg, 1959), 103–104.
6. Birmingham, *Conquest of Angola*, 12.
7. Couto, 'Da Ásia', 249; Padre Gonçalo da Silveira to Provincial (SJ), Goa, 12 February 1560, *DPMAC, VII*, 453; for the various charters of appointments of Francisco Barreto see *DPMAC, VIII*, 173–203.
8. Birmingham, *Conquest of Angola*, 10. See Chapter 2 above for evidence that the Portuguese knew of, took part in and wanted to control the gold trade of the Munhumutapa. See also notes 11 and 12 below.
9. 'Conclusions of men of Learning', Almeirim, 23 January 1569, *DPMAC, VIII*, 163, 165, 167, 169, 171.
10. 'Inquérito', *DPMAC, VIII*, 229, 231, 233, 235, 237, 239, 241, 243, 245, 247.
11. Monclaro, 'Relação', 327.
12. Faria e Sousa, 'Ásia Portuguesa', 21; Dos Santos, 'Ethiopia Oriental', 217.
13. Charter of King Sebastião, Almeirim, 18 March 1569, *DMPAC, VIII*, 173, 175, 177, 179, 181, 183.
14. El Rey, Lisboa, 21 February 1571, *DPMAC, VIII*, 195, 197, 199, 201, 203.
15. Couto 'Da Ásia', 251; Monclaro, 'Relação', 327, 329, 331.
16. Ibid.
17. Monclaro, 'Relação', 333, 335, 337.
18. Couto, 'Da Ásia', 253.
19. Monclaro, 'Relação', 357; Vasco Fernandes Homem to Luís da Silva, Sena, 15 February, 1576, *DPMAC, VIII*, 447, 449. Monclaro says they left Mozambique in November 1572. In here we accepted Homem's 1571 date.
20. Couto, 'Da Ásia', 255, 257, 259, 261; Monclaro, 'Relação', 357; Vasco Fernandes Homem to Luís da Silva, Sena, 15 February 1576, *Ditto*, 447, 449.
21. Couto, 'Da Ásia', 257, 259, 261.
22. Vasco Fernandes Homem to Luís da Silva, Sena, 15 February 1576, *Ditto*, 449.
23. 'Inquérito', 235, 241, 245.
24. Vasco Fernandes Homem to Luís da Silva, Sena, 15 February 1576, *Ditto*, 451.
25. Ibid., 449.
26. Couto, 'Da Ásia', 257, 259.
27. Ibid., 259.
28. Monclaro, 'Relação', 417.
29. Couto, 'Da Ásia', 259.
30. Ibid., 263.
31. Ibid., 259.

32. Ibid; Vasco Fernandes Homem to Luís da Silva, Sena, 15 February 1576, *Ditto*, 449.
33. Couto, 'Da Ásia', 261.
34. Ibid., 263; Vasco Fernandes Homem to Luís da Silva, Sena, 15 February 1576, *Ditto*, 449.
35. E. Axelson, *Portuguese in South-East Africa 1488–1600* (Johannesburg, 1973), 158.
36. Vasco Fernandes Homem to Luís da Silva, Sena, 15 February 1576, *Ditto*, 449.
37. Couto, 'Da Ásia', 263.
38. Vasco Fernandes Homem to Luís da Silva, Sena, 15 February 1576, *Ditto*, 449.
39. Ibid., Monclaro, 'Relação', 371, says that the year was 1572.
40. Monclaro, 'Relação', 373. However Couto gives a figure of 1 000. See Couto, 'Da Ásia', 265.
41. Monclaro, 'Relação', 371, 379; Vasco Fernandes Homem to Luís da Silva, Sena, 15 February 1576, *Ditto*, 449.
42. Monclaro, 'Relação', 371, 397.
43. Ibid., 371, note 16.
44. J.J. Jackson, A.J.E. Needham and J.A. Lawrence, 'Some Recent Investigation into Rhodesian Toxic Plants', *Transactions of the Rhodesia Scientific Association*, *53*, 1, May 1968, 9–12. Among the Shona it is common knowledge that cattle die when they eat *mukawuzani* or *mufanawembudzi* herbs.
45. Ibid.
46. Monclaro, 'Relação', 371 note 16.
47. Ibid.
48. C.H.W. Donovan, *With Wilson in Matebeleland* (Bulawayo, reprint 1979), 54–57;E. Mohr, *To the Victoria Falls of the Zambezi* (London, 1876), 82–83.
49. Monclaro, 'Relação', 373.
50. Ibid., 371, note 16.
51. Ibid., 373.
52. Couto, 'Da Ásia', 275.
53. Ibid., 277.
54. Ibid.
55. Ibid., 275, 277, 279.
56. Monclaro, 'Relação', 395.
57. Ibid.
58. Couto, 'Da Ásia', 277, 279.
59. Monclaro, 'Relação', 395.
60. Ibid.
61. Ibid., 377, 393.
62. Ibid., 397; Couto, 'Da Ásia', 281.
63. Couto, 'Da Ásia', 281.
64. Ibid., 281, 283.
65. Monclaro, 'Relação', 397.
66. Ibid.
67. Couto, 'Da Ásia', 283.
68. Monclaro, 'Relação', 397.
69. Ibid.
70. This was the first ox-drawn wagon seen in southern Africa. The Africans found the sight quite strange. Monclaro, 'Relação', 385.
71. Monclaro, 'Relação', 397, 399, 410; Couto, 'Da Ásia', 285. Vasco Fernandes

Homen to Luís da Silva, Sena, 15 February 1576, *Ditto,* 449.
72. Vasco Fernandes Homem to Luís da Silva, Sena, 15 February, 1576, *Ditto,* 449.
73. Monclaro, 'Relação', 401.
74. Couto, 'Da Ásia', 283.
75. Ibid., 283, 285; Monclaro, 'Relação', 399, 401.
76. Couto, 'Da Ásia', 287; Monclaro, 'Relação', 403.
77. Monclaro, 'Relação', 403.
78. Ibid.
79. Ibid., 405; Couto, 'Da Ásia', 287, 289.
80. Couto, 'Da Ásia', 289; Monclaro, 'Relação', 405.
81. Couto, 'Da Ásia', 289, 291; Monclaro, 'Relação', 405, 407.
82. Couto, 'Da Ásia', 289; Monclaro, 'Relação', 405, 407.
83. Couto, 'Da Ásia', 289; Faria e Sousa, 'Ásia Portuguesa', 27.
84. Couto, 'Da Ásia', 291.
85. Monclaro, 'Relação', 409.
86. Ibid.
87. Ibid., 411.
88. Ibid; Couto, 'Da Ásia', 291.
89. Vasco Fernandes Homem to Luís da Silva, Sena, 15 February 1576, *Ditto,* 451.
90. Monclaro, 'Relação', 411, 413, 415; Couto, 'Da Ásia', 293, 295, 297.
91. Monclaro, 'Relação', 415; Vasco Fernandes Homem to Luís da Silva, Sena, 15 February 1576, *Ditto,* 451.
92. Monclaro, 'Relação', 417, 419.
93. Ibid., 427.
94. Ibid., 423, 425, 429; Couto, 'Da Ásia', 311; Vasco Fernandes Homem to Luís da Silva, Sena,15 February 1576, *Ditto,* 453.
95. Monclaro, 'Relação', 429.
96. Vasco Fernandes Homem to Luís da Silva, Sena, 15 February 1576, *Ditto,* 455.
97. Couto, 'Da Ásia', 313.
98. Ibid., 313, 315; Dos Santos, 'Ethiópia Oriental', 217.
99. Vasco Fernandes Homem to Luís da Silva, Sena, 15 February 1576, *Ditto,* 455, 457.
100. Ibid., 457; Couto, 'Da Ásia', 315, 317; Dos Santos, 'Ethiópia Oriental', 217–218.
101. Ibid.
102. Ibid; Faria e Sousa, 'Ásia Portuguesa', 29.
103. Vasco Fernandes Homem to Luís da Silva, Sena, 15 February 1576, *Ditto,* 459.
104. Ibid; Couto, 'Da Ásia', 317; Dos Santos, 'Ethiópia Oriental', 218; Faria e Sousa, 'Ásia Portuguesa', 29.
105. 'Inquérito', 229, 231, 233, 235, 237, 239, 241, 243, 245, 247.
106. Dos Santos, 'Ethiópia Oriental', 218; Faria e Sousa, 'Ásia Portuguesa', 29; Couto, 'Da Ásia' 317, 319; Vasco Fernandes Homem to Luís da Silva, Sena, 15 February 1576, *Ditto,* 459.
107. Axelson, *Portuguese in South-East Africa 1488–1600,* 162.
108. Ibid.
109. In fact gold was to be found in Uteve around Bandire.
110. Faria e Sousa, 'Ásia Portuguesa', 29; Dos Santos, 'Ethiópia Oriental', 219–220; Couto, 'Da Ásia', 319.
111. Axelson, *Portuguese in South-East Africa 1488–1600,* 162.
112. Vasco Fernandes Homem to Luís da Silva, Sena, 15 February 1576, *Ditto,* 459, 461.

113. Faria e Sousa, 'Ásia Portuguesa', 30; Dos Santos, 'Ethiópia Oriental', 283–285. For a different construction of these events see Abraham, 'Early Political History', 73.
114. António Falção, 'Certidão', Moçambique, 20 April, 1577, *DPMAC*, VIII, 517.
115. Faria e Sousa, 'Ásia Portuguesa', 30.
116. Diogo Velho to King [1584–1588], *DPMAC, VIII*, 523, 525; Nuno Velho Pereira to King, Moçambique, 29 October 1585, *DPMAC, VIII*, 529.
117. Faria e Sousa, 'Ásia Portuguesa', 30.
118. 'Inquérito', 237, 245; Monclaro, 'Relação', 393.
119. Monclaro, 'Relação', 393.
120. Couto, 'Da Ásia', 269.
121. Couto, 'Da Ásia', 273.
122. Diogo Velho to King [1584–1588], *DPMAC, VIII*, 523, 525; Nuno Velho Pereira to King, Moçambique, 29 October 1585, *DPMAC, VIII*, 527, 529, 531.
123. Nuno Velho Pereira to King, Moçambique, 29 October 1585, *Ditto*, 529.
124. Dos Santos, 'Ethiópia Oriental', 289–290.
125. Fr Agustinho da Zevedo, 'Apontamentos pera V Magde sobre as Cousas do Estado da India e Reyno de Monomatapa', *RSEA, 4*, 35–37.
126. Ibid., 37.
127. Dos Santos, 'Ethiópia Oriental', 291–299; Couto, 'Da Ásia', *RSEA, 6*, 395, 403–405; Faria e Sousa, 'Ásia Portuguesa', 31–32, 35–36.
128. Dos Santos, 'Ethiópia Oriental', 290.
129. Abraham, 'Early Political History', 74.
130. Dos Santos, 'Ethiópia Oriental', 290. Dos Santos says that Negomo died soon after receiving a greyhound from Dom Jorge de Meneses, Captain of Mozambique, between 1586–1589.
131. Bocarro, 'Década', 361; [Anon.], 31 January 1602, *RSEA, I*, 50.
132. Alpers, 'Mutapa and Malawi Political Systems', 21–22.
133. Bocarro, 'Década', 361–362; M. Schoffeleers, 'A Martyr Cult as a Reflection on Changes in Production: The case of the Lower Shire Valley, 1590–1622 AD' in *African Perspectives* ([1978]/2), Africa Studiecentrum (Leiden, 1978), 25–30.
134. Ibid.
135. Ibid.
136. Dos Santos, 'Ethiópia Oriental', 293–299; Faria e Sousa, 'Ásia Portuguesa', 31–32, 35–37.
137. Bocarro, 'Década', 362.
138. Ibid.
139. Ibid; King to Viceroy, 26 February 1602, *RSEA, 4*, 50–51.
140. Bocarro, 'Década', 362–363.
141. Diogo da Cunha de Castelbranco, 'Report', Goa, 7 February 1619, *RSEA, 4*, 155. He describes a *chuambo* as a wooden fort.
142. Dos Santos, 'Ethiópia Oriental', 293–299; Couto, 'Da Ásia', *RSEA, 6*, 405, 408–409; Faria e Sousa, 'Ásia Portuguesa', 36.
143. Bocarro, 'Década', 363–364.
144. Ibid., 364.
145. Dos Santos, 'Ethiópia Oriental', 288.
146. Bocarro, 'Década', 354.
147. Dos Santos, 'Ethiópia Oriental', 290–291; Couto, 'Da Ásia', *RSEA, 6*, 403.
148. Bocarro, 'Década', 364, 456.

149. Ibid., 364–365.
150. Ibid., 274.
151. Ibid., 365.
152. Ibid., 365–366.
153. Ibid., 366, 371; Faria e Sousa, 'Ásia Portuguesa', 39.
154. Bocarro, 'Década', 367–369.
155. Monclaro, 'Relação', 427.
156. Ibid., 391, 429.
157. Bocarro, 'Década', 368, 378–379, 381.
158. Ibid., 369.
159. King to Viceroy, Lisboa, 24 March 1626, *RSEA, 4,* 86.
160. King to Viceroy, Lisboa, 18 March 1619, *RSEA, 4,* 169; King to Viceroy, Lisboa, 2 March 1620, *RSEA 4,* 171; King to Viceroy, Lisboa, 17 February 1624, *RSEA, 4,* 187–8; King to Viceroy, Lisboa, 21 March 1625, *RSEA, 4,* 189, 190.
161. Bocarro, 'Década', 371.
162. Ibid., 372.
163. Ibid.
164. Ibid., 373.
165. Ibid. This shows that tribute payment was a burden to many vassals. It was not a happy exchange of presents as some have argued. See also note 163 above for evidence of Gatsi's attempt to punish Makombe for refusing to pay tribute.
166. Bocarro, 'Década', 373.
167. King to Viceroy, Lisboa, 24 March 1612, *RSEA, 4,* 86.
168. Bocarro, 'Década', 373–374.
169. Ibid., 374–375.
170. Ibid., 376.
171. Ibid., 376–377.
172. Ibid., 376–378.
173. Ibid., 378.
174. Ibid.
175. Ibid., 378–379.
176. Ibid., 379–380.
177. Ibid., 380. This is the first evidence of a Portuguese garrison being left at Mutapa's court. From the reign of Mutapa Mavhura this was to become a regular feature.
178. Ibid., 380–381.
179. Ibid., 380.
180. Axelson, *Portuguese in South-East Africa 1600–1700,* 35 note 15. This was in 1610.
181. Bocarro, 'Década', 382.
182. Ibid.
183. Ibid.
184. Ibid., 382–384; Faria e Sousa, 'Ásia Portuguesa', 39.
185. Bocarro, 'Década', 384; Faria e Sousa, 'Ásia Portuguesa', 39.
186. Ibid.
187. Bocarro, 'Década', 384–385.
188. Ibid., 385–386; Faria e Sousa, 'Ásia Portuguesa', 39.
189. Bocarro, 'Década', 387.
190. Ibid., 396.
191. Ibid., 387–395.

192. Ibid., 390.
193. Ibid., 395; Faria e Sousa, 'Ásia Portuguesa', 40–41. It may be that this Neshangwe was a son of previous Mutapa Neshangwe Munembire.
194. Bocarro, 'Década', 396; Faria e Sousa, 'Ásia Portuguesa', 41.
195. Bocarro, 'Década', 397–398; Faria e Sousa, 'Ásia Portuguesa', 41.
196. Bocarro, 'Década', 396, 398.
197. Ibid., 398–399; Faria e Sousa, 'Ásia Portuguesa', 41.
198. Bocarro, 'Década', 428, 429.
199. Ibid., 399; Faria e Sousa, 'Ásia Portuguesa', 41.
200. Bocarro, 'Década', 399–401; Faria e Sousa, 'Ásia Portuguesa', 41.
201. Bocarro, 'Década', 401–403.
202. Ibid., 403–405.
203. [King to Viceroy], 29 March 1609, *RSEA, 4,* 76. This letter shows that the Portuguese king sent a banner as a present to the Mutapa.
204. Bocarro, 'Década', 405–406; Faria e Sousa, 'Ásia Portuguesa', 41.
205. Bocarro, 'Década', 406; Faria e Sousa, 'Ásia Portuguesa', 41.
206. Diogo da Cunha de Castelbranco, 'Report', Goa, 7 February 1619, *RSEA, 4,* 158.
207. Bocarro, 'Década', 371–372, 406.
208. Ibid., 408. For further evidence that royal blood was not to be spilt among the Shona except in war, see also, 'Descripção do Império Moanamotapa', 223–224; Mello e Castro, 'Notícia', 138.
209. Bocarro, 'Década', 407–409; Faria e Sousa, 'Ásia Portuguesa', 41.
210. Diogo da Cunha de Castelbranco, 'Report', Goa, 7 February 1619, *RSEA, 4,* 158, 161.
211. Bocarro, 'Década', 409–411; Faria e Sousa, 'Ásia Portuguesa', 41.
212. Bocarro, 'Década', 411.
213. Ibid., 411, 412.
214. Ibid., 412–415; Faria e Sousa, 'Ásia Portuguesa', 42.
215. Faria e Sousa, 'Ásia Portuguesa', 42; Bocarro, 'Década', 413, 422; King to Viceroy, Madrid, 10 March 1618, *RSEA, 4,* 135–136; Padre Fr Francisco do Avellar, 'Relação das Minas de Prata da Ethiópia Oriental do Império do Monomotapa e das cousas necessarias e pertencentes para sustentação e conservação dellas e dos Rios de Cuama' in J.C. de Alcántara Guerreiro and J. Oliviera Boléo, 'As Minas de prata da Chicoa em um relatório do século XVII', *Moçambique Documentario Trimestral, 39,* (1944), 61–77. Castelbranco says one of the silver lumps from Chikova weighed sixty pounds (27 kg). See Diogo da Cunha de Castelbranco, 'Report', Goa, 7 February 1619, *RSEA, 4,* 159.
216. Bocarro, 'Década', 415–419.
217. Ibid., 419–421; Faria e Sousa, 'Ásia Portuguesa', 42.
218. Bocarro, 'Da Ásia', 420–421.
219. Ibid., 422–433; Faria e Sousa, 'Ásia Portuguesa', 42–43; King to Viceroy, Lisboa, 18 March 1619, *RSEA, 4,* 168–169; King to Viceroy, Madrid, 20 March 1618, *RSEA, 4,* 141–142; Diogo da Cunha de Castelbranco, 'Report', Goa, 7 February 1619, *RSEA, 4,* 155–162.
220. Bocarro, 'Década', 424.
221. Ibid., 430.
222. Ibid., 430–433; Faria e Sousa, 'Ásia Portuguesa', 43.
223. Bocarro, 'Década', 433–434; Faria e Sousa, 'Ásia Portuguesa', 43.
224. Diogo da Cunha de Castelbranco, 'Report', Goa, 7 February 1619, *RSEA, 4,* 161–162.

225. Rezende, 'Estado da Índia', 418. I think Richard Gray is quite right when he says during this period Portuguese muskets were not the decisive factor in the wars of the Zambezi. R. Gray, 'Portuguese Musketeers on the Zambezi', *JAH, XII*, 4, (1971), 531–533. However Axelson still upholds the reverse; Axelson, *Portuguese in South-East Africa 1488–1600*, 53.
226. Padre Fr F. Avellar, 'Relação das Minas de prata', 74.
227. Ibid.
228. King to Viceroy, Madrid, 10 March 1618, *RSEA, 4*, 135–139; King to Viceroy, Lisboa, 25 March 1618, *RSEA, 4*, 145.
229. Diogo da Cunha de Castelbranco, 'Report', Goa, 7 February 1619, *RSEA, 4*, 157.
230. Gace Rucere [Gatsi Rusere] to Dom Nuno Alvares Pereira, Zimbabwe *Chiromée*, March 1620, *Machona e Nyassa*, 106.
231. King to Viceroy, 29 March 1609, *RSEA, 4*, 76.
232. Gace Rucere [Gatsi Rusere] to Pereira, Zimbabwe *Chiromée*, March 1620, *Ditto*, 106.
233. Ibid., 106–107; Gatsi Rusere to Pereira, June 1620, *Ditto*. 108; Sousa, *O Oriente Conquistado*, 837.
234. Nuno Alvares Pereira to Monomatapa, Tete, 5 June 1620, *Machona e Nyassa*, 109.
235. Gace Rucere [Gatsi Rusere] to Nuno Alvares Pereira, July 1620, *Machona e Nyassa*, 110.
236. Axelson, *Portuguese in South-East Africa 1600–1700*, 59.
237. Ibid., 60.
238. King to Viceroy, Lisboa, 10 March 1622, *RSEA, 4*, 183–185.
239. King to Viceroy, Lisboa, 1 February 1623, *RSEA, 4*, 185–186.
240. King to Viceroy, Lisboa, 17 February 1624, *RSEA, 4*, 187–188.
241. A.H.U. Av. de Moç. Cx. I, Diogo de Sousa de Menezes, Mosambique, 1 April 1624.

CHAPTER 7

The 'Puppet' Munhumutapas: Portuguese Ascendancy South of the Zambezi *c.* 1624 to 1684

When Nyambo Kapararidze succeeded his father in *c.* 1624 this was contrary to convention. The throne should have gone to the 'house' of Negomo Mupunzagutu which was then headed by one Mavhura (Standard Shona *Mamvura*), a son of the former. By succeeding his father, without any special arrangements with the house of Negomo as is said to have happened at the time of Nyandoro Mukomohasha, in effect Kapararidze was trying to eliminate that house from any claims to future succession because if Mavhura did not in fact succeed, his sons could have been barred from succeeding on the pretext that their father did not succeed. Mavhura had to do something to stop Kapararidze proceeding with his plans or his house would be required to keep silent ever after. Since Mavhura had the law and justice on his side, his cause must have evoked a responsive cord among some of the people. Some writers have at times presented Mavhura Mhande as a usurper and a Portuguese puppet. According to the rules of succession it was Kapararidze who was the 'usurper' and Mavhura the 'legitimate' Mutapa.

i. The Kapararidze–Mavhura succession wars

The succession of Kapararidze was also contested by some of his brothers. Because Gatsi ruled for such a long time he must have left a number of grown-up sons who, once Kapararidze had tampered with the laws of succession by usurping the throne, were equally tempted to seize the throne for themselves. In early 1624 some of them were openly trying to seize the throne.[1] It is possible two of these sons may have been either Dom Filippe or Dom Diogo, both of whom we have read about in chapter six. Dom Diogo was particularly favoured by the Portuguese. As will be recalled, he could speak and write Portuguese well; he was well-versed in christian doctrine, 'good natured, *very* docile and peaceful'. (emphasis in original) He was the son of Gatsi's first wife. In 1617 he was away in Goa for further studies under the tutelage of the Dominican friars. In that year Fr Francisco do Avellar,

who had baptized him in 1607, was trying to persuade the king of Portugal to urge Gatsi Rusere to nominate Prince Dom Diogo as his heir.[2]

There must have been many Portuguese interests trying to promote Prince Dom Diogo in 1624. In addition to the above challengers, Kapararidze heard that Karonga Muzura of Maravi was attacking Tete and Sena in the hope of throwing out the Portuguese so that he could more easily make himself lord of the kingdom of Mutapa. Apparently the above events affected trade with the coast for the captain of Mozambique, Diogo de Sousa de Menezes, complained that he was unable to recover the 40 000 *xerafins* a year he had paid to lease the trade of the rivers as a result of those troubles.[3] But Kapararidze's undoing was triggered by his confrontation with the Portuguese. It is not very clear why Kapararidze attacked the Portuguese in 1628. One possible explanation is that the new captain of Mozambique, Nuno Alvares Pereira, who took office in 1627, delayed the payment of *kuruva* in 1628. This was not the first time Pereira had delayed paying *kuruva*; during Gatsi Rusere's reign he once did the same thing.

However the delay in paying *kuruva* was probably not the only explanation to account for Kapararidze's action. Certainly it cannot fully explain why, in the first instance, Kapararidze should have killed Jerónimo de Barros, the Portuguese ambassador who brought the *kuruva* and, secondly, why he should have ordered a *mupeto* against all the Portuguese in his state. Rezende claims that Kapararidze did that 'for no other reason than his wickedness'. And Fr Gomes claims Kapararidze removed all the former advisors to his father and replaced them with young men of his own generation and it was these new young ministers who 'began to influence the king and among other things, gave him the idea of killing all the Portuguese'.[4] However, a closer analysis of the data suggests other motives. In Rezende's report it is said that when Jerónimo de Barros brought the *kuruva* Kapararidze asked him by whose orders that *kuruva* was brought to him.[5] It seems a serious breach of protocol had been committed in connection with the de Barros embassy. The normal practice was for the captain of Mozambique to send word to the Mutapa to tell him to send an embassy to Tete to receive the goods. Together with the Mutapa ambassadors, the Portuguese would then dispatch their own envoy to accompany the *kuruva*. Kapararidze's

complaint suggests that Captain Dom Nuno Alvares Pereira simply sent Jerónimo de Barros to the Mutapa without first seeking Kapararidze's authority to do so. Besides the security and protocol implications in Pereira's approach, by short-circuiting the process Pereira robbed Kapararidze of the *boca* (mouth)[6] presents which should have been brought by the first mission inviting the Mutapa to send an embassy to fetch the *kuruva*. The *mupeto* declared by Kapararidze in 1628 may have been in theory justified by the need to recover the *boca*. Kapararidze's justification of his actions could then have been based on the legalistic argument that the breach of protocol was such a serious matter as to invalidate the goods brought by de Barros from being regarded as *kuruva*. But even if we conceded any or all of the above points, Kapararidze's actions would still be too drastic for the offence.

It is only when the state of the Mutapa–Portuguese relations at the time are understood that Kapararidze's actions begin to become intelligible. As has already been pointed out, Kapararidze's succession posed a serious challenge to one Mavhura Mhande. It seems that Mavhura managed to become a good friend of the Portuguese, especially the Dominican friars. One Fr Luíz de Espirito Santo, a native of Mozambique and therefore likely to have been aware of Mavhura's rights to the Mutapa throne, befriended the latter and managed to convert him to christianity. The other, Fr Manoel de Sardinha, catechized Mavhura and the latter respected the former 'with the veneration of a son'. Even when he became the Mutapa, Mavhura continued to rely on the advice of Fr Manoel de Sardinha. In spite of evidence to the contrary, Mavhura, described as having been a man of a genial nature and great perspicacity, avoided baptism until he had ascended the Mutapa's throne. He was baptized by Fr Luíz, who gave him the name Dom Filippe.[7]

It appears that Mavhura's special relationship with the Portuguese Dominicans developed to such a degree that Kapararidze was alarmed. Fr Santa Catharina somewhat enigmatically states that Fr Luíz had 'hope of great consequences' flowing from his relationship with Mavhura. For those reasons, we are told, Mutapa Kapararidze 'was enraged, and was searching for some means of vengeance.' He revenged himself by killing Jerónimo de Barros.[8] Kapararidze must have viewed this manifestation of friendship between his rival and uncle, Mavhura, and the Portuguese as posing a threat to his throne. It

had to be nipped in the bud. The unprocedural nature of the mission of Jerónimo de Barros provided him with an opportunity to strike.

On 17 November 1628, Nyambo Kapararidze ordered the death of ambassador Jerónimo de Barros and declared a *mupeto* against all the Portuguese in his dominions.[9] At the time the *mupeto* was declared, André Fereira, the Captain of the Gates of Masapa was at Kapararidze's *zimbabwe* but was fortunate enough to hear about the death of de Barros before he received his own orders to present himself before the Mutapa. Fereira refused to obey orders to present himself at court and successfully evaded all attempts to apprehend him until night-time when a heavy rainstorm provided him with cover to slip away unnoticed to the *chuambo* of Masapa.[10] From there he sent word to all the Portuguese traders in Mukaranga to retire to the *chuambos* in the *feiras* of Ruhanje, Dambarare and Chipiriviri where they were to defend themselves.[11] The Portuguese traders were able to defend themselves in the *chuambos* until help arrived from Tete. Fr Catharina suggests that only the prayers of his fellow Dominican friars among the Portuguese must have provided the 'protection of Heaven' that saved the Portuguese traders from being massacred.[12] More probable was the fact that the *chuambos* were quite effective in defensive warfare and that at this stage Kapararidze's men were scattered all over Mukaranga trying to get at individual Portuguese traders.

When reports of the *mupeto* and death of de Barros reached Tete and Sena, the Portuguese decided to mobilize a force composed mainly of the Africans from around Tete and Sena and some Portuguese traders. The Dominicans, especially Fr Luíz, played a very active role in recruiting men for the war against Kapararidze. One Manoel Gomes Sarros was appointed Captain-Major of the Portuguese forces at Sena which were sent to fight Kapararidze. It is said that Francisco Figueiredo da Almeida, the factor of governor Dom Nuno Alvares, spent a lot of the latter's property to put together the army which went to fight against Kapararidze.[13]

The anti-Kapararidze forces mobilized and came to the *feira* of Ruhanje where many of them declared Mavhura to be the rightful Mutapa and placed themselves under his overall command.[14] This army is reputed to have numbered either 15 000 or 30 000 Africans and 250 Portuguese.[15] From Ruhanje until Masapa no contact was made with Kapararidze's forces.[16] But at Masapa in December 1628,

Kapararidze's army, said to have numbered 100 000 warriors, awaited Mavhura and his allies.[17] The actual number of Kapararidze's men is highly exaggerated for effect. According to the Portuguese sources, no sooner had the two armies engaged into battle than Kapararidze's men were forced to retire into the interior. In May 1629, Kapararidze attacked the Mavhura–Portuguese forces but was forced to retire with heavy losses.Fr Gomes has left for us an interesting description of the takeover of Kaparidze's *zimbabwe* and the last resistance of his army during this battle. According to Gomes,

> . . . at the Monomotapa Court at *Zimbaõe* a lot of spoil was found, silk, blankets, rich tents; gold coins of all kinds and, besides, a lot of gold; the king fled and with only a few of his men he wanted to fight our army. Some of them came forward first with the tails of some animals with medicines to blind the Portuguese and their people; [then] there also followed [others] with a big copper kettle drum covered with rich silk cloth and lion skins and filled with various revolting things, [like] the hands and feet of a human body, finger tips, ears of . . . tigers and lions, etc., and the Africans believed that when that (*am Goma*) [sic], as they call it, were touched, all our people would fall flat on the ground. Our kaffirs were so afraid of this that instead of [being] black they looked white. Two Portuguese went to stop that nonsense and they came so near those with the medicines that [when] they were a shot's distance from them, they fired so hard that they threw them [the others] on the ground. [But] notwithstanding the great commotion [that followed] the *Angoma* was still to be conquered; it was carried on a stand by twelve men who had been especially charged with that. The kaffirs, on seeing they were in trouble, gave the signal to advance by playing the *Angoma* and a great yelling could be heard from the enemy camp. It sounded like the Day of Judgement. . . The Portuguese in front started shooting their guns and hit the *Angoma*; and as it was important to finish with it, they rushed up to it and broke it into pieces. [it was then that] our [black] troops recovered their courage [and] the enemy ran away; [and] the King retreated with only a few of his fighters.[18]

Fr Luíz thought that the victory of the anti-Kapararidze alliance was achieved in part through the intercession of our Lady of the Rosary.[19] With this victory, the Mavhura forces entered the *zimbabwe* where a victory mass was celebrated and a little church dedicated to Our Lady of the Rosary was built. But when it came to the formal appointment of a successor to Kapararidze the Portuguese were divided. Fr Luíz and his powerful faction favoured Mavhura but another group wanted one

relative of Kapararidze who had promised them special favours if he were made the Mutapa. It is conceivable, as Abraham has suggested, that this may have been Dom Filippe, the son of Gatsi Rusere who ran away to Diogo Simões Madeira. But it is also possible that this was Dom Diogo, another brother of Kapararidze of whom we read at the beginning of this chapter. Dom Nuno Alvares Pereira says the prince was 20 years old in 1629. If Dom Diogo and Dom Filippe were about eight years in *c.* 1607 when they were baptized, then in 1629 they would have been nearly 21 years old. This suggests it probably could have been one of the two princes.[20] In the end, Mavhura was declared Emperor Munhumutapa in May 1629.[21] But for helping him to win his throne the Portuguese required him to sign a treaty of vassalage to the Portuguese crown.

The 'capitulations' were signed by Mavhura on 24 May 1629. In that document he was made to declare that he had received his throne in the name of the King of Portugal whose suzerainty over him he acknowledged. He agreed to allow complete freedom to proselytize to all the religious orders and to treat all the religious with great respect; to expel all the moslems from his dominions within one year and to allow all those still living in his lands to be killed and their property confiscated by the Portuguese; to allow Portuguese ambassadors, contrary to the conventions of his people, to enter his *zimbabwe* in full armour and speak to him seated on a chair without clapping their hands; to treat all other Portuguese as if they were ambassadors except that such non-ambassadors should be provided with a *kaross* to sit on rather than a chair; to show great respect to the Captain of Masapa, who from that date 'shall reside in his [Mutapa's] zimbahe' instead of at Masapa. He had to consult with the said captain on matters of war and peace; and to allow the captain or his servants to visit his *zimbabwe* as often as they wanted without requiring them to pay a present. Furthermore, Mutapa's ambassadors to Sena and Tete or to the Captain of Masapa were no longer to demand presents. In addition to the usual lands given to the Captain of Masapa he should grant him those lands which used to belong to Inhama Fururano found at *feira* Ruhanje and those of Mapundo at Bera as well as those of Chuabo at Palullua. Furthermore, he agreed to provide the captains with clothes. He also undertook to allow Portuguese traders or their *vashambadzi* to travel freely throughout the villages in his lands without paying any tariffs or tolls to him or his vassal rulers and to

refer all *empofias* (*mhosva* or litigations) arising between his people and the traders to the Captain of Masapa. He was not to be rewarded for apprehending such wrongdoers and bringing them before the captain. He was to prohibit Portuguese, moslems or African *vashambadzi* from marrying any of the local women or settling in his lands, but if this happened he was obliged to hand over the woman and the said *mushambadzi* to the latter's master for enslavement. He was forbidden to grant land containing gold to anybody and was to order the opening up of as many mines as possible in his state and to desist from the practice of closing rich mines. He was obliged to search and reveal the existence of silver-mines to the Captain of Masapa.

In acknowledgement of his vassalage to the Portuguese crown, Mavhura agreed to pay three *pastas* (1.28 kg) of gold every three years at the start of each captaincy of Mozambique. In return for those *pastas* the captain was to send him a *sagoate*. In other words it was now to be the duty of the Munhumutapa to pay *kuruva* to the Portuguese.

Finally, he was to allow Tete to annex the lands surrounding it so that they could be used by the Portuguese crown. By this grant the reconquest by Gatsi Rusere of the lands surrounding Tete was undone. The way was open for the Portuguese at Tete to call those people to the service of the Portuguese in much the same manner as Diogo Simões Madeira had done. The viceroy was so satisfied with the outcome of these developments that he sent some clothes, a canopy, a chair with a high back and a stool, all in red velvet and fringed with gold. In addition, he sent him a footstool in damask, a sword, a cape, a crown, a silver sceptre, a hat, two bonnets, some Portuguese wine as well as some palm wine and *aqua vitae* to appease Mavhura and to show that the latter was now a vassal of the Portuguese king.[22] Had the treaty been capable of being fulfilled in full its provisions would have had far-reaching implications for the subsequent history of Zimbabwe. But as things turned out, the 'capitulations' of Mavhura had more teeth on paper than in reality. It was mainly the continued threat from Kapararidze that kept Mavhura friendly to the Portuguese.

After eight months of regular teaching, Mavhura, his queen and four or five nobles were baptized by Fr Luíz. Mavhura was given the name Dom Filippe and his queen that of Dona Giovanna.[23] Furthermore, the Dominicans tried to use one of the sons of Kapararidze, taken prisoner during one of the engagements against his father, to promote the interests of their order at Rome and in Lisbon. After his

capture, the boy was originally given to the captain of Mozambique, Dom Nuno Alvares Pereira, who passed him on to the viceroy of India, the Count of Linhares, who, 'thinking it unseemly to employ him in his service, being the son of a king, although a tyrant and in rebellion, delivered him to the Dominicans to educate him and to give him religious instruction, paying for his maintenance and clothing out of his own property'.[24]

At first the Dominicans wanted to mount a well-orchestrated campaign by parading the boy in Lisbon. Fr Jerónimo, the Vicar-General at Goa, wrote the Provincial in Portugal telling him to have the boy

> placed by order of the King in some Dominican Convent, and be baptised with all pomp and ceremony. And he should be given such state and accommodation as is befitting a prince of so great an empire . . . so that the kingdom and Court of Spain, and that of Rome, may know that the sons of St. Dominic have taken in hand, and baptised emperors, and sons and nephews of emperors.[25]

Although the boy never left for Lisbon, such were the reports from the Dominicans about their achievements in Munhumutapa, a field where the Jesuits had failed so dramatically at the time of Dom Gonçalo da Silveira, that both the Vatican and Lisbon were impressed. Fr Luíz was highly commended for his achievements by the Vatican.[26] And the Vatican even tried to use its muscle to have more missionaries sent to the lands of Mutapa.[27] According to Fr Catharina, many more friars did in fact come into southern Zambezia after the Mavhura–Kapararidze wars.[28] In the end, this son of Kapararidze was kept and baptized Dom Miguel (Lord Michael) and educated at royal expense in Goa. The king of Portugal ordered that Dom Miguel should be provided 'with the best possible means of living . . . [because] being brother of the emperor and a convert to the faith, all the honour and favour should be shown to him which it is customary to show to those who avail themselves of my protection.'[29] He became a priest and spent some time at Basaim. Dom Miguel was a hard-working scholar and brilliant teacher. In 1670 he received the degree of Master of Theology which is equivalent to today's doctorate in divinity. He was appointed vicar of the parish of the Convent of Santa Barbara, just outside the walls of Goa. Next to the ruins of the Convent of Santa Barbara there is today a small disused church known as Santa Barbara of Mercy. It appears that in 1664 one Fr Miguel da Prezentação, vicar of the parish of the

Convent of Santa Barbara, was a member of a group of rebel revolutionary priests who demanded far-reaching changes at the Convent of Santa Barbara, including the temporary closure of the Convent and dismissal of the students. It is conceivable that this particular Fr Miguel was none other than our Miguel, son of Mutapa Kapararidze. Dom Miguel, priest, prince, professor, heir to the imperial throne of the Mutapas and the first Zimbabwean to receive a doctorate degree in any field of study, died in Goa at the Convent of Santa Barbara sometime after 1670.[30]

But Miguel's father, Nyambo Kapararidze, had a few more exploits of his own worthy of recall. In 1629 Kapararidze had suffered a setback and not annihilation. Sometime in 1631 he began his counter-offensive. Apparently Mavhura was not expecting that Kapararidze would be ready to fight him within such a relatively short time.[31] According to Rezende, Mavhura was busy trying to expel the moslems from his state and by so doing forced the latter group to throw in its lot with Kapararidze. The Kapararidze–moslem alliance roused the country against the Mavhura–Portuguese alliance.[32] In the engagement between the two armies the Mavhura forces were worsted, losing, so it is said, about 6 400 men of whom 300 to 400 were Portuguese.[33] Sousa ascribed the disaster to rivalry for command among the Portuguese.[34] Whatever may have been the true cause of this defeat, Axelson is right when he says that in terms of casualties this was the biggest military disaster the Portuguese had yet suffered in south-east Africa.[35] Mavhura managed to escape but a number of his supporters, including Fr Luíz de Espirito Santo and Fr João da Trindade were captured. Fr João da Trindade was so badly wounded when he was captured that he was thrown over a high cliff and his body shattered into pieces on impact.

Fr Luíz de Espirito Santo was a particularly satisfying prisoner to Kapararidze for the latter, probably rightly, felt that the friar had a big hand in his misfortunes. At first, Kapararidze asked Fr Luíz to do him homage *zumbaya* (*zvambayira*, to crawl on the stomach), but Luíz refused to do him that form of homage and instead made a long harangue declaring his loyalty to Mavhura, the Portuguese crown and Jesus Christ, the 'King of Kings'. He likened Kapararidze to Lucifer and threatened him with hell-fire, 'the horrible lake' where he would burn 'for all eternity as miserable fuel to the inextinguishable fire! Return,' cried the good friar, 'return to reason, now that God counsels

thee by my voice, and bend the knee before the true Lord, rather than expect me to bend to thee'. Tired of what must have sounded as the rantings of a crazy but politically dangerous friar, Kapararidze ordered him to be put to death. He was tied to a tree-trunk and killed with assegais. Fr Catharina tells us that by this 'martyrdom he [Luíz] gloriously ended his life and went to render to God, in glory, the adoration he had defended for him on earth'.[36] However it would appear more likely that the good friar went to face his Creator to answer some serious charges about his role in the spilling of so much innocent blood in those wars.

When all this was done, Kapararidze sent word to Mavhura asking the latter to acknowledge him as emperor so as to avoid further bloodshed. But Mavhura rejected Kapararidze's invitation. The confrontation had to go on. Kapararidze and his men, through persuasion and intimidation, and because many Africans in the Rivers of Sena resented the lawlessness of the Portuguese settlers, roused many people to revolt against the Portuguese and were able to chase the latter from much of the land, forcing them to seek refuge in the fortress towns of Tete and Sena and the *feiras* of Manyika and Mukaranga. The confusion spread all the way to Quelimane.[37] Kapararidze ruled as the Mutapa until June 1632 when he was finally defeated.[38] It is probably after one of these victories that Dom Domingos (or was it Dom Diogo?), a brother of Kapararidze who had been baptized by the Dominicans, left the Portuguese camp to join his brother.[39] The Portuguese recovery was organized by Diogo de Sousa de Menezes, the new captain of Mozambique. Starting at Quelimane, he attacked and defeated some of Kapararidze's partisans, killing 2 000 and capturing many men and cattle. He pacified all the lands up to Sena and then invaded Manyika where he killed a ruling Chikanga and put another on the throne who agreed to become a Portuguese vassal and a christian. He also agreed to show his mines to the Portuguese; to pay three *pastas* of gold a year to the fort of Sena; and to charge tax of only one *pano* per *mutoro* of cloth to each trader in place of the much higher duty he is said to have levied in the past. Finally, he was forced to acknowledge the suzerainty of the Mutapa over Manyika.[40] After this he turned his forces against Kapararidze. Apparently Mavhura, with the help of Fr Manoel Sardinha, had been able to recruit many warriors, especially from the Maravi country, by giving presents of cloth to them. Fr Catharina says 20 000 warriors

and some Portuguese were recruited. According to Fr Catharina, two engagements were necessary before Kapararidze was finally defeated. Before the first engagement Mavhura is said to have seen a resplendent light and beautiful cross in heaven in the same way as it had appeared to the Emperor Constantine the Great. The story of the cross was spread to Mavhura's army and its significance was elaborated upon by Fr Manoel de Sardinha so that Mavhura's army went into battle full of confidence. According to Fr Catharina, 35 000 Africans, mainly on Kapararidze's side, lost their lives on that day, so Kapararidze was forced to retreat. However, with the help of the *Mukomohasha* and some other chiefs, Kapararidze assembled another powerful force consisting of many of the nobles in the state.

But they found Mavhura, apparently now joined by the forces Menezes had used in Manyika, with an army said to have numbered between 12 000 and 40 000 men, of whom 200–300 were Portuguese musketeers.[41] Although Kapararidze was, so it is said, confident of victory, in fact he was defeated very badly. He lost 2 000–12 000 men dead and many of their women, cattle, arms and provisions were captured.[42] It is said that during this last engagement, fought on the feast of St John, a man of such beauty and splendour as to be nearly like the very sun itself appeared among the anti-Kapararidze forces, encouraging and animating them.[43] From these 'miraculous' defeats Kapararidze never really recovered, although he was still a force to reckon with as late as 1652.[44] With the defeat of Kapararidze in June 1632 the Portuguese entered a period of ascendancy on the Zimbabwe highlands which was only effectively checked by Dombo in 1684. By Portuguese ascendance we do not mean to say that the Portuguese governed the Mutapa state but that they held the balance of power. It seems the Kapararidze–Mavhura factions remained unreconciled for much of that period and this allowed the Portuguese to play a pivotal role in the state.

The civil wars between Mavhura and Kapararidze had far-reaching consequences from which the empire never really recovered. Because Kapararidze and his faction posed a constant threat to Mavhura up to the end of his life, the latter was forced to remain tied to the Portuguese alliance. This situation was to be exploited both by the Portuguese crown and individual Portuguese to their benefit and to the detriment of the Mutapa empire as a whole.

The first blow was delivered by the Portuguese crown when the

Portuguese king, with impeccable logic, replied negatively to Mavhura's request for payment of the traditional *kuruva* and *boca*, by pointing out that by the Treaty of 1629 Mavhura had become a vassal of the Portuguese crown and therefore it was improper that the sovereign, i.e. Portuguese king, should pay tribute to his vassal, i.e. Mutapa.[45] Instead the Portuguese king favoured granting Mavhura's alternative request, i.e. the right to import, duty free, a quantity of cloth worth 3 000–4 000 *maticals*. However, in accepting that request the king left the question of what exact quantity to allow the Mutapa to import to the viceroy to decide upon.[46] It does not seem that even that concession was in fact ever officially granted to Mavhura by the viceroy, for Mavhura continued to make the same request.[47] By this decision alone, the Portuguese king cut away about 3 000–5 000 *crusados* worth of income every three years to the Mutapa. After the abolition of the *kuruva* in 1629 it was never reintroduced in its original form. The treaty also abolished a number of tariffs and tolls that traders had to pay in the past. Perhaps more serious was the eventual abolition of the role of 'Captain of the Gates' of Masapa, replacing it with that of captain of the garrison, to whom the Mutapa was required to give clothes. It had been part of the duties of the 'Captain of the Gates' to levy one-twentieth (1/20) of the trade cloth brought into the state for the Mutapa treasury. By the Treaty of 1629 neither the Mutapa nor any of his subject chiefs could levy or demand anything for the protection they provided to the Portuguese traders.[48] All this robbed the Mutapa of a much-needed source of acquiring additional presents for his vassal rulers seeing that trade merchandise provided convenient forms of presents.[49]

In addition to the above, the treaty required the Mutapa to pay three *pastas* of gold every three years to the captain of Mozambique in return for which the captain would send him 'his sagoate'. In 1631 the Portuguese king claimed that these *pastas* were in fact a form of tribute which should be paid yearly by the Mutapa and as such should be sent directly to him (King of Portugal), and that the so-called *sagoate* to the Mutapa could be anything 'such as a crystal goblet' or anything else deemed suitable for the Mutapa.[50] For the above economic losses the Portuguese king gave Mutapa a garrison of 30 soldiers, granted him the Habit of the Order of Christ, and a copy of the laws by which the Portuguese state was governed to be introduced into the Mutapa empire so 'that the government of the kingdom may

be settled.'[51] There is no evidence that either the Habit of the Order of Christ or the code of laws ever reached Mutapa Mavhura.

Furthermore, the struggle against Kapararidze meant that, from 1629 on, the powerful Mukomohasha family lost its right to provide the general of the Mutapa armies. Indeed it seems that that house did not throw its weight behind the Mutapa state for much of the remaining part of the seventeenth century. It is only in the eighteenth century when evidence of its playing some role as one of the courtly grandees comes to light. Mavhura also seems to have lost support on account of the fact that he became a christian.[52] Although the sources do not make it clear how his becoming a christian and his governing 'with christian piety'[53] undermined his position, it can be surmised that the royal *mhondoro* cult and the *Dzivaguru* cult, and Shona spiritual tradition in general, confronted Mavhura and his new ideas. In the end this was one struggle the Portuguese were unable to win. But it was not for lack of trying. The period saw a proliferation of churches and missionaries in the empire. In 1631 Ruhanje *feira* had a beautiful church with a Dominican Friar; Dambarare *feira* had a church and a Dominican Friar; at Masapa a church and a Dominican friar were also found; and later Fr Aleixo dos Martyres built a church at Mavhura's *zimbabwe* whose foundation stone was laid by Mavhura himself, a sight that prompted Fr Catharina to exclaim:

> Doubtless a great day for the sons of St. Dominic! to see in lands so remote, strange, and uncultivated, the monarch and lord of them (though black, a powerful King and respected as such, for the extent and beauty of his empire) burdened with a great stone, not to raise as in heathendom the mount of Mercury, but to erect upon it the temple of the true God, and hear his praises sounded in that unknown tongue like an echo of the apostolic call which invited them thither![54]

The last of the churches of Mukaranga, also under a Dominican friar, was the church at Matafunya.[55] Fr Catharina claims that another Dominican church was found at Chipiriviri.[56] In the kingdom of Manyika three churches and Dominican friars were found at the *feiras* of Vumba, Chipangura, and Matuka (whose curator was also in charge of the Maungwe *feira* community).[57] According to Rezende, there were many christians in Manyika kingdom and the Chikanga ruling in 1634, like Mutapa Mavhura, did not prevent his people from becoming christians.[58]

In general, the missionaries found women and young children

easier to convert than adult males. Father Catharina thought women liked christianity because it raised their status by insisting on monogamy. Adult males found the law against polygamy too severe and as a result were reluctant to become christians.[59] However, equally important in Shona resistance to christianity was the fact that 'these Mocarangas are so attached to their rites' and because 'the Mocarangas are more opinionated than any other Kaffirs whatever'.[60] These disparaging comments reveal how effectively the Shona 'world view' equipped its adherents to confront the Luso-Christian 'world view'. In this struggle, christianity never even approached anything like a serious threat. With the exception of Mavhura, most seventeenth-century Mutapas were christians only in name.[61] But more significant was the Dominican role in Mutapa succession and court politics.[62] In the latter role they acted more as patriotic Portuguese than men of the good book.

But much more far-reaching in its consequences was the growth of the *prazo* system. In the Treaty of 1629, Mavhura surrendered jurisdiction over the lands around Tete to that town. In 1634 it was estimated that captains of Tete and Sena had jurisdiction over lands which could provide 8 000 and 30 000 warriors respectively when called upon to do so.[63] These lands were turned into estates or *prazos*.[64] As the century progressed, the Portuguese were able to acquire lands all the way into present-day Zimbabwe as far south as Rimuka (Kwekwe–Kadoma area). The Portuguese settlers acquired lands and jurisdiction over the people living on those lands with the result that they found themselves occupying the political positions of *mambo* or *madzishe* in the Shona political structure. The people over whom they had jurisdiction were generally loyal.[65] The trouble with these *prazo*-holders was that, being also traders, they were more interested in personal profit than in showing allegiance to either the Mutapa or the Portuguese throne. They were ready to eliminate officers of the Portuguese crown as well as the Mutapas themselves if their interests were interfered with.[66] Attempts by the Portuguese crown to control and populate these lands in its interests during the seventeenth century failed. Furthermore, the personal nature of the power of these *prazo*-holders made the system inherently unstable. Indiscipline and lack of co-operation created the conditions which ultimately led to the destruction of Portuguese ascendancy in Zimbabwe.

During this period the Portuguese built a number of *chuambos*

(forts) all over the Mutapa empire. Each of these forts was

> only a palisade of stakes, filled up inside with earth, allowing those within to fight under cover. The stakes are of such a nature that when they have been two or three months in the ground they take root and become trees which last many years.[67]

Usually they each had an unsalaried captain. The main seventeenth-century *chuambos* in Mukaranga were found at Matafunya, Dambarare, Chipiriviri, Ruhanje, Masapa, Manzovo, Chitomborwizi and Hwangwa.[68] Those of Manyika were at Matuka and Chipangura.[69] From these strongholds Portuguese influence radiated. However this was not the influence of the Portuguese crown but that of individual Portuguese traders in south Zambezia.

In 1633, not long after the defeat of Kapararidze, the viceroy, Conde de Linhares, wrote a report in which he painted a glowing picture of the wealth of the Rivers of Sena and proposed that all Portugal needed to conquer and exploit that wealth were 500 soldiers and 2 000 Portuguese families. In 1635 the Portuguese crown tried to exploit the new situation in southern Zambezia by settling as many Portuguese as possible so that they could exploit the famed gold- and silver-mines said to exist in Mukaranga, Uteve, Manyika, Guruuswa and Chikova. Although the Portuguese had hoped, initially, to send 200 soldiers and about 200 married couples to the Rivers of Sena, in the end even this modest start could not be effected because all the manpower resources available had to be diverted to India.[70]

In the meantime, in the Rivers of Sena, much effort was expended trying to locate the famous silver-mines of Chikova. With Mavhura on the throne it was hoped the search would prove more fruitful than at anytime in the past. Therefore, on 8 January 1636, Francisco Figueiredo da Almeida and Dǒm Andres de Vides y Albarado, the assayer and administrator of the yet-to-be-discovered silver-mines, left Tete for Chikova in the company of Portuguese and African followers. On 28 January they arrived at Chikova but to their disappointment António de Castilho de Mendonça, who had been sent from Tete to Mutapa Mavhura to ask the latter to send some *nhume* to Chikova to show the silver-mines to the Portuguese, had not yet arrived. When António de Castilho did at last arrive he did not bring any *nhume* from Mavhura. Therefore da Almeida sent one soldier well-acquainted with the land, by the name of Diogo Velho, to go with a letter to Mavhura to ask for the *nhume*. In the letter Almeida pointed out to Mavhura that he,

Almeida, had already arrived at Chikova expecting to find the envoy from Mavhura but this unfortunately did not happen with the result that he and the other Portuguese were sitting idly at Chikova doing nothing except squandering the Portuguese king's money.

Mavhura's response was immediate. He dispatched an *encosse* (*inkosi*), a grandee, together with other followers in the company of Velho. At Chikova the grandee rested for a few days before taking the Portuguese to a hill where he said silver was to be found. Accompanied by Dom Andres and a Dominican priest, the Rev Padre António de Salvador, as well as the clerk Tomé de Barros, Almeida followed the grandee. The grandee pointed out a place where he said silver was to be found. Almeida promptly asked his men to dig. After digging *mais de dous estados* (more than 12 feet, or about four metres) deep Dom Andres told Almeida that there was no silver to be found in that place. Almeida reminded the grandee that he should show him a place where there was silver and not just any place. Therefore, on the following day, he pointed out three other places on the same hill where he claimed silver was to be found. Again Almeida had his men dig those three places but again no silver was to be found, and to compound his disappointment the grandee and some of his followers decided to run away from Chikova. Although the miners continued to look for the silver-mines they found nothing.

Almeida sent another letter to Mavhura with João Lopes Pinheiro, another soldier well-acquainted with the region. The Pinheiro embassy told Mavhura of what had happened at Chikova. Mavhura summoned the grandee who had escaped from Chikova and scolded him, and threatened dire consequences on him for his actions at Chikova. The grandee replied that he did not know any more places where silver could be found than the ones he had already pointed out. But he had an uncle, Mavareka (*Mavareca*), who knew of one place where silver could be obtained. Mavareka was immediately summoned before Mavhura and ordered together with his nephew, the runaway grandee, to go down to Chikova under escort to show the mines to Almeida.

Almeida alternately cajoled, promised and intimidated Mavareka to show him the mines. Mavareka agreed and promised to show him the mines. He took the Portuguese miners back to the same hill where his nephew had taken them. There Mavareka tried to locate the mines but without success. He visited the hill on three separate days but had no success in locating the mines. It seems he had to get into a trance

(get possessed?) before he could locate the mines. But each time he tried he failed to get possessed. In the end he told Almeida that he would have to wait for the spirits to show him the mines in his dreams as had happened during the times of his ancestors. Almeida decided he had had enough of these hippety-hoppety dealings from Mavareka and Mavhura. After failing to identify any sign of previous mining on that same hill he decided to call off the whole exercise. And thus ended another of those Lisbon dreams about the rich silver-mines of Chikova.[71] In the end even the Portuguese crown had to agree that the venture should be abandoned for the time being, for not only had the efforts to find the silver-mines proved fruitless but also another expedition to find out more about the gold-mines of Zimbabwe had yielded little results, partly because even the Portuguese traders were unwilling to let the Portuguese crown know of the true wealth of those gold-mines.[72]

Besides the activities of the search parties, Mavhura also had to cope with the threat posed by Kapararidze and the Portuguese *prazo*-holders. Although Kapararidze was defeated in 1632 he was not completely destroyed. From his base north of the Zambezi he planned his return to Zimbabwe. As early as 1635, Mavhura was sending messages to Sena alleging that one chief, Maparo, near the rapids, was scheming to ferry across Kapararidze's growing army from the north to the south bank of the Zambezi. The Portuguese responded to this threat by sending 40 soldiers to guard Mavhura at his *zimbabwe*.[73] This was not the first time the Portuguese had sent a garrison to guard Mavhura for, before 1631, Dom Nuno Alvares Pereira had built a fort at the court of Mavhura garrisoned by the latter's personal bodyguard of about 30 Portuguese sharp-shooters. But this fort had to be abandoned after being set on fire when Mavhura had to change the site of his *zimbabwe*. This fort was built from the money which used to be paid for the 'mouth' (*boca*) and *kuruva* of Mutapa, and its function was, according to the Portuguese king 'to maintain the monomotapa in submission to my authority, and . . . also serve to shield and defend him from his enemies'.[74]

In 1643 there is yet another report claiming that old Maparo was back to his old plot of trying to help Kapararidze to cross over from the north to the south bank. It is said the crossing was to be made near a place called Camcomba on the south bank where some of Kapararidze's spies were already busy preparing the ground. It is said Maparo had

already infiltrated some of his own spies, posing as refugees, into Mukaranga. The situation, it seems, was quite serious.[75] The problem was compounded by the fact that, about the same time, a son of Mavhura by the name of Dom Aleixo, described as a devout christian and a great friend of the Portuguese who had educated him, died. Mavhura said that seeing that he had lost the assistance of Aleixo it was essential that the Portuguese should build him a fortress (*chuambo*) at his court and station a garrison of 25 soldiers for his protection. It appears that besides the growing threat from Kapararidze was added the danger that his eldest son was disliked by the Portuguese and their religious; and to make matters worse, the son in question had little respect for his father, Mavhura. In response to Mavhura's appeal, the settlers of Sena agreed at a meeting in that town that each trader entering Mukaranga should pay one *bertangil* of cloth for each four *corjas* of cloth brought into the country in order to support the proposed garrison.[76] In 1646 the Portuguese king urged that the garrison at the *zimbabwe* should continue and he ordered the settlers of Mozambique and the Rivers of Sena to contribute one *corja* of cloth out of every four *corjas* towards its upkeep.[77] The king's request was much more than the traders had agreed to pay. The traders of Sena had agreed to pay one *bertangil* of cloth for each four *corjas*, i.e. one-eightieth (1/80) of their cloth, as contribution towards the upkeep of the garrison. But the king suggested one-quarter (1/4). It is most unlikely that in fact the king's request was ever met.

After the defeat of Kapararidze in 1632, the Portuguese–Mavhura correspondence was largely centred around the search for silver-mines, the danger posed by Kapararidze who was then a refugee north of the Zambezi, and the lawlessness of the Portuguese settlers in Mukaranga. The danger from Kapararidze was exacerbated by the activities of the Portuguese traders and the *prazo*-holders who built private armies and fortifications and stole from, killed and harmed Mutapa vassals almost at will; neither the Portuguese governor of Mozambique nor Mavhura could control them. These activities risked rousing the Mutapa subjects into revolt and reduced gold-mining activities as people abandoned gold-producing lands out of fear. Furthermore, some of the Portuguese settlers were capturing some of Mutapa's subjects into slavery for no just cause, a thing regarded as 'a great outrage' amongst Mutapa's subjects. To compound the outrage, Mavhura went on, the Portuguese settlers were not only enslaving the

ordinary people but even daughters and sons of the nobility. In the past Mavhura had appealed to the captains of Mozambique requesting them to do something about the behaviour of these settlers, but more often than not all he got from that quarter were insults. Of late, Captain Júlio Moniz da Silva had tried to bring about some discipline but with little success. In the meantime, the Mutapa's court grandees were impatiently demanding an end to the state of lawlessness in the kingdom and threatening to solve the problem in their own way. These grandees believed Mavhura was the cause of the nation's humiliations and for that reason showed 'great hatred against my person'. To improve the situation, Mavhura asked the Portuguese to send a garrison to guard him at the *zimbabwe* and to order all traders to assemble at the *feiras* of Dambarare, Masapa and Ruhanje and not to wander all over his kingdom; they should cease to have private armies or fortifications and they should employ only christians to help them because many people were abandoning their traditional chiefs to work for the Portuguese traders. The behaviour of the Portuguese was destroying the very basis of Shona society. Finally, any complaint between a Portuguese and a native of the land should be brought before either the Mutapa's court or that of the chief in whose land it occurred, this 'being in accordance with Natural Law'. To act otherwise would result in injustice to the Africans.[78] This latter request was contrary to the 1629 treaty where Mavhura had agreed that all such cases were to be referred to the captain of Masapa. But nothing was done to arrest these developments. The Portuguese king was disturbed by reports that some of the Mutapa's vassals were becoming disaffected.[79] Already in 1644 Mavhura had been made to sign yet another treaty of vassalage to the Portuguese by Sisnando Dias Bayão. In that treaty he agreed to pay a *bar* of ivory as his tribute to the Portuguese.[80]

On 25 May 1652, Mavhura, the Mutapa who thought it was a great honour to be described by his own people as 'the black man of the Portuguese', died from a gunshot wound.[81] While the Portuguese saw Mavhura as a friendly vassal ruler, latter-day historians have depicted him as a puppet and usurper put on the Mutapa throne by the Portuguese for their own interests, a true 'Uncle Tom' who served his master's interests. However in this study we have been able to show that Mavhura had as much, if not more, right to the Mutapa throne than Kapararidze himself. For that reason he was not a usurper invented by the Portuguese. All his efforts to assert his independence

proved futile because of the threat posed by Kapararidze and the *prazo*-holders. Mavhura had to depend on Portuguese arms to keep him on the throne. His conversion to christianity antagonized the religious leadership within his own society. Thus he could not build his own internal base to extricate himself from over-reliance on the Portuguese. He realized that the Portuguese activities which did not respect the customs of his people destroyed the very basis of that society yet he himself tenaciously continued to follow christianity to the end. His curse was that Kapararidze remained a threat throughout his reign, with the result that Mavhura had to be dependant on foreign interests to retain his throne. This forced him, at times, to subordinate the interests of his people to those of the Portuguese. Yet to balance that is the fact that through his 'Uncle Tomism' Mavhura ensured that all succeeding Mutapas until the end of the state were his own descendants.

ii. Mavhura's legacy

Mavhura was succeeded by his eldest son, Siti Kazurukumusapa, then referred to as *Motota* (Mutota or Motata?), a young man said to have been only 13 years of age. Although Sousa calls Siti a brother of Mavhura, in his own letter Siti makes it clear that he was a son of Mavhura.[82] The succession had to be arranged quickly for fear that Kapararidze might decide to move in during the interregnum. According to the rules of succession Siti should not have succeeded his own father. His succession was technically unconstitutional as had been that of Kapararidze himself.

Prince Siti was brought up by the Dominicans at the request of his father, Mutapa Mavhura. Although Siti was catechized and taught the christian doctrine in his youth and was already fully convinced of the need to become a christian, he decided (or was it his father who did?) not to receive baptism until he had succeeded to the throne. Since he and his father were already planning his unconstitutional succession they must have realized that for him to antagonize the traditional religious authorities by becoming a christian before his succession would force that formidable faction to be ranged against him. Siti claims that his own father had deliberately delayed his own baptism until he had succeeded although he had been converted and instructed by Fr Manoel Sardinha before his succession.[83]

In 1652, the Dominicans, like at the time of Mavhura, decided to intervene in Mutapa succession politics. As soon as Mavhura died, the

Domican fathers, led by the vicar of the *zimbabwe*, Fr Ignácio de St Thomás and some nobles rushed to where Siti lived some leagues from the court, as was the custom and practice in the Mutapa state.[84] During the first half of the eighteenth century, the two *nevanjes* (hereditary princes) were sent to Dande and Chikova. Since the court was in Dande at this stage, it may be that the chief *nevanje* was sent to Chikova to become the *Sachikova*. Before leaving where he was, Siti asked the Portuguese Captain of Dambarare, António Alvares, to inform the Portuguese to be prepared for all eventualities, especially from Kapararidze. Dambarare was the chief trading centre at this time and therefore many traders were to be found around it. But most important perhaps was the fact that it lay close to Guruuswa, an independent and powerful kingdom under the Togwa dynasty, from whom the Kapararidze forces might receive support. To ensure that matters remained under control on that flank, Siti also sent Fr João de Mello, his personal tutor and counsellor, to go to Dambarare in person to deal with what Siti simply calls 'different matters of great importance to our person'.[85] Whatever this business was it was sufficiently important that if it had been unsuccessful Siti claims that he would have delayed accepting to be baptized. It is possible Fr João de Mello's mission may have been aimed at either winning over or neutralizing the Togwa dynasty in the event of a Kapararidze rising. The Father successfully carried out his mission and returned to the *zimbabwe* on 1 July 1652.[86] After that Siti agreed to be baptized. On 4 August 1652, the feast day of St Dominic (Domingos in Portuguese), Siti, his Queen, his *Nengomasha*, his *Nevinga*, as well as *Inhamapa* (Nyamapa?) and *Inhamafunhe* (Nyamafunye?), Siti's personal friend, were baptized by Fr João de Mello. Their new names were Dom Domingos, Dona Luisa, Dom João, Dom Sebastião, Dom Ferdinando and Dom Pedro respectively. The nobles, whom Siti claims were relatives of his, accepted baptism at his personal exhortation and orders. Two of Siti's sons were also baptized, with the heir receiving the name Dom Miguel.[87]

The baptismal ceremony was quite an event, as Siti himself recalled:

> On this day we issued from our palace with great pomp, accompanied by all the nobles, the soldiers of the garrison, and by the aforesaid religious who walked on each side of our person. [We were] richly decorated and prepared with great magnifi-

> cence . . . This baptism was celebrated with great rejoicing, especially by those of our court, who with musical instruments and festive dancers gave incredible signs of joy.[88]

When the news of this event was received in Europe the Dominicans so managed the affairs[89] that both Rome and Lisbon were agog. The Superior-General of the Dominicans in Rome had a bronze plate engraved in Latin commemorating the event.[90] In Lisbon, the news was celebrated with the full royal and cannonical razzmatazz. As the chronicler recalls:

> In the Convent of St. Dominic at Lisbon, the chief house of the province, the event was celebrated with the highest Catholic demonstrations, the Blessed Sacrament being exposed, with solemn high Mass, at which King João IV of happy memory assisted with all his court, favouring the Religious of that house upon that day with singular marks of his majesty and greatness.[91]

In spite of all this Dominican brouhaha, the event had little lasting significance in Zambezia; attempts to cash in on it by rousing the Portuguese king to mount an expedition to traverse Africa from Angola to Mozambique did not succeed.[92] The reign of Siti was short and insecure. In 1655 the Portuguese king agreed to grant him some unspecified favours partly because he wanted the rulers of India and Africa to know if they became christians they would receive favours from the Portuguese king.[93] In that same year Siti died. One source says he was burnt alive by the Portuguese.[94]

The successor to Siti Kazurukumusapa was Dom Afonso, his uncle and brother to his father. His succession was not without bloodshed. One of the younger royal princes (Mukombwe?), a son of Mavhura and also a christian, mobilized an army to press for his claims to the throne, but his claims were rejected in favour of those of Dom Afonso who was supported by one Francisco de Lima.[95] Axelson is quite wrong when he suggests that Afonso, as a brother to Mavhura, had less right to succeed than a son of Mavhura.[96] The reverse was in fact the case. Afonso, according to the laws of succession of the Mutapa political system, had even more right to succession than Siti himself.

It appears that the Dominicans may also have had a hand in Dom Afonso's succession for we find that he afterwards not only asked the Portuguese crown to reward the chaplain at the *zimbabwe*, a Dominican by the name of Fr Marcello, but also asked that the Dominicans as a whole should be favoured by the Portuguese crown.[97] The little that is known about Afonso's reign shows that he felt insecure on his throne.

In 1663 he asked the Portuguese king to maintain the garrison at his court and for friendly relations with the Portuguese to continue.[98] But the viceroy replied that the people needed to maintain the garrison could not be found in the Rivers.[99] Dom Afonso's fear seems to have been justified because before the end of 1663 he was assassinated. According to a report by Fr Manuel Barretto, Dom Afonso was killed during the governorship of António de Mello e Castro – 1664 to 1666. But from a letter of 4 August 1663 by Dom Manoel Mascarenhas to Viceroy António de Mello e Castro we can conclude that he was murdered between 20 April and 4 August 1663.[100] It appears that his death was brought about by a Portuguese faction led by António Roiz de Lima. He and other Portuguese as well as some Mocoque (moslem?) traders had (bought?) been given jurisdiction over certain land around Dambarare by Afonso. Because they controlled so many people, they were able to build powerful armies which rivalled that of the Mutapa himself. So confident were these people that they declared themselves independent of the Mutapa and then declared war on him. But when the two armies were face to face,

> the *encozes*, who are the lords or chief Kaffirs of that kingdom, killed the poor king (a thing unprecedented among the Kaffirs) for fear of the Portuguese, and came and subjected themselves to them that they might make whom they chose king.[101]

iii. The Mukombwe revival

The man chosen to succeed Mutapa Dom Afonso was 'a young man of the royal house, but very crafty and cunning.'[102] His name was Kamharapasu Mukombwe, a younger son of Mutapa Mavhura, and a man whose stature in some of the Mutapa traditions ranks with that of Mutota and Matope as one who distributed land to his vassals.[103] His long reign ended around 1692. According to one of his own letters, his christian name was also Dom Philipe like his father Mavhura. Even before 1667, Mukombwe was able to inspire such respect that he was 'sufficiently feared' even by the Portuguese traders.[104] It appears that Mukombwe, for some unknown reasons, granted the lands of Maramuka to one Gonçalo João but gave monopoly of its trade to António Roiz de Lima and a mulatto priest, Fr Simão Gomes, both very rich traders. As it will be recalled, Roiz de Lima was said to have been one of the leaders of the group that revolted against and caused the death of Mutapa Afonso. Barretto describes him as a friend to Mutapa Mukombwe. Certainly Mukombwe succeeded with the approval or

indeed the support of Roiz de Lima and his group. But soon Mukombwe had cause to be concerned by some of the actions of Roiz de Lima and Fr Simão Gomes, because those two started encouraging some of the local chiefs in Maramuka who lost their lands to Gonçalo João to rise against him. It is even said that the two men sent arms and men to those chiefs. Gonçalo João was taken by surprise and so was defeated, losing many men and much property as a result. The story did not end there for Fr Barretto continues:

> The comedy of it was, that after doing him this good turn they accused Gonçalo João of having stirred up Maramuca with war and caused them the loss of many pastas. The matter was tried before the tribunal of Dambarari (sic), which was worthy of them, and Gonçalo João was condemned to lose all he possessed.[105]

Mukombwe was also unhappy about the fact that Roiz de Lima and his associates had usurped the lands around Dambarare at the time of Mutapa Afonso. He therefore made a number of appeals, both to the governors of the Rivers and the Portuguese crown,[106] asking for help to recover those lands. Governor António de Mello e Castro was told that so long as those Portuguese owned the lands concerned, the chiefs and the people would, through fear, be unwilling to work the gold-mines. This would lead to a decline in the trade of the Rivers. The governor was persuaded by the above reasoning and so sent Francisco Pires Ribeiro to order the Portuguese land-holders to surrender the lands to the Mutapa. But when Franciso Pires arrived in the interior he disobeyed his orders. Like Fr Barretto, he must have realized that if those Portuguese were 'deprived of their lands and vassals [they] would be scattered and powerless,and of no service' to the Portuguese cause.[107] The Portuguese crown was unwilling to do anything about the problem as well,[108] no doubt reasoning much the same as Barretto that to do that 'would close the door by which the Portuguese become each time more powerful in that kingdom, and which is very conducive to conquest.'[109]

António de Mello e Castro sensed that Mukombwe was a 'formidable' man to keep in check and so he asked António Lobo da Silva, who besides having been a son-in-law of the famous Sisnando Dias Bayão was also the most powerful man in the Rivers, to be the captain of the garrison of the *zimbabwe*.[110] But by 1667 Ignácio Sarmento de Carvalho, the Governor of Mozambique, informed the viceroy that he had no men for the garrison of the *zimbabwe*.[111] In the 1670s the Portuguese crown received reports that some Portuguese began to

harbour 'distrust and other suspicions' against Mukombwe, and the Governor of Mozambique, João de Sousa Freire, was even planning at one stage to march with an army against Mukombwe. Since there were hopes of finding the silver-mines the Portuguese crown was not averse to this enterprise.[112] Mukombwe was not feared without reason, for even by the 1660s he had been able to bring some rebellious Tonga, once under Portuguese authority, under his control. The powerful kings of Barwe and Manyika also paid him homage and for those reasons Mukombwe was 'still a very powerful king'.[113] In a letter of 8 June 1679 Mutapa Mukombwe was able to begin thus, 'Lord Philipe, by the Grace of God, King Manamotapa, Sire of Mocaranga, Mongaz, Baroe, Chicanga, Inhaxaco, Xangoe, etc'. Such pretensions had largely been absent in the letters of other Mutapas from the days of Mavhura until then. In his letter Mukombwe explained the many fruitless attempts to discover the famed silver-mines in his kingdom in recent years; he complained about how his Dominican chaplains were in the habit of spending only three months in a year at his court while the other nine they spent on the gold-fields. For that reason he was requesting for two Jesuits to be sent in their place so that work of teaching the Good Word could prosper in his kingdom.[114]

He went on to explain that life had been very hard for everybody in the region of late; smallpox, measles and plague had decimated the population of south Zambezia. Many villages and settlements were abandoned with fields left unharvested; very few people were left to work the gold-mines. At the *feira* of Hwangwa the agents of Gonçalo João were the last to abandon the place, and Manuel Rebello and João Penrreiros and their agents had also abandoned the *feira* of Dambarare. Everything was desolation. When António Lobo da Silva went with about 8 000 men to rescue Manoel Pais de Pinto who was being attacked by some rebel Tonga he was able to return with only 3 300 men, the others having been wiped out by smallpox. If the death rate from the epidemic was generally as high as in the above expedition then more than half the population in the region as a whole may well have died. Trade was much reduced in volume, with the little there was left falling into Goanese hands.[115] It is conceivable that the epidemic helped Mukombwe by removing Portuguese from parts of his lands and/or weakening them through loss of followers. Certainly in the early 1680s the Portuguese population in the Rivers was much reduced – 50 whites in all in 1680.[116]

Although there seem to have been friendly letters exchanged

between the Portuguese crown and Mukombwe in the early 1680s, where in one of these letters Mukombwe even asked for the christian mission of the region to be raised to the bishopric,[117] the relationship in fact remained uneasy with Mukombwe 'constantly threatening to rise in rebellion'. To improve the relationship the Portuguese who had bought lands from the Mutapa and other rulers in the interior were ordered to give them back. Although this was done, gold-mining trade did not increase. In fact Mukombwe even tried to ban gold-mining in his state altogether. Although this was not successful, nevertheless the Portuguese continued to be unhappy about Mukombwe's tactics. It is said that Mukombwe was only a christian in name, but lived like a true Shona, observing all traditional rites, never going to church or saying confession, and many of his people who became christians followed his example. No doubt this behaviour of Mukombwe brought him closer to his people, unlike Mavhura, his father, who seems to have alienated them by his christianity. It was even said that the friendly letters from Mukombwe to the Portuguese crown were in fact not written by him. They were forgeries from the Portuguese in his kingdom despite the fact that they bore his royal seal.[118]

But if Mukombwe used the carrot-and-stick approach to reassert his authority over Mukaranga, and in effect seems to have almost succeeded in that enterprise as seen by the fact that the Portuguese settlers had surrendered the lands they had occupied and the fact that the Portuguese population in Mukaranga was already much reduced by the 1680s, other forces, much more impatient and uncompromising, tired of Mukombwe's approach of two steps forward and one step backward, seized the initiative. The leader of this movement was one Changamire Dombo, who was Mukombwe's herdsman in and around modern Mbire. He advocated a policy of total expulsion of the Portuguese from Mukaranga. His story will be dealt with in the next chapter.

Conclusion

The story of the Mutapa state during the seventeenth century has been presented by one writer as demonstrating the destructive nature of Portuguese influence on African societies:

> In the first quarter of the sixteenth century, these new institutions successfully maintained peaceful relations between Africans and Europeans. This, however, was not to hold in the following century when the trade and insatiable greed of the

> Portuguese caused in African society a break down of equilibrium and the growth of tensions which inevitably promoted crises and wars.[119]

Randles misses the meaning of events covered in chapters six and seven. It was not Portuguese mercantile capitalistic rapacity that created the instability but the inherent structural weaknesses of the Mutapa body politic, especially the adelphic collateral succession system as well as the personal blunders of Gatsi Rusere and the unbridled ambition of his son Kapararidze that unleashed so many civil wars which the Portuguese settlers in the Rivers were able to exploit. What is remarkable is the resilience which the Mutapas were able to show during this period, proving thereby that the imperial integrative institutions were quite strong, at least in Mukaranga. A Portuguese document of 1683 shows the significance of the Mutapaship itself as an institution when it states that,

> It should be added here that for the King [Mutapa] to keep us away from the mines he does not have to wage war against us nor proclaim himself against us, nothing of this is necessary; all he has to do is leave the court; it is customary in that kingdom to become so disorganized that nothing will be found in its right place; it all is thieving, disasters everything; nobody has any rest, they all are active because they all put themselves out to do all the wrong they can and when this is not possible they cry and shout and enact a live representation of hell. Nobody can do any trade because anything that is out on the routes is robbed. Nor can anyone say that he is alive because he is such confusion, and all this disorder prevails until everyone gets to know that the King is already back in the Court.[120]

Perhaps equally important was the failure of the Portuguese crown to exploit the situation to its advantage. To do that the crown needed to increase the Portuguese population and to create new colonizing structures. In the end it failed to do both because emigration to Brazil proved more popular than emigration to Africa. Instead it gained what advantage it could get by grafting its interests onto those Portuguese in the Rivers who had attained influence by operating in the idiom of the indigenous people. But ultimately these *prazo*-holders became part of the Zambezi community and in nineteenth century formed part of the local resistance to Portuguese imperial ambitions during the scramble.

CHAPTER 7

Notes

1. A.H.U. Av. de Moç. CX.I, Diogo de Souza de Menezes, Mosambique, 1 April 1624. However Fr Gomes makes clear that Kapararidze was the 'older son' (O filho mais velho), Gomes, 'Viagem', 189.
2. Padre Fr Francisco do Avellar, 'Relação das Minas de prata', 74. See also Chapter 6 above.
3. A.H.U. Av. de Moç. CX. I, Diogo de Souza de Menezes, Mosambique, 1 April 1624.
4. Rezende, 'Estado da India', 415; A.H.U. Av. de Moç. CX. 2, Diogo Lobo Pereira to King, Lisboa, 8 January 1652; Gomes, 'Viagem', 189–190.
5. Rezende, 'Estado da India', 415.
6. King, Madrid, 9 February 1622, *RSEA, 4*, 181.
7. Monomotapa [Mavhura] to Viceroy, Zimbahoe, 12 April 1645, DRdI, 60, fols 233–234 V. Makes it clear that he was baptized by Fr Luíz only after he had become the Mutapa.
8. Fr Lucas de Santa Catharina, 'História de S. Domingos', 396; Rezende, 'Estado da India', 415; Fr Luíz to Provincial, 3 February 1630, *RSEA*, 2, 427–428.
9. Fr Luíz to Provincial, 3 February 1630, *RSEA, 2*, 427.
10. Rezende, 'Estado da India', 415; Catharina, 'História de S. Domingos', 396.
11. Ibid.
12. Catharina, 'História de S. Domingos', 397.
13. Ibid.,Fr Luíz to Provincial, 3 February 1630, *RSEA, 2*, 427; Monomotapa to Viceroy, Zimbahoe, 12 April 1645, *DRdI*, 60, fols 233–234 V.
14. Catharina, 'História de S. Domingos', 397.
15. Fr Luíz to Provincial, 3 February 1630, *RSEA, 2*, 427; 'Advices from Goa', 1630, *RSEA, 2*, 429; Gomes, 'Viagem', 190, says that the Portuguese army numbered 60 000 men.
16. Fr Luíz to Provincial, 3 February 1630, *RSEA, 2*, 427.
17. Ibid.,'Advices from Goa', 1630, *RSEA, 2*, 429.
18. Ibid., Catharina, 'História de S. Domingos', 397; Gomes, 'Viagem', 190–191.
19. Fr Luíz to Provincial, 3 February 1630, *RSEA, 2*, 427.
20. Abraham, 'Monomotapa Dynasty', 80; A.H.U. Av. de Moç. CX. I, Nuno Alvares Pereira to Viceroy, Senna, 16 March 1631.
21. Fr Luíz to Provincial, 3 February 1630, *RSEA, 2*, 427–428; Catharina, 'História de S. Domingos', 397.
22. Manuza [Mavhura], 'Capitulações', Tete, 28 June 1629, *RSEA, 5*, 287–290; Viceroy Conde dé Linhares to King, Goa, 15 January 1630, *Machona e Nyassa*, 114.
23. Fr Luíz to Provincial, 3 February 1630, *RSEA, 2*, 428.
24. King to Viceroy, Lisboa, 27 March 1639, *RSEA, 4*, 283–284. Here Fr Miguel is incorrectly referred to as a brother of Kapararidze on page 283.
25. Fr Gerónimo to Provincial, Goa, 20 February 1630, in Wilmot, *Monomotapa*, 231.
26. The Holy Congregation of the Propaganda to Monsig. Colletore of Portugal, Rome, 31 December 1630, in Wilmot, *Monomotapa*, 232–233; The Sacred Congregation of Propaganda to Fr Luíz, Rome, 31 December 1630, in Wilmot, *Monomotapa*, 233.
27. The Sacred Congregation of Propaganda to the Colletore of Portugal, 20

November 1631, in Wilmot, *Monomotapa*, 238–239; Monsig. Lorenzo Bishop of Gerace to the Propaganda, Lisboa, 1 November 1631, in Wilmot, *Monomotapa*, 239.

28. Catharina, 'História de S. Domingos', 401.
29. King to Viceroy, Lisboa, 17 January 1639, *RSEA, 4*, 284.
30. Axelson, *Portuguese in South-East Africa 1600–1700*, 71 note 73; Catharina, 'História de S. Domingos', 404. Fr Catharina says Fr Miguel was Vicar of Santa Barbara. And Abraham ('Monomotapa Dynasty', 80) says he was a Vicar of the Convent of Santa Barbara. In fact Fr Miguel was vicar of the parish of the Convent of Santa Barbara and not of the Convent itself. See also Livros das Monções (L.M.) 31–32, Frequesia da Santa Barbara, 30 November 1664 fol 230–230 V signed by 23 friars including Fr Miguel da Prezentação. The revolt is covered in the same volume, fols 230–253.
31. Catharina, 'História', 398.
32. Rezende, 'Estado da Índia', 419.
33. Francisco de Lucena, [undated], *RSEA, 4*, 277; Faria e Sousa, 'Ásia Portuguesa', 46.
34. Faria e Sousa, 'Ásia Portuguesa', 46.
35. Axelson, *Portuguese in South-East Africa 1600–1700*, 77.
36. Catharina, 'História', 398–399. According to Fr Gomes, in 1620, the Italian Jesuit priest Fr Júlio Ceasar also refused to do *zvambayira* form of homage to Gatsi Rusere, the father of Mutapa Kapararidze. We are told that when Júlio requested for an audience with Gatsi Rusere,

> The Council [Mutapa's *Dare*] convened and . . . decided that the Priest could go [to meet the Mutapa] provided he performed all the ceremonies that were expected just like everybody else did. The Priest sent word to him that he thought it very strange that he [Mutapa] should want to be paid greater homage than he [Júlio] could pay [even] to his own king; that the Masters of the Law of God were to be treated by princes with greater respect; *the ceremony was to crawl on one's stomach, like a crocodile, barefooted, and clap one's hands as he went on a ground spread with fresh [cow] dung.* (emphasis added)

Gomes claims that Fr Júlio refused to do this form of homage, preferring instead to leave the Mutapa's kingdom. However, from other sources we know that Fr Júlio did in fact meet Gatsi in the company of Ambassador Gaspar Bocarro. He even acted as Gatsi's clerk as proved by a letter of March 1620 to Dom Nuno Alvares Pereira which Gatsi dictated to Fr Júlio Ceasar at *zimbabwe* Chiromwe. It is highly improbable that the mercurial Gatsi would have allowed Fr Julio to evade paying him homage. See Gomes, 'Viagem', 239; Monomotapa [Gatsi Rusere] to D. Nuno Alvares Pereira, Jimbaoe [*zimbabwe*], March 1620 DRdI 15, fol 163.

37. Francisco de Lucena, *RSEA, 4*, 277–278; King to Viceroy, Madrid, 31 March 1631, *RSEA, 4*, 213–214.
38. Botelho, *História Militar e Política*, 1, 299; Francisco de Lucena, [undated], *RSEA, 4*, 278; Faria e Sousa, 'Ásia Portuguesa', 46; Catharina, 'História', 400. According to a letter of Diogo de Sousa de Menezes summarized by Lucena above Sousa de Menezes spent only 10 months in Mozambique. We know that he arrived in Mozambique in 1632 and left in 1633. The problem is that the Lucena document says Menezes left Mozambique Island for the Rivers of Sena to start

the reconquest in October (p 278). If this is correct and Menezes came to Mozambique in 1632 and stayed for 10 months until 1633, then we would be forced to conclude that this was October 1632 and therefore the defeat of Kapararidze would have been on 24 June (feast day of St John) 1633. However if the reference to October is a mistake then the problem does not arise.

39. Rezende, 'Estado da India', 416.
40. Francisco de Lucena, [undated], *RSEA, 4*, 278; Rezende, 'Estado da Índia', 411.
41. Francisco de Lucena, op. cit; Rezende, op. cit. 416; Catharina, 'História de S. Domingos', 399–400.
42. Francisco de Lucena, op. cit; Catharina, op. cit. 400.
43. Francisco de Lucena, op. cit. 278–279.
44. Manamotapa Domingos, Zimbaoe, 14 August 1652, *RSEA, 2*, 445.
45. King to Viceroy, Madrid, 31 (sic) April 1631, *RSEA, 4*, 223; King to Viceroy, Lisboa, 8 March 1634, *RSEA, 4*, 240.
46. Ibid.
47. Manamotapa to King, 23 October 1644, *DRdI*, 60 fol 231–233.
48. Manuza [Mavhura], 'Capitulações', *RSEA, 5*, 291.
49. King to Viceroy, Madrid, 31 (sic) April 1631, *RSEA, 4*, 223.
50. Ibid., 221–222; Manuza, 'Capitulações', *RSEA, 5*, 291.
51. King to Viceroy, Madrid, 31 (sic) April 1631, *RSEA, 4*, 221–222, 223–224; King to Viceroy, Lisboa, 8 March 1634, *RSEA, 4*, 240; King to Viceroy, Lisboa, 24 February 1635, *Machona e Nyassa*, 121; King to Monomotapa, Madrid, 31 (sic) April 1631, *RSEA, 4*, 226.
52. King to Viceroy, Lisboa, 26 March 1649, *RSEA, 4*, 311–312.
53. Catharina, 'História de S. Domingos', 402–403.
54. Ibid., 401.
55. Ibid., 401; Rezende, 'Estado da Índia', 416–417; Monsig. Lorenzo, Lisboa, 28 June 1631 in Wilmot, *Monomotapa*, 236.
56. Catharina, 'História de S. Domingos', 401.
57. Ibid; Rezende, 'Estado da Índia', 412–413; Monsig. Lorenzo, Lisboa, 28 June 1631 in Wilmot, *Monomotapa*, 236–237.
58. Rezende, 'Estado da Índia', 412–413.
59. Catharina, 'História de S. Domingos', 402.
60. Rezende, 'Estado da Índia', 416, 419.
61. See below and Chapter 8.
62. Ibid.
63. Rezende, 'Estado da Índia', 410, 413.
64. Ibid., 410–411, 414.
65. Ibid., 418.
66. Monomotapa to Viceroy, Zimbahoe, 12 April 1645, *DRdI*, 60, fols 233–234; A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX, 1, Manamotapa, Zimbaoe, 4 March 1643; Mudenge, 'Rozvi Empire and Feira of Zumbo', 28–33.
67. Rezende, 'Estado da Índia', 416–417.
68. Ibid., 414, 416–418; Assumpção, 'Breve Informação', fol 37.
69. Rezende, op. cit. 412.
70. Axelson, op. cit. 101, 104, 114.
71. A.P.O. IV, 11 (II), 146–149. Chicova, 2 May 1636, Tomé de Barros, Panelas de Polvora, Francisco Figueira de Almeida, Dom Andres de Vide Salbarada, Fr António de Salvador, Bertholameu Telo.

72. Axelson, op. cit. 111–113; King to Viceroy, Lisboa, 15 February 1640, *RSEA, 4*, 286–287.
73. A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 1, Manamotapa, Zimbaoe, 4 March 1643; Axelson, op. cit. 111; A.H.U. Av. Moç CX. 1, Viceroy to Francisco da Almeida, 24 January 1636.
74. Rezende, op. cit. 418; King to Viceroy, Madrid, 31 (sic) April 1631, *RSEA, 4*, 219.
75. A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 1, Manamotapa, Zimbaoé, 4 March 1643.
76. A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 1, [Anon. *c.* 1643.]
77. King to Viceroy, Lisboa, 25 March 1646, *RSEA, 4*, 305–306.
78. Monomotapa to Viceroy, Zimbahoe, 12 April 1645, *DRdI*, 60, fols 233–234; King to Viceroy, Lisboa, 15 February 1640, *RSEA, 4*, 287.
79. King to Viceroy, Lisboa, 26 March 1649, *RSEA, 4*, 311–312; Monomotapa to Viceroy, Zimbahoe, 12 April 1645, *DRdI*, 60, fols 233–234.
80. Manamotapa to King, 23 October 1644, *DRdI*, 60, fols 231–233.
81. Manamotapa, Zimbahoe, 14 August 1652, *RSEA, 2*, 445; A.H.U. Av. de Moç. CX. 1, Manamotapa, Zimbaoé, 4 March 1643.
82. Manamutapa, Zimbaoe, 14 August 1652, *RSEA, 2*, 445; Faria e Sousa, 'Ásia Portuguesa', 46; L.M. 28 A fol 150, António Alvares Pereira to King, Goa, 15 September 1661. In view of the fact that Siti had two sons already in 1652 (see note 87 below) it is unlikely that he was only 13 years old in 1652 as claimed in Sousa, 'Ásia Portuguesa', 46. Since Sousa died in 1649 the reference in his work to events of 1652 is suspicious and suggests his work was tampered with by someone after his death.
83. Manamotapa, Zimbaoe, 14 August 1652, *RSEA, 2*, 445.
84. Ibid.
85. Ibid., 446.
86. Ibid.
87. Ibid., 445–447; Catharina, 'História de S. Domingos', 403.
88. Manamotapa, Zimbaoe, 14 August 1652, *RSEA, 2*, 447.
89. Axelson, *Portuguese in South-East Africa 1600–1700*, 135 note 30.
90. Catharina, op. cit. 403.
91. Ibid., 403–404.
92. Axelson, op. cit. 135–136.
93. King to Viceroy, Lisboa, 15 March 1655, *RSEA, 4*, 330.
94. Ajuda, 51–VIII–43, [Anon], 16 March 1683, fol 475; A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 2, Conselho Ultramarino, 'Consulta', 10 February 1656.
95. A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 2, Conselho Ultramarino, 'Consulta', 10 February 1656; Axelson, op. cit. 136.
96. Axelson, op. cit. 136.
97. A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 1, Afonco to King, Zimbaoe, 20 April 1663.
98. Ibid., King to Viceroy, Lisboa, 8 March 1666, *RSEA, 4*, 343.
99. Viceroy to King, Goa, 9 January 1668, *RSEA, 4*, 344.
100. Barretto, 'Informação', 483; A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 2, Moçambique, Dom Manoel Mascarenhas to Viceroy, 4 August 1663.
101. Barretto, op. cit. 483.
102. Ibid.
103. Bourdillon, 'Peoples of Mt Darwin', 104; Latham, 'Tribes in the Mount Darwin', 177–179; A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 2, Manamotapa, Zimbahôe, 8 June 1679.
104. Barretto, op. cit. 483; B.N.L., *Collecção Pombalina*, 525 fol 36, Manamotapa, Zimbaoé, 22 June 1678. Another copy is on fol 37 and in A.H.U. Av. Moç CX. 2;

A.H.U. Av. Moç CX 2, Manamotapa, Zimbaôe, 8 June 1679.

105. Barretto, op. cit. 485.
106. Ibid., 482–483; A.H.U. Av. Moc. CX. 2, King to Viceroy, Lisboa, 14 March 1675. Also Theal, *RSEA, 4*, 365; A.H.U. Av. Índia, Códice 212, Conde Saa, Matheiros, Telles, Sande, Dourado, Lisboa, 26 January 1675.
107. Barretto, op. cit. 483.
108. A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX 2, King to Viceroy, Lisboa, 14 March 1675.
109. Barretto, op. cit. 484.
110. Barretto, op. cit. 483.
111. Viceroy to King, Goa, 9 January 1668, *RSEA, 4*, 344.
112. Prince to Viceroy, Lisboa, 3 April 1675, *RSEA, 4*, 375, 377.
113. Barretto, op. cit. 482.
114. A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 2, Manamotapa, Zimbaôe, 8 June 1679; A.H.U. Av. Índia, Códice 212, fol 123, Conde Matheizo Cardozo, Lixboa, 9 January 1681.
115. A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX 2, António Lobo da Silva, Zimbaoé, 22 June 1678.
116. Axelson, op. cit. 154.
117. King to Viceroy, Lisboa, 21 February 1681, *RSEA, 4*, 400; King to Viceroy, Lisboa, 25 March 1683, *RSEA, 4*, 417.
118. A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 2, António Pais Sande, Lisboa, 8 February 1684; A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 2, Gaspar de Souza de Lacerda to King, Senna, 3 July 1682; Ajuda, 51–VIII–43, [Anon], 'Descripção dos Rios de Cuama' (1683), fol 479 V.
119. Randles, *L'Empire du Monomotapa*, 48. Translation comes from the English version of the book translated by R.S. Roberts, p 30.
120. Ajuda, 51–VIII–43, [Anon], 'Descripção do Rios de Cuama' (1683), fols 473–483 V. During the mourning period or *chiriro* for a dead Mutapa such anarchy always occurred. It ended when a new Mutapa took over.

CHAPTER 8

Mutapa Kingdom and Rise of the Rozvi *c.* 1684 to *c.* 1760

To many people the history of the Mutapa state ends somewhere between 1684 and 1695 with the rise to power of the Rozvi Changamires. As Professors Oliver and Fage so succintly summed up the state of knowledge then available when they wrote their masterly synthesis,

> the Changamires . . . in a campaign lasting from 1693–5 finally drove the Monomotapas and their Portuguese overlords off the plateau . . . and left the eighteenth century Monomotapas to rule a tiny remnant of their former territories in the valley between Tete and Zumbo, as *puny puppets* of the Portuguese.[1] (emphasis added)

However, recent advances in our knowledge of Portuguese sources of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries require us to modify somewhat the image of pathos painted by Oliver and Fage. To begin with, the Mutapas were not wholly ejected from the Zimbabwe highlands and secondly, far from being 'puny puppets of the Portuguese' they sometimes proved themselves, especially during the eighteenth century, to be the scourge of the Portuguese in the Rivers of Sena. Indeed the most remarkable aspect of the post-1720 Mutapa state is the fact that in spite of its incessant civil wars and succession rivalries it continued to exist into the nineteenth century and remained robustly independent of the Portuguese, notwithstanding the latter's desire to return to the seventeenth-century situation when the Portuguese dominated the politics of the Mutapa empire. Instead of marauding Portuguese *prazo*-holders plundering the Mutapa empire, as happened during the seventeenth century, what we see in the eighteenth century are independent Mutapa princes now cajoling, here intimidating, there extorting and often pillaging Portuguese traders and settlers. At times when the Portuguese found the Mutapa exactions too severe they were reduced to beg for help from the then Rozvi rulers, the effective lords and arbiters in the politics of eighteenth-century south Zambezia.

The dramatic change in Portuguese–Shona relations which took

place in the late seventeenth century is associated with the rise of the Rozvi.[2] But above all it is usually associated with one man – Dombo.[3] Dombo's first attack on the Portuguese began at the Battle for Maungwe which took place before June 1684.[4] An insight into Dombo's remarkable military talents and ability to organize is provided by his conduct of the Battle for Maungwe. The importance of this battle to the Portuguese is underlined by the fact that Caetano de Mello de Castro, then Governor of Mozambique and the Rivers, himself 'for that engagement marshalled all the resources of those Rivers'.[5] That battle was joined and raged all day; the bow and arrow against the arquebus. On four or five occasions Dombo's army nearly routed the Portuguese forces. But the Portuguese exploited to the full the known advantage of the arquebus over the bows and arrows. By late afternoon the Portuguese had inflicted heavy casualties on Dombo's army. In response to this situation Dombo issued the following orders: (a) no one was to retreat from battle during daylight, (b) the women, who it appeared always accompanied the Africans, were ordered to cut as much firewood as they could. These orders were immediately put into operation. Father Conceição conceded that 'in being so well obeyed by his men [Dombo] enjoyed a great advantage over us [Portuguese].'[6] Evening fell with the battle undecided. The Portuguese forces, unaware of the problems of Dombo's army, held a council of war which resolved that their men should camp in the battlefield awaiting the enemy until the following morning.

Then, at one in the morning, the Portuguese found themselves suddenly surrounded by fires made from the wood which the women had cut during the battle. The impact was instant. The African troops fighting on the Portuguese side 'and some who were not Kaffirs [i.e. Portuguese], just like the Mideonites at the sight of Gideon's torches, went into a disorderly flight; and it was a good thing that the enemy had already withdrawn as nobody would have escaped.'[7] Commenting on Dombo's tactics on this occasion, Father Conceição ruefully wrote, 'He was so wily and cunning that after being defeated by our arms, he vanquished us with his stratagems.'[8] At daybreak Dombo's army collected prizes from the Portuguese camp. Since his army had suffered so many casualties the previous day, so Fr Conceição thought, Dombo did not deem it advisable to pursue the Portuguese. Conceição does not give us the real reason why Dombo did not pursue the Portuguese. But in a letter of Caetano de Mello de Castro we are

told that the Munhumutapa had at that very time tried to cut off Dombo from the rear by attacking 'the lands of Butua where this black man [Dombo] called himself king'.[9] Dombo returned to Butua where he inflicted a shattering blow on the army of the Munhumutapa Mukombwe. Some Portuguese living in Mukaranga as well as all the grandees of Munhumutapa and about 5 000 African soldiers of the Munhumutapa were said to have been killed on that occasion.[10] Before Changamire Dombo returned to his kingdom he had thrown Mukaranga and the Rivers into turmoil and caused untold destruction. It was on such achievements that the reputation of the invincibility of the Rozvi Changamires was to be nourished in the future. Already Dombo was so much feared that the Africans in the Portuguese army trembled 'only at the mention of his [Dombo] name'.[11]

After defeating the Mutapa forces, Dombo lingered in the country between Manyika and the *feiras* of Mukaranga, replenishing his army. In June 1684, C. de Mello de Castro was writing to the viceroy of the frantic efforts being made at Manyika to fortify that *feira*. For some reason Dombo did not attack Manyika in 1684.[12] Possibly he needed more time to replenish his forces. In 1685 Caetano de Mello de Castro, after describing the events of 1684, informed the viceroy that Dombo had 'many kings and chiefs' still under his command and as such continued to pose problems for the Portuguese.[13] But a letter of April 1694 shows that after the 1684 campaign against the Portuguese, Dombo did not attack the Portuguese positions again until 1693.[14] It would appear that between 1685 and 1692 Dombo was consolidating his position in Butua. However in 1687, Almeida wrote to the viceroy telling him that he had to send 700–800 men to assist 'our very great friend' Mutapa Mukombwe put down an uprising by one Prince Gugu.[15] But time was now drawing near when 'our very good friend' had to call it a day.

Mukombwe died in about 1692 and was succeeded by his brother Nyakunembire. The Portuguese, who had groomed Prince Nyamaende Mhande, a son of Mukombwe, saw Nyakunembire's succession as a usurpation.[16] Nyamaende Mhande (Dom Pedro) was a good friend of the Portuguese for they had baptized him in his youth and taught him the christian doctrine. Apparently, even when he became the Mutapa he, contrary to the normal practice, married only one wife. He had a perfect grasp of the christian principles and even taught them to his personal aides.[17] It is therefore hardly surprising that the Portuguese

had long determined that he was to be heir to his father Mutapa Mukombwe.[18] Since the days of Mutapa Mavhura the Portuguese had been used to dominating the Mutapa empire and its succession process. But by 1692 their power on the Zimbabwean highlands had been seriously shaken by the victories of Dombo.

As soon as Nyakunembire took over the Mutapaship he appealed to Changamire Dombo to help him to punish the Portuguese traders at the *feira* of Dambarare, supposedly for some offence they had committed[19] but more likely, it would appear, he was so nervous about his position that he could not afford to be sandwiched between the major Portuguese *feiras* at Dambarare and Chitomborwizi and those at Masapa, Ruhanje, etc. After all, he had come to the Mutapa throne against the wishes of the Portuguese, an unheard of act for over half a century. For these reasons it appears, he needed Dombo's help to clear the Portuguese from his southern flank. However, the plight of Nyakunembire cannot explain why Dombo was willing to help him. It may be that Dombo jumped at the chance to get rid of the Portuguese in line with his post-1684 policy. On the other hand, it is possible to speculate that the coming to power of Nyakunembire may well have been engineered by Dombo and his supporters in the first instance. It is conceivable that Nyakunembire was a member of the uncompromising faction led by Dombo. Placing a man hostile to the Portuguese on the Mutapa throne had obvious strategic advantages for Dombo. Although there is no positive evidence for this speculation, subsequent history shows that (a) Nyakunembire was dependent on the Rozvi to keep him on his throne and (b) the Rozvi *madzimambo* were very keen to have friendly Mutapas on the throne of that kingdom.

In November 1693, 'Changamire, for the second occasion descended on these *feiras* of the Rivers'[20] beginning with Dambarare. There were altogether about 60 people at Dambarare comprising Indians, Africans, Whites, some women, and two religious of St Dominic. The *feira* was without proper defences and so some of the *moradores* grouped for the fight in the house of one António Rebello, the richest trader at the *feira*. Once again, Changamire and his men proved that they earned their description as the '*inimigos do sangue Portugues*', (enemies of Portuguese blood) [21] Not a soul escaped at Dambarare. The Changamire's men destroyed the church, profaned holy vessels, desecrated sacred images and any other holy article they could lay their hands on. Changamire, it is said, had the two dead Dominicans and other Portu-

above: Burial at the Ruanga ruin showing stones filling the grave shaft. Scale is half metre.
below: Excavation at the old Portuguese *feira* of Dambarare at Mount Hampden near Harare, showing burial position of skeleton and shape of lower part of grave shaft. Scale is half metre.

guese flayed and their skins displayed at the head of his army so as to strike terror into the Portuguese followers. He disinterred the bones of the dead Portuguese and prepared with them a medicine which he told his men would make them invincible against the Portuguese. This was much in line with his reputation as 'a most skilled wizard'.[22]

When these reports reached the Portuguese and Indian settlers of Hwangwa and some Indian traders living at Chitomborwizi they all fled to the *zimbabwe* of the Emperor Munhumutapa where the captain-major, Manoel Pires Saro, was scheming to murder the emperor, Nyakunembire.[23] But Manoel Pires Saro found it hard to accomplish his designs in time as Nyakunembire was able to receive aid from the Changamire before help could be sent from Tete for Pires Saro. Instead Pires Saro safely retreated to Tete, thanks to Chief Gocha who, contrary to the orders of Nyakunembire that he should intercept Pires Saro, allowed the latter safe passage through his lands.[24] It may well be that Dombo destroyed Masapa[25] and caused the abandonment of the other *feiras* of Mukaranga (Matafunya, Ruhanje)[26] between the time he came to the aid of Nyakunembire, in November/December 1693, and 1695 when he destroyed the *feira* of Manyika.

In December 1693 all these reports reached the Captain-Major of the Rivers, Manoel de Távora e Sampaio, a settler of Sena who had already tasted the power and cunning of Changamire Dombo at the battle for Maungwe. Távora e Sampaio quickly sent *patamares* to Thomé de Sousa, the Governor of Mozambique, asking him to send him soldiers and musket balls and any other forms of help he could give. But before the help from Mozambique arrived, Prince Dom Pedro (Nyamaende Mhande), a son of Mukombwe, saw his opportunity to regain his father's throne. He left the land near Manyika where he was living and together with his brother Chirimbe and a force of 400–500 Africans he came to Tete and visited the Captain-Major of the Rivers at Sena, in the hope of joining hands with the Portuguese to fight Nyakunembire.

It was agreed that their forces should converge at a certain place known as Chambo. But as it turned out Tete would not send help to the appointed place within the 17 days agreed upon. The settlers of

Tete said they could not go to Chambo because this entailed crossing the lands of 'strong and war-like Kaffirs'. However the Captain-Major of the Rivers of Sena and the men from Sena went to Chambo to meet Mhande. At Chambo, the men from Sena lost a lot of Africans while fighting the *Mongas* (Samungazi Tonga). In the end, partly because of a shortage of ammunition, the captain-major and the men from Sena returned to Sena in May 1694, leaving behind Mhande and his men. The only achievement of the Portuguese forces which had gone to Chambo, according to Father Conceição, was that they were able to retreat in an orderly manner 'which was no small Divine mercy bestowed on our Kaffirs'.[27]

Arriving at Sena, they found the help which had been requested from Mozambique by Manoel de Távora e Sampaio. This consisted of 30 Portuguese soldiers and their officers, of whom Theodózio Francisco de Sousa was captain. They brought sufficient powder and bullets but the musket balls were too big. They also carried 100 *bares* of cloth, 'the money with which to pay for the war', and some more powder, balls and guns which were spontaneously donated by the merchants of Mozambique and some of those from India. According to Jóseph da Fonseca Coutinho, many settlers had to pawn their household effects to raise the cloth and money needed but after the war they could not raise money to recover those things and so were forced to sell them to pay for their debts. Great losses were incurred in the process.[28]

Manoel Pires Saro, owing to lack of provisions, could not bring help to Mhande who had to defend himself against the hostile Samungazi Tonga around Chambo. Mhande sought refuge with the widow of Francisco Pinheiro de Faria who lived with her sons in the lands of Nyambanzou. Not long after this, news was received that the Emperor Nyakunembire had granted the lands of Nyambanzou to one of his grandees who was already on his way with sufficient forces to take possession of the said lands. The widow of Francisco Pinheiro de Faria brought together all her slaves and free people and those of her uncle, Pedro Gonçalves Pinhão, and put them under the command of Mhande. Prince Mhande was able to defeat the approaching army with the forces at his disposal. From those he captured he was able to learn that Nyakunembire had fallen out with Dombo and so Dombo

had no intention of descending with help to the *zimbabwe* of Nyakunembire. Mhande, to be safe, decided to station his forces at a Mount Chiquiziri, lying between Dambarare and the *zimbabwe* of Nyakunembire, so as to make sure that the forces of the Rozvi Changamire and Nyakunembire would not be united again. When the residents of Tete saw the new turn that events had taken they decided to exploit the situation by joining forces with Mhande. Since the Africans of the Portuguese were too exhausted to undertake a new expedition, a company of Portuguese men under the command of Francisco Machando Tavares was sent to Mhande. This force had to pass through the lands of the powerful Chief Gocha and as surety of his good faith Gocha offered one of his sons to Prince Mhande.

Soon afterwards, another force under Jóseph da Fonseca Coutinho, the then recently-nominated Captain-Major of the Rivers, arrived at Tete from Sena. This too had to pass through the lands of Gocha. As a further sign of his good faith he sent his wives to the Portuguese army. All was now set for the attack of the *zimbabwe* of Nyakunembire. But all this preparation was unnecessary for, at the sight of the oncoming forces, Nyakunembire panicked and fled without resistance, it was 'mainly seven or eight Kaffirs of Changamire who were the only ones to take up their bows'.[29] Mhande took possession of the *zimbabwe* and with due ceremony was declared Emperor Munhumutapa.

Nyakunembire took refuge with the Changamire who was at this very time at Maungwe, poised between Dambarare and Masekesa (*Masseqaueca*) with such a mighty force that both places were in a state of constant fear. Although it was within Dombo's power to restore Nyakunembire to the throne of Munhumutapa, the former, among other reasons, was too preoccupied with his moves against Manyika to be bothered.

From documentary evidence the final fate of Nyakunembire is unknown. But there seems to be circumstantial evidence to associate Nyakunembire with the founder of the present Mutasa dynasty of Manyika. From the Portuguese records it is known that the Rozvi *mambo*, Dombo I, removed the ruling Chikanga of 1695 and replaced him with his own nominee.[30] From oral tradition it is known that the founder of the present Mutasa dynasty was a foreigner who came into Manyika from outside the kingdom. He is said to have assumed kingship of the area on a small technicality. His name was Nyamubvambire, i.e. the one who came from Mbire.[31] This should be compared

to the name Nyakunembire, i.e. the owner of Mbire. If the identification of Nyakunembire with Nyamubvambire proved acceptable it would solve the technicality of the expulsion of the Nguruve–Chikanga dynasty and its replacement with the Mutasa–Chikanga dynasty. Nyamubvambire would then be seen to have taken over the throne of Manyika with the support of Changamire Dombo.

The reign of Mutapa Nyamaende Mhande was quite short and nothing remarkable is found in the records except the discovery of silver in the lands of Nyakase (*Inhacasse*) near Chikova. The man who discovered the mine used to be so secretive about it that even his own wife and children did not know about the mine. He used to secretly dig for silver and sell it to some African christians. Mhande soon heard of it and was so angry that he sent some warriors to have the man killed, but the chap managed to escape. The Portuguese came to know of the mine and so Pires Saro requested Mhande to grant the mines to the Portuguese crown. Before acceding to the Portuguese request, Mhande demanded clothes from them. When this was done he granted them the silver-mines of Chikova. But Mhande's grant did not mean that the silver-mines were already in Portuguese hands for the chiefs of Chikova refused to divulge their whereabouts. Some bribery and cajoling of Chikova residents was needed before silver could be found. Although silver from Chikova continued to make its way to Mozambique up to the end of the seventeenth century, it does not seem that the Portuguese themselves ever found rich silver-mines at Chikova.[32] Mhande's reign came to an end in 1697/8 with his death.[33]

The successor to Mhande was his brother, Prince Chirimbe (*Gende, Ginde, Zenda or* Dom Manuel).[34] The Portuguese, as usual, pretended to be ignorant of the practice of collateral succession and therefore argued that Fr Constantino do Rosario, as son of Mutapa Mhande, should have succeeded his father. Of course they had a vested interest in such a possibility. It was felt that Fr Constantino would have been a pro-Portuguese candidate. To have a pro-Portuguese Mutapa was deemed important at that time because the Portuguese crown wished to have the grant of silver-mines made by Mutapa Mhande reconfirmed. It was felt that Fr Constantino, being a son of Mhande, would have been particularly amenable to that request.[35]

Fr Constantino, or Prince *Mapeze* (Mapeza?), the only son of Mutapa Mhande and his wife *Veredanhe*[36] (or *Vondato*),was baptized

at Tete in 1699 by Fr Francisco da Trindade, his teacher and the compiler of two catechisms, one probably in Sena and the other either in Nyungwe or Shona. Afterwards, Constantino left for Goa to study for the priesthood. His brother, Prince João, who was baptized by Fr Filippe da Assumpção, also joined him in Goa to study for the priesthood. At one time both stayed at the Convent of Santa Barbara at whose parish Fr Dom Miguel, the son of Mutapa Kapararidze, had been vicar.[37] In 1706, reference is made to a petition of Fr João da Asunção asking the Portuguese king to show favours to Fr Joseph de S. Agostinho, to himself and to his brother Fr Constantino.[38] Later Fr João became a parish priest for the church of Curca, not far away from the city of Goa. But on account of some minor indiscretion he had made, Constantino was banished to Macão by the Vicar-General of the Dominicans at Goa after his status had been reduced to that of a lay brother. From Macão he petitioned the King of Portugal to have his exile lifted. In 1709, the king granted his request and ordered that Constantino be returned to Goa. In his letter the king shows that he was not impressed by the vicar-general's actions, for he says,

> Dom Constantine, son of the emperor of Monomotapa . . . complains to me of the vicar general of the said religious, who for some slight irregularity of which the said Dom Constantine was guilty commanded him to be deprived of the habit and banished him to Macão as a lay brother, [Constantine] petitions me to command him to be recalled from the said exile and to compel the aforesaid religious to allow him to be professed; and seeing what he has further alleged, I think fit to command you to cause the Prince Dom Constantine to be recalled forthwith from Macão to Goa, having due care that immediately upon his arrival he is received into one of the houses of the Society of Jesus, commanding that he be well treated and with all courtesy, remembering the honour which his presence confers upon others . . .
>
> If time shows that he is bent on following the religious life, that this is his vocation, and that he desires to become one of the order into which he has already entered, or wishes to take the habit of whatever order he thinks most fitting, you shall direct the aforesaid prelate to command the matter to be put to vote that he may be accepted, informing him how much his admittance into the order will please me.
>
> As to the conduct of the vicar general with regard to the most ignominious expulsion of the said prince, if you obtain proof that he offended in the manner which the said prince complains of, you shall severely reprimand him in my name, not only for

> depriving him of the habit, but also for banishing him to such a distant part, because not being his subject he had no power to act towards him in this manner, but rather he should have excused him on the ground of his youth for any indiscreet conduct . . . as only the carelessness of youth.[39]

The king further instructed that Prince Constantino should be well-guarded so that foreign nations may not use him to undermine Portuguese interests in the Rivers of Sena. Constantino was duly returned to Goa where he continued with his religious calling as a Dominican friar. We are told that by 1712 he was already in Goa at the Convent of Our Lady of the Rosary.[40]

During the reign of Chirimbe, Prince Samutumbu Nyamhandu was a source of trouble. It appears that in 1702 Samutumbu Nyamhandu ousted Chirimbe from the Mutapa throne with the help of the ruling Rozvi Changamire. But Nyamhandu's reign did not last very long because around 1703 Chirimbe regained the throne with the help of the Portuguese. The Portuguese were so elated by this turn of events that they sent a garrison to guard Mutapa Chirimbe at his *zimbabwe*.[41]

But in 1708, Prince Samutumbu Nyamhandu attacked and took possession of some of the *prazos* close to Tete. The reason for this seems to have been that Fr Nicolau de S. Jozé had provoked Nyamhandu by abducting his daughter. He did this by scaling the walls of Dona Catherina Gomes Nobre's garden where the girl was kept. In this war against Nyamhandu, António Simões Leitão, the General of the Rivers of Sena, was killed. It was his successor, Rafael Alvares da Silva, who was able to bring peace to the region. According to one Manuel Gonçalves Guião, after Rafael Alvares da Silva's death the former temporarily took over and during that occasion spent 6 000 *maticals* on presents to Chirimbe and his vassals so that the vassals would be more favourably disposed towards Chirimbe and the latter towards the Portuguese.[42]

Mutapa Chirimbe died in about 1711 and was replaced by Mutapa Boroma Dangwarangwa (Dom João) in about 1712.[43] The Portuguese felt that Boroma Dangwarangwa, like Mutapa Chirimbe, as an uncle to Fr Constantino, was in fact a 'usurper'. And to undo this 'usurpation' they decided to bring back Fr Constantino from Goa to Zimbabwe. The decision to bring back Fr Constantino was taken in the interest of Portugal. For this mission Fr Trindade, Constantino's old teacher, was dispatched to Goa to persuade him to return home

where, with Portuguese assistance, he would take over the Mutapa-ship.[44] So much was to be done to and for Fr Constantino if he accepted to come back that it was hoped he would forever be grateful to the Portuguese crown and thus Portuguese interests would remain protected. It is said that even Constantino's own mother, Queen *Veredanhe*, urged him to return home in order to claim the throne. However, Constantino, knowing as he must have done that in fact his uncle, Dangwarangwa, had as much if not a greater right to succeed Chirimbe as himself, prudently declined the Portuguese offer claiming that as he was already a professed Dominican he had abandoned all worldly interests.[45]

The Portuguese king then ordered that Fr Constantino should be paid a pension of 200 *xerafins* a year because 'although he is of a different colour, this does not detract from the esteem in which he should be held as prince of an empire so powerful as was that of his father'.[46] Thus ended Portuguese designs to obtain silver-mines by using Fr Constantino.

But the story of Fr Constantino does not end there. In 1720 he was in trouble again with the vicar-general at Goa. He was threatened with imprisonment by the vicar-general for what the king calls 'private reasons' but the king of Portugal ordered that he be brought to Lisbon. Apparently Fr Constantino had shown a desire to leave India. Fearing, no doubt, that he might attempt to escape into the interior the Portuguese king ordered that,

> you shall send him to this kingdom in the first monsoon, commanding a suitable cabin to be prepared in the ship which is to sail and all that he further requires, at the cost of my royal treasury; recommending the captain to treat and entertain him well, and if they put in at Mozambique to have due care that he does not proceed to Monomotapa, but in such a manner that he may not suspect that he is distrusted.

Although both Fr Constantino and his brother Fr João did leave for Portugal in 1720 to meet the Portuguese king none of them in fact ever reached Lisbon. One died at the start of the voyage and the other died in the city of Bahia in Brazil and was buried in the cathedral of that city. After Fr Constantino and Fr João, there is yet another reference to a son of a Mutapa going to Goa in 1740 to study for the priesthood. But that prince died of smallpox soon after arriving in Goa.[47]

i. Birth of the Boroma–Nyamhandu rivalry

As events turned out, the Portuguese need not have worried too much about the succession of Boroma Dangwarangwa for he proved to have been quite friendly to the Portuguese.[48] Unfortunately for the Portuguese, his reign did not last long because Prince Samutumbu Nyamhandu, or Debwe, assisted by the then Rozvi Changamire, defeated and killed Dangwarangwa and some of his Portuguese allies from Tete. 'For us,' wrote one Portuguese, 'surely it was a lamentable defeat.'[49] This defeat was around 1712.[50] The Portuguese from Sena could not send help because at that very time the governor, Jácome de Morais Sarmento was in the kingdom of Manyika with an army of about 3 000 Africans and some Portuguese settlers from Sena on his way from Uteve where he had gone to castigate Sachiteve Sakakate (*Sacacate*), who was accused of being a confederate of the Rozvi *mambo*.

The Rozvi Changamire had devastated the lands of Mukaranga so savagely that even Samutumbu himself at the end of it all was reluctant to take over the Mutapa crown. But the Rozvi Changamire forced him to accept it. Just to make sure Samutumbu would behave himself, the Changamire placed one of his own *encosses*, or captains, at the court of Samutumbu to ensure that the latter ruled according to the instructions of the former.

Samutumbu Nyamhandu soon found out that he was not quite a master in his own house. For besides placing a captain at the former's court the then Rozvi Changamire imposed such conditions on Samutumbu that it appeared the latter was more of a vassal of the Rozvi Changamire than an independent ruler of another state. Samutumbu was not allowed to make treaties relating to peace, friendship or trade with the Portuguese or attack any of his vassal rulers, though he may be a rebel, without permission from the Rozvi Changamire. He was also forbidden to refer to his court as a *zimbabwe* but only as a *muzinda*. In effect he was to be stripped of his imperial pretensions and reduced to the status of a Rozvi vassal.[51]

Samutumbu thought that to retain his independence he should improve his relations with the Portuguese. The Portuguese on their part were only too eager to be reconciled with Samutumbu. Therefore, while publicly maintaining a hostile stance against the Portuguese, in secret Samutumbu treated with them. He invited the Portuguese to send a garrison to his court, then at a place called Nyapende.[52]

Although the Rozvi Changamire threatened to send an army to punish Samutumbu for dealing with the Portuguese in the end he did not do it.

However, Samutumbu soon found out that the Portuguese were no better allies for all they were interested in was to use him for their own benefit. It is said that Samutumbu was educated in the Jesuit House at Sena; he could speak perfect Portuguese and is said to have been a man of superior intelligence and highly talented. His ambition, so he informed Bartholomeo Alvares, the Portuguese captain at his court, was to rule his subjects fairly and justly. But the Portuguese programme had slightly different emphasis from that of Samutumbu. They wanted him to be baptized and to assume the throne of Mutapa with the full pomp and panoply as had been the case with his predecessors. Furthermore they asked him to allow the Portuguese to enter his kingdom again. But Samutumbu replied that all that had to wait a while until he had taken full control of his kingdom and his authority had been accepted by the potentates in his kingdom.

The Portuguese were displeased with his reply and started to hatch plots to place a prince more amenable to their interests on the Mutapa throne. They tried to carry through their scheme as secretly as possible without raising suspicion from Samutumbu. Captain Bartholomeo Alvares was called back and appraised of the intended plot. Alvares attacked the scheme with devastating logic, showing that it was completely suicidal. But he was overuled by the others and so an expedition was mounted to go and destroy Samutumbu.

When reports of Portuguese treachery reached Samutumbu, at first he dismissed them as untrue, for such was his deep trust in his friendship with the Portuguese. But when he realized that the reports were in fact correct he laid an ambush against them and then attacked them with such savage fury that the end result was indeed a 'great carnage'. Alvares was one of those killed in the battle. The whole episode so sickened Samutumbu that until his death the thought of that Portuguese chicanery always overcame him with emotion.[53]

In addition to Portuguese treachery, the early years of Samutumbu's reign experienced a devastating smallpox epidemic and a horrendous drought. Sometime around 1714 it is said that more than 200 000 people died from the above. The figure is almost certainly an exaggeration, but since the viceroy of Goa seems to have accepted it we should also accept its broad message that this was probably the

worst catastrophe to befall south-east central Africa since the Portuguese came to the region. Nowhere in the records does one come across such a figure as having been lost either in war or through an epidemic.[54]

Before his death, around 1718, Samutumbu appears to have accepted baptism because in a letter of January 1719 the viceroy, Dom Luíz de Menezes, addressed the former as 'Dom João, King Monomotapa'. Alluding to the above events, the viceroy with masterly understatement says, 'I regret that your highness has not experienced from all my vassals the consideration that I commanded them to give you.' He then goes on to assure Samutumbu that the new Portuguese garrison will be absolutely loyal to him and will defend him against the plots of one Prince Kamota.[55] It seems, therefore, that towards the end of his life Samutumbu had mended some fences with the Portuguese.

The political history of the Mutapa kingdom from about 1719 onwards can best be told as largely a struggle for succession between the house of Boroma and that of Nyamhandu. Generally speaking, the house of Boroma tended to be friendly to the Portuguese while that of Nyamhandu adopted an independent, and occasionally hostile, stance. The Rozvi Changamires do not seem to have played a very active role in the succession wars after the reign of Samutumbu.

Between 1720 and 1750 our sources on the internal history of the Mutapa state are not as satisfactory as they could be. However, from the limited sources at our disposal, a tolerable if somewhat hazy picture can be reconstructed for those 30 years. Albino Pacheco says that after the death of Samutumbu Nyamhandu, a son of Boroma and a son of Nyamhandu fought for the throne. He claims that it was then that a *mhondoro* ruled that succession to the Mutapaship should alternate between the two houses of Boroma and Nyamhandu.[56] The sources are not agreed as to who succeeded Samutumbu Nyamhandu. Pacheco says that it was Chisamharu (*Chisamparo*), a blind son of Boroma Dangwarangwa.[57] On the other hand, Dionízio de Mello e Castro and Miranda give the name of Zinyemba[58] whom D.P. Abraham claims was a son of Gweera, the first son of Mutapa Mukombwe.[59] Since Mello e Castro was relatively closer to the events than Pacheco it may well be that his reconstruction of Mutapa succession in this particular period is more accurate than Pacheco's. In January 1719 the viceroy mentioned that the 1718 letters from

Mozambique reported the death of a Mutapa and implies that a number of princes were contending for the throne. Therefore, he told the Lt Governor of Mozambique, António Cardim Frões that,

> As the nomination of a king Monomotapa is necessary, let it be made with due circumspection, seeing that the prince having the most right is crowned, if he be not a declared enemy, as thus God will bless the election. The same care must be exercised in preventing private persons from taking part in these elections ...
>
> A king Monomotapa capable of governing his empire and his prince Inhapandò [Nyamhandu] has justice on his side, and from the circumstances which you report to me I presume he has been crowned.[60]

The above quotation shows that in January 1719 the Portuguese were against a Prince Nyamhandu succeeding his father Samutumbu Nyamhandu, but it does not mention who the successor was. From other sources it is known that Prince Nyamhandu was ruling as Mutapa by 1723. The Mutapa João Nyamhandu built his *zimbabwe* in the Mavange (*Mavangor*) hills in present-day Mozambique.[61] This leaves the period from 1718 to *c.* 1723 unaccounted for. It would appear that this short period of about five years encompassed the reigns of Mutapas Zinyemba and Nyatsutsu, son of Boroma. According to one of D.P. Abraham's informants, 'Nyatsutsu only reigned for a short time.'[62] It is conceivable that both Zinyemba and Nyatsutsu ruled under the christian name of João, thereby making them Mutapas João III and IV respectively.[63] The period between *c.* 1719 and 1726 was a troubled time in the Mutapa history. From the records it is known that more than one Mutapa ruled, for it is said that during that time Mutapas did not rule for long periods. They usually had a number of rivals who removed them from power.[64]

According to the records, the reign of João V, or Nyamhandu, was uniquely blessed with peace, tranquility and longevity. He ruled for '*dilatados annos*' (years on end).[65] The few events remembered in connection with João V's reign included Fr Simão Santa Thomás's canonical visitation to the missions of the Rivers of which the mission of the Mutapa's own *zimbabwe* was one. Fr Santa Thomás says that when he visited Mutapa João V in 1735 he was received 'with great honours and demonstrations of great joy'. Apparently old João V met Fr Thomás at the gate of the *zimbabwe* and led him while clasping his hand into his palace where he gave him the seat of honour while he himself took a lowly position. This was a great honour which even the

captains and vicars at the *zimbabwe* did not enjoy for he only allowed them to sit on cushions in his presence while all other people sat on the ground. All this led Fr Thomás to remark that, 'such veneration in a King of the Kaffir race shown to one Prelate of the Church is much to be admired.'

Mutapa João V allowed Fr Thomás to baptize his nine-year-old son, giving him the name Dom Simão. Fr Thomás celebrated a Pontifical Mass at which Mutapa João V and the grandees of his court assisted. After that he administered the sacrament of confirmation to all the christians of the *zimbabwe* mission. But Fr Thomás was very disappointed to find out that the vicar of the *zimbabwe* parish was away at the time of his canonical visit. Apparently the vicar had gone to the mining settlement of Mano on the northern bank of the Zambezi, a distance of 15 days journey from the *zimbabwe*. He also found out that this practice was quite common. Some of the past vicars had also absented themselves from their parish. For example, Fr Matheus de S. Thomás is said to have lived at the parish for a total of only 15 days over a period of two years, and Fr Manoel de S. Vicente again concentrated on his temporal interests at the expense of his missionary duties. The result was that many christians had died without receiving the sacraments.[66]

Fr Simão S. Thomás also tried to use the good offices of Mutapa João V to try to negotiate for the release of the prisoners who were captured during the wars of Changamire Dombo.[67] After his visit to the churches of Zumbo and Mixonga, Fr Thomás returned by the way of the Mutapa's *zimbabwe*. He was received with much the same honour as before.[68] During his visit to Zumbo he met some people who had once lived at the *feiras* of Dambarare, Masapa, Hwangwa, etc. who told him of their expulsion from those places by Changamire Dombo. They recounted how they shed tears at seeing their children and relatives taken prisoners by Dombo or disappearing into the bush. It was already about 40 years since these people had gone, and therefore those of them still alive and their descendants continued to live without receiving the sacraments, in some cases ignorant of the christian doctrine itself. Their fate prompted Fr Thomás to request Mutapa João V to rectify the position by handing over to the Portuguese the old *feiras* of Mukaranga. But before delivering them to the Portuguese it was necessary that he should first pacify the region where they were found so that the Portuguese could go and live there without fear.

Mutapa João V presented the request to his grandees for debate and resolution. After a few days of consultation, João V came up with the decision that he was happy to comply with the request of Fr Thomás because he realized that this was in the interest of the church and his brother João V, King of Portugal. However, he requested that he would need three *bares* of cloth and two *barris* of gunpowder to be distributed among his commanders who were to be in charge of the enterprise.[69] Fr Thomás was very pleased about this and so he quickly communicated the information to the Captain of Mozambique, António Barboza Leal, urging him to make available the wherewithal to accomplish what he termed 'such supreme ends' which were in concordance with both the interests of God and the Crown of Portugal. In particular he urged that the cloth and gunpowder requested by the Mutapa should be granted.[70]

António Barboza Leal concurred with the arguments of Fr Thomás and added that the opening of the *feiras* would have a positive effect on the declining trade of the colony. According to Barboza, while in the past many boats laden with goods used to come to Mozambique from India for trade and be able to sell all their goods, of late it was not unusual sometimes for them to fail to trade even the equivalent of one boat-load of trade goods.[71] He then went on to suggest that it was best first of all to reoccupy the *feira* of Masapa as it was nearer to both the *terras da coroa* and the Mutapa *zimbabwe*. There a fortress should be built. Then, using Masapa as a base, the other *feiras* could be re-established. He accepted that the three *bares* of cloth requested by the Mutapa for his commanders was sufficient for the purpose of giving presents to some of the rulers neighbouring to those *feiras*. He felt that the required cloth and gunpowder should be obtained by levying all the traders and merchants of the Rivers of Sena as this project was also in their interest.[72] From Tete, João Pereira Velho endorsed most of the above points but thought that *Chittive* should be the first to be occupied and then Dambarare and the others. He felt that a wise and prudent captain should be appointed to maintain law and order. And added that the reoccupation of those *feiras* should make it easier for the christian prisoners in the lands of the Rozvi to escape as the *feiras* were near to the place of their captivity.[73]

In the end, nothing lasting came out of all these plans. According to the records some traders from Tete did indeed go to re-establish these *feiras*. However, so it would appear, the returns from their

efforts were only enough to meet their bare necessities and, in any case, after the death of Mutapa Nyamhandu João V, during the *chiriro*, those traders were either killed or robbed by the local people and so those of them still alive decided to abandon the *feiras* and return to Tete.[74]

Since these traders could not have reoccupied these *feiras* before 1737 and abandoned them at the time Mutapa João V died, the period or effect of their occupation at the *feiras* must have been quite limited.[75] It is not clear when João V died but in view of the fact that his reign was remembered as having been long and peaceful, we assume that it ended before the succession troubles of 1743.[76] João V was succeeded by Karidza (*Kariza*), a blind son of Boroma Dangwarangwa. It is because of his blindness that we identified Karidza with Pacheco's Chisamharu.[77] Karidza's succession did not last for long because Chikoka, the father of future Mutapa Ganyambadzi,[78] successfully challenged Karidza for the throne.[79] Karidza escaped across the Zambezi into Maravi country where he lived as a refugee for some years.[80] Not much is known of Chikoka's reign except that he was succeeded by one Kabwe.[81] Kabwe's own reign was a very short one of which little is known besides that Kabwe himself was violently removed from the throne by Debwe II, a son of Mutapa Nyamhandu (João V).[82]

Debwe II is said to have been a man of haughty temperament and war-like disposition. Apparently he unleashed such a violent war that its aftermath was still being felt in the *prazos da coroa* even during the 1760s.[83] It is said that Debwe II managed during his reign to exact a modicum of respect from his vassals and to cause the ruin and desertion of crown lands like Bamboe in Maravi country.[84] It is possible that the violent war referred to here may well be the same as that mentioned by Francisco de Mello de Castro as taking place in 1743[85] and by Fr Catarina as continued in 1744.[86] The 1743 troubles were so severe that the Portuguese were forced to ask help from the Rozvi emperor.[87] Besides his wars, Debwe II is also remembered as having been quite a flamboyant character. He on many occasions dressed like a Portuguese – shoes, socks, coat, headgear and all.[88]

When Debwe II died, the throne was taken over by his peace-loving, but cowardly and ineffectual, brother Debwe Mupunzagutu.[89] While it may be true that Mupunzagutu's reign was relatively peaceful when compared to that of Debwe II, it is also sadly true that he lost

control of his vassals and spent a good deal of his days 'taking trips on marijuana' and composing inspired 'hits' on his *mbira*. It is said that one of his 'hits', *Rumbo rwa Mupunzagutu*, can still make many a Shona greyhead nod and jerk rhythmically even to this day.[90] Dos Santos confirms that marijuana, or *mbanje*, was consumed widely by Africans of south-east central Africa in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. According to dos Santos,

> Throughout the whole of Kaffraria a certain herb is found, which the Kaffirs sow, and which they call *bangue* [*mbanje*] . . . The Kaffirs dry the leaf and stalk, and when they are well dried they pound them to powder, of which they eat a handful, and then drink some water, after which they are quite satisfied and their stomachs are comforted. Many Kaffirs sustain themselves with this bangue for many days, and eat nothing else; and many of them assemble together to eat it, becoming as drunk as if they had taken a quantity of wine. All these Kaffirs are very fond of this herb, and commonly use it, going about half drunk from its effects; and those who are accustomed [addicted?] to it do not take any pombe, but are satisfied with bangue alone.[91]

Some sources claim that Mupunzagutu ceded half of his kingdom to King Dom Sebastião of Portugual.[92] Nogueira says that a good part of the Portuguese lands in the Rivers of Sena in the 1780s was in fact a result of this donation.[93] This often-quoted reference is almost certainly mistaken. First of all, King Dom Sebastião of Portugal reigned between 1568 and 1578[94] while Debwe Mupunzagutu ruled in the mid-eighteenth century. Secondly, the *prazos da coroa* after the wars with Dombo continued to be limited to the area below Chikova. Mupunzagutu could not have ceded the lands below Chikova to the Portuguese because they were already in Portuguese hands by the end of the seventeenth century. Col Dionízio de Mello de Castro, who was in the Rivers during the reign of Mupunzagutu and was at one time captain-major of the garrison of *zimbabwe* of Mupunzagutu, makes no such claim. All he says is that during Mupunzagutu's reign the *terras da coroa* were reoccupied after Debwe II's wars, and some kind of peace was experienced after Mupunzagutu had openly declared himself to be a friend of the Portuguese nation.[95]

During Mupunzatugu's reign, the Portuguese, in February 1755, appointed as captain-major of the *zimbabwe* garrison one Manoel Dassa Castelbranco. According to Brigadier David Marques Pereira, he, Dassa, was a companion of the Governor-General and a man of 'little honour' who soon fell out with Mutapa Mupunzagutu. After 31

witnesses had spoken against him, the brigadier had him thrown into prison for a while and then later released him.[96] In July 1757, Dassa was given a set of instructions on how to behave at the Mutapa's *zimbabwe*. Among other things, he was to do everything in his power to please Mupunzagutu and to see to it that the latter's advisors did not influence him against Portuguese interests. He was to take care that the men of the garrison behaved themselves well so that the Portuguese reputation would rise in the estimation of the Mutapa and of his people. He was to ensure that any of the soldiers granted leave of absence from duty by the Mutapa spent it at Tete. It was necessary that as soon as he heard any intelligence he should relay it quickly to the governor. Finally, he was to apologize for bringing the Mutapa a *sagoate* of only 15½ *corjas*, which was less than what was customary.[97] But by November that same year a similar set of instructions were given to Commandant Jozé António Brabo seeing that Manoel Dassa de Castelbranco was by then in prison for having murdered the '*Feitor dos Foros e Quintos*' (Factor for the collection of rents and fifths). Dassa had already squandered much of the cloth for the payment of the garrison. The Lt Governor had to replace the cloth. For the *sagoate* of the Mutapa, Brabo was given 17 *corjas* and 18 *chuabos*. This, too, was said to have been less than what was normally given.[98] The last Captain-Major of the *zimbabwe* garrison during the reign of Mupunzagutu was Coronel Dionízio de Mello de Castro, the famous *memorialista*. Dionízio reinforces the image of Mupunzagutu as an ineffective ruler by pointing out that during his reign many Portuguese traders were robbed by the former's vassals.[99]

In 1760 Mupunzagutu was assassinated in his *zimbabwe* by his own brother Zindove (*Zindabe*).[100] It is said with his death the remnant Mutapa state fragmented further into smaller principalities.[101] Evidence for this statement is again hard to come by. What is known for certain is that the kingdom divided into two, viz Dande and Chidima, with Dande being ruled by Derere[102] and his descendants, while Chidima became the residual part of the former state where the Boroma and Nyamhandu descendants continued to vie for the succession.

CHAPTER 8

Notes

1. R. Oliver and J.D. Fage, *A Short History of Africa* (Harmonsworth, 1962), 133.
2. Mudenge, 'Rozvi Empire and Feira of Zumbo', 35–43, 66–99.
3. Ibid., 66–99.
4. Filmoteca, 3/3/3/9–10 $\frac{59-60}{1-4}$, fols 327–331 V, Caetano de Mello de Castro to Viceroy, Senna, 26 June 1684 and 28 June 1684. Letters forwarded by Viceroy to Lisbon on 20 January 1685.
5. Conceição, 'Tratado', 105 para 105; Ajuda, 51–VII–34, fol 50, 27 June 1698, 'Proposta que fizerão os moradores dos Rios de Cuama ao Senhor V. Rey'.
6. Conceição, op. cit. 105 para 106.
7. Ibid., 106 para 107; A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 2, Caetano de Mello de Castro to King, Senna, 24 July 1685.
8. Conceição, op. cit. 105 para 106.
9. A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 2, Caetano de Mello de Castro to King, Senna, 24 July 1685.
10. Ibid., Ajuda, 51–VII–34 fol 50, 27 June 1698, 'Prosposta que fizerão'.
11. Conceição, op. cit. 106 para 108.
12. Filmoteca, 3/3/3/9–10 $\frac{59-60}{1-4}$, fols 327–331 V, Caetano de Mello de Castro to Viceroy, Senna, 26 June 1684 and 28 June 1684.
13. A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 2, Caetano de Mello de Castro to King, Senna, 24 July 1685.
14. A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 2, Fr António da Conceição, Manoel Pires Saro and others, Sophalla, 20 April 1694.
15. L.M. 52 fol 403, Dom Miguel de Almeida to Viceroy, Senna, 23 June 1687.
16. A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 2, Fr A. da Conceição, M.P. Saro and others, Sophalla, 20 April 1694; Conceição, 'Tratado', 67 para 50–51; 106 para 109.
17. Conceição, 'Tratado' 67 para 52; Miranda, 'Monarchia', 109; Mello e Castro 'Notícia', 130–131.
18. Conceição, 'Tratado', 67 para 51.
19. Ibid., 106 para 109; A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 2, Fr António da Conceição, Manoel Pires Saro and others, Sophalla, 20 April 1694.
20. Conceição, 'Tratado', 106–107 para 109–113; A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 2, Fr António da Conceição, Manoel Pires Saro and others, Sophalla, 20 April 1694.
21. A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 2, Fr A. da Conceição, Manoel Pires Saro and others, Sophalla, 20 April 1694.
22. Conceição, 'Tratado', 105 para 104.
23. Ibid., 106–107 para 111.
24. Ibid., 106–107, para 109–113.
25. Assumpção, 'Breve Informação', fol 37.
26. Ibid; B.N.L. Códice 176, [Anon . . . 1726], 'Memórias e documentos para a história ecclesiástica do Arcebispado de Goa e seus suffragâneos. Continuam as notícias do Arcebispado de Goa', 22.
27. Conceição, 'Tratado', 107 para 114.
28. Ibid., 108 para 115. Gives the figure of 30 soldiers with their officers. But Viceroy to King, Goa, 23 September 1694, *Machona e Nyassa*, 127, gives a figure of 35 not

counting the officers. And in a letter of 16 October 1694 the same viceroy gives the figure of 40 men. See S.R. Welch, *Some Unpublished Manuscripts* (Pretoria, 1930), 38; L.M. 63 fols 197–198, Joseph da Fonceca Countinho to Viceroy, Soffalla, 14 June 1699.

29. Conceição, 'Tratado', 108–109 paras 116–122.
30. Ibid., 110 para 124; Manuel Galvão da Silva, 'Diário das Viagens', 327.
31. Rev R.H. Baker, 'The Mutasa and Makoni Dynasties', *NADA*, 2, (1924), 85; Posselt, *Fact and Fiction*, 20; National Archives of Zimbabwe, J Machiwenyika, 'History of the Manyika People', His. Mss. Colln, MA 14/1/2 lessons 6, 8, and 9 part 2.
32. Conceição, 'Tratado', 64–65 para 37–39; Ajuda, 51–VII–34 fols 49–50; Joseph da Fonceca Coutinho to Viceroy, Senna, 29 June 1698; Ajuda, 51–VII–34 fol 19, Manoel Pires Saro to King, Tette, 11 June 1696; A.P.O. IV-II (II), 150–151, Viceroy to King, Goa, 15 December 1696; Assumpção, *'Breve Informação'*, 38. In 1702 silver was discovered in large quantities. See B.N.L. Códice 176 fol 22 [Anon . . . 1726,] 'Memorias e documentos'. On one occasion a nugget worth 200 000 *cruzados* of silver was found.
33. Schebesta, *Portugals Konquistamission*, 176; Ajuda, 51–VII–34, fols 49–50, J. da Fonceca to Viceroy, Senna, 29 July 1698.
34. Ibid; A.H.U. Av. India Códice 212 fol 48, Serrão=Silva=Pereira=Telles, Lisboa, 22 November 1707; King to Viceroy, Lisboa, 16 August 1710, *RSEA, 5,* 23.
35. A.P.O. I-III-III, 37–38, [Anon] to King, Goa, 13 January 1721; A.P.O. I-III-II, 331, King to Viceroy, Lisboa, 9 April 1718; A.P.O. I-III-II, 388–390, King to Viceroy, 2 September 1719; King to Viceroy, Lisboa, 23 March 1712, *RSEA, 5,* 34–36; A.P.O. IV-II-II, 214–215, [Anon] to King Goa, 2 January 1713.
36. Schebesta, *Portugals Konquistamission*, 174.
37. Catharina, 'História de S. Domingos', 405.
38. A.H.U. Av. Índia Códice 212 fol 400 V, Conde — Mesqta=Silva=Silvra. Barboza=Pereira, Lisboa, 5 July 1706.
39. L.M. 176 B fol 330, Dominican Vicar General, 'Convento de S. Domingos', (Goa), Annual Report on Missions, 5 July 1794; King to Viceroy, Lisboa, 2 April 1709, *RSEA, 5,* 20–21.
40. King to Viceroy, Lisboa, 23 March 1712, *RSEA, 5,* 34–35.
41. A.P.O. IV-II-II, 164, Viceroy to King, Goa, 14 January 1709; Abraham, 'Chaminuka', 43–44 note 3; A.P.O., I-III-I, 394–395, Viceroy to King, Goa, 15 January 1707; Goa Archives, Panaji, 'Regimento e Instrucções', vol 8, (1696–1704) Caet[ano de Mello de Castro], Goa, 31 January 170–(?); F.M. Bordalo, *Ensaio Sobre a Estatística de Moçambique e suas dependencias na costa Oriental da África ao Sul do Equador*, Lisboa, 11, 4, (1859), 119.
42. Bordalo, op. cit. 119; Botelho, *História, Militar e Política*, 1, 356; King to Viceroy, Lisboa, 17 September 1711, *RSEA, 5,* 32–33; Viceroy to António Cardim Frões, Goa, 21 January 1719, *RSEA, 5,* 48; A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 3, [Anon–1751], 'Memorial do que tenho obrado nestes Rios no Servico de S. Magestade que Deos Guarde'. Convincingly shown to have been written by Gonçalves Guião by M.D.D. Newitt, 'The Zambesi Prazos in the eighteenth century', Ph.D. London, (1967), 249–254.
43. King to Viceroy, Lisboa, 23 March 1712, *RSEA, 5,* 35.
44. Ibid; Catharina, 'História de S. Domingos', 405.

45. King to Viceroy, Lisboa, 23 March 1712, *RSEA*, 5, 35; King to Viceroy, Lisboa, 7 April 1714, *RSEA*, 5, 36–37.
46. King to Viceroy, Lisboa, 7 April 1714, *RSEA*, 5, 37.
47. King to Francisco José de Sampayo, Lisboa, 21 April 1720, *RSEA*, 5, 111–112; L.M. 176B fol 330, Dominican Vicar General, 'Convento de S. Domingos', (Goa), Annual Report on Missions, 5 July 1794.
48. B.N.L. Códice 176 fol 22 V, [Anon . . . 1726], 'Memórias e documentos'.
49. Ibid; Miranda, 'Monarchia', 109; Mello e Castro, 'Notícia', 131.
50. Schebesta, *Portugals Konquistamission*, 176.
51. B.N.L. Códice 176 fol 22–23 V, [Anon . . . 1726], 'Memórias e documentos'.
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid.
54. A.P.O. I-III-II, 149–150, Viceroy to King, Goa, 3 January 1715.
55. Viceroy to Monomotapa, Goa, 26 January 1719, *RSEA*, 5, 67–68.
56. Pacheco, *Uma Viagem*, 26.
57. Ibid.
58. Mello e Castro, 'Notícia', 131; Miranda, 'Monarchia', 109.
59. Abraham, 'Monomatapa Dynasty', 69.
60. Viceroy to António Cardim Frões, Goa, 21 January 1719, *RSEA*, 5, 50.
61. Fr Manoel de Santo Thomás, Report, Senna, 19 June 1723. *Chronista de Tissuary*, 40, (1869), 61, 62.
62. Abraham, 'Monomotapa Dynasty', 70; Miranda, 'Monarchia', 109; Mello e Castro, 'Notícia', 131.
63. Boroma Dangwarangwa was known as João I (?); Samutumbu Nyamhandu was also known as João II (?). If both Zinyemba and Nyatsutsu were baptized as Joãos they would then have been João III and IV respectively.
64. B.N.L. Códice 176 fol 23, [Anon . . . 1726], 'Memórias e documentos'.
65. Manuel da Costa, 'Projecto de restabelecimento da Feira de Dambarare', Zumbo, 2 March 1769, *IdFdS, XVIII,84,* (1955), 86.
66. B.N.L. Códice 866, 'Collecção Moreira', fols 2–7, Simão de S. Thomas, Senna, 10 June 1735.
67. A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 3, Manamotapa, Zimbaõe, 14 November, 1736; A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 3, Simão de S. Thomás to António Barboza Leal, Tette, 29 March 1737.
68. A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 3, Simão de S. Thomás to António Barboza Leal, Tette, 29 March 1737; A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 3, Simão de S. Thomás, Senna, 27 June 1737; A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 3, Manamotapa, Zimbaõe, 14 November 1736.
69. A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 3, Manamotapa, Zimbaõe, 14 November 1736.
70. A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 3, Simão de S. Thomás to António Barboza Leal, Tette, 29 March 1737.
71. A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 3, António Barboza Leal, Massangano, 6 April 1737.
72. Ibid.
73. A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 3, João Pereira Velho, Tette, 1 April 1737.
74. Manuel da Costa, 'Projecto de restabelecimento da Feira de Dambarare', op. cit. 86.
75. S.I. Mudenge, 'Eighteenth-century Portuguese settlements on the Zambezi', 388. Here the author incorrectly claimed that the feiras of Mukaranga were never

reoccupied in the eighteenth century. However, the argument of the author that eighteenth-century objects on those sites cannot be used to date the Zimbabwean ruins can still be maintained on the ground that the 1737/8–1743/4 reoccupation seems to have been rather transient in nature and unlikely to have resulted in much remains.

76. C.R. Boxer, 'A Dominican Account of Zambezia in 1744', *Boletim da Sociedade de Estudos de Moçambique*, Lorencǫ Marques, *XXIX*, 125, (1960), 8; Francisco de Mello de Castro, *Descripção dos Rios de Senna* (Nova Goa, 1861), 32 para 66, 31 para 63.
77. Mello e Castro, 'Notícia', 131; Miranda, 'Monarchia', 109; Pacheco, *Uma Viagem*, 25–26.
78. Miranda, 'Monarchia', 111.
79. Miranda, 'Monarchia', 109; Mello e Castro, '*Notícia*', 131.
80. Ibid.
81. Ibid.
82. Miranda, 'Monarchia', 110, 111; Mello e Castro, 'Notícia', 131.
83. Mello e Castro, 'Noticia', 131; Miranda, 'Monarchia', 110.
84. Miranda, 'Monarchia', 111; A.H.U. Av. Moç. Códice 1339 fol 17, undated; Mello e Castro, 'Notícia', 132.
85. Mello de Castro, *Descripçáo*, 32 para 66.
86. Boxer, 'Dominican Account', 8.
87. Mello de Castro, *Descripção*, 32–33 para 66–67.
88. Miranda, 'Monarchia', 114.
89. Ibid., 110; Mello e Castro, 'Notícia', 131.
90. Abraham, 'Monomotapa Dynasty', 70. Part of the song goes thus *'Imbopa, Imbopa, Uchipire mwana anokanza musango.'* (Give a scrap just a scrap for the child who roots for some food in the bundu.)
91. Dos Santos, 'Ethiópia Oriental', 210.
92. Jerónimo José Nogueira de Andrade, 'Descripção do Estado em que ficavão os Negócios da Capitânia de Mossambique nos fins de Novembro do Anno de 1789 com algumas Observaçoens, e reflecçoens sobre a causa da decadençia do Commérçio dos Estabelecimentos Portugueses na Costa Oriental da África', *Arquivo das Colónias*, (Lisboa, 1917), 94; Sousa e Silva, *Distrito de Tete*, 32. Says the half ceded was the land around Zumbo.
93. N. de Andrade, 'Descripção em que ficavão', 94.
94. C°. Alcântara Guerreiro, *Quadros da História de Moçambique*, Lorenço Marques *11*, (1954), 464.
95. Mello e Castro, 'Notícia', 131; Miranda 'Monarchia', 110.
96. A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 5, David Marques Pereira, 'Rellação do Provim.^{to} dos postos, e offícios da costa de África e Rios de Senna', Senna, 10 June 1756; António Alberto de Andrade, *Relações de Moçambique Setecentista* (Lisboa, 1955), 542.
97. A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 5, 'Instrucção de que hade uzar Manoel Dassa Castelbranco Capp.^{m} Mor do Prezído de Zimboé da guarda do Emperador Muanamuttapa', Senna,24 November 1757.
98. A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 5, 'Instrucção de que hade uzar Jozé Ant°. Brabo Commandante do Prezído de Zimboé da guarda do Emperador Muanamuttapa',

Senna, 24 November 1757.

99. Andrade, *Relações*, 542; Mello e Castro, 'Notícia', 131.
100. Mello e Castro, 'Notícia', 131; Miranda, 'Monarchia', 110.
101. N. de Andrade, 'Descripção em que ficavão', 94.
102. Mello e Castro, 'Notícia', 132. Derere Chihwahwa was succeeded by his son Gomo Nyamushamba and the latter by his son Mvirimbo Chuzu who was followed by Nyapfuko. Today this line is represented by Chief Muzarabani. See D.P. Abraham, 'Monomotapa Dynasty', 69; Garbett, 'Valley Korekore', 158, and chapter 9 below.

CHAPTER 9

Kingdom of Chidima: Wars of Succession and the Last Years of the Mutapa State c. 1761 to 1902

With the death of Debwe Mupunzagutu (*Punzaguto*), the Mutapa state entered a period of unprecedented turmoil and confusion. Law and order broke down; robberies and murders were the order of the day. Wars and rebellions were common occurrences. In this situation, trade was disrupted and the life in Portuguese crown lands adversely affected. At the core of the trouble was the struggle for succession to the Mutapa crown. According to D.P. Abraham, Debwe Mupunzagutu died in 1759 and was succeeded by Changara who ruled from 1759 to 1785.[1] Abraham's reconstruction of this period of Mutapa history is less full than it could have been. In 1766, one João Moreira Pereira claimed that from 1751 to 1766 he had knowledge of six Mutapas who ruled in that period, of whom only two (Zezi and Mutanyikwa) ruled concurrently in opposition to each other.[2]

Prince Zindove killed his brother Mutapa Mupunzagutu and declared himself Mutapa in 1760. This was the beginning of the civil wars. Zindove was challenged by one of his own brothers, Prince Kamota (*Camota*). In the ensuing battle Zindove was defeated and had to flee to Dande to seek reinforcements. But the King of Dande, known as Derere, not only refused to help Zindove but killed him.[3] Kamota then became Mutapa. But Kamota did not feel safe on his throne while Karidza, the blind prince, was still alive and so he continually crossed the Zambezi river into the lands of the Maravi where Karidza had taken refuge. Kamota never succeeded in his attempt to destroy Karidza but instead was himself killed, or according to other sources expelled from the throne, by Prince Mutanyikwa (*Mutanhiqua, Mutanica*), a son of Karidza, in February 1761.[4] But after only one year's rule Mutanyikwa was being challenged by Prince Zezi, a brother of Zindove and Kamota. In 1762, Zezi marched to the *zimbabwe* of Mutanyikwa. Instead of standing and fighting Zezi, Mutapa Mutanyikwa fled north of the Zambezi to the country of the Maravi. Zezi then became the Mutapa.[5]

It seems that Zezi and Mutanyikwa were still vying with each

other for the throne in 1766–7.[6] Mutanyikwa appears to have remained in exile north of the Zambezi with his father, the blind Karidza. The Dominican Fr Santa Anna says that, during his time at Zumbo, Mutanyikwa visited that *feira*, demanded tribute from its residents and proceeded to cross the Luangwa river into modern Zambia where he castigated one Chivunukura who was then vying for the Mburuma chieftaincy with one Karikomeno.[7] Despite this display of virility north of the Zambezi it does not appear that Prince Mutanyikwa ever regained the Mutapaship.

i. The Changara–Ganyambadzi succession conflict

After the swift changes of the early 1760s came the bitter and protracted struggle of Changara and Ganyambadzi (*Ganeabaze*). The period between 1768 and 1806 saw only three Mutapas on the throne, viz Ganyambadzi, Bangoma and Changara. At first sight this might suggest nearly 40 years of calm and stability. This is only superficially true. In truth, the Changara–Ganyambazi struggle was so bitter that both trade and political stability in the state were adversely affected.

According to the instructions Governor-General Balthazar Manoel Pereira do Lago gave to Ignácio de Mello e Alvim, the Lt Governor of the Rivers, in April 1767, there was an uncrowned prince, victor in the civil wars in which two Mutapas had died, who had some expectations of being crowned Mutapa. It is conceivable that the two Mutapas who died in battle against each other were probably Mutapa Zezi and Mutanyikwa, and the prince with a chance to succeed was Prince Ganyambadzi.[8] It would appear that Ganyambadzi succeeded to the throne sometime in either 1767[9] or early 1768.[10] According to Ignácio de Mello e Alvim, in February 1768 Ganyambadzi's succession was still shaky and for that reason the former had still not sent him the *presídio* for his *zimbabwe*. The threat to Ganyambadzi was posed mainly by one Prince Chiveve who was himself a pretender to the throne. Ignácio de Mello e Alvim issued a decree forbidding all the Portuguese settlers from assisting Prince Chiveve in his designs.[11] But trouble was soon knocking at Ganyambadzi's door as a result of the activities of Prince Bangoma, a son of the late Mutapa Debwe Mupunzagutu.[12] It is said that Prince Bangoma decided to invade some of the Portuguese lands on the southern side of the Zambezi as well as on northern, or Maravi, side. Some of these lands (*Terra Cassunca*) had just been granted to one Francisco Xavier de Campos.[13] In cahoots with some other princes, Bangoma committed a

number of robberies and murder, apparently without any provocation.[14] He captured some prisoners in order to sell them as slaves.[15] Ignácio de Mello e Alvim decided to teach Bangoma and all the other chiefs a lesson. He put together a force under the command of Domingos Caetano de Albuquerque to go and castigate them. The force was able to inflict a number of casualties on Bangoma and his lieutenants. Bangoma, as well as some of his Karanga and *vanyai* followers, were taken as prisoners to Tete where they were kept under heavy security pending determination by the Governor-General on Mozambique Island. However, Ignácio de Mello e Alvim made it clear that if the Governor-General should decide that Bangoma was to be set free that would lead to further disturbance of the peace in the *terras da coroa*.[16] When Mutapa Ganyambadzi secretly asked for the release of Prince Bangoma the request was rejected by Alvim.

After the arrest of Bangoma, some of the *vanyai* who had collaborated with him fled and went to join Ganyambadzi. It is said that while Bangoma was a prisoner at Tete some *vanyai* and Karanga went to that *vila* 'to ask for food in the houses of these settlers with the usual arrogance and audacity'. These too were arrested and locked up in the fortress. But after a plea from Ganyambadzi the Karanga in the group were released.[17]

The relations between Ganyambadzi and the Portuguese deteriorated further during 1768. Apparently one trader of Tete, by the name of João Baptista Rollem, asked for the right of free passage from Ganyambadzi to carry his trade goods through his lands until Chikova. Ganyambadzi granted him free passage, all the usual tariffs and taxes were duly paid, and some of Ganyambadzi's envoys even accompanied Rollem on his journey. But on the way, Prince Nyamavurume, Ganyambadzi's *nevanje*, robbed Rollem's caravan of four *pastas* worth of trade goods. In addition, Ganyambadzi is alleged to have sent one chief by the name of Chikukura (*Chicocura*) to arrest or kill Gil Bernado Coelho de Campos, a captain-major of Zumbo who was on his way to Tete.[18] The Portuguese were livid.

Ignácio de Mello e Alvim described Ganyambadzi as a 'vile barbarian' and declared him an 'enemy of the state' who henceforth was to be attacked in every way possible.[19] On the question of Prince Bangoma, then still in prison, the Governor-General thought he should be hanged and, from Tete, Manoel Gomes Nobre concurred with him.[20] But Luís António Pereira Pinto, also at Tete, saw

nothing but problems arising from such an execution as it would alienate many people[21] in the Mutapa state. He also opposed any overt moves by the Portuguese to assist Prince Chiveve against Ganyambadzi; on the other hand, he felt that Chiveve should be allowed free passage on his way to fight Ganyambadzi for he had reservations as to the true strength of Ganyambadzi.[22] But Pinto's was a minority voice. Lt Governor Alvim was in a fighting mood. When three *vanyai* of Ganyambadzi entered Pondé, one of the lands of João Moreira Pereira, the Lt Governor ordered that they should be arrested. One of the *vanyai* escaped and a second was taken prisoner, while the third, said to have been the chief guide given to João Baptista Rollem by Ganyambadzi, was hanged. Besides these three, another five *vanyai* of Ganyambadzi also entered Sacumbe, the land of Manuel Gomes Nobre. Lt Governor Alvim sent a detachment of sepoys who killed three of them and stuck their heads on poles near the tree where one of the other three *vanyai* had just been hanged. Of the remaining two, one jumped into a river and the other disappeared into the forest, but both are said to have been mortally wounded before their escape.[23] In addition, the Lt Governor seized some ivory belonging to Ganyambadzi and then asked the Governor-General whether to use its proceeds to compensate J.B. Rollem or to send it to the royal treasury.[24]

The above developments provided an opportunity for Ganyambadzi's rivals to the throne. Although Prince Chiveve, then living in Maravi country, had been his chief rival, he was then found to be with too small a force to mount a strong challenge against Ganyambadzi. Instead it was left to one Prince Changara to move against Ganyambadzi. It is not clear whether this Prince Changara is the same as the one mentioned in October 1768 as the *munyai* of Chikova.[25] When Changara moved against Ganyambadzi, the latter did not offer any resistance but just fled across the Zambezi into Chief Bive's country where he sought refuge.[26]

Ignácio de Mello e Alvim wanted Ganyambadzi to be expelled from Bive's country at once because he feared that the two would soon form common cause against the Portuguese. Although Bive assured Alvim that he would do no such thing, he secretly hid Ganyambadzi and his family in a remote part of his country. Soon Alvim received information to the effect that Bive had already made a pact with Ganyambadzi for the purpose of trying to recover some of his (Bive's)

lands which had been conquered and turned into *prazos* by the Portuguese. Alvim decided to counter this threat by mobilizing a force of fighters and placing them at the frontiers of Bive's lands, poised for both defensive and offensive purposes. The army remained encamped there for 49 days.[27]

Apparently this move paid off for as the news of the Portuguese troop deployment spread, no chief, far or near, was sure at whom the force would strike. Frightened by such a threat, Bive sent envoys to ask for forgiveness and to affirm that he did not wish to measure his arms against the Portuguese but only longed for peace and good neighbourliness with them. He made it clear that he had abandoned all attempts to recover his lands occupied by the Portuguese *prazo*-holders. He went further to add that, should Alvim enter his country to make war on him, he would simply retire into the interior without offering any resistance whatsoever. In these circumstances, Alvim decided not to march against Bive and instead accepted a tusk of ivory the latter had sent as a sign of his peaceful intentions. In return Alvim sent Bive goods worth double the value of the ivory tusk. As intermediaries for these negotiations Bive had used João Moreira Pereira and António Aráujo Bragança, two important residents of Tete.[28]

Prince Ganyambadzi, described as 'the driving force behind these disorders', also sent envoys to Alvim to ask for forgiveness, pledging that he had no intention of fighting the Portuguese. He promised to pay compensation to J.B. Rollem for the loss the latter had incurred. This he would do in spite of the fact that, so he claimed, the chief who had robbed Rollem had done so without his approval. From the information available to Ganyambadzi, the chief in question and his *vanyai* had committed the robbery under the influence of alcohol. During the 49 days the Portuguese forces were encamped at the frontiers of Bive they did daily drills, and on the two occasions when envoys from Bive and Ganyambadzi visited them they put on a full display of military manoeuvres. Alvim says the envoys of those two rulers were profoundly impressed by Portuguese power.[29]

But Alvim's success at the frontiers was not matched by equal fortune at guarding his prized captive, Prince Bangoma. When Alvim left for the border he left the fortress of Tete and the security of the prisoners under the care of an *alferes* (sub-lieutenant). Bangoma and his fellow prisoners were kept locked up in prison, their legs secured by tightly-rivetted chains locked with molten lead. They were guarded

24 hours a day by sentinels with strict orders to inspect the doors and walls of the prison as well as to examine the chains of the prisoners regularly. But, through the negligence of the *alferes*, the prisoners were able to break the wall and escape from the prison at night after the guards had retired. When Alvim heard the news he immediately despatched a detachment of over 30 men after the runaway prisoners, but they were unable to catch up with them.[30] According to Alvim, by February 1769 Prince Bangoma had pledged vassalage to Mutapa Changara.[31]

From all the struggles against Bive and Ganyambadzi, the immediate material benefit to the Portuguese were some captives — 23 women and children from Bive and 64 from Ganyambadzi — who were sold by public auction into slavery.[32] The 23 captives from Bive realized 41 *maticals* and two *tangas* of gold[33]; those from Ganyambadzi raised 198 *maticals* and two *tangas*.[34] To this may be added the profit from the seizure of Ganyambadzi's ivory.[35] However, of far greater import to the Portuguese was the succession of Mutapa Changara. On 18 January 1769, Mutapa Changara signed a treaty of friendship with the Portuguese in which he granted freedom of movement to the Portuguese traders and their agents in those parts of his state then under his control. This grant 'he confirmed with the oath of *vazimos* [*vadzimu*]'. He also agreed that the Portuguese could start exploiting the gold-fields around the old *feiras* like Dambarare, and was equally in favour of the Portuguese constructing a fortress anywhere in his state. He even went further and promised to move his own *zimbabwe* near to such a fortress if it were built so that, together with the Portuguese, they would be in a much stronger position to deal with their mutual enemies. He is said to have agreed to pay tribute to the Portuguese and expressed himself as being much flattered by the attentions the Portuguese had paid him by signing the treaty of friendship with him; and furthermore he is said to have expressed his respect for Portuguese firearms.[36]

The Portuguese–Changara treaty of 1769 resulted in the frenzied attempts of João Moreira Pereira, the captain of the *zimbabwe* garrison, to re-establish the *feiras* of Dambarare. The major reason for this move was the decline in the trade of Zumbo in the 1760s. Elsewhere we have argued that, despite views to the contrary, the *feiras* of Mukaranga were not reoccupied in 1769[37] or at any other time after that date, notwithstanding the fact that João Moreira Pereira

was able to send some of his African agents and some subjects of the king of Dande to go and explore the old *feiras* in 1769.[38] It is said that the lands where these old *feiras* were found were deserted because 'the plagues, wars and famine have wiped out their inhabitants' and even in those parts where some people were found, these people 'lived almost the whole year on fruits, herbs, roots, honey and meat of wild animals'.[39] The cost, materially and otherwise, entailed in the project for the re-establishment of the old Mukaranga *feiras* was such that when the Zumbo trade started to pick up again after 1769 the whole project was conveniently forgotten.

Changara's relations with the Portuguese were not always easy. In January 1770, Lt Governor Alvim wrote to Governor-General do Lago informing him that Changara had betrayed his pledge of friendship to the Portuguese by invading one of the *terras da coroa*. Alvim's response to that was characteristic. He declared war against Changara and ordered that if any of his *vanyai* set foot on the crown lands he should be killed at once. Finally, he issued a *bando* (decree) prohibiting trade between the Portuguese and Changara. The decree threatened severe penalties to anyone transgressing its provisions. It is said that when Changara heard about the *bando* he sent his envoys with four tusks of ivory to apologize for what he said was an action carried out without his approval by one of his grandees. He assured Alvim that all he wished for was peace and friendship with the Portuguese. To prove that he meant what he said he promised to abide by whatever penalties Alvim saw fit to impose in order to make up for the invasion. Alvim refused to receive either the envoys or the ivory but instead let it be known by other channels that until Changara had punished the grandee responsible for the invasion, and reparations for the damages suffered by the Portuguese had been paid, he would not accept his offers of friendship and he, Changara, would always be regarded as a declared enemy of the Portuguese. Alvim says that he had, by 23 January 1770, already received reports that Changara had complied with all his demands and as such was willing to re-establish good relations with him.[40]

By 1771, the relationship between the Portuguese and Changara was so good that they sent a garrison of soldiers under the captaincy of João Moreira Pereira to guard him. As Governor-General do Lago said, Changara was to be kept on his throne 'by all the forces' available to the Portuguese.[41] Changara was so confident about his position

that when the blind Prince *Zuniana*, former Mutapa Karidza, died he had the audacity to order the death of the priests Netondo and Simboti. This was an outrage likely to inflame the passions of his Tavara subjects. Yet he got away with it. The reason for this move against the two 'priests', it is alleged, was that those two had authorized the burial of Karidza in the lands of Maravi without the permission of Changara or the Portuguese. Changara therefore sent one of his *dumbze*, by the name of *Muquegurovaeumbe* (Mukweguru-bandu?), who had to kill *Simboti* and *Netondo* Remua (*Remhuwa* or *Remwa*) as well as the *matumbze* of Karidza in *Terra Matundeu* at a place called Cabambe. The *dumbze* was ordered to destroy the *matsanza* at Cabambe and to carry the body or bones of Karidza back to south Zambezia. One Nemasecha was charged with the duty of making a *matsanza* for Karidza at Mount Nyangoma or Chumbe. His *matumbze* carried out this duty. Each Portuguese of Tete was asked to contribute as their *micheo* five pieces of cloth towards the expenses of transporting the body. In addition, he asked for some *chikunda* to accompany his *vanyai* to go and collect all the personal effects and other followers of Karidza. Those who refused to come were to be killed or to be forcibly seized and sold into slavery to buy some goats for Changara, and part of it to cover the expenses for the *matsanza*. He asked one Marave (princess?) by name of Sazora to hand over Princess Matambira and those followers of Karidza who were with her at Carambo.[42]

In spite of the increasingly friendly Changara–Portuguese relations the danger to his throne continued to exist so long as Prince Ganyambadzi was still alive. As early as June 1769, the Portuguese had received intelligence to the effect that an anti-Portuguese alliance was being mooted between Chief Bive and Prince Ganyambadzi.[43] Lt Governor Alvim was in no doubt that Ganyambadzi, 'a resident or vagabond in the lands of Marave', was a suspicious character always plotting to injure Portuguese interests. His proximity to Portuguese lands was regarded as inimical to Portuguese interests. It was for these reasons that when Alvim issued the 1770 *bando*, temporarily declaring Changara a Portuguese enemy, he also declared Ganyambadzi an enemy of the Portuguese state.[44] To Bive, Prince Ganyambadzi proved a problematic guest. He attracted too much adverse attention from the Portuguese. Bive needed to trade with the Portuguese and so he sent an embassy to the Portuguese in 1771 to explain that he had

no intention of joining any anti-Portuguese alliance with Ganyambadzi but only wished for friendship and good neighbourliness.

To prove his good intentions, he offered the *Bar* of Bive to the Portuguese for them to exploit with the support of his people. The only wish he had was that they should reopen trade with his territories. The Portuguese accepted Bive's offer provided he undertook to forbid his people to molest the Portuguese working the *prazos* of Buzi and Meronga, which had been conquered and taken from him by the Portuguese. Bive acceded to that request as well. Apparently, by 1771, Ganyambadzi had moved further north into Maravi country in the lands of the Undi. However in June 1771, news was received at Tete that Undi wished to send envoys to the Portuguese to ask for peace and that Prince Ganyambadzi had been removed from the lands of Undi.[45] Whatever Ganyambadzi was up to during that period it must have been clearly connected with his actions of 1772. Besides Ganyambadzi's moves, there were those of his cousin Prince Bangoma who was accused of having carried out some robberies and attacks on the Portuguese lands in 1771.[46]

In 1772, Ganyambadzi 'in the spirit of his revenge' blockaded the *Vila* and *Feira* of Zumbo. According to Governor-General do Lago, Ganyambadzi did this because he had not forgotten the 'unjust and inhuman actions' of former Lt Governor Alvim who, through his strong-arm tactics, had earned only a temporary respect for the Portuguese.[47] Alvim's strong-arm methods only worked because of the serious struggle between Ganyambadzi and Changara. Neither of them could deal effectively with Alvim because of the fear that his rival would gang up with the Portuguese. Ganyambadzi's attacks in 1772 were not primarily motivated by desire to revenge what Alvim had done against him but were aimed at enabling him to regain his throne. The Portuguese were able to lift the Ganyambadzi blockade only after the intervention of the then Rozvi Changamire.[48] A combination of Changara, the Portuguese and the Rozvi Changamire was more than Ganyambadzi could handle, and he retreated to plan his next attack. In 1776 he was again fighting Changara. It is interesting to note that, in November 1776, the Tete authorities were describing Ganyambadzi as *Rei* (King) and Changara as *Principe* (Prince) and pretender.[49] This may well indicate that, sometime before November 1776, Ganyambadzi had been able to take away the throne from Mutapa Changara. But in their last engagement, in 1776,

Ganyambadzi was forced to retreat to Barwe where he was to place a pretender on the throne of that kingdom after killing the ruling Makombe. The new Makombe ruled as a protégé of Ganyambadzi and it looked more like the latter was the true ruler of Barwe. During that period the trade route to Manyika from Sena through Barwe was subjected to many robberies and attacks. Prince Changara himself was wandering in the lands of Chidima without any fixed abode. Reports from Tete were confident that before the end of the year a final decision would clearly emerge as to who was the true Mutapa.[50] From the sources it is not clear when Changara left Chidima, but by early 1780 it is known for certain that Changara was a fugitive living in the lands of Zumbo.[51]

ii. Alexandre Jozé Pereira's report: a glimpse into eighteenth-century Mutapa–Portuguese relations

After Changara fled to Mixonga, north of the Zambezi, Ganyambadzi requested the Portuguese to recognize his succession by sending him the *presídio*. But since Ganyambadzi was still living in Barwe beyond the river Rwenya, there was at first some doubt among the Portuguese as to whether or not to recognize him. After a meeting of the settlers of Tete, it was agreed to send the *presídio* in the interest of trade. When the captain-major of the *zimbabwe* came to Ganyambadzi's 'court' (camp) he found him drunk and surrounded by his warriors. The mission spent nine days before being granted an audience. When this was given, the negotiations centred around the need for establishing peaceful trade relations. After the negotiations the Portuguese party returned to Tete to report on its mission. The captain of the *zimbabwe* spent a lot of goods on the mission in presents/payments to 21 *vanyai*, to the wives of Ganyambadzi at court, and to 10 *patricios* who had accompanied him on the journey.[52]

As a follow up to the above mission, on 18 December 1780, Alexandre Jozé Pereira, who was sent by Lt Gov António Manoel de Mello e Castro as clerk of the court of Mutapa Ganyambadzi, arrived at the latter's *zimbabwe*. Jozé Pereira's report of his stay at Ganyambadzi's court is so rich in detail of Mutapa–Portuguese relations, and throws so much light on Mutapa Ganyambadzi's 'court' and some of its key officers, that it has been judged worthwhile to look at some length at this unique report from the late-eighteenth-century Mutapa state.

When Pereira reached the *zimbabwe* of Ganyambadzi on the night

of 18 December 1789, he was in the company of four ambassadors – the *mbokorume* (*bucurume*), *Nyakusengwa* (*Nhacucengua*), *Mangava*, and the *Mukaranga* (junior wife) Vamutoro – whom Ganyambadzi had sent to Tete on a mission to discuss the strengthening of peace and friendship between him and the Portuguese. But the mission brought only a small present for the Mutapa – one *mutoro* of cloth and a box full of drinks. The four ambassadors were so scared that they decided to ask Pereira to look after the presents until Ganyambadzi was ready to grant them an audience. After three days they were summoned to present themselves with the *saguate* at the *zimbabwe*. On that same day, the *mhondoro* Nebedza visited the Mutapa to tell him not to receive the embassy personally but instead to command his grandees to receive the embassy on his behalf and report to him afterwards. It is not clear whether Nebedza's advice was based on considerations of protocol, i.e. because the embassy was so small in size and status and in the volume of the presents it carried that it was an insult to Ganyambadzi. By not appearing in person the Mutapa would be showing his displeasure and returning the slight. Alternatively it is conceivable that there was some fear that Ganyambadzi might be bewitched. It is also possible that Nebedza and some of the grandees may well have had other ulterior motives to benefit from Ganyambadzi's non-appearance. But Ganyambadzi disregarded the advice and gave audience to the embassy in person.[53]

When Jozé Pereira came to the meeting, he was given a *lupassa* (*rupasa*), or reed mat, to sit on. Ganyambadzi himself, contrary to the orders of the *mhondoro* Nebedza, came to the meeting and sat under his *sombreiros*. Business commenced with Ganyambadzi asking the first *mwanamukati* what the mission had brought. Apparently the latter was a circumlocutionist of some note, who, through his long-windedness, managed to speak for a long time but evaded answering the question directly for fear of offending the Mutapa. Ganyambadzi is said to have smiled with amusement at the man's facility with words and dilatory tactics. The meeting was adjourned inconclusively.

On the fourth day the Mutapa granted the mission another audience. The same sitting arrangements were followed as on the previous day. But to this meeting the Mutapa also summoned all the Chikunda *vanamukati* of all those settlers of Tete to whom he had sent presents. The Chikunda brought their masters' presents to him with them. When everybody was seated the Mutapa ordered a tusk of

ivory, said to have been as straight as a line, to be shown to the assembled dignitaries. Turning to Jozé Pereira, Ganyambadzi asked him:

> 'What do you think of the ivory?' I said to him that it was very beautiful. And replying to me he said, 'Of course I wanted to give it to you but now I do not wish to.'[54]

On that note he stood up and went into one of the houses leaving Jozé Pereira seated outside. He then sent what Jozé Pereira calls his court 'buffoon' (*bobo*) by the name of Mukunowafumo or Mukonowepfumo (*Muconoafumo*).[55] Buffoon Mukonowafumo,

> 'For what reason did His Lordship, the Most Illustrious Governor, not give, as a present, to *mucaranga* Vamoturo, the carpet and cushion on which she sat on the occasion she bade him farewell?' To which I also publicly replied to him [saying] that 'You should go and tell your *Mambo* that that is not the practice in any other part of the world. And furthermore I would wish to know how many *lupassas* I have taken away from those which had been spread for me to sit on in this Zimbave?'[56]

Ganyambadzi is said to have taken pity on Jozé Pereira and ordered that he should be allowed to retire to his temporary barracks until another day.

Sometime later another meeting was convened. On this occasion, Jozé Pereira was asked to read out the letter from the governor to the Mutapa. In the letter the governor declared that since friendship between the Mutapa and the Portuguese remained intact and as he, the Mutapa, had done nothing to harm the Portuguese, the governor was only too happy to despatch the *presídio* to him. He said it was absolutely false that the reason for the delay was that he wished to make war against the Mutapa. Surely if there was any truth in these rumours, he added, he would neither have accepted the reconciliation moves nor would he have been foolish enough to allow Portuguese traders to send trade goods to the Zezuru country. Under these circumstances it clearly stood to reason that the reports of his *vanamukati* to the contrary must have been falsehoods. The passage of time and experience would prove that as long as the Mutapa continued to maintain 'harmonious and peaceful relations with the state [Portuguese], assisting our trade, I will not fail to be a most willing and faithful servant of Your Highness in carrying out your Royal Commands.'[57]

Ganyambadzi was pleased with the contents and tone of the letter,

especially when he heard that the governor was willing to send the *presídio*. After 10 days he dispatched some four *vanamukati* to go and fetch the *presídio*. He sent an ivory tusk to the captain-major with two of the *vanamukati*, viz Nyamuzonga (*Nhamuzonga* or *Nyamudzonga*) and *Runtumbui* (Runtumbwe?) and to the governor of Tete he sent a little puppy with the other two *vanamukati*, i.e. the *Nechinanga* and a *mukaranga* Tondowa or Tondo (also *Tondoa*). He sent a letter saying that as soon as he received the *presídio* he in turn would send a present of a young woman to the governor.

On Monday, 16 April 1781, the *presídio* reached the *zimbabwe*. The captain-major of the *zimbabwe*, Caetano António Xavier, and his men were received with *pemberaçoens* in which the Mutapa himself also went out to *pembera*. After the joyous welcome the captain-major entered the *zimbabwe* where he delivered two letters from the governor, one to the Mutapa and the other to the clerk, Jozé Pereira. The latter immediately left for his house where he read his own letter. In that letter the governor said he hoped that in return for the *presídio* the Mutapa would allow Pereira to return together with the captain-major and his men to Tete as expeditiously as possible. He told Pereira to effect the above as faithfully and secretly as possible. He informed him that since he had no children in his house except servants who worked for him and for whose services he paid, nobody, including the Mutapa, would be doing him any favour when they give presents to such servants. He warned Pereira that he would hold him personally responsible if such a thing happened in future. Furthermore, he expressed his displeasure at what he termed 'such a vile and ugly' puppy the Mutapa had sent to him. He was not amused that two ambassadors had to be sent to him to deliver a present he felt neither 'profited nor honoured me for they are common to everyone'.[58]

The Mutapa was given the *presídio* and other presents demanded by custom. After receiving the presents, he spent the following days drunk. The captain-major repeatedly pestered the Mutapa to grant him an audience so that he could deliver to him the message in the governor's letter. But the old man was always drinking. At one stage he was so exasperated by the captain-major's persistence that he threatened to wash his spear and arrow in the man's blood, but his grandees prevailed upon him not to carry out his threat. The Mutapa said he did not wish to be hurried because he needed time to consult with his grandees. But in the meantime he made continuous requests

to the captain-major, sometimes as many as three times a day, for brandy. This went on until the last drop of brandy was gone. Even after that he began offering ivory to induce the captain to sell him any drink. But the captain-major had run out.[59]

Some days afterwards, a sober Mutapa and three of his grandees, Nyamuzonga, Masora and the *mbokorume*, went to the Portuguese quarters to hear the message of the governor. After the message was read, he replied that the weights (measurements) which the clerk had brought to him when he came to his *zimbabwe* in December 1780 had returned from the Zezuru country where he had sent them. However, the Zezuru chiefs had made it clear that they did not wish to accept those weights and unfortunately there was nothing Ganyambadzi could do to force them to reverse their decision. But he gave his snuff-box as a sign that the Zumbo traders could traverse through his lands freely. On the question of castigating those princes and *vanyai* of his who had robbed the Portuguese in the past, his grandees had advised him against doing it at that stage, but, if after the *vazungu* had reoccupied their lands, there was any further disturbance then he would deal with them. With those points made, the meeting was adjourned.

On the second day after the above discussion, *mhondoro* Nebedza and Chisamharu (*Chisamparo*) unexpectedly visited the *zimbabwe*. At five o'clock the following day they sent for the captain-major and the parish priest for discussions. This was not done at the Mutapa's behest. After these talks they gave some instructions to the Mutapa. What these were the Portuguese were unaware, nor would anyone else at the *zimbabwe* tell them what those *matumbzes*, also known as 'seus padres' (his priests), had come to inform the Mutapa about. It was only on the following day that the Portuguese heard from the Mutapa's officers ('criers') known as *chirambaunua* that the former had issued a proclamation revoking the sentences passed on some *vanyai* who had not assisted in '*as bassas da (sic) cazas*' (household duties or *zunde* obligations) and in raising of income for the *zimbabwe*. All this sounded rather mysterious to the Portuguese. Could it be that this was the reason the two *mhondoro* had come to the *zimbabwe*? The clerk became curious, but all his efforts to unravel the mystery by tapping some of his contacts at court drew blanks. It was only when he inquired from one *Sapouzaminzua* (Saponzaminzwa?), a poor brother of Ganyambadzi, that the puzzle began to unfold. According to

Saponzaminzwa, it happened that the gun of one of the soldiers at the *zimbabwe* had gone off accidentally. This incident provided some *vanyai* with an excuse to resort to some of their well-known crafty tactics of trying to defraud the Mutapa of the presents he had received from the *presídio*. They falsely invoked the *mhondoro* to warn the Mutapa against using any of the presents he had received from the Portuguese. They claimed that the going off of the gun was a premonition, warning the Mutapa not to use the 'evil' presents of the Portuguese. Therefore he should hand them over to the *mhondoro* for redistribution to the *vanyai*. But Ganyambadzi was such 'an old bird that he was not entrapped in the snare.' Instead of giving all of the presents to the *vanyai* he gave them only a few items.

Days later, he summoned his clerk to read out to him a draft treaty of friendship from Lt Governor António Manoel de Mello e Castro. The five-clause treaty was originally carried to the Mutapa's *zimbabwe* by the clerk Alexandre Jozé Pereira in December 1780. It went thus.

In order to prove the truthfulness of his friendship to the Portuguese the Mutapa ought to open all the routes through his kingdom to the *vazungu* traders especially those routes leading to Zumbo, the Zezuru country, Guruuswa and to such other places as the traders might wish to go to. He should not demand any more tariffs than the usual *boca* and should protect the traders against harassment by his vassals and should not offer lame excuses when traders were robbed or harassed, such as that his subjects acted without his knowledge. If any one of them did in fact rob the *vazungu* he ought to castigate him thoroughly. In short he ought to be faithful to his friendship with the *vazungu* in everything he did.

The second proposal requested that the Mutapa should ensure that the Zezuru chiefs did not change the gold weights from what they used to be in the past as was indicated on a list which was in the possession of the clerk of the *zimbabwe*. Furthermore the Zezuru chiefs must not ask for any more cloth from the *vashambadzi* after the latter have paid some to the Mutapa. The *vashambadzi* of the *vazungu* must not be allowed to raise the prices or change the weights. If any one of them was found to have secretly done so he should be reported to the Lt Governor immediately so that he could be duly punished.

The third proposal reminded Ganyambadzi that the *terras da coroa* south of the Zambezi close to Chidima had been depopulated and deserted by their Portuguese owners because of the disorders

created by some of the *vanyai*, his subjects. It was therefore part of his friendly duty to put an end to the situation by threatening to impose the death sentence on all those who harassed and robbed the *prazo*-holders and their people. It claimed that as long as these *prazos* were occupied then there was little risk of famine or any other danger to the Mutapa from his enemies as happened after the lands had been attacked and abandoned.

The fourth proposal said that the Lt Governor was sending a clerk to Ganyambadzi so as to improve communications between the two of them. It urged Ganyambadzi to ensure that the clerk wrote only on matters of importance to the Mutapa state and not mainly a litany of fictitious *milando* of the *vanyai* as that only soured the good relationship between the two peoples. It proposed that in future it would be best that if any *munyai* had any complaint against a *muzungu* then the matter should be referred to the Portuguese magistrate at Tete for resolution as, so the proposal claims, had been the practice in the past.

The last and fifth proposal said that since the behaviour of some of the envoys sent to and by the Portuguese were less than honest – seeing that often they opened the parcels of presents exchanged and stole some items, and seeing that large numbers of envoys cost much to entertain and pay and tended to be generally domineering – it proposed that from then on each embassy should consist of not more than two envoys.[60]

After discussing the above proposals the meeting was adjourned to allow further consultations.[61]

On another day the Mutapa called his clerk to put down his replies to the proposal. With regard to the first proposal, he claimed that the trade routes through his kingdom were now open and from then onwards there was no reason for anybody to complain. He said if any prince or *munyai* should in any way injure any *muzungu* in the *terras da coroa* then that *muzungu* ought to address his complaint to the governor so that the culprit could be punished. He added that he had grounds to say that sometimes the *vazungu* traders were themselves to blame for the fact that their goods were robbed in the forest because instead of travelling along the route in Mutapa's country they sometimes travelled through the lands of some of the princes. A recent case in point, he went on, was when some *chikunda* were beaten and robbed when they used the route through *Simirongo*'s (Samarengo's?) country.

To the second proposal Ganyambadzi replied that the weights which the clerk had brought him he had now dispatched with a *munyai* called *Nhamupombra* (Nyamupombora?) who accompanied the *vashambadzi* of commandant Jozé Alvez Pereira to the Zezuru country so that they could be compared with those of the Zezuru chiefs. He was still awaiting reports from his *munyai*.[62] But he promised that if he found out that any *mushambadzi* had tampered with the weights he would report the culprit to the governor.

As to the third proposal that he should castigate the princes and *vanyai* who robbed and harassed the *prazo*-holders, Ganyambadzi replied that after those *prazos* had been occupied, if any of his people caused disturbances and it was found that the Portuguese authorities were unable to deal with the matter, then, of course, he would be quite happy to come with forces to assist what he called 'the Sovereign Lord, King of Portugal, My Brother'.

The fourth proposal that if any *munyai* had a complaint against a *muzungu* the *milando* should be brought to the magistrate at Tete for resolution was acceptable provided that when any *muzungu* or his agent had a complaint against any of the Mutapa's subjects the *milando* should likewise be referred to the *zimbabwe* tribunals for determination.

Finally, the fifth proposal saying that the Mutapa should not send more than two envoys to any Portuguese with whom he had relations was again acceptable to Ganyambadzi. However he stated that for his part he still preferred that the Portuguese should send him more than two envoys because he realized that the envoys were often dishonest. He seems to have believed that the more they were the better the chance that they would tell the truth.

He ended his reply by assuring the Portuguese that the route through his lands was open for the Zumbo traders as well. All that was required was payment of the usual *boca*. He had regrettably learnt that in spite of this some traders had in 1780 used the Maravi route to Zumbo with the result that they had to spend large amounts of their goods paying the many chiefs on that route, and then, that notwithstanding, on the return journey some of their boatmen were beaten and others killed by the Maravi. All this was now totally unnecessary and as a sign of his good faith he was sending a snuff-box to the governor to assure him that the route was now truly safe.

The above document was signed by Ganyambadzi in the presence

of his three grandees, viz the *mbokorume* and two other princes, i.e. Nyamuzonga and Masora, and his chaplain, the Rev Fr Patrício, as well as second-lieutenant, Francisco Gomes dos Santos.[63]

Seeing that the Mutapa had replied positively to clause four of the treaty the clerk then asked him to prove his good faith by sending to Tete one man who was a servant of the late Governor-General Francisco de Mello de Castro, the uncle of the then Lt Governor, António Manoel de Mello e Castro. Apparently the man was a christian who had lived in Mutapa's country for a long time and had already been excommunicated for no good reason. Ganyambadzi replied that the man was perfectly free to leave at any time he wanted. He was not a prisoner of anybody. He had come to Mutapa's country to enjoy himself; for that reason Ganyambadzi was not willing to force him to go back to Tete, but certainly the man was free to leave the Mutapa's country whenever he wished to.

After disposing of the above matters, the Mutapa instructed the clerk to write about the abominable action of a mulatto soldier, Chirinza, who had run away with one of the Mutapa's *vakaranga* by the name of Catharina. To deal with this matter the Mutapa sent three ambassadors – Masora, Mukonowafumo and his own daughter, Mavhu (*Mavu*). The ambassadors carried two tusks of ivory as presents for the governor at Tete. To the envoys of Sebastião de Moraes e Almeida he entrusted the letter he had dictated.

Some days after the above envoys had left he sent yet another three – the *Nechinanga*, Nyamuzonga and a *mukaranga* Tondowa (*Tondoa*) with one tusk to request the governor to send the *presídio*. He also sent one *kaporo* (*caporro*) (house slave) to the captain-major of Tete.

Not many days afterwards, the envoys sent to negotiate the Chirinza affair returned to the *zimbabwe*. Ambassador 'Buffoon' Mukonowafumo gave the report:

> Mambo; You sent us with two tusks of ivory to the governor. And although he accepted the said tusks nevertheless he sent us away empty-handed saying that, we were devils and should go away. He refused to deliver to us the people who are the prize for the *milando* of the mulato . . . And he wanted to hand over to us the compensation which he wished to send to you in return for the two tusks, but as we were not in the company of his Chicunda we did not accept it.[64]

Ganyambadzi listened carefully to the above disturbing report but did

not immediately respond to it. Three days after the return of his ambassadors two *chikunda* of Sebastião de Moraes arrived at the clerk's house with the compensation for the two tusks, made up of one gun, one flask of gunpowder, two of drinks, one bottle of curry (*pimenta de Goa*), six notebooks, one cotton night-gown, six birettas, one handkerchief, two small bundles of thread, two dozen needles, six flint stones, etc. They also brought two letters, one from the governor for the Mutapa and the other from Sebastião de Moraes for the clerk. In his letter to the clerk, Sebastião de Moraes explained that the governor had not given the Mutapa's envoys anything in connection with Chirinza's *milando* simply because Chirinza was nowhere to be found. It is true that he had ordered the arrest of Chirinza's mother and four other old ladies. This he had done because the five women had been pawned to the notary's office by the late Gutua for some debt he owed. If the Mutapa envoys said anything different it must be dismissed as untrue.

When the clerk sent the interpreter to take the governor's letter to the Mutapa he met the 'Buffoon' Mukonowafumo on his way to the same place. All the way to the court Mukonowafumo was cursing and swearing at the news that the *chikunda* of Sebastião de Moraes had first gone to the clerk's house without reporting their presence to the court. When Mukonowafumo reached where the Mutapa was, he found the old man lying down naked, being massaged by one of his young wives. The clerk heard about Mukonowafumo's attitude and decided to go to the place where Ganyambadzi was. He found Mukonowafumo complaining bitterly to the Mutapa about the breach of protocol committed by both the *chikunda* and the clerk. Ganyambadzi, no doubt infuriated at being so rudely interrupted from the pleasurable fingering, palming and kneading by the one of his young wives, pointedly cold-shouldered Mukonowafumo for his *faux pas* and only spoke to the clerk. He told the latter to retire to his house in order to rest until the following day when he would be in circumstances more fitting for them to discuss serious business.

The following day the Mutapa sent 'Buffoon' Mukonowafumo together with the interpreter to the clerk's house. Mukonowafumo commanded the clerk, in the name of Mutapa, to open and to read the contents of the governor's letter to them. This was done. The governor's letter explained that neither Chirinza nor his father or step-father could be found. The latter had escaped for fear of being

arrested for his son's *milando*. In addition he claimed to have no news of the whereabouts of *mukaranga* Catharina. He said that he had told the envoys to thank the emperor for the present of two ivory tusks for which the already-mentioned list of presents was the recompense. He also assured the Mutapa that as soon as he received any news about Chirinza's whereabouts he would have him arrested and chastised, and order him to reveal the whereabouts of *mukaranga* Catharina. The governor reminded the Mutapa that if he was not in the habit of giving asylum in his lands and admitting into his service runaway soldiers and slaves of the *vazungu* then such unfortunate incidents like the Chirinza affair would not happen and the *vazungu* would not be deprived of the service of their slaves nor would the King of Portugual lose the service of his soldiers. In his letter the governor claimed that the Mutapa's *vanyai* had not been happy about the fact that they had not themselves received any presents at Tete for their role in connection with the Chirinza episode. The reason they had not received anything was because Chirinza had not been found and also because his father possessed nothing. The governor thought that those *vanyai* had spent happy days at Tete, without being molested but being ever so generously fed by Sebastião de Moraes. However, he was aware that, as was their custom, they often spoke nothing but evil of the *vazungu*. He went on to add that the reasons why he had not given the *vanyai* any present in connection with the Chirinza case was because he had no obligation to do so and because he felt that to do so would have created a bad precedent. It was only proper that the culprit himself should pay for his abominable crime. He went further to add that although he felt honoured by the presents from the Mutapa he was requesting that in future he should not send him presents as the *vanyai* used these presents as a pretext to demand counter-presents for themselves from the governors. And then they were never satisfied with whatever they were given. It was for this reason that the *vazungu* were now asking that he, Mutapa, should not send them more than two envoys at a time. The demands of the envoys were simply excessive and oppressive. The governor hoped the Mutapa would agree to their request for the sake of peace and friendship.

The governor went on to allege that the *vanyai* cared little for Mutapa's interests and only for their own profits. They had demanded that the governor should hand over to them Chirinza's mother and the four old ladies arrested with her. The four ladies belonged neither to

the father nor the mother nor to Chirinza himself and so could not be handed over to the *vanyai*. The governor went on to explain that among christians it was improper to punish the father or the mother of Chirinza for the latter's crime and therefore he could not act against the laws of his people. Chirinza himself had no property left, his two or three slaves having fled and his small patches of land and all else he ever had having been pledged for his debts. The four old ladies had nothing whatsoever to do with Chirinza or his parents. If the *vanyai* said anything to the contrary it was unadulterated rubbish motivated by their not having received any presents from him. Therefore since the *vanyai* had refused to carry the *saguate* for the Mutapa the governor sent it with the *chikunda* of Sebastião de Moraes. The governor's letter ended thus: 'I protest to Your Highness my highest goodwill to obey in every thing what you demand of me in your service.'

Mukonowafumo was not at all pleased by the governor's letter. He directed the clerk and two *chikunda* of Sebastião de Moraes to accompany him to the court. But before leaving for the court and all the way there he kept issuing all manner of threats against the *chikunda*: he told them that for having first visited the clerk who was not a *munyai* of the Mutapa they would die that very day; their heads were going to be chopped off. As a result of these threats the *chikunda* decided to entrust the *saguate* to the clerk while they themselves fled to Tete without seeing the Mutapa.

In spite of Mukonowafumo's attitude the Mutapa took a more conciliatory tone in his reply to the governor. He told the governor that he was quite pleased with the *saguate* brought by the *chikunda* who, unfortunately and for no obvious reason as far as the Mutapa knew, fled to Tete before delivering the present to him.

He made it clear that he had expected that his envoys sent on the Chirinza mission would be given presents because when he sent the two ivory tusks he had assumed that Chirinza, who should have paid for the presents, would be found. On the question of what to do with the four old ladies arrested together with Chirinza's mother, notwithstanding the fact that the governor had had no compunction in dealing with his *vanyai* on the matter of presents, the Mutapa took pity on them and felt they should be released. He then sent the letter to Tete with the same three *vanyai* whom he had sent before in connection with the Chirinza affair.

Within a few days the other envoys previously sent to conduct the

presídio returned with two other agents of Sebastião de Moraes carrying a letter from the governor. In the letter the governor explained that the practice was to send the *presídio* at the same time the Zumbo traders left Tete for the *feira*, which was usually before the winter months. However, that custom notwithstanding, he would still have sent the *presídio* then, although it was already winter, had it not been for the fact that the captain-major was ill and also because the *presídio* was likely to suffer discomfort and deprivation on the way on account of it being winter time. In his own letter the captain-major informed the Mutapa that he had received the letter as well as the *kaporo* the Mutapa had sent to him. Since the *kaporo* had already been promised on a previous occasion to the captain-major by the Mutapa, he reminded him to send yet another present in the form of an ivory tusk with which to buy brandy to be brought when the *presídio* came to the *zimbabwe* as demanded by custom.[65] Because of his own illness he had been unable to make the arrangements for bringing the *presídio* to the *zimbabwe*, but as a sign of his continued friendship he sent one flask of drinks and one fine piece of (cloth?) as presents to the Mutapa.

But before the Mutapa could respond to the above messages, one of his *vanamukati* by the name of Nyamuzonga, who had returned from Tete, spoke:

> Mambo, I am certain that when you ordered that a letter be written to his lordship the governor [asking him] to send you the *prezídio* you told all of us, the three *manamucates*, to be directed to the residence of the said lordship, to be *bairados*. There [at Tete] Sebastião de Moraes did something else; he took me by myself to the house of the captain-major and when I enquired as to the reason for this they told me that it was your clerk who had suggested the move in the letters. But then I came out without being *bairado* for the captain-major was claiming that the *caporro* you had already promised him in order to seal the friendship as he has asserted in his letter. Meanwhile the sickness which he says he is suffering from is of his new status since he is recently married to the daughter of the late Sr D. Jozé da Costa, your grandson. And for this [reason] I assure you that you will not see the *prezídio* except for the *monção grande* [main monsoon].

The clerk was rattled by the report, which he vehemently attacked. 'That is false; because the *prezídio* will come without fail.' There was no reason, he continued, why the governor should not send it.

'Equally', he asserted, 'I must state that I am not to blame for the separation which you, *munhai*, claim.' He went on to point out that the *kaporo* was not a new present from the Mutapa but an outstanding promise which was only then being fulfilled. For this reason no present in return should have been expected. Had the envoys carried the usual ivory tusk then no doubt presents would have been given to them and *munyai* Nyamuzonga would not have been detained nor would the separation have upset him so much. The clerk added that separation was nothing new nor particularly sinister; the previous year, when seven *vanamukati* were sent to Tete to bring the *presídio*, the commandant of Tete, Jozé Alvez Pereira, took four of the envoys to his house and sent the other three to that of the captain-major. On that occasion nobody had complained. Ganyambadzi listened to the discussion but took no decision that day.

However, some days later, the princess and the other two envoys who had been sent to Tete with a letter to discuss the Chirinza affair returned with the letter undelivered. The 'Buffoon' Mukonowafumo explained what had happened. According to his report, when they came to Tete, Sebastião de Moraes e Almeida refused to take the letter to the governor from whom they expected presents. Instead he chased them away. The reason for this, alleged Mukonowafumo, was the fact that the *zimbabwe* clerk had informed the Portuguese authorities at Tete that he was dying of hunger because the Mutapa did not give him food. Secondly, the clerk had complained that the Mutapa had seized some of his slaves who had escaped to Prince *Chidiamauyo's* (Chidyamauyo?) country and redistributed them to the *vanyai*. Furthermore, he had reported that the Mutapa had in his power a female slave by the name of Regina who belonged to Jozé Francisco de Oliveira, the clerk of the Tete judiciary, in spite of the fact that her master had sent some cloth to the Mutapa to have her released. Also the clerk had privately written to Sebastião de Moraes warning him against sending cloth to the Zezuru country as the Mutapa could not be trusted. It was therefore most unlikely that Sebastião de Moraes would send a *saguate* to the Mutapa to ask for safe conduct for his goods. Finally, Mukonowafumo claimed that the *mukaranga* who had run away with Chirinza was in fact a prisoner in the house of the governor. But whenever a *munyai*, who might recognize her, visited the place her face was always covered with a piece of cloth. The governor refused to hand her over, arguing that the

woman was the daughter of *fumo Canoheira* and that the Mutapa had stolen her after killing her father in battle. For the above reasons Mukonowafumo asked the Mutapa to punish the clerk. In conclusion, digressing from his litany of accusations, he declared that he had not been able to sleep well while at Tete because of mosquitoes.

Mukonowafumo, whom the clerk describes as a 'develish dog of a scheming buffoon', had clearly dropped a bombshell. Added to the fact that Sebastião de Moraes' African agents had fled without giving reasons, this led the Mutapa to indulge in all sorts of speculations. Fearing that those *chikunda* had given a distorted report at Tete, especially with regard to the clerk's safety, the Mutapa sent an ivory tusk with *munyai* Nyakasanto (*Nhacassanto*) to the commandant Jozé Alvez Pereira to inform him of all the *aringas* which Mukonowafumo had mentioned. A little later the Mutapa sent the *munyai* Chitonge with a quill of gold and a letter to Sebastião de Moraes asking that there be peace between him and the Portuguese. He put the blame on Mukonowafumo for the past misunderstandings.

Days later, the *munyai* sent to Jozé Alvez Pereira returned in the company of Domingos, an agent of Alvez Pereira, carrying a bombshell of a letter from the governor. In the letter the governor informed the Mutapa that the captain-major was by then in much better health. He dismissed as undiluted falsehoods the reports from the *vanyai*. However he warned him that 'Illustrissimo Governor' (Lt Governor) was already at Tete preparing to attack his, the Mutapa's, lands and that he was keeping the *presídio* for Changara whom they had already sent for. When the two Africans of Sebastião de Moraes heard of this they decided to escape by swimming across the Manzovo river. But the clerk stayed behind, awaiting his fate. He was to be guarded even at night. Although we do not know the clerk's fate, we can assume all ended well as he lived to tell the tale.[66]

However there seems to have been some truth in the accusation of Portuguese–Changara collusion in 1781, for in one surviving document, without a date or signature, but clearly written at Zumbo in 1781 by Caetano Manoel Correia, the captain-major of that settlement, there is evidence that Correia was trying to obtain 15 *bares* of cloth, some beads, gunpowder, drinks, handkerchiefs, some lead, and other odds and ends. Such presents were equivalent to the *presídio*. In his letter Correia claims that those items were due to Changara by treaty right. Although Changara moved his headquarters closer to the

Zambezi and Zumbo in 1781 he nevertheless informed Correia that he had no intention of attacking Ganyambadzi in that year. Correia also reveals that he and other Zumbo Portuguese gave some presents to Changara that year and hoped to benefit militarily from his proximity.[67] It seems the Portuguese were now fed up with Ganyambadzi's suspicions and demands.

However peace between the Portuguese and Ganyambadzi seems to have held, for there is an unsigned ten-article treaty dated *zimbabwe*, June 1783 and purporting to contain an agreement between Ganyambadzi and Lt Governor António Manoel de Mello e Castro. Much of what it contains is a summary of the 1781 five proposals as previously discussed. But it has additions and elaborations which modify or even contradict the 1781 understandings.

Clause three of the treaty was recast to say that the Mutapa was under an obligation to hand over an assegai or an arrow to the captain of the *zimbabwe* garrison when the latter brought the *presídio* as a sign that the Portuguese had his full support to make war on and kill any of his princes and *vanyai* who caused trouble in the *terras da coroa.* The Mutapa was under an obligation to order his vassals living in those lands to get out so that the *vazungu* could populate them with their *mukazambos* and Tonga.

The new number four said that the Mutapa was under an obligation to hand over all runaway slaves of the *vazungu*. In particular he should surrender those found in the *masanza* of Chisamharu (*Chisamparo*). He should sentence to death Chiputaputa and the *bandadzi* of the said *masanza* because it was these two who encouraged the slaves of the *vazungu* to run away, and they were the driving spirit behind the harrassment of the *terras da coroa.* He should have those two replaced by new officers who should be warned against behaving like their predecessors. And in future if any slave went to a *masanza* then the *Matope*[68] of that *masanza* must either immediately send him away or give him a report of his presence so that he could be brought back. However if the *Matope* failed to act as above the Mutapa should permit the governor of the Rivers to punish him.

Clause five of the new treaty was an elaboration of clause two of the original. According to this new version the *vazungu* who sent trade goods to the Zezuru country should be made to pay tariffs only once and in proportion to the quantity of the goods they were sending. On their return from there they should not be made to pay any additional

taxes. The Mutapa should not confiscate the gold or ivory of these traders on any flimsy pretext nor should he call back traders from Zezuru country to his *zimbabwe* by pretending that they had committed a *milando* but in truth with the aim of robbing them.

Clauses six and seven of the new treaty reiterate the point that Portuguese subjects must be dealt with by Portuguese authorities when they have committed any crime. However they make no reference to Ganyambadzi's request for reciprocity as seen in his answer to clause four of the original treaty. Clause eight restates the point that the Mutapa should not send more than two envoys to the Portuguese save in extraordinary cases when a maximum of three could be sent.

Clause nine grants free passage to the Portuguese traders subject to the payment of the usual tolls. It authorizes them to take punitive action against any of the Mutapa subjects robbing or hindering traders. The Portuguese should not be accused of any *milando* for punishing such people.

Clause ten says that when the Mutapa wants to write a letter to the governor of the Rivers he must personally dictate the letter to the scribe. And when a letter comes from the governor it must be opened in front of him and read by the clerk directly to him. He should never send people either to tell the clerk what to write or to listen to what a letter from the governor contains. Only thus could deception and fraud be minimized.

Clauses one and two of the new treaty deal with the resolution of two specific cases, one being that of a Marimamupunga and the other concerning the lands of Gutua, a father-in-law of one Buka.[69]

While the provisions of the above treaty reveal some of the problems of Mutapa–Portuguese relations – runaway slaves, burdensome tolls, unruly princes, possible miscommunication through deception or misunderstanding, etc. – and for that reason it was necessary that we summarize it fully, it must however remain of doubtful validity in that it was not signed by the Mutapa or indeed by anybody. It probably was at best a draft document subject to revision and at worst a warmed-up version of the original meant only for the Portuguese eyes and not those of the Mutapa.

Alexandre Jozé Pereira's uniquely detailed report on Ganyambadzi and the Portuguese provides us with a number of interesting insights into some aspects of Ganyambadzi's rule. The first point to

note is the unhurried manner in which Ganyambadzi took decisions. When an embassy visited him he would grant it two, three or even four audiences before taking his final decision. After each audience he would meet with his grandees privately to deliberate and review the situation and decide on the next move.

The second point worthy of noting is the pretty efficient intelligence system available to Ganyambadzi. This is revealed when Alexandre Jozé Pereira arrives for the first time at the *zimbabwe* of Ganyambadzi on 18 December 1780. It will be recalled that old Ganyambadzi already knew that the embassy was bringing a small present and hence was found to be in a foul mood. How did he know about that? Furthermore, it is clear from the sources that Ganyambadzi's advisers were reasonably aware that the Portuguese were in fact secretly dealing with Changara.

Yet another aspect of interest was the role of the *mhondoro*, especially Nebedza. Each time the *mhondoro* are mentioned there is an air of mystery about what they were up to. The clerk was always at a loss. In the end his interpretations of their mysterious actions often seemed unconvincing. But important as the *mhondoro* role may have been, it is clear that theirs was not the dominant voice in the land; Ganyambadzi was the man in charge.

Also of interest was the regularity of the embassies going between the Portuguese and the Mutapa and their concern with such subjects as trade, tariffs, tolls, presents and issues of peace and war as well as escaped slaves. Besides the regularity of these missions was the high-powered composition of the Mutapa embassies. Worthy of note, too, was the presence of a young wife (*mukaranga*) or daughter of the Mutapa in the missions. It would seem that that was the person representing the Mutapa on the mission. But why a woman? Did that mean Ganyambadzi had no sons? It does not seem to have been a question of having no sons for elsewhere we have evidence of Changara also sending embassies to Zumbo that included one of his young wives. The explanation would seem to be that in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries Portuguese affairs at the *zimbabwe* of the Mutapas used to be handled by *Mazvarira*, the first wife of the Mutapa. Every mission to the Portuguese then was said to have included a representative from the house of *Mazvarira*. It would appear that what we see here is the survival of the practice of involving Mutapa wives in diplomatic relations with the Portuguese.

Kupara, the spirit medium of *mhondoro* Mutota, *c*1956. A great oral historian of the Munhumutapa dynasty, he was Professor Abraham's chief informant on Mutapa history.

iii. 'Mambo aChidima': the last days of the Mutapa state

Coming back to the Changara–Ganyambadzi rivalry, we know that the ultimate victor in the controversy was in effect Prince Ganyambadzi whose reign came to an end in 1784/5.[70] During the period of Ganyambadzi's reign, Changara lived as a refugee north of the Zambezi in the lands of Mixonga from where he made occasional sorties to regain his throne. Between July 1777 and December 1779 the *feira* of Zumbo suffered severe loss from the consequence of the Changara–Ganyambadzi rivalry. It appears that one Prince Kasiresire, possibly a follower of Changara, visited Zumbo in 1777. There he quarrelled with the captain-major of the *feira* for some unknown reason. It is said that the captain-major, José da Camara, had in fact provoked Kasiresire. Soon it dawned on Camara that his action had endangered the *feira* and so he sent urgent appeals for help from the ruling Rozvi Changamire as well as from King Derere of Dande. Before help could come from either of these two rulers, Kasiresire crossed the Zambezi and slaughtered many of the traders and settlers of Zumbo including captain-major Camara. Since Kasiresire is said to have crossed the Zambezi to come to Zumbo he must therefore have come from south of the Zambezi. Although both Derere and the Rozvi Changamire sent help to Zumbo in 1780 and Derere was able to kill Kasiresire, for many Portuguese at Zumbo it was already too late.[71]

Changara's relations with Zumbo in the 1780s were somewhat problematic. Although in exile, Changara remained an armed warlord who continually sent envoys to Zumbo to ask for presents and tribute from the traders and settlers.[72] In doing this Changara was trying to rebuild his power base. But when Ganyambadzi tried to do the same by raising the gold price the Portuguese complained and protested most bitterly.[73] To show the nature of Changara's demands on Zumbo two incidents, one from 1783 and the other from 1784, will be cited.

On 28 December 1782, a Changara embassy made up of some envoys and one of his *vakaranga* arrived at Zumbo carrying presents of two women and one child. At first the Zumbo *vazungu* claimed that they had no cloth to give to Changara because no goods had arrived at Zumbo during the 1782 *monção*. To this Changara's envoys responded by saying that reports had already reached their master to the effect that a *muzungu* with a boatload of trade goods had been spotted sailing for Zumbo. This seems to have been true and therefore the

vazungu quickly decided to comply with Changara's request by sending to him three *chuabos* of cloth. However this was felt to be inadequate compensation for the presents from Changara and so one of the two women and the child were returned to Changara.[74]

Secondly, in March 1784, the residents of Zumbo made a collection which raised 50 *maticaes* of gold which were used to purchase three *mitoro* of cloth, some beads, corals, cambaya, drinks and other items for the present/tribute to Changara.[75] After these items had been dispatched to Changara, news reached Zumbo that one chief by the name of Nyapende had posted some men on an island in the Zambezi as well as on both sides of the river to way-lay the boatloads of goods belonging to the Zumbo traders then known to be on their way from Tete. When the captain-major of Zumbo, António Caetano de Souza, received this information he sent word to Changara asking for help. In the meantime he proceeded down the river himself to see what could be done. When he arrived near to where Nyapende's men were, de Souza pitched camp for the night in the hope of meeting Nyapende the following morning. But at night he was visited by a nephew of Nyapende who told him bluntly that the convoy of boats would not be allowed to proceed and that if de Souza tried to intervene he himself would be eliminated. That night Nyapende's nephew pitched his own *musasa* in the camp of de Souza and together with his men chanted war songs and indulged in war dances throughout the night.

However, a little distance from de Souza's camp, a prince from Changara pitched his own *musasa* for the night. The following morning he visited de Souza who informed him of what had already taken place. The prince was furious. To add insult to injury, Nyapende's nephew threateningly pointed his battleaxe at the prince. This made the prince mad, and there and then he ordered his men to engage Nyapende's nephew. At that stage de Souza intervened and peace was restored. In the end the boats arrived and were safely escorted, by the prince from Changara, to Zumbo. For this assistance Changara asked for more presents. Another levy of the Zumbo traders was made and 90½ *maticaes* were collected. From that amount eight *corjas* and two *chuabos* of cloth were bought as presents for Changara.[76]

As if the above two contributions were not enough, later that year Changara sent his envoys to Zumbo to ask for what he described as '*mucunguro*' which seems to have been some sort of assistance

Changara expected from Zumbo in his attempts to regain his throne. Besides the '*mucunguro*' he asked for a fleet of boats to ferry his army along the Zambezi to Nyapende's country. Changara said that it was most important that he should attack Nyapende for some offence the latter had committed, possibly the way his nephew behaved in the story narrated above. It would appear that *mhondoro* Nebedza of Dande as well as other key *mhondoro* had asked him to punish Nyapende. Changara told the Zumbo residents that if he failed to do that then his plans to marshal support in Dande for his attack on Mutapa Ganyambadzi planned for mid-November that year would be undermined. The Portuguese at Zumbo agreed to give Changara the boats he wanted there and then but the *mucunguro* of three *mitoro* of goods was paid a little later.[77]

On this occasion the Zumbo residents had gone too far in identifying their interests with those of Changara. As it happened, Nyapende received advance intelligence about Changara's proposed attack and so decided to beat a tactical retreat to the lands of Dande where he was joined by one Prince Bereko (*Bereco*), an ally of his. Since Bereko and Nyapende were both anti-Changara it is possible they may have been pro-Ganyambadzi in the Mutapa succession rivalry. In the light of these developments, Changara decided to return the boats to Zumbo and then start making his preparations against Ganyambadzi.[78] While Changara was making his moves against Ganyambadzi, Prince Bereko and Nyapende were preparing to attack Zumbo. It was then that the Zumbo residents realized the imprudence of their close relationship with Changara and therefore decided to run away from Zumbo to an island on the Zambezi as a precautionary measure. To make matters worse, the Zumbo residents heard that King Derere of Dande, a good friend of the Portuguese, had died sometime before 5 January 1785. Virtually at the same time as news of Derere's death reached Zumbo, other reports were also received that Mutapa Ganyambadzi was dead and that Changara was making his moves to try to succeed him.[79] This came as a relief to the Zumbo residents.

The reign of Ganyambadzi had seen some interesting alliances emerge. On the one hand there were the Rozvi Changamires, King Derere of Dande, Changara and, at times, *mhondoro* Nebedza all doing their best to support the *Feira* and *Vila* of Zumbo against its enemies who included Mutapa Ganyambadzi and Princes Nyapende,

Kasiresire and Bereko. It is also interesting to note that Undi, the ruler of Mixonga where Changara sought refuge did not in fact send him away as appeared to have been the case with Ganyambadzi. On the face of it there appears to have been a powerful assortment of forces favouring Changara's cause and yet Changara was ultimately the loser and Ganyambadzi the winner. Why was this so? The reason was that the Rozvi Changamires were more interested in the survival of the *Feira* and *Vila* of Zumbo than the succession of Changara. Derere of Dande may well have held a similar position to that of the Rozvi Changamires. But Changara was able through pressure on the *feira* to identify his own personal fortunes with those of Zumbo. This was a shrewd move which brought Ganyambadzi many headaches. Whenever he threatened the survival of Zumbo he found himself in direct confrontation with the commercial interest of all who relied on Zumbo as their major trading outlet. But on the other hand Changara could not bring all those forces into actively supporting him and his cause.

a) Bangoma's reign

In spite of Changara's attempts to succeed Ganyambadzi, he was foiled in his ambitions by none other than the escaped prisoner Prince Bangoma, the son of Mutapa Debwe Mupunzagutu and cousin of the late Mutapa Ganyambadzi. Bangoma ruled from *c.* 1785 to *c.* 1794.[80] The successor to Derere in Dande was one Prince Gomo.[81] Perhaps the most important event during Bangoma's reign was the abandonment of Zumbo in favour of Mukariva in 1788.[82] This important move had its roots in the Changara–Ganyambadzi rivalry. It is said that in January 1774 one Prince Ganda, an ally of Mutapa Changara, crossed the Zambezi for Zumbo on what was suspected to be a spying mission. The Portuguese at Zumbo decided to neutralize him by killing him. Eventually this information was known to *mhondoro* Nebedza, Prince Changara and other relations of Ganda. As a result, in February 1777 *mhondoro* Nebedza explained to the Portuguese at Zumbo that some of the princes had wanted to use strong-arm methods against the settlers but Nebedza, as a good friend of the Portuguese, 'held their hand' in favour of peaceful methods. The Zumbo settlers agreed to pay a *milando* of cloth worth 30 *maticaes*. In July the same year *mhondoro* Nebedza sent some envoys with a '*bicho piqueno*' (small girl or animal) as a *rusambo* to the Zumbo residents as a sign that the *milando* on the death of Prince Ganda was over.[83]

It was not until 1788, during the reign of Mutapa Bangoma, that Prince Bereko reopened the question of the *milando* of the death of Ganda. This time António Caetano de Souza, a resident of Zumbo and a friend of Changara, was accused of having caused the death of Prince Ganda. The accusation arose from a visit by the *vanamukati* of Bereko to Zumbo in March 1788. It happened that while at Zumbo Bereko's chief *mwanamukati*, who also happened to have been his *mbokorume*, heard a young woman denouncing António Caetano de Souza. The *mbokorume* took the young woman aside to find out more regarding her predicament. It turned out that this young woman claimed that she was a daughter of Prince Ganda. According to her story, she came to Zumbo in 1774 with her father who, so she said, decided to rest for a time in the house of one Alexandre da Costa. But at that time Alexandre was out of the *vila* and so they were stranded. António Caetano de Souza then took them into his house. That night, while at the house of de Souza, the young woman heard two shots. Soon afterwards it was reported that her father, Prince Ganda, was dead. De Souza then took her, as well as one of her father's wives, who was in their company, as his slaves. She claimed that she was handed over to Mangava, one of de Souza's agents. After Mangava's death she was taken into de Souza's house from where, she alleged, she discovered that de Souza practised witchcraft. Bereko's *mbokorume* took the young woman to two grandees who were in the embassy of *mhondoro* Nebedza and had her repeat her story to them. On hearing that, the two embassies hurried to report the above story to their respective masters. The *mbokorume* of Bereko took the young woman with him to his master.

Prince Bereko took this as a God-sent gift with which to square some old scores he had against António Caetano de Souza. Although these are not spelt out in the documents it is not hard to guess what one of these could have been. During de Souza's acting captaincy at Zumbo (1782–1785), he asked for and received help from Changara against Nyapende, the friend of Bereko. Later we know that de Souza lent some boats to Changara for the attack on Nyapende and Bereko. In 1784 Bereko is said to have killed Katsande (*Cassande*), an agent of de Souza. Whether this grudge against de Souza led Bereko to concoct the accusations against him we do not know for certain. But as soon as Bereko heard the news from his envoys he sent messengers to *mhondoro* Nebedza to report the affair. Nebedza got the news from his

own envoys and from those of Bereko at the same time. When *mhondoro* Nebedza heard the reports it is said that he convened a meeting of all the *mhondoro* of Dande to discuss the matter. In the end, notwithstanding the fact that a *milando* had already been received on the death of Ganda in 1777, it was decided that the new information concerning the circumstances of Ganda's death warranted a reopening of the whole case and thus a demand for a new *milando* was made. Prince Bereko was asked to exact the *milando* from de Souza. It was decided that the price of *milando* de Souza had to pay for his action was the loss of all his property, including wife and children, as well as his head.[84]

Bereko could not have had a more satisfying fulfilment for his vengeance. With the greatest secrecy and alacrity he dispatched ambassadors to the Governor of Zumbo, Sebastião de Moraes e Almeida, to inform him of what was to happen. He requested Sebastião de Moraes' co-operation so that the business to be transacted could be expeditiously executed without causing undue stress, despondency or alarm among the *vazungu* at Zumbo. Sebastião de Moraes was horrified at what he termed 'such a barbarous and wholly impractical act'. He flatly refused to consider the suggestion by Bereko.[85] But Bereko's reply was equally emphatic. He sent his *evanje* with what to Zumbo appeared as a 'powerful army';[86] but, as another document shows, the 'powerful army' was made up of about 30 armed men.[87] No doubt 30 armed men against four to five men must indeed have been a frightening sight for the latter group. The Bereko army struck camp in the centre of Zumbo settlement.[88] As the negotiations for the head of de Souza proceeded, the *nevanje's* warriors created a situation of near-anarchy at Zumbo by extorting goods from the inhabitants of the *feira* through intimidation and other bullying tactics.[89] Portuguese powerlessness at Zumbo in the late eighteenth century could not have been more dramatically presented than by the sight of one of Bereko's men swaggering, assegai in hand, through the settlement of Zumbo while Portuguese inhabitants peeped behind closed doors wondering if it was their turn to be robbed of their property. What remains to be told of this copiously documented incident is not the recounting of any more Portuguese humiliations, pleading and losses of property; all that need be done here is to give de Souza's own defence against the charges against him, as well as to tell the final outcome of the case.

In a meeting on 18 June 1788, the '*Governador e Capitão Mor*' of

Zumbo, Sebastião de Moraes e Almeida, having heard the case against de Souza, asked the latter to reply to the accusations against him. Specifically he was asked to comment if it was true that he had a daughter of Prince Ganda in his control. To the above question he replied that he did not have a daughter of Ganda under his control. But de Souza admitted that in 1774, when A. J. de Azavedo was governor of Zumbo, he, de Souza, had received from that governor a young girl as well as one woman of age. De Souza said that he gave the little girl to his agent by the name of Mangava who in turn handed her to his father Katsande who was also an agent of de Souza. After the death of Katsande, at the hands of Bereko, the girl was handed over to another agent of de Souza. By 1788, according to de Souza, the little girl of 1774 was already a woman. De Souza ended by saying that the young woman had been recently taken away secretly by her relatives.[90]

When the other side rejected de Souza's self-defence the case continued for about two months until, after much haggling over de Souza's head,[91] the following were accepted as the terms of settlement:

(a) all the property of de Souza was to be sequestrated by Bereko;
(b) de Souza was to be banished from Zumbo;
(c) Zumbo was forced to hand over more than 60 people to Bereko;
(d) Zumbo *vazungu* were to pay some cloth to Bereko.[92]

The above conditions were met in full.[93]

Was de Souza guilty or not guilty of the crime he was punished for? As a signatory to the report on the meeting held at Zumbo on 11 January 1774 which decided to give Prince Ganda 'a quiet flight to the other life', de Souza must be held jointly responsible with his co-signatories for the death of Ganda. But was it de Souza who shot Ganda in 1774? Whether the evidence against de Souza is incriminating depends on why the *Governador* of Zumbo, António Jozé de Azavedo, gave de Souza the two females – a woman and a little girl. Was this the reward for the murder of Prince Ganda? The young woman's testimony seems to have been so accurate on the major aspects of the allegation that neither de Souza nor the letter of 1774 disagreed with her on the details of the events. António Caetano de Souza was the '*Tenente coronel dos auxilares da vila do Zumbo*' since 1771.[94] Being probably the only military man besides Captain-Major

A.J. de Azavedo then at Zumbo, de Souza was a likely candidate for doing the shooting of Ganda. But in mitigation it can be pointed out that the accusations were made by Bereko, not exactly a great friend of de Souza. Could Bereko's *mbokorume* have used the young woman from de Souza's house to make false allegations against de Souza? Since Ganda was killed on suspicion that he was spying for Changara, why should Bereko have been prompted to revenge the former's death? But it must be admitted that on balance the evidence seems to go against the innocence of de Souza.

However a new turn of events took place in October 1788 for in that month *mhondoro* Nebedza instructed Prince Gomo (*Gomoe*), who had by then become the King of Dande, to punish Prince Bereko.[95] Nebedza informed Zumbo of his intentions. The *vazungu* at Zumbo decided to move out of the *Vila* of Zumbo to the peninsula of Mukariva. Houses were erected on Mukariva in October 1788. The move to Mukariva was done because the Zumbo inhabitants had feared that Bereko would have claimed that the Zumbo *vazungu* had prompted Gomo to attack Bereko.[96]

But in the end Gomo could not cross the Zambezi for the northern bank with his army because he lacked boats. For that reason the attack on Bereko never materialized.[97] On 12 December 1788, Bereko sent envoys to Mukariva to find out why the *vazungu* had moved from *Vila do Zumbo*. He assured the *vazungu* that if they had been afraid of the rumoured attack of Gomo on Bereko himself, then that threat was all over as the attack never took place. But if the *vazungu* had changed their settlement for some other reasons, then he, Bereko was unaware of them and would be glad to be enlightened. On his part, he added, he wished for nothing but friendship with the *vazungu* and so he urged them not to live in the forest but to return to the comfort of their houses at the *Vila* of Zumbo.[98] But Sebastião de Moraes rejected Bereko's invitation saying that Bereko had been less than neighbourly to Zumbo in the past, in particular over the expulsion of António Caetano de Souza. Since the *Vila* of Zumbo was so close to Bereko's lands, Sebastião de Moraes concluded, it would be unwise for the *vazungu* to return to that place. Sebastião de Moraes went on to reject even the present that Bereko had sent[99] which seemed a fitting end to a relationship that had been punctuated by so much bitterness.

It is not clear how far Mutapa Bangoma was directly involved in all these moves. But since these events were directed against the allies of

his rival Prince Changara, he could hardly have been disinterested. It is also worthy of note that, although for a time *mhondoro* Nebedza is said to have supported Bereko, in the end he used his influence and authority in favour of the settlement of Zumbo. It may well be that the death of Derere in Dande and the succession of Bangoma in Chidima created a delicate hiatus during which period Nebedza felt unable to oppose Bereko's wishes. Bangoma's relations with the Portuguese would seem to have been fair. In 1793 the captain-major of Zumbo suggested that Bangoma, whom he said possessed great powers, should be approached with a view to requesting him to help the Portuguese to castigate Chief Mburuma of Zambia who was causing the latter much trouble.[100] It is not clear whether this was ever carried through. However in 1795, after Bangoma had lost the Mutapaship, we meet with a report to the effect that Bangoma robbed some traders at a place called Kapende (*Capende*).[101] By December 1794 Bangoma had lost his throne to Changara.[102] However Bangoma was to return to the throne in the early nineteenth century.

b) The return of Changara *c.* 1794 to *c.* 1806

The return of Changara to the Mutapa's throne for the period *c.* 1794 to *c.* 1806 brought the political instability of the latter half of the eighteenth century to a close and introduced about 12 years of relative peace. But the rule of Changara saw some other problems. To begin with, a severe drought struck the whole of Zambezia, including Zimbabwe, with devastating consequences for a period of about five years, *c.* 1795–1800. In the Rozvi empire it helped to loosen the emperor's control, set in motion the fragmentation of the state, led to the assassination of one emperor, usurpation by another, and sowed the seeds for the destruction of the state itself.[103] In the lower Zambezi valley it led to the slowing down of trading activities and the impoverishment of many traders.[104] Chidima suffered the same drought. The second major event was the attack on Zumbo–Mukariva by Chief Mburuma in 1804 and its abandonment by the Portuguese. This meant that few, if any, Portuguese traders passed through Chidima on their way to and from Zumbo–Mukariva with the result that revenue from tolls and tariffs was much reduced for Changara.[105] To compound the economic problems of the period for the Mutapa, the Portuguese traders became increasingly more interested in the slave trade than in the gold or ivory trade. Both Chidima and Dande suffered from the ravages of slave hunters.[106]

Because of the difficulties associated with the period, the Mutapa–

Portuguese relations were adversely affected. For example, in 1795, the settlers and governor of the Rivers of Sena, João de Souza e Britto, took some retaliatory measures against Mutapa Changara for breaches of treaties of friendship which required that he should provide safe passage to the Portuguese traders on their way to Zumbo and the interior of '*Muzezuro*' (Zezuru country). They accused the Mutapa of robbing the trade goods belonging to Dionízio de Araújo Bragança, a commandant of Tete. The Portuguese claimed that the robbing of Bragança was most uncalled for since Bragança had in fact paid the Mutapa a larger amount of road tolls than was demanded by custom. Furthermore, one of Changara's princes had harassed and robbed some Zumbo traders with the full knowledge of Changara himself. Since the Portuguese felt that they did not possess sufficient forces to confront Changara they decided that the only way to punish him was to suspend any further trade dealings with him and to stop the annual present (*presídio*) until full compensation had been paid. All the traders were given two months (January and February) to wind up any business contacts they had with the Mutapa and his people. Suspension of trade was regarded as a severe form of reprisal.[107]

Mutapa Changara responded quickly to the situation as soon as he was appraised of the Portuguese moves. He sent envoys to Tete to assure the Portuguese that he fully appreciated the reasons for their proposed actions and agreed with the response as being entirely justified under the circumstances. He promised to give full restitution. He ordered the prince who had robbed the Zumbo traders to return all the goods he had stolen to them. This was done. Changara also sent a few tusks of ivory and pieces of cloth as part of his attempt to give restitution for the loss suffered by Dionízio de Araújo Bragança. Although Britto felt that Changara should be forced to make full restitution to Bragança before full friendly relations could be resumed, he was prevailed upon by a majority of the traders at Tete that he should lift the ban on trading with the Mutapa. The only dissenting vote on this issue was that of Bragança who felt the prohibition should continue. The traders of Tete pointed out that Changara had gone a very long way – further than most Mutapas ever did – in trying to meet the Portuguese complaints. There was no point in trying to squeeze the last drop out of him. Besides the ban was hurting the traders badly seeing that the trade of the Rivers was already much reduced for other reasons. The Portuguese were in fact suffering more than Changara as

a result of the boycott. Under these circumstances it was agreed to lift the ban.[108]

In spite of Changara's willingness to placate the Portuguese by paying part of the compensation for Bragança's goods, it is not clear that he himself had ever sanctioned such robberies. Captain-major Pedro Diniz of Zumbo disagreed with the above accusations against Changara and suggested that the insults and robberies were perpetrated by chiefs and princes who were opposed to Changara's succession. Those marauders infested the region between Chikova and the Musengezi river, plundering and wandering about without any fixed abode. Mutapa Changara, he asserted, had tried his best to help the traders by sending his envoys to escort the traders and their goods but the rebels showed no respect for them. True, for providing the escort, Changara had demanded '*horrorozo sag.te*' (horrendous payment, ie huge present) and much trade goods had to be paid to placate the rebels, especially Bangoma. But the payment of such a heavy protection fee should not be equated with robbery.[109]

The fact that old Changara may not have been himself a robber does not mean that he was beyond employing bullying tactics against the Portuguese. For example, in 1797 he took a hard line against a Portuguese mission led by the captain-major of the *zimbabwe* which had brought him his *presídio*. After 15 days on the road, during which heavy rains[110] threatened the lives of the team, Captain Joaquim Jozé de Oliveira arrived at Changara's *zimbabwe* sometime in March. He and his men found the old man Changara drunk and in a foul mood. The latter told them that their *presídio* was quite inadequate. However they waited for four days in the hope that perhaps after sobering up he would take a more accommodating attitude but the old man refused to receive their presents and instead told his grandees to inform the mission that he was not prepared to receive the *presídio* until a carpet, a chair and some more cloth had been added to it. He reminded them that he had been emperor for very many years[111] and knew very well how much he was entitled to. He decided to hold the Portuguese team at his *zimbabwe* while his grandees descended on Tete for the additional items.[112] According to Governor Lacerda e Almeida, Changara, whom he described as an 'indolent and drunk kaffir', was so mischievous on that occasion that he enquired of Captain Oliveira if the women at Tete still get pregnant. When the latter replied affirmatively, it is said that the old man Changara retorted

that he had his doubts about that, since he realized that there were no men at Tete, the insinuation being that the Portuguese at Tete were cowards.[113] Oliveira pleaded with the governor that if his captive team was to be released 'from this inferno' and 'from the talons of this dragon', he should send the carpet, chair and additional cloth soonest.[114]

Even more bothersome than Changara to the Portuguese traders during this time were the other rulers of the region. Among some of these latter culprits may be cited such worthies as former Mutapa Bangoma, Prince Chivhenge, and chiefs Nyapende and Pangura.[115]

It is said that in 1801, ten chiefs and princes were found along the Zambezi from Chikova to Zumbo. One of these was Prince Bangoma, described as one of the two Mutapas then living six days down the river from Zumbo.[116] This confirms that this Bangoma was the very Bangoma successor to Ganyambadzi and son of Mutapa Debwe Mupunzagutu. It is alleged that Prince Chivhenge and Chiefs Pangura, Nyapende, and Mburuma of Zambia and even *mhondoro* Nebedza sometimes formed alliances to destroy the Portuguese market town of Zumbo.[117] In the end, Zumbo was destroyed by Mburuma in 1804. Perhaps Bangoma's action against the Portuguese in 1803 best illustrates how problems arose. In January 1803 Bangoma decided to hold up the Portuguese trade goods from *Mukariva do Zumbo* to Tete. The hold up took place at Chikova. The reason for this action was that the Tete settlers were in the habit of ill-treating the *vanyai* of Bangoma, a case in point being the shabby way they had treated Chikukura (*Chicucura*), an envoy of his and a nephew to Chief Nyapende. Chikukura had been arrested by João Bauptista Octaviano dos Reis Moreira. On another occasion, one other envoy of Bangoma was arrested by Joaquim Carveiro Correa. For these *milando* Bangoma demanded reparations. After some negotiations Bangoma was persuaded to release the goods and allow them to proceed to Tete while arrangements were made for some compensation to be paid. Bauptista Octaviano in fact quickly paid the *milando* demanded.[118]

Yet, all the harassment notwithstanding, when Chief Mburuma attacked and destroyed Zumbo in 1804, thereby forcing a stoppage in trading activities, it was none other than Prince Chivhenge, Chiefs Nyapende and Pangura as well as *mhondoros* Nebedza and Samarengo who sent their envoys to Tete to ask the Portuguese authorities to reopen trading relations with their lands, thereby showing just how

much they also shared in and depended on the trading commonwealth of Zambezia.[119]

c) Mutapa Chifombo vs. Governor Truão

Although we do not know precisely when Changara's reign came to a close, we know for certain that in 1804 he was still there because during that year the Portuguese sent the annual present to him.[120] However, it is clear that by May 1806 his rule had come to an end and Bangoma Mutuwa (*Mutua*) was the *Mambo* of Chidima.[121] It appears that Lt Governor António Norberto de Villas Boas Truão was made privy and in fact consented to Bangoma's plans to take over the throne of Chidima.[122] However Bangoma's reign seems to have been abruptly brought to an end by one Utiora, who, because of old age, did not rule for very long.[123] Utiora was succeeded in 1806 or 1807 by Chifombo, a son of former Mutapa Changara.[124] Chifombo is best remembered as the man who defeated and executed Lt Governor António Norberto de Villas Boas Truão in 1807. Truão was a relative newcomer to Zambezia and according to Gamitto he was completely 'ignorant of the usages and customs of the country'. In addition, 'he was endowed with austerity of character, and inclined to inflexibility'.[125]

It is said that on 20 October 1807 he set out for Chikova in search of one Portuguese trader, Jozé Felix Rocha, who had run away with some of his trade goods. Rocha was thought to be hiding in the lands of Chief Chimatanga in Maravi country opposite to Chikova. Attempts to persuade Chimatanga to apprehend Rocha had failed.[126] Truão marched in search of Rocha at the head of a poorly-equipped Portuguese army that carried cases full of biscuits instead of ammunition.[127] On its way to Chikova the army passed through some four villages where the *matsanza* (*masanza*) of dead Mutapas were located. Under normal circumstances to pass through such villages was an offence for which a *milando* had to be paid. But Truão not only passed through the villages but also, allegedly on the advice of one Captain António Jozé da Cruz, ordered that the villages be burnt down. Such desecration of places so sacred to the Mutapa and his people was, in the eyes of the people, sacrilege of the highest order for which blood, of man and/or beast, had to be spilt to assuage the spirits or else the dead ancestors (*midzimu*) would smite the nation with all manner of disasters. This apparently unprovoked act of Truão was, in part, to cost him his head.[128] As if that was not by itself a sufficiently grave act, Truão is said to have seized a son (relative?) and some

women of the Mutapa, thrown them in chains, and forced them to transport stones for him. He ill-treated them and subjected them to much cruelty even after he had been offered a ransom of ten tusks of ivory to release them. In spite of such outrages, Chifombo claims that he was still reluctant to punish Truão but the *mhondoro*, as the mouthpiece of the *vox populi*, forced him to march on Chikova with his army. He suggests that his intention in marching on Chikova was merely to ask Truão why he had acted in such an unfriendly way against him. But before he reached Chikova he sent ahead an embassy led by one Prince Utiora to assure Truão that the Mutapa was following with an army not to make war on him but to find out the reason why the governor had treated his people in such a shabby manner. It is said that when Utiora's (*Otoyora*) embassy delivered its message to Captain António Jozé da Cruz (Bereko) who was guiding Truão's army, da Cruz answered them by shooting one of the envoys and heaping insults on the Mutapa.[129]

Chifombo replied by declaring war on Truão. He ordered his men to attack the latter's army but not to kill Truão or anyone else they could capture alive.[130] It is said that on the morning of 8 November 1807, Truão and his men were already preparing to cross the Zambezi into the Maravi country when they were suddenly attacked by a force of *vanyai* exaggeratedly said to have numbered about 50 000 men. Truão's men not only stood their ground but claim to have inflicted heavy casualties on the Mutapa men and forced them to retreat helter-skelter. Truão did not lose even one man. Some of his men pursued the Mutapa warriors for such a long distance that they could only return the following morning. But those under the command of António da Cruz (Bereko) failed to return with the others. The reason, according to Agostinho Jozé da Cruz, the brother of Bereko, for Bereko's failure to return was that his troops were under pressure from the attacking forces of Mutapa. One Inácio Gomes dos Santos was quickly dispatched to go and relieve him. But Gomes was surprised by what he saw when he arrived where Bereko was. Instead of finding a comrade locked in combat with an enemy he found Bereko and Prince Utiora sitting together on the ground clearly having a tête-à-tête. Gomes returned to Truão to appraise him of what he felt to be Bereko's treasonable action. He advised Truão that under these circumstances he should return to Tete at once. But Truão rejected his advice and instead resolved not to return to Tete without the

platoon under Bereko's command. This was a fatal decision.

Bereko soon returned to report his actions to Truão. He is said to have given what some felt to have been rather flimsy reasons to account for his suspicious behaviour. After explaining the rationale for his actions, Bereko felt confident enough to take part in the discussion as to whether Truão should retreat to Tete. Bereko's position was that to retreat would be disastrous. Instead, he argued, the army must hold its ground. While this palaver was going on, the sentinels suddenly sounded the alarm. The Mutapa's army was back in full force, clearly determined and exhibiting complete confidence in its ability to smash the Portuguese army. It is said they chanted a war song with a refrain which alluded to the Portuguese impotence and lack of ammunition. In this critical situation, instead of Truão asserting his authority and directing his men, the Portuguese commanders resorted to bickering among themselves, each one arguing for his own plan of action. It is said that Bereko used all manner of dilatory tactics to try to persuade the others to follow his own plan of retreat. In the meantime the Mutapa troops closed in on the Portuguese forces and started calling upon the latter, some of whom were already deserting, to return and lay down their arms. Sheepishly they came back clapping their hands and threw their weapons at the feet of the Mutapa's men. Those brave but foolish Portuguese soldiers who dared to resist were speared or axed to death by the *vanyai*. All the survivors then surrendered and were taken as prisoners of war. Among them were Truão and the da Cruz brothers.[131]

The prisoners were brought before Mutapa Chifombo for trial. The Mutapa reprimanded Truão for having burnt the *matsanza*. For this crime he demanded reparations in cloth, beads and other goods,[132] He told him that when those goods were paid he would release all the prisoners and allow them to return to Tete. During these deliberations Bereko was the interpreter. It was agreed that some prisoners and Prince Utiora were to leave for Tete on 9 November to collect the ransom/reparations. As a guarantee that Truão and the remaining prisoners would be well-treated during their captivity, the Mutapa gave them his *rota* (staff) which conferred upon the prisoners the Mutapa's special protection enjoyed by all those who possessed the staff.[133]

But during the night of 8 December a plot is said to have been hatched between Bereko and Princes Utiora and Mukombwe and other influential forces at court to convince the Mutapa to kill Truão

and the other prisoners. Bereko's credentials at the court were good. By virtue of being married to Princess Kasere, a daughter of former Mutapa Changara and a sister to Mutapa Chifombo, he was in fact a brother-in-law of the Mutapa.[134] Bereko is alleged to have told Chifombo that Truão was a very revengeful man who, if he was set free to go to Tete, would soon return with a powerful army to destroy him and his family, enslave his subjects and make himself lord of Chidima. He went on to assure Chifombo that if Truão was killed he, Bereko, would be made Lt Governor of the Rivers and relations between the Mutapa and the Portuguese would improve and flourish. Chifombo then called his *mhondoro* to advise him on the subject placed before him by Bereko. The *mhondoro* endorsed the course of action proposed by Bereko and his fellow plotters.[135]

On the morning of 9 November the prisoners were paraded before Mutapa Chifombo. The latter ordered that Truão should surrender the *rota* to him. When Truão tried to protest and resist, Chifombo made a gesture to his guards who wrenched the staff from Truão. Chifombo ordered that the prisoners now without the *rota*'s protection, should be executed. They were immediately speared or axed to death and their bodies were burnt, as if they were wizards. Only Bereko and his brother Agostinho escaped death. It is said that these two were escorted all the way to the Cahora Bassa rapids by Prince Utiora himself.[136] For his alleged role in the death of Truão and the other prisoners, Bereko was later hanged.

The Portuguese historian Filipe Gastão de Almeida de Eça has raised some very pertinent arguments to challenge the validity of the accusations against Bereko in this whole episode.[137] In the first place, many, including most of those who gave evidence against Bereko, disliked Governor Truão and must have felt a sense of relief when he was killed.[138] Bereko seems to have been a convenient scapegoat because of his connection with Mutapa Chifombo. Mutapa Chifombo had enough reasons of his own to dislike Truão. First of all, Truão admits that he was privy, and even consented, to the succession of Bangoma, a rival of Chifombo. Secondly, on his assumption of duty as governor in 1804,[139] Truão says that he had to send a detachment of soldiers to go to destroy and burn four villages in the Mutapa state where he claims escaped slaves were living. Truão justifies the latter action on two additional grounds: he asserts that some of Changara's *vanyai* had insulted some of the Tete settlers and, secondly, he

wished, through the punitive expedition, to make it clear from the outset of his governorship that unlike some of his predecessors he had no intention of kowtowing to Changara. As a son of Changara and a rival of Bangoma for the Mutapaship in 1806, Chifombo had enough motives of his own not to love Truão.[140] Furthermore, the burning of the *matsanza* of Mutapa was itself a crime for which the death penalty could be invoked.

Bereko's life, and that of his brother Agostinho, may have been saved because of his matrimonial relationship to the Mutapa and not because of any treasonable act of his. However Bereko's son, Nyaude, and grandson, Bonga, both of Massangano, amply repaid the Portuguese authorities for what they did to Bereko.[141]

The death of Bereko was to lead to a break in relations between the Portuguese and the Mutapa state.[142] However the Portuguese had to travel through his lands on their way to Zumbo–Mukariva[143] hence, according to Gamitto, it was only official communication with the Mutapa which was broken, and this only until 1823 when the then Mutapa demanded his annual *presídio* from Col J.F. Alves Barbosa. The latter told his envoys on that occasion that he would only renew the old friendship and send the *presídio* when the Mutapa had returned Governor Villas Boas Truão. It was only in 1826 that relations with the Mutapa were restored. According to Gamitto, after 1826 no other present was sent to the Mutapa until 1841. He goes on to say that although the post of captain-major of the garrison of Mutapa 'continued to exist after Truão's death, the person so appointed never had to live at the Mutapa's *zimbabwe*. The post was by then no more than a sinecure usually granted to a relative of the governor-general of Mozambique.[144]

d) The dream of empire lingers on

Not much more is known of Chifombo's reign after Truão's death. This is so because of the break in relations between the Portuguese and the Mutapa state. However, from the records, it is known that in 1810 there were two princes, Chipute and Kandeya, who were vying for influence in the state. In March 1810 there were reports that Chipute had crossed the Zambezi to attack the settlement of Mixonga at the behest of *mhondoro* Nebedza. The reason for this action is not given. It is said that by then one Prince Kandeya, apparently living at Chikova, had conceded the superiority of Chipute.[145] By June 1810,

Kandeya was so afraid of Chipute that he retreated to the kingdom of Dande and left his rival as lord of Chikova.[146]

The rivalry between Chipute and Kandeya in 1810 may well mark the end of Chifombo's reign and the struggle for succession that followed it. However in 1811 there is evidence that one 'Amutua' was occupying the Mutapa throne. This 'Amutua' could well have been Bangoma Mutuwa, the son of Mutapa Debwe Mupunzagutu and himself a former Mutapa, by then a man of over 60 years of age. It is of course possible that 'Amutua' was in fact a son of Bangoma Mutuwa Whether this 'Amutua' was the same person as Prince Chipute of 1810 is not clear. According to Baptista, in 1811 'Amutua' was harassing the then governor of Tete. In this he was assisted by one Prince Changara who lived close to Tete. The reason why Prince Changara was persecuting the governor of Tete was that he wanted the latter 'to render him vassalage, and send him monthly tributes as the sovereign of the lands.'[147] The reference to Changara here is almost certainly not to the old man Changara but to some descendant of his.

The period from the last reference to Mutapa 'Amutua' in 1811 until the 1820s is shrouded in darkness because the Portuguese, once Zumbo was closed again in 1813, found little reason to reopen diplomatic relations with the Mutapa and his vassals, seeing that by that time Chidima was primarily valued for the transit facilities it provided to the Portuguese traders on their way to and from Zumbo and the Zezuru country.[148] However in 1820 the Portuguese reopened the *Vila* and *Feira* of Zumbo.[149] *Mhondoro* Nebedza and Samarengo as well as Prince Nyamagwete and Chief Gumaguma of Chikova were involved in the negotiations to reopen Zumbo.[150] With the reopening of Zumbo, the Portuguese found it necessary to mend their relations with the *mambo* of Chidima, i.e. the Mutapa. In 1821, the Portuguese sent presents by one Prince Boroma to Prince Kandeya to obtain free passage for the Zumbo trade route.[151] This action did not constitute a reopening of full diplomatic relations between the Portuguese and the Mutapa state. Full diplomatic relations were only restored in 1826.[152] On 26 November 1826, one Bernardo António da Cunha accompanied by some soldiers and Prince Teverere, who had been sent to Tete by Mutapa Kandeya to invite the Portuguese back to the *zimbabwe*, left Tete for the Mutapa's court.[153] It had been such a long time since formal relations between the Portuguese and the Mutapa had been

broken that some confusion crept in as to the customs and practices of the Mutapa and as to how much and by whom expenses for the mission were to be borne. Some lively correspondence ensued. It was even found necessary to seek guidance from the records of 1802 on some of the issues.[154]

The reign of Kandeya was bedevilled by famine, drought and civil wars.[155] It seems that the famine may have struck Sena as early as 1824 and was still ravaging lower Zambezia as late as 1829. This famine is thought to have been part of the triggering-off mechanism for the upheavals that were brought about by the rulers of Barwe, Uteve and some Tonga chiefs during that period in the Rivers of Sena.[156] The Mutapa state was equally affected by the ravages of that famine. The *zimbabwe* garrison then lived at Tete and was composed of less than 30 men, mostly Africans.[157] The post of captain-major, by the 1830s, remained, in the words of Gamitto, 'a sinecure'.[158] But the biggest headache for Kandeya was Prince Dzeka.[159] By January 1830, although the drought seems to have come to an end,[160] Kandeya was forced to abandon his *zimbabwe* and was living in the woods for fear of Prince Dzeka who had invaded the lands of Chidima. Under these circumstances trade into the interior had to be suspended.[161]

Sometime in the 1830s Dzeka succeeded Kandeya I.[162] It is not clear whether this was a peaceful succession or not. Albino Pacheco claims that Dzeka was a weak character whose reign witnessed the Nguni invasion of southern Zambezia. It seems that Dzeka, like the *prazo*-holders of south Zambezia, failed to cope with the Nguni invasion.[163] The Nguni effect on Zambezia was shattering; many *prazos* were abandoned, most *feiras* were closed down, trade was interrupted or stopped, and many societies were uprooted or displaced. Chidima also suffered from the above effects of the Nguni but fortunately, not being good cattle-keeping country, no Nguni group decided to settle in Chidima itself. According to Albino Pacheco, it was during Dzeka's reign that the Mutapa state reached its final decadence.[164]

When Dzeka was succeeded by Kataruza is not clear, but there is evidence that by 1843 Kataruza was already the ruling Mutapa.[165] By his succession Kataruza thwarted the aspirations of the favourite son of Mutapa Dzeka by the name of 'Muzungo' and described by Livingstone as a man who had 'a narrow tapering head, and probably none of the ability or energy his father possessed'.[166] It is possible that

the 'Muzungo' mentioned above may have been Dzuda, a future Mutapa. Livingstone says that Kataruza was 'a chief of no great power' and the only evidence of greatness was his 'having about a hundred wives'.[167] In spite of the fact that Kataruza was 'only an insignificant chief',[168] both Livingstone and the Portuguese who lived in the Rivers of Sena often found it more prudent to obey the laws of Kataruza than to defy them. Livingstone tells us that all the Portuguese traders who passed through Chidima for other places had to pay a levy of 32 yards (29.5 metres) of calico and some other goods to Kataruza to obtain free passage[169] and Livingstone himself was forced to report his unauthorized presence to Kataruza.[170] In the wars of 1853–55, when first the Pereiras and then Coimbra launched attacks against Nyaude of Massangano, Mutapa Kataruza supported the latter. On one occasion when the Portuguese forces were retreating from Massangano, Kataruza 'who had hitherto pretended to be friendly with the Portuguese, sent out his men to capture as many of them as they could. They killed many for the sake of their arms.'[171]

However there is no gainsaying that *Mambo aChidima* or Mutapa Kataruza was in fact ruler of a much-weakened kingdom. His was a kingdom divided into many small chiefdoms, each ruled by a ruler whom Kataruza called a 'son' but each one of whom was to all intents and purposes an independent ruler. Chidima produced little that could be traded, firearms having driven out even the elephants that used to provide ivory.[172] Transit duties provided Kataruza with a regular source of trade goods. But even this source was for a time threatened in the early 1860s. In November 1860 a son of Kataruza seized a portion of the trade goods of one of the Tete traders as, it would seem, part of *chupata* or transit duties. When he was asked to return the goods he abusively refused to do so. The governor of Tete then sent an army that killed the said son and his followers. After that incident the governor told all the neighbouring chiefs that in future the Portuguese traders were no longer prepared to pay *chupata* which sometimes used to cost the traders as much as 25 per cent of their goods. Apparently for a time the traders did not in fact pay the *chupata*.[173] Overall, however, Kataruza is remembered as having been faithful and submissive to the Portuguese.[174]

Kataruza died in 1867.[175] He was succeeded by his own son/relative, Kandeya II.[176] As soon as Kandeya II came to the throne he was advised by *mhondoro* Nyanhehwe (Nebedza) to sever the relatively

good relations that had existed between the Portuguese and Kataruza and throw in his lot with Bonga of Massangano. It is said that Bonga of Massangano and the Pereiras of Makanga listened to and respected *mhondoro* Nyanhehwe. Kandeya II accepted the advice and threw his weight behind Bonga. The Portuguese were alarmed by this and so decided to annex part of Chidima. After the disgraceful death of Governor Gouveia at Massangano, commandant Cunha resolved to castigate Kandeya II. He sent a force of 50 regular soldiers and 'innumerable auxiliaries' under the joint command of Manuel de Sant'Anna and the *muzungu* Ignácio de Jesús Xavier (Karizimamba). In the first encounter the Portuguese managed to fire a bullet through the head of *mhondoro* Nyanhehwe. Kandeya II and many of his followers fled when they saw what had happened to Nyanhehwe. Ignácio Karizimamba was ordered to give chase. He met the fleeing Kandeya II and his people at the river Kangure (*Cangure*), a tributary of the Manzovo river. In the engagement that followed *Canguencue* (Kangwekwe?), the heir apparent to Kandeya II, was killed. After his defeat, Kandeya II lost the lands from Kangure to Tete which were then turned into the *prazos* of Debwe (*Degoe*) and Boroma (*Broma*). The remaining part of Chidima continued to be under the shaky control of Kandeya. It is said that Kandeya II died a natural death in 1876.[177] But *mhondoro* Mutota claims that he was expelled from the throne by Dzuda.[178]

The successor to Kandeya II was one Dzuda, said to have been a son of former Mutapa Dzeka and to have possessed a large army with which he was able to bully others.[179] For a time he was able to harass the Zumbo traders with impunity on the portion of the route.between Tete and Kachombo (*Cachombo*).[180] In 1881 Dzuda was reported to have been making preparations for a confrontation with the Portuguese over certain lands he claimed to be his but which were then under Portuguese control. In readiness for the showdown with the Portuguese he came to an understanding with the new ruler of Massangano, Vitorino da Cruz or Nyamizinga. To seal their friendship Dzuda asked Nyamizinga to send him a chair. The Portuguese were puzzled by the significance of the chair.[181] Yet if they had perused their records they would have realized that in the past a chair was a common present the Portuguese governors used to send to the Mutapa. By requesting a chair from Nyamizinga, Dzuda may well have meant to indicate that he regarded the latter as the new Portuguese authority in the Rivers of Sena.

Statue of *mhondoro* Mbuya Nehanda in the House of Parliament of Zimbabwe. Mbuya Nehanda was a leader of the first Chimurenga War of 1896-7 who was hanged in Harare in 1898. She refused to be baptised and is said to have prophesied the second Chimurenga (Liberation War). Nehanda was the medium of Nyamhita Nehanda, sister-wife of Mutapa Matope, the Great.

But Dzuda's good fortune did not last for long because sometime after 1876 Karizimamba rented the *prazo* of Debwe from where he plotted the destruction of Chidima.[182] In 1883, when Joaquim de Almeida da Cunha travelled up the Zambezi to Zumbo, he was struck by Dzuda's obsession with security. It appeared to him that Dzuda was expecting a Portuguese attack any day.[183] His fears were amply justified because in 1884 Karizimamba and Firmino Luís Germano attacked Dzuda and destroyed his power. In 1885 the remaining lands of Chidima were officially annexed by the Portuguese[184] and Dzuda went into exile. On 10 May 1887, Joaquim Carlos Paiva d'Andrade visited Dzuda at his *aringa* on the banks of the stream Hue and the mouth of the Chisika (*Chissica*), both tributaries of the Fungue.[185] In 1889 the lands of *Mambo* Dzuda were included in the captaincy of Chikova, then under Ignácio de Jesus Xavier and not that of Kachombo (*Cachombo*), formerly Nyapunga, which was given to Firmino Luís Germano.[186]

From his place of exile, first Dzuda and later his successor Chioko Dambamupute tried to organize their forces against the Portuguese. Sometime in the 1890s Dzuda was expelled by Chioko, a brother of Kandeya II.[187] Chioko then set about rallying some anti-Portuguese forces around him. With the support of major *mhondoro* like Nyanhehwé, Chioko built up a broad-based anti-Portuguese alliance which included Chiefs Boroma, Gosa and his own relation, Changara. In addition he liaised with the Zimbabwe resistance leader, Mapondera. In 1897 they attacked Portuguese *prazos* and bases all the way to Tete as well as defeating Karizimamba. By 1900 the patriotic forces were joined by Makombe of Barwe and the forces of Massangano. By 1901 these forces of liberation had nearly turned the Tete district into a liberated zone. Chioko's dream of recreating the new empire of Munhumutapa looked like becoming a reality. He made Mapondera a commander of his forces and men from present-day Mutoko, Mt Fura (Mt Darwin) and north Manzovo in Zimbabwe joined the Chioko forces. Many spirit mediums supported the rising. However Chioko's attempts to revive the Mutapa empire collapsed in 1902 when he was killed trying to assist the people of Barwe in their war against the Portuguese. Chioko's heir, Kamanika, was never able to create the same broad-based alliance as Chioko had done. With Chioko's death, both the dream and the reality of the historic Mutapa state came to an end.[188]

Conclusion

The passing away of the political kingdom founded by Mutota and Matope did not mean the end of all its influence. The role of *mhondoro* Nehanda in the Zimbabwe revolts of 1896–97 has already been brought to light by T.O. Ranger.[189] However, the role of the Mutapa-related *mhondoro* in the FRELIMO and ZANLA liberation of the Tete province and north-east Zimbabwe respectively remains to be investigated. If the frantic airborne-leaflet war by the Rhodesian regime of Ian Smith using names of various key Mutapa-related *mhondoro* to appeal to the people not to support ZANLA combatants is any indication of the importance these mediums played in the battle for the minds, then an equally dramatic role of these *mhondoro* awaits to be unravelled.[190] It is perhaps not without significance that the early co-operation of the ZANLA and FRELIMO forces took place in the Tete province, for here the longest standing institution of Mozambican–Zimbabwean relations – the Mutapa state – had its last headquarters. Nor is it irrelevant that many of the songs of *Chimurenga* (Liberation War), sung by guerillas committed to scientific socialism, evoke the name of *Mbuya* Nehanda or Nyamhita, the daughter of Mutota and sister-wife of Munhumutapa Matope.[191] Other typically Shona institutions like the adelphic-collateral system of succession so beloved by the majority of the Shona polities appear in the records for the first time in Shona history in association with the Mutapa state.

The contribution of the Mutapa empire to the development of Shona music, legal concepts, courtly etiquette and other political, cultural, social and moral ideas, beliefs and practices can at this stage only be surmised.

The Mutapa state throughout its history was never a militaristic one nor were the powers of the Mutapas excessively oppressive. The genius of the Mutapas was in the creation of resilient institutions which accorded with the environment and culture of the people. It is the attachment of the people to these institutions which in part gave such longevity to the Mutapa state; in particular the institution of the royal *mhondoro* cult did, during the existence of the empire, assume elements of an ideology and has, in spite of the destruction of its economic and political underpinnings, robustly and stubbornly lingered on into the independent state of Zimbabwe.[192] As Captain Pedro Barreto de Rezende had observed with characteristic seventeenth-century Lusitanian prejudice and exaggeration,

> These Kaffir Mocarangas [Shona] are so attached to their rites . . . of civil government, that they would lose many lives in their defence, being at the same time more obedient to their kings and lords than any other nation whatever, so that any secret which they are commanded to keep, although it be a public matter, not one will be found to reveal . . . though we have so many dealings with them.[193]

Equally interesting are the empire's impressive contacts with the outside world. This study has traced, in some detail, the multifaceted relations with Portugal, and it was through Portugal that the Mutapa empire became known in Europe. But the international dimension went beyond connections with that country. Map-makers of Europe knew the geographic location of the Empire of Munhumutapa and included it on their maps. It is probably no exaggeration to say that between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries few educated people in Europe would have been unaware of the existence of the lands of Munhumutapa. Dutch and French artists drew their own 'conceptions' of the portraits of the Mutapas and their courts; a French poet, La Fontaine, immortalized the Mutapas in a poem about 'Friendship'. In Rome, a bronze tablet, depicting the baptism of Mutapa Siti Kazurukumusapa, was engraved to commemorate that event, on the orders of the Dominican Superior-General. And in the Arab or Moslem world, the port of Sofala and Mt Fura, whence gold came to the Middle East, were well known, especially before the seventeenth century. Persian carpets were prized items at the Mutapa courts. Indians,especially Goanese and Gujarati Banyan communities, were in regular trade contact with the Mutapa state up to the nineteenth century. We have also read about the sons of the Mutapas who became priests and laboured in that capacity in India (Goa). One of these sons even went as far as China (Macão) and another travelled to Brazil and died there in Bahia.

Besides learning of the material cultures of the peoples they came into contact with, the Shona of Mutapa also learned of the beliefs of some of these people. We know that the present Lemba people in Zimbabwe owe their Islamic observances and traditions to the moslem traders who used to trade with the people of Zimbabwe in pre-colonial times. Portuguse and Arabic words have found their way into the Shona language through such contacts.

Besides its long and wide-ranging relations with the continents of Europe and Asia, the Mutapa state also had important regional or 'Pan Africa' perspectives. This is evident in its relations with

Mozambique, souther-east Zambia and the Marave (Malawi) people. The relations with these three regions were close, both politically and economically. We have read of Zimbabwean leaders in exile in Zambia, Mozambique and among the Maravi people; and of the alliances they formed with some leaders of those countries in order to fight either the Portuguese or their own rivals within Zimbabwe. The lucrative trade in Maravi hand-woven cotton cloth being sold in Zimbabwe in precolonial days has a very modern ring and parallel to it when one considers the realities of the 1980s. It is also probable that, through the Torwa state, Zimbabwe traded with both modern Botswana and the northern Transavaal (South Africa) before the eighteenth century. From the eighteenth century we have definite evidence that this did happen. We know that through the trade of Sofala the Mutapas and their predecessors had important contacts with the sultanate of Kilwa in modern Tanzania. In addition there is a source claiming that traders from Angola may have traded with Zimbabwe during this period. All this suggests a long and deep historical ancestory to Zimbabwe's relations with the countries of the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC).

Present Zimbabwe, therefore, is not merely a 'geographical expression' created by imperialism during the nineteenth century. It is a reality that has existed for centuries, with a language, a culture and a 'world view' of its own, representing the inner core of the Shona historical experience. Today's Zimbabwe is, for these reasons, therefore a successor state. And as successors to all that has gone before, present Zimbabweans have, both materially and culturally, much to build and not a little to build upon.

CHAPTER 9

Notes

1. Abraham, 'Monomotapa Dynasty', 66, 70, 82.
2. A.H.U. Av. Moç.CX. 12, João Moreira Pereira, Tette, 28 January 1766.
3. Mello e Castro, 'Notícia', 131–132; Miranda, '*Monarchia*', 110. The Kamota referred to here should not be confused with the Prince Kamota mentioned in Chapter 8. The Prince Kamota in Chapter 8 who was scheming to invade the *zimbabwe* of Mutapa João or Samutumbu Nyamhandu in 1718 (Vicerov to Monomotapa, Goa, 26 January 1719, *RSEA*, 5, 67) may well have been Prince Kamota Kasekete, the only son of Chikobvora Chihurinyanga, a half-brother to Samutumbu Nyamhandu. Since Chikobvora Chihurinyanga died as a young man it may be that his son Kamota Kasekete was trying to lay claim to the throne on behalf of his dead father's house. In the end he failed to do that but his own son Derere Chihwahwa was able to keep Dande province for that house after the death of Debwe Mupunzagutu in 1760. [Chapter Eight, note 55; Abraham, 'Monomotapa Dynasty', 69. But the Kamota of the 1760s was one of the five most important sons of Mutapa Debwe Mupunzagutu. Abraham, 'Monomotapa Dynasty', 70].
4. Mello e Castro, 'Notícia', 132; Miranda, '*Monarchia*', 110; A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 9, Marco António de Azevedo Couthinho Montaury to Pedro de Saldanha de Albuquerque, Senna, 15 July 1761.
5. Mello e Castro, 'Notícia', 132. The Castro report was written at Sena on 20 January 1763. Since Mutanhikwa was only ruler for one year and as he had taken over the throne by February 1761, it can be deduced that Zezi took over power sometime in 1762. See also João Pereira da Silva Barba, 'Instrucção para por elle se reger o governador dos rios de Senna e seus conquistas ou quem seu lugar fizer', Mossambique, 9 May 1763, *Machona e Nyassa*, 193–194.
6. A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 12, Fr Manoel Jozé de S^{a} Anna to Balthazar Manoel Pereira do Lago, Zumbo, 24 September 1767; Balthazar Manoel Pereira do Lago, 'Instrucção que se deo ao Governador e Tenente General dos Rios de Senna Ignácio de Mello Alvim', Mossambique, 5 April 1767, *Machona e Nyassa*, 204.
7. A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 12, Fr Manoel Jozé de S^{a} Anna to Balthazar Manoel Pereira do Lago, Zumbo, 24 September 1767; Fr Jerónimo Maria da Santissima Trindade to Tenente General Inácio de Mello Alvim, Zumbo, 25 October 1768, *IdFdS XVIII*, 89–92, (1957), 165–170.
8. Balthazar Manoel Pereira do Lago, 'Instrucção que se deo ao Governador e Tenente General dos Rios de Senna Ignácio de Mello Alvim', Mossambique, 5 April 1767, *Machona e Nyassa*, 204.
9. Ibid.
10. A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 13, Ign^{cio} de Mello e Alvim to Governor General, Tette, 8 February 1768.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 13, M^{el} Gomes Nobre, Tette, 18 July 1768.
14. A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 13, Ign^{cio} de Mello e Alvim to Governor General, Tette, 8 February 1768.
15. A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 13, M^{el} Gomes Nobre, Tette, 18 July 1768.
16. A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 13, Ign^{cio} de Mello e Alvim to Governor General, Tette, 8 February 1768.

17. Ibid.
18. A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 13, M^{el} Gomes Nobre, Tette, 18 July 1768. It seems the practice of keeping one *nevanje* at Chikova was still operative.
19. Inácio de Melo Alvim to Governor General, Tete, 3 February 1769, *IdFdS XVIII, 80*, (1954), 123–126.
20. A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 13, Ign^{cio} de Mello e Alvim to Governor General, Tette, 8 February 1768.
21. A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 13, Luís Ant^{o} Pr^{a} Pinto to Tenente General, Tette, 19 July 1768.
22. Ibid.
23. Inácio de Melo Alvim to Governor General, Tete, 3 February 1769, *IdFdS XVIII, 80*, (1954), 123–126.
24. Ibid.
25. Filipe Pereira, Sena, 3 October 1768, *IdFdS XVIII, 85*, (1956), 114.
26. Inácio de Melo Alvim to Governor General, Tete, 3 February 1769, *IdFdS XVIII, 80*, (1954), 124.
27. Ibid., 124.
28. Ibid., 124–125.
29. Ibid., 125–126.
30. Inácio de Melo Alvim to Governor General, Tete, 10 February 1769, *IdFdS XVIII*, 80, (1954), 131–132.
31. Ibid., 132.
32. José Francisco de Oliveira, [Tete SD], *IdFdS XVIII, 84*,(1955), 87–88; Jozé Francisco de Oliveira, 'Lista dos escravos . . .', Tete, 29 January 1769, *IdFdS XVIII, 84 + 85*, (1955), 99–100, 111–112.
33. Jośe Francisco de Oliveira, [Tete SD], *IdFdS XVIII, 84*, (1955), 88.
34. Jozé Francisco de Oliveira, 'Lista dos escravos . . .', Tete, 29 January 1769, *IdFdS XVIII, 85*, (1955), 112.
35. Inácio de Melo Alvim to Governor General, Tete, 3 February 1769, *IdFdS XVIII, 80*, (1954), 123.
36. Caetano Pereira, João Mor^{a} Per^{a} and others, Zimbaué, 18 January 1769, *IdFdS XVIII, 84*, (1955), 97–99.
37. Mudenge, 'Eighteenth-Century Portuguese Settlements', 386–388. See also Chapter 8 above.
38. João Moreira Pereira to Tenente-General, Zumbo, 18 April 1769, *IdFdS XVIII, 89 a 92*, (1957), 178.
39. João Moreira Pereira to Governor General, Tete, 20 February 1770, *IdFdS XVIII,89 a 92*, (1957), 180.
40. Inácio de Melo Alvim to Governor General, Tete, 23 January 1770, *IdFdS XVIII, 82*, (1955), 69–70.
41. A.H.U. Av. Moç.Códice 1332 no. 35 fols 142–148V, Balthazar Manoel Pereira do Lago, 'Regimento e Instrucçoens dos Capitaens Mores do Prezídio de Zimbaoe', Tette, 19 April 1771; António Jozé de Mello to Governor General, Tette, 26 June 1771, *Machona e Nyassa*, 216; João Moreira Pereira to [António Jozé de] Mello, Zimbavé, 2 July 1771, *Machona e Nyassa*, 220–221.
42. António Jozé de Mello to Governor General, Tette, 26 June 1771, *Machona e Nyassa*, 217; Alexandre Jozé Pereira, 'Reposta do Emperador Manamutapa Changara sobre a proposta que Illmo Snor Tenente Coronel e Governador destes Rios lhe mandou por mim Alexandre José Pereyra Alferes de Presídio de Zimbove

a respeito do Rey cego Cariza', Tette, 16 June 1771, *Machona e Nyassa*, 217–218.

43. Manuel Gomes Nobre to Inácio de Melo Alvim, Tete, 9 July 1769, *IdFdS XVIII, 89 a 92*, (1957), 213.
44. Inácio de Melo Alvim to Governor General, Tete, 23 January 1770, *IdFdS XVIII, 82*, (1955), 70.
45. António Jozé de Mello to Governor General, Tette, 26 June 1771, *Machona e Nyassa*, 216–217; João Mor[a] Per[a] to Balthazar Manuel Pereira do Lago, Tette, 23 June 1771, *Machona e Nyassa*, 218.
46. António Jozé de Mello to Governor General, Tette, 11 July 1771, *Machona e Nyassa*, 219.
47. A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 14, B[ar] M[el] Per[a] do Lago, Moçambique, 15 August 1773.
48. Ibid.
49. A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 15, Avaristo Jozé Pereira da Cruz to Governor General, Tette, 1 November 1776.
50. Ibid.
51. A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 17, Jozé Alz. Pr[a], Tette, 8 March 1780.
52. Ibid.
53. A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 17, [Alexandre Jozé Pereira, Report . . . Post April 1781]. See footnote 42 for evidence that in 1771 Alexandre Jozé Pereira had the title *alferes* of the *presídio* of Mutapa. From the document cited in note 42 and the one quoted here it is clear that this man paid particular attention to details and understood the Mutapa politics and culture as few other Portuguese did.
54. Ibid.
55. It seems that Pereira is using the term 'buffoon' here in a derogatory sense and not as a technical term to describe a functionary at a Mutapa's *zimbabwe* as in Chapter 3 above. As will become clear later, Pereira had cause to dislike councillor/ambassador Mukonowafumo.
56. Pereira's Report, op. cit.
57. Ibid.
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid.
60. Ibid; A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 17, [N.D. but c. December 1780], 'Proposta, q'Escr.[m] do Zimbavé ha de fazer ao Imperador Maonamutapa p[a]a reconciliação da amizade q' o mesmo pertende ter como Estado, e os Muzungos habitantes nesta conq[sta] aqual se reduz em sinco propoziçoens seg[tes] lhe manda fazer o Geral da mesma'.
61. Pereira's Report, op. cit.
62. We have already noted above that the Zezuru chiefs in fact refused to use the old equivalents (weights).
63. A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 17, Ganiambazi, 26 April 1781; Pereira's Report, op. cit.; A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 17, Jozé Alz. Pr[a], Tete, 19 June 1780.
64. Pereira's Report, op. cit.
65. It will be recalled that Ganyambadzi had promised to send a young woman to the governor if the governor should send him the *presídio*. On Monday, 16 April 1781, the *presídio* duly arrived. But Ganyambadzi only sent the *kaporo* on the occasion covered by the present footnote.
66. A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 17, Ganiambazi to António Manoel de Mello de Castro, 20 April 1781. Alexandre Jozé Pereira wrote the letter for Ganyambadzi; Pereira Report, op. cit.

67. A.H.U. Av. Moç. Maço 12, Anon. Also summarized by F. Santana, *Documentação Avulsa Moçambicana do Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino*, Lisboa, 11, (1967), 443–445. For evidence that the document was written by Caetano Manoel Correia at Zumbo after August but before the end of December 1781 see Mudenge, 'Rozvi Empire and Feira of Zumbo', 382–384.
68. An interesting reference showing the special way the name/title Matope was used.
69. A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 20, Anon., 'Artigos de Tratado de reconsiliação entre o Emperador de Moanamotapa, eo Estado dos Dominios de S. Mag^e. F. Nesta parte da África Oriental a que se obriga o ditto Emperador a satisfazer e cumprir maneira seguinte pela ultima convenção e ajuste feito com o actoul Governador dos Rios de Senna António Manoel de Mello e Castro', Zimbaoé, June 1783.
70. A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 21, António Caetano de Souza to Governor of the Rivers of Sena, Zumbo, 5 January 1785; A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 21, António Caetano de Souza to Governor of the Rivers of Sena, Zumbo, 16 December 1784. In the December letter Souza says nothing about Ganyambadzi's death but in the 5 January 1781 letter he mentions Ganyambadzi's death as recent news.
71. Santana, *Documentação*, 11, 443–445; A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 38, V.A. Pereira, History of Zumbo, Mucariva, 28 April 1801; A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 17, Caet^o M^el Corr^a to Tenente General, Zumbo, 24 January 1781; A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 17, Jozé Fran^co de Oliv^a, Tette, 2 November 1780; A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 17, G.B. Coelho de Campos to A.M. de Mello de Castro, Zumbo, 31 May 1780; A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 25, António Manuel de Sequeira, Report, Zumbo, 13 July 1777, copied from a duplicate made by Cosme de Mello dated Zumbo, 18 August 1788; A.H.U. Av. Moç. Códice 1339, fols 211V–212V, Jozé de Vasconcellos de Almeida, Letters Patent of Caetano Manoel Correa, Moçambique, 28 December 1779; A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 17, Jozé Alz. Pr^a, Tette, 8 March 1780.
72. A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 17, Caet^o M^el Corr^a to Governor General, Zumbo, 22 January 1781; Santana, *Documentacão, 11*, 443–445; A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 20, Manoel Jozé G^lz, 'Termo de Adjunto que Mandey fazer com a vinda da Mucaranga e Manamucates do Rey Changara', Zumbo, 1 February 1783.
73. A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 16, António M^el de M^o de Castro to Jozé de Vasconcellos de Almeida, Senna, 17 July 1780.
74. A.H.U. Av. Moç CX. 20, Manoel Jozé G^lz. 'Termo de Adjunto', Zumbo, 1 February 1783. For evidence that some boats had arrived at Zumbo see A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 18, Ant^o Caet^o de Souza, Zumbo, 28 November 1782.
75. A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 21, Manoel Jozé G^ls. 'Folha da finta . . . do Sagoate ao Rey Changara, vestir do seu Principe por nome Utiora . . .', Zumbo, 20 March 1784; A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 21, Manoel Jozé G^ls, List of Expenses, Zumbo, 22 March 1784.
76. A.H.U. Av. Moç CX. 21, Ant^o. Caet^o de Souza, Zumbo, 20 June 1784.
77. A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 21, Ant^o Caet^o de Souza to the Governor of the Rivers of Sena, Zumbo, 13 September 1784. Another letter covering the same events was written by Domingos de Valle on the same date. A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 21, Dg^os de Valle, Zumbo, 16 September 1784; A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 21, Dg^os de Valle, Zumbo, 15 October, 1784; A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 21, Dg^os de Valle, Zumbo, 24 November 1784; A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 21, Dg^os de Valle to Governor of the Rivers, Zumbo, 6 November 1784.
78. A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 21, Ant^o Caet^o de Souza to Governor of the Rivers, Zumbo, 13 September 1784; A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 21, Dg^os de Valle, Zumbo, 16

September 1784. Another copy made by Valle on 24 November 1784; A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 21, Dg^{os} de Valle, Zumbo, 15 October 1784. Another copy made by Valle on 24 November 1784. A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 21 Dg^{os} de Valle Zumbo. 28 October 1784. Another copy made by de Valle on 24 November.

79. See note 70 above.
80. Ibid; A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 28, Jozé Ant^{o} Almd^{a} Bar^{tto} to Governor of the Rivers, Mucariva, 10 June 1793. This document shows that Bangoma was still the Munhumutapa. A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 28, Changara Zimbavé, 22 December 1794. This document shows that Changara was the Mutapa.
81. A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 25, Cosme de Mello and others, Zumbo, 10 October 1788.
82. Ibid.
83. A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 25, António Manoel de Sequeira and others, Zumbo, 11 January 1774. Copy of the above document made at Zumbo on 18 August 1788 by Cosme de Mello; A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 25, António Manoel de Sequeira and others, Zumbo, 25 February 1777. Copy of above document made at Zumbo on 18 August by Cosme de Mello; A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 25, António Manoel de Sequeira and others, Zumbo, 13 July 1777. Copy of the above document made at Zumbo on 18 August 1788 by Cosme de Mello.
84. A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 25, Sebastião de Moraes e Almeida, Zumbo, 18 June 1788; A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 25, Sebastião de Moraes e Almeida to Governor of the Rivers, Zumbo 23 August 1788; A.H.U. Av. Moç. Cx, 25, António Manoel de Sequeira and others, Zumbo, 11 January 1774, Copy of the above document made at Zumbo on 18 August 1788 by Cosme de Mello.
85. A.H.U. Av. Moç. Cx. 25, S. de Moraes e Almeida to Governor of the Rivers, Zumbo, 23 August 1788.
86. Ibid.
87. A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 38, Vicente Affonco Pereira, 'Rellação da Fundação e Estado da Villa do Zumbo e desta de Mucariva de q'o Snor Jozé Pedro Diniz etc', Mucariva, 28 April 1801.
88. A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 25, S. de Moraes e Almeida to Governor of Rivers, Zumbo, 23 August 1788.
89. Ibid.
90. A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 25, S. de Moraes e Almeida, Zumbo, 18 June 1788.
91. A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 25, Cosme de Mello, Zumbo, 7 July 1788; Cosme de Mello, Zumbo, 22 July 1788.
92. A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 25, S. de Moraes e Almeida to Governor of Rivers, Zumbo, 23 August 1788.
93. Ibid.
94. A.H.U. Av. Moç. Códice 1335, fol 271, Balthazar Manoel Pereira do Lago, Appointment of António Caetano de Souza, 20 June 1771.
95. A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 25, Cosme de Mello and others, Zumbo, 10 October, 1788.
96. Ibid.
97. Ibid., A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 25, Cosme de Mello, Mucariva, 5 January 1789.
98. A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 25, Cosme de Mello, Mucariva, 5 January 1789.
99. Ibid.
100. A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 28, Jozé Ant^{o} Alm^{da} Bar^{tto} to Governor of Rivers, Mucariva, 10 June 1793; A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 28, Jozé Sebastião de Ataide, Mucariva, 30 May 1793.
101. A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 34, João de Souza, Mucariva, 6 December 1797.
102. A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 28, Changara, 22 December 1794.

103. Mudenge, 'Rozvi Empire and Feira of Zumbo', 283–329.
104. Ibid.
105. Ibid., 313–322.
106. Ibid; A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 50, Franc^{o} de Paulla Roz Ganhado, Zumbo e Mocariva, 22 August 1808; A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 50, João de Souza, Zumbo e Mocariva, 22 August 1808.
107. A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 31, Diogo da Costa X^{er} [Sena], 27 December 1795.
108. A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 32, João de Souza e Britto to Dom Diogo de Souza, Tette, 20 March 1796; A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 32, Dionízio de Araújo Bragança to Governor of Rivers, Tette, 20 July 1796.
109. A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 38, Vicente Affonço Per^{a} and others, Mocariva do Zumbo, [. . . 1801]. A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 32, Jozé Pedro Diniz to Governor General Diogo de Souza, Zumbo e Mucariva, 21 May 1796.
110. This is an important piece of detail for it shows that the 1795–1800 drought in south Zambezia did have its spells of rainfall.
111. Confirming thereby that he was indeed the old Changara of the late 1760s.
112. A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 34, Joaq^{m} Jozé de Oliveyra to Governor of the Rivers, Zimbavé, 11 March 1797.
113. F.J. de Lacerda e Almeida, *Diário da Viagem de Moçambique Para os Rios de Senna*, (Lisboa, 1889), 30.
114. A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 34, Joaq^{m} Joźe de Oliveyra to Governor of the Rivers, Zimbavé, 11 March 1797.
115. A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 34, João de Souza, Mucariva, 6 December 1797.
116. A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 38, Jozé Pedro Diniz, 'Rellação da Discripsão dos Limites de Villa do Zumbo, e desta de Mucariva, suas distancia, confins dos Reinos, e terras secumvizinhas e Comrespond^{cias} estabelecidas dos senhorios dellas', Mucariva do Zumbo, 30 April 1801.
117. A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 38, Jozé Pedro Diniz, Mucariva do Zumbo, 20 February 1801; A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 40, Jozé Pedro Diniz to Jerónimo Pereira, Mucariva, 4 March 1802.
118. A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 42, Jozé Pedro Diniz, Mucariva, 14 February 1803.
119. A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 46, Jozé Sebastião Ataide, Tette, 16 May 1806.
120. A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 43, J^{oam} Vicente da Cruz, Tete, 2 February 1804.
121. António Norberto de Barbosa de Villas-Boas Truão, 'Plano para um regimento ou Nova constituição economica e politíca da capitânia de Rios de Senna, com todas as observações, e informações necessarias para o referido fim: organisado pelo Governador da mesma colonia António Norberto de Barbosa de Villas-Boas Truão, no anno de 1806', Tete, 20 May 1806, *Annaes do Conselho Ultramarino*, parte naõ official, serie 1, December 1857, 415.
122. Ibid.
123. Pacheco, *Uma Viagem*, 27. See also note 75 above for evidence that Prince Utiora was already active and important in 1784.
124. Pacheco, *Uma Viagem*, 27; A.H.U. Av. Moç, CX. 2, 'Diversos Documentos', No. 37, fol 4, Joaquim Carlos Paiva de Andrade, 11 June 1887.
125. A.C.P. Gamitto, *King Kazembe* (Trans. Ian Cunnison), Lisboa, 2, (1960), 176.
126. P.G. de Almeida de Eça, *História das Guerras No Zambeze: Chicoa e Massangano*. Lisboa, 1,(1953), 88–90, 97, 418.
127. Ibid., 97–98; Gamitto, *King Kazembe, 11*, 176.
128. Eça, *Guerras no Zambeze, 1*, 104–105, 415.

129. Ibid., 418–419.
130. Ibid., 419.
131. Ibid., 108–112.
132. Ibid., 112, 113, 114.
133. Ibid., 113.
134. A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 2, 'Diversos Documentos', no. 37 fol 4, Joaquim Carlos Paiva de Andrade, 11 June 1887.
135. Eça, *Guerras no Zambeze, 1*, 114–115, 419–420.
136. Ibid., 116, 420.
137. Ibid., 123, 174, 394–395.
138. R.F. Burton (ed & trans.), *The Lands of Cazembe* (New York, 1966), 237.
139. Eça, *Guerras no Zambeze, 1*, 82.
140. A.N. de B. de Villas-Boas Truão, 'Plano para um Regimento', 415.
141. Newitt, *Portuguese Settlement on the Zambesi*, 251–274.
142. Gamitto, *King Kazembe, 11*, 176; A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 48, João de Souza to Governor of Rivers, Zumbo e Mucariva, 2 January 1808; A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 50, João de Souza to Governor of the Rivers, Zumbo e Mocariva, 22 August 1808.
143. A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 56, João de Souza to Governor of the Rivers, 27 July 1812; A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 52, João de Souza to Governor of Rivers, Zumbo e Mocariva, 1 March 1809.
144. Gamitto, *King Kazembe, 11*, 175, 176.
145. A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 54, João de Souza to Governor of Rivers, 12 March 1810.
146. A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 54, João de Souza to Governor of Rivers, 3 June 1810; Eça, *Guerras no Zambeze, 1*, 431.
147. Burton, *Lands of Cazembe*, 237.
148. Truão, 'Plano para um Regimento', 415.
149. Mudenge, 'Rozvi Empire and Feira of Zumbo', 322–325.
150. A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 66, Francisco Pereira Coutinho de Velharia to Rodrigo J. de Sa Aboim, Tette, 19 January 1820.
151. A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 72, José dos Santos Reis to José Francisco Alves Barbosa, 2 March 1821. The fact that Kandeya was working with a Prince Boroma strengthens our speculation that the Changara of 1811 harassing the governor of Tete may well have been this same Kandeya.
152. Gamitto, *King Kazembe, 11*, 176; A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 77, Camillo J^{se} de Limas to J. da Costa Cardozo, Tette, 8 November 1826. (There are two other letters of same date by the same writer addressed to Bernardo António da Cunha, Capitão mor for the *zimbabwe* of Kandeya); A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 77, Camillo J^{se} de Limas to Bernardo António da Cunha, Tette, 9 November 1826; A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 77, Fran^{co} J^{oam} da Costa Xavier to Francisco Henriques, Tette, 27 November 1826; A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 77, Francisco João da Costa Xavier, 31 December 1826.
153. A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 77, Fran^{co} J^{oam} da Costa Xavier to Francisco Henriques, Tette, 27 November 1826; A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 77, Francisco João da Costa Xavier, 31 December 1826.
154. Same as note 152 above minus document dated 31 December 1826.
155. Santana, *Documentação, 1*, 482, 518–519, 681.
156. Ibid., 963.
157. Ibid., 968.
158. Gamitto, *King Kazembe, 11*, 176.
. Santana, *Documentação, 1*, 519; Santana, *Documentação*, 11, 330, 572.

160. Santana, *Documentação, 11*, 572, 573.
161. Ibid., 572; A.H.U. Av. Moç. Códice 1468 fol 29V, Manoel Joaq^{m} Mendes de Vasconcellos Carne to Paulo J^{se} Miguel de Britto.
162. Pacheco, *Uma Viagem*, 27; Sousa e Silva, *Distrito de Tete*, 39, 48.
163. Pacheco, op. cit. 27.
164. Pacheco, *Uma Viagem*, 27; A.H.U. Av. Moç. Correspondencia de Governadores, Maço 1, 2ª Secção, sala 12 no 1283, Izedr^{o} Manoel de Carrazedo to Governor General, Moçambique, 17 October 1843; A.H.U. Av. Moç. Corresp. de Govern, Maço 6, 2ª Secção, sala 12, Visconde de Sá da Bandeira, 6 November 1838; A.H.U. Av. Moç. Corresp. de Govern. Maço 4, 2ªSeccão, sala 12, Joaquim Pereira Marinho, 'Relatorio em rezumo do estado em que se achava Moçambique em Março de 1840', Moçambique, 24 September 1840; A.H.U. Av. Moç. Corresp. de Govern. Maço 4, 2ª secção, sala 12, António Francisco Cardoso and others to Ministro e Secretario d' Estado dos Negócios da Marinha e Ultramar, Moçambique, 30 January 1840.
165. Arquivo Histórico Moçambique, Códice 2–438, Fd 6. fol 45, João de Nunes Andrade to Domingos Jozé Gomes de Araújo, 17 August 1843 quoted in A.F. Isaacman, *The Tradition of Resistance in Mozambique* (London, 1976), 205.
166. Livingstone, *Researches*, 687; Souza e Silva, *Tete*, 48.
167. Livingstone, *Researches*, 660.
168. Ibid.
169. Ibid., 687.
170. Ibid., 671.
171. Ibid., 676–677.
172. Miguel Augusto de Goveia, 'Observações feitas em Tete ácerca dos Ensaios sobre o Estatística das Possessões Portuguezas no Ultramar por Francisco Maria Bordalo', Livro 4, Tete, 15 July 1862, in *Annaes do Conselho Ultramarino*, Parte Naõ Official, serie IV, September 1863, 94.
173. António Tavares de Almeida to Acting Secretary General, Tete, 2 January 1862, *Ann. do C. Ult.* – Parte Não Off. – serie IV, September 1863, 89.
174. A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 2, 'Diversos Documentos', Joaquim Carlos Paiva de Andrade, 'Expedičao de Sofala', no 37 fol 1, 11 June 1887.
175. Sousa e Silva, *Tete*, 48, 187.
176. Ibid., 48; A.H.U. Av. Moç. CX. 2, 'Diversos Documentos', Joaquim Carlos Paiva de Andrade, 'Expedição de Sofala', no 37 fol 1, 11 June 1887.
177. Sousa e Silva, *Tete*, 48; Joaquim Carlos Paiva de Andrade, 'Expedição de Sofala', op. cit. fols 1–6.
178. Abraham, 'Monomotapa Dynasty', 71.
179. Ibid; Sousa e Silva, *Tete*, 48; Joaquim Carlos Paiva de Andrade, 'Expediçaõ de Sofala', op. cit. fol 6.
180. Joaquim Carlos Paiva de Andrade, 'Expedição de Sofala' no 37 fol 6; no 35 fol 4.
181. A.H.U. Av. Moç. 1ª Repartição, Maço 1, sala 12, Francisco António Pinheiro Bayaõ to Secretary General, Tete, 31 July 1881; Jozé d'Almeida d'Avila to Secretary General, Quilimane, 15 September 1881; Francisco António Pinheiro Bayaõ to Secretary General, Tete, 11 August 1881; and Visconde de Paço de Arcos to Secretary of State for Trade, Navy and Overseas, Moçambique, 20 August 1881.
182. Newitt, *Portuguese Settlements on the Zambesi*, 306, 308.
183. Joaquim de Almeida da Cunha, 'Relatorio do secretario geral', Moçambique, 31 October 1883, *Machona e Nyassa*, 373.

184. Luíz Joaquim Vieira Braga, 'Território de Zuda "Zumbo",' Tete, 12 November 1885, in *Termos de Vassalagem nos Territorios de Machona, Zambezia e Nyassa 1858 a 1889* (Lisboa, 1890), 35.
185. Joaquim Carlos Paiva de Andrade, 'Expedição de Sofala', op. cit. no 35 fol 4.
186. José de Almeida, 'Portaria provincial de 13 de abril de 1889', Moçambique, 13 April 1889, *Machona e Nyassa*, 328–329.
187. Abraham, 'Monomotapa Dynasty', 71.
188. Ibid; Isaacman, *Tradition of Resistance*, 138–140.
189. T.O. Ranger, *Revolt in Southern Rhodesia*, 209–212.
190. Frederikse, *None But Ourselves: masses vs. media in the making of Zimbabwe* (Harare, 1982), 130, 131.
191. A.J.C. Pongweni, *Songs that Won the Liberation War* (Harare, 1982), 51–52, 54; D. Martin and P. Johnson, *The Struggle for Zimbabwe: the Chimurenga War* (Harare, 1981), 1–34.
192. G.K. Garbett, 'Religious Aspects of Political Succession among the Valley Korekore (N. Shona)', 137–170; J. Friedman, 'Tribes, States, and Transformations, in M. Bloch (ed), *Marxist Analysis in Social Anthropology*, (London 1975), 171–178.
193. Rezende, 'Estado da India', 416.

Les Deux Amis

Deux vrais amis vivaient au Monomotapa :
L'un ne possédait rien qui n'appartînt à l'autre :
  Les amis de ce pays-là
  Valent bien dit-on ceux du nôtre.
Une nuit que chacun s'occupait au sommeil,
Et mettait à profit l'absence du Soleil,
Un de nos deux Amis sort du lit en alarme :
Il court chez son intime, éveille les valets :
Morphée avait touché le seuil de ce palais.
L'Ami couché s'étonne, il prend sa bourse, il s'arme;
Vient trouver l'autre, et dit : Il vous arrive peu
De courir quand on dort; vous me paraissiez homme
A mieux user du temps destiné pour le somme :
N'auriez-vous point perdu tout votre argent au jeu?
En voici. S'il vous est venu quelque querelle,
J'ai mon épée, allons. Vous ennuyez-vous point
De coucher toujours seul? Une esclave assez belle
Était à mes côtés : voulez-vous qu'on l'appelle?
— Non, dit l'ami, ce n'est ni l'un ni l'autre point :
  Je vous rends grâce de ce zèle.
Vous m'êtes en dormant un peu triste apparu;
J'ai craint qu'il ne fût vrai, je suis vite accouru.
  Ce maudit songe en est la cause.
Qui d'eux aimait le mieux, que t'en semble, Lecteur?
Cette difficulté vaut bien qu'on la propose.
Qu'un ami véritable est une douce chose.
Il cherche vos besoins au fond de votre coeur;
  Il vous épargne la pudeur
  De les lui découvrir vous-même.
  Un songe, un rien, tout lui fait peur
  Quand il s'agit de ce qu'il aime.

Two Friends

Two good friends were living in Monomotapa:
What belonged to one, the other also had it:
  Friends in that country
  Are just as good as friends in ours.
One night when both were asleep,
And took advantage of the sun's absence,
One of them got up in alarm:
Went to his friend, woke up the servants:
For Morpheus had set upon the house.
The friend in his bed is amazed, he takes his purse, grabs a weapon;
Finds the other one and says: it seldom happens
That one runs whilst sleeping; you seemed a man
To make proper use of time devoted to sleep:
All your fortune have you lost gambling?
Here is my money. Have you got into a quarrel?
Here is my sword. Let's go. Are you bored
Of always sleeping alone? Some pretty woman
Was by my side. Should we call her?
  No, said the other, it is none of this:
  I am grateful for this zeal of yours.
I dreamed you were rather sad;
I thought you really were and came at once.
  This stupid dream is just to blame.
Which of the two was the better friend? What says you reader?
This question is worth to be asked.
A true friend is indeed such a pleasant thing.
He will look for your needs deep in your heart;
  He will spare your feelings
  By not letting you disclose those needs yourself.
  Of a dream, of any little thing he will be frightened,
  Whenever it concerns the one whom he loves.

Mutapa List & Reigns

1.	Mutota [Nemassengere?]	c1400
2.	Nemangoro	?
3.	Matope (Nebedza or Nyanhehwe)	?
4.	Mavhura Maombwe	?
5.	Nyahuma Mukombero	? – c1490
6.	Changamire [Togwa]	c1490 – c1493/4
7.	Chikuyo Chisamarengu	c1493/4 – c1530
8.	Neshangwe Munembire	c1530 – c1550
9.	Chivere Nyasoro	c1550 – 1560
10.	Negomo Mupunzagutu (Chisamharu) [Sebastião]	c1550 – c1586/9
11.	Gatsi Rusere*	c1586/9 – 1623/4
12.	Nyambo Kapararidze	c1623/24 – 1629 1st reign
13.	Mavhura Mhande [Filippe I]	1629 – 1631 1st reign
14.	Nyambo Kapararidze	1631 – 1632 2nd reign
15.	Mavhura Mhande	1632 – 1652 2nd reign
16.	Siti Kazurukumusapa (*Citate* or Chikati) also known as Domingos and *Motota* or *Motata*	1652 – 1655
17.	Dom Afonso (*Cupica* or Kupika or Kupisa)	1655 – 1663
18.	Kamharapasu Mukombwe [Filippe II]	1663 – c1692
19.	Nyakunembire	c1692 – 1695
20.	Nyamaende Mhande [Pedro]	c1695 – 1697/8
21.	Chirimbe (Gende, Ginde) or Nyenyedzi Zenda [Manuel]	c1697/8 – 1702 1st reign
22.	Samutumbu Samutambira Nyamhandu	1702 – c1703 1st reign
23.	Chirimbe or Zenda [Manuel]	c1703 – 1711 2nd reign
24.	Boroma Dangwarangwa [João I]	c1712 – c1712
25.	Samutumbu Samutambira Nyamhandu [João II]	c1712 – c1718 2nd reign
26.	Zinyemba [João III?]	c1719 – ?
27.	Nyatsutsu Boroma [João IV?]	? – c1723
28.	Nyamhandu [João V] Debwe I	c1723 – c1743
29.	Karidza Chisamharu	c1743 – ?

30. Chikoka	– 1744? – ?
31. Kambwe	Pre 1751
32. Debwe II	Post c1751
33. Debwe Mupunzagutu	Post c1751 – 1760
34. Zindove	c1760
35. Kamota	c1760 – 1761
36. Mutanyikwa (*Mutanhiqua*)	1761 – 1762
37. Zezi (*Zeze*?)	1762 – 1767/8
38. Ganyambadzi	c1767/8 – 1768 1st reign
39. Changara	c1768 – 1776/80 1st reign
40. Ganyambadzi	c1776/80 – c1784/5 2nd reign
41. Bangoma (Mutuwa?)	c1784/5 – 1794 1st reign
42. Changara	1794 – c1806 2nd reign
43. Bangoma Mutuwa	c1806 2nd reign?
44. Utiora	c1806/7
45. Chifombo	c1806/7 – 1810
46. "Amutua" (Mutuwa)	c1811
47. Kandeya I	? – 1826 – c1830
48. Dzeka	1830 – c1843
49. Kataruza	?1843 – 1867
50. Kandeya II	1867 – 1876
51. Dzuda	1876 – post 1890
52. Chioko Dambamupute	Post 1890 – 1902

* A usurper by the name of Matuzianhe declared himself to be the true Mutapa and his claims were supported by some people during Gatsi Rusere's reign. If his reign is included then there were at least 53 reigns and not 52.

MUTAPA GENEALOGY



--- Broken line indicates that the suggested relationship has not been proved beyond doubt.

F = Female

1. Last Karanga ruler at Great Zimbabwe.
2. Mazvarira was a sister of Mutota.
3. Nyamhita was married by her half brother Nyanhehwe Matope.
4. Mukombero Nyahuma was one of the sons born of the union of Nyamhita and Matope.
5. From the evidence it is not very clear whether Mureche was Matope's sister or daughter.
6. This was the first Sachiteve of Uteve Kingdom. Like his father Nyahuma Mukombero, he seems to have had a pronounced forehead.
7. The Nguruve Chikanga dynasty of Manyika was replaced by the Mutasa Chikanga dynasty in about 1695.


NEGOMO
MUPUNZAGUTU
CHISAMHARU
(DOM SEBASTIÃO)
MAVHURA
MHANDE
(DOM FILIPPE I)
GWENZI
AFONSO
("Cupica",
Kupika
or Kupisa)
DOM ALEIXO
MUSINYARI
SITI
(Motota
or Motata)
KAZURUKUMUSAPA
(DOM DOMINGOS)
"Citate" or Chikati?
DOM MIGUEL
KAMHARAPASU
MUKOMBWE
DOM FILIPPE II
NYAKUNEMBIRE
KAGATSI
GWEERA
KACHEMBERE
ZINYEMBA
(JOÃO III?)
NYAMAENDE
MHANDE
(DOM PEDRO)
REV FR
DOM JOÃO
da ASUNÇÃO
REV FR
DOM CONSTANTINO
(MAPEZE or
MAPEZA)
CHITOHWA
NYENYEDZI
ZENDA
CHIRIMBE
(DOM MANUEL)
KARIDZA
CHASAMHARU
(ZUNIANA)
BOROMA
DANGWARANGA
JOÃO I
NYATSUTSU
(JOÃO IV?)
MUTUMBI
(KAMBWE?)
NYANDORO
MUKOMOHASHA
NESHANGWE
GATSI
RUSERE
CHIDZONGA
DOM FILIPPE
DOM DIOGO
NYAMBO
KAPARARIDZE
REV FR
DOM MIGUEL
(SAMUTUMBU)
SAMATAMBIRA
NYAMHANDU
(DOM JOÃO II)
NYAMHANDU
(JOÃO V)
CHIKOBVORA
CHIHURINYANGA
KAMOTA
KASEKETE

			SOURCE
			Handley, Memoirs
			[ref. p.?] quoting
			Thomas Lopez,
			Navegantes Viages y
			India (Madrid,
			[illegible] in G B
			Ramusio and Purchas
			Sidney Lee,
			Navigantes y Viages
			Venice. Hereditas
			Chron. 1550), I. f.
			1842.
			Diogo de Alcaçova
			to King, Co bun.
			[illegible] 1498,
			[illegible] 1505
			Handley, Memoirs
			[illegible] p. ?? quoting
			Joao dos Santos,
			Ethiopia Oriental
			Book 2, chapter 14
			Handley, Memoirs
			[illegible] p. ?? quoting
			Duarte do Couto,
			[illegible] do Soldado
			Pinto [1610], ed.
			Henry Lee Lopes
			Ilustres, Sa da
			Costa, 1837), 278.
			Manoel Severim
			[illegible]
			[illegible]
			[illegible]

GOLD EXPORTS[1] THROUGH THE PORTS OF MOZAMBIQUE FROM THE MUTAPA EMPIRE

TIME	*AMOUNT*	*WEIGHT IN KG*	*SOURCE*
1502 (Arab period through port of Sofala)	2,000,000 maticals	8 500	Randles, *Monomotapa* p.79 quoting Thomé Lopes. 'Navigationi Verso le Indie Orientali' (1502) in G.B. Ramusio (ed) *Primo Volume Delle Navigationi e Viaggi* (Venice, Heredi L. Giunti, 1550), l. f. 144r.
1506 (end of fifteenth century through ports of Sofala and Angoche)	1,350,000 maticals	5 737.5	Diogo de Alcaçova to King, Cochin, 20/11/1506, DPMAC, *I*, 395.
1591	200,000 cruzados	716	Randles, *Monomotapa* p.79 quoting João dos Santos, 'Ethiópia Oriental' Book 2, chapter 12.
1610	200,000 maticals	850	Randles, *Monomotapa* p.79 quoting Diogo do Couto, *Diálogo do Soldado Prático* [1610], ed. Rodrigues Lapa (Lisboa, Sa da Costa, 1937), 238.
1667	3,500 pastas (350,000 maticals)	1 487.5	Manoel Barretto, 'Informação do Estado e Conquista dos Rios de Cuama' (1667), RSEA, *3*, 450.
1758 [2]	1,000 pastas (100,000 maticals)	425	Ignácio Caetano Xavier, 'Relação do Estado Presente de Moçambique...' (1758) in *Anais*, 211.
1762	700 pastas (70,000 maticals)	297.5	[Anon], 'Memorias da Costa da África oriental', *Anais*, 242.

1781 (passed through Sena)	31:064 $640 (Reis) (64,718 maticals)	275	
1782 "	37:860 $480 (Reis) (78,876 maticals)	335	
1783 "	39:543 $080 (Reis) (82,381.417 maticals)	350	
1784 "	29:848 $320 (Reis) (62,184 maticals)	264	AHU Av. de Moç. Cx. 33, September 1796. 'Mappa importância das fazendas, marfim, ouro, escravos, e patacas' (1781–1790), unsigned.
1785 "	53:200 $576 (Reis) (110,834.53) maticals)	471	
1786 "	37:130 $528 (Reis) (77,355.267 maticals)	328.8	
1787 "	26:703 $424 (Reis) (55,632.133 maticals)	236.4	
1788 "	31:650 $368 (Reis) (65,938.267 maticals)	280	
1789 "	27:380 $096 (Reis) (57,041.867 maticals)	242.4	
1790 "	30:104 $416 (Reis) (62,717.533 maticals)	266.5	
1806 (through Quelimane then the port for the Rivers of Sena)	6,786 maticals	28.84	Biblioteca da Academia das Ciências, Lisboa, Ms Azul No. 1788 f. 14V, 'Statística da cappitania de Rios de Senna do anno de 1806 por António N.B de Villas Boas Truão', also Ms. Azul 648 No. 16 [Anon], 'Memórias sobre O Rio de Senna 1810 '.
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compiled by Roger Stringer

As there are a great many variations in spelling of the Portuguese names, cross-references have been used from all variants found in the text. Thus, the entry, *Cimbote* (95) SEE *Simboti*, indicates that the variant *Cimbote* will be found on page 95, but that all other references to this person will be found under the entry *Simboti*. Where only one reference is made in the text, page numbers of all variants are given without a SEE reference.

Shona and Portuguese words, other than proper names, have been selectively indexed. Entries and page references are given only to explanations or discussions of the meaning or function of the term. So, for example, references to *munyai* are only given where its function is concerned. Cross-references between singular and plural are not given; these can be obtained from the glossary.

The alphabetical arrangement is word-by-word and subheadings are listed in chronological order, i.e. in the order they appear in the text.

Notes have been indexed only when they add information to the text; similarly, sources and authorities have been indexed only when their works are quoted or their views discussed.

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

Munhumutapa was one of the few African polities south of the Sahara that survived for a very long time. This book is the story of its history as it expanded and then shrank, spanning five centuries from about 1400 until the last chief to use the title died at the turn of the twentieth century.

Dr Mudenge's compelling account of this period examines changes in the political, religious and military structures of the state, its economic base and the court institutions.He puts a firmer chronological framework to the study of precolonial Zimbabwean history

This book is essential reading for students, scholars and Africanists.

Dr. S.I.G. Mudenge, BA(hons) York (UK), PhD (Lon), has taught history at the University of Sierra Leone (Fourah Bay College), the University of Botswana, and the National University of Lesotho, where he became a Reader in history. He was the founding Director of the Institute of Southern African Studies at the National University of Lesotho. He has served as Vice-President of the International Congress of African Studies and is currently its Treasurer, in addition to being President of the Central African Historical Association.

At Zimbabwe's independence in 1980, Dr Mudenge was appointed Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He is now the Permanent Representative of Zimbabwe to the United Nations in New York.

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